cia-uap-003-the-central-intelligence-agency-and-overhead-reconnaissance-the-u-2-and-oxcart-programs-1954-1974

PURSUE Release 03 — THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE THE U 2 AND OXCART PROGRAMS 1954 1974 (CIA-UAP-003)

Source: U.S. Department of War, PURSUE (Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters) — Release 03 (third tranche), published 12 June 2026. Document CIA-UAP-003. URL: release portal https://www.war.gov/UFO/release/03/ · bundle https://www.war.gov/medialink/ufo/061226/release_03/release_03_documents.zip (file: CIA-UAP-003-THE_CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_AGENCY_AND_OVERHEAD_RECONNAISSANCE-THE_U-2_AND_OXCART_PROGRAMS_1954-1974.pdf) Captured: 2026-06-12. Text below is the clean born-digital / OCR text extracted from the released PDF (406 pages). What this is: THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE THE U 2 AND OXCART PROGRAMS 1954 1974. Index/analysis: pursue-release-03-uap-records.

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The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Gregory W . Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach

History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D .C. 1992 Sec,et

♦ Chapter 1

Searching for a System

The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance … 1 Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance … 2 New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance… 4 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft… 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. … 13 Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance … 17 The BEACON HILL Report … 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack … 19 The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel… 21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar … 23 The Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 … 24 The Technological Capabilities Panel … 26 Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 … 27 A Meeting With the President … 32 CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 … 33

♦ Chapter 2

Developing the U-2

The Establishment of the U-2 Project… 39 Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE … 43 Major Design Features of the U-2 … 45 The Development of the Camera System … 48 Preparations for Testing the U-2 … 56 Security for the U-2 Project… 59 The CIA - Air Force Partnership … 60 Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight … 61 Delivery of the First U-2 … 66 Initial Testing of the U-2 … 68 U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK… 72

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Hiring U-2 Pilots …_… 73 Pilot Training … 75 Final Tests of the U-2 … 76 Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 … 79 Coordination of Collection Requirements … 80 Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions … 82 The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons… 84 AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress … 88 The U-2 Cover Story … 89

♦ Chapter 3

U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958

The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath … 94 The Move to Wiesbaden … 95 President Eisenhower’s Attitude Toward Overflights… 96 First Overflights of Eastern Europe … 100 First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union … 104 Soviet Protest Note … 109 The End of the Bomber Gap… :… 111 Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis … 112 Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union … 122 Radar-Deceptive “Dirty Birds” … 128 The New Detachment C … 133 Detachment B Flights From Pakistan … 135 The Decline of Detachment A … 139 Cooperation With Norway … 142 Declining Overflight Activity… 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 … 147 More Powerful Engines for the U-2 … 149 Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 … 152 British Participation in the U-2 Project … 153 The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959 … 157

♦ Chapter 4

The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960

The U-2 and the “Missile-Gap” Debate… 159 The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM … 170 The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing … 177 The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments … 181 The Fate of Francis Gary Powers … 183 Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 … 187

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..‘t’, Chapter 5

U-2 Operations After M ay 1960 U-2 Operations in Latin Ameri ca … … … .. 197 U-2 Support to t he Bay of Pigs Invasion.. … … … … 197 Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 … … … .. 198 U-2 Coverage Duri ng the Cuban Missile Crisis … 199 U-2s Over South America … … 211 U-2 Operations in Asia … … … 211 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 … … … 211 China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 … … … 215 U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet… 216 U-2Cs for Detachment C… … … … 217 U-2 Crash in Thailand … 219 End of Detachment C Operations … … 219 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam … 221 New Detachment on Taiwan … … … 222 Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots … … 230 U-2s in India … … 231 Increasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia … 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H… 237 Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants … 238 … … 240

::-::;—::,-;-:F:::.:-:=—::-r-;~ =-=-=~ The End of U-2 Overflights o ain an China … 242 Peripheral M issions by Detachment H … … 244 Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam … 246 Improvements in U-2 Technology …247 Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment … … … 247 Use of Car rier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site… 249 A New Version of the U-2 … … 251 Replacement of the Orig inal U-2s W ith U-2Rs… … … 253 The Final Years of the U-2 … … … 253 Support to Ot her Agencies … … … 254 Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions … 255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities … … 257

Chapter 6 The U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 … … 260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair … 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design … … … … 270 Efforts To Red uce t he A·12’s Radar Cross Section … 274 The OXCART Contract … 277

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New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART’s Hig h Speed … 279 Designing the OXCART’s Cameras … … .. … … 281 Choosing Pilots for OXCART … 283 Selection of a Testing Site fo r t he OXCART… … 283 Delivery of t he First OXCART … … 286 Changes in the Project Management … 286 OXCART’ s First Flights… … … … … … .. … 288 Speed-Related Problems … .. … … … … 290 New Versions of the OXCART … … … … 291 The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART … 292 Additional Problems During Final Testing … 295 Discussions on the OXCART’s Future Employment … 297 First A-12 Deployment: Operat ion BLACK SHIELD … 304 The End of the OXCART Program … 307 Possible Successors to the OXCART… 312 Summary of t he OXCART Program … 313

♦ Chapter 7

Conclusion U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union … 315 Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram… 319 U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence … … 319 Advances in Technology… … 320 Cooperation With the Air Force … 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the CIA. … 321

♦ Appendix A: Acronyms … 325

♦ Appendix

B: Key Personnel … 327

♦ Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried

by the U-2 … 335

♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, … 337

4 July 1954-1 May 1960 ♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects … … 339 ♦ Bibliography … 347 ♦ Index … 355

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All material on this page is Unclassified.

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FOREWORD

This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita­ tive history of the CIA’s manned overhead reconnaissance program. which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program’s technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi­ cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program, along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the CIA’s work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais­ sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in this study. The authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July 1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program · managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover­ age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt­ ful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation’s potential payoff against the diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2’s em­ ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance programs. Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in­ formation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned

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reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno­ logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national pol icy. For this reason, the program’s history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today. Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of this volume. ln the History Staff’s preparation of the manuscript, Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon­ strated her high talent as a copy editor, and[ [provided staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to more members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume. Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W. Pedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this work. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter­ viewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized. edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be­ come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly benefited from both authors’ contributions, is the CIA’s own history of the world’s first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦

J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff April 1992

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PREFACE When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947, no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime. By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais­ sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non­ military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air Force provided vital support. The Agency’s manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted 20 years. It began with President Eisenhower’s authorization of the U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad­ vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air­ craft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71. Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in­ formation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years

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later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l (strategic reconnaissance) versions. The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number of books, beginning with David Wise’s and Thomas B. Ross’s The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers’ memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael Beschloss’s Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (l 986) and William Burrows’s Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac­ curate, these books suffer from their authors’ lack of access to classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable amount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration ‘s overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows’s broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air­ craft because little information about the Agency’s aircraft has been officially declassified and released. After the present study of the Agency’s overhead reconnaissance projects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the United Kingdom. Chris Pocock’s Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac­ cess to classified documents by interviewing many former participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller on the latter’s excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (l 983). There has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and OXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and Technology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by

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Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O’Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of the Agency’s reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af­ fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and ended the CIA’s reconnaissance aircraft projects. In preparing this study of CIA’s overhead reconnaissance pro­ gram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air Force, contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly impor­ tant for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen­ tation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very sketchy and there are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual reconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews. Both authors are grateful for the assistance they have received from many individuals who played important roles in the events they recount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance of Agency records management officers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance program is also greatly appreciated. To ensure that this study of the Agency’s involvement in over­ head reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors have kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those involving satellites and related interagency agreements, have had to be described in very general terms. The omission of such information is not significant for this book, which focuses on the Agency’s recon­ naissance aircraft. ♦

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1

Searching for a System

THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time oif the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob­ se_ryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better view of the “other side of the hill.” With the advent of dry film, it became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi­ tion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: ’·‘The nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next 1 war.” By World War II, lenses, films , and cameras had undergone many improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster than the primitive craft of World War I. Now it was possible to use photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be­ fore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing afteiwarcl Peacetime applications of high-altitude photography at first in­ cluded only photornapping and surveying for transcontinental high­ ways and mineral and oil exploration. There was little thought given to using photography for peacetime espionage until after World War II, when the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most fonns of communi­ cation between the Soviet Bloc of nations and the rest of the world.

’ Roy M. Stanley II, World War I/ Photo Intelligence (New York: Scribners. 1981), p. 16.

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Chapter 1 2

By I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Sov iet military carried out its planning. production. and deployment activi­ ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities­ bomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weap­ ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory policies, was also largely an unknown factor. Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone, telegraph, and radio-telephone-mo re secure, thereby greatly reduc­ ing the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent secu­ rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents using covert means to communicate intell igence, travelers to and from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re­ port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth­ ods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other methods were available.

Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance Although at the end of World War II the Un ited States had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source of current intelligence on the Soviet Union’s military installations was interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To obtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence community established several programs to debrief German scientists who had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but were now being allowed to leave.~

: A t the end of World War II. th<! Bri tish had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor. mation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and the term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical information. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather intt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later ab­ sorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<! ­ gan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit individuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had worked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the Returnee Exploitation Group ( REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of s,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[ ) he Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service Historical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff.. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S).

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Chapter 1 3

Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in­ formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer. As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and electronic “ferret” equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com­ pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of any accessible targets. These ·‘penetration photography” flights (called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet military response. 3 In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, the Soviet Union extended its “severe air defense policy” to the Far East. In the autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en­ gine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey also reported attacks on their planes. 4

’ A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study RM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, inter­ view by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS Codeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study are on file at the DCI History Staff. ’ Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Morrow, 1987) that “the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this case fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949.” In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did not attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in Soviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer. George, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S).

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Chapter 1 4

The Soviet Union’s air defense policy became even more aggres­ sive in August I952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re­ connaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become a very dangerous business. Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation determined to expand its borders-a perception that had been greatly strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950—increased US determination to obtain informa­ tion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan­ ger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.

New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re­ connaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces’ 67th Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais­ sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential enemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948, Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa­ bility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution cameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu­ nity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951. 5

’ Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington, DC. 19 August 1985 (S).

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5 In Leghorn’s view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the MIG-17. had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet fighters . Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World. This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber­ the Canberra-built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra had made its first flight in May I949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki­ lometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance). which be­ gan flying in March 1950. 7 At Leghorn’s insistence, the Wright Air Development Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marrin Aircraft Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb­ er. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that was stressed to less than the standard military specifications. Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000 feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin­ ing fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modi­ fied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo­ graph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries. Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance

• 13.716 meters. To avoid givi ng a false impression of e:imemely precise measurement.s. original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to the metric system. To convert feet to meters. multipl y by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in knots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. multiply by 1.85. ’ Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage. Secret Intelligence Flights by Easr and West (Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. I8.

Richard S. Leghorn

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Chapter 1 6

RAF Canberra Mark-PR3

division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini·s unit reviewed Leghorn’s design and ordered extensive modifications. According to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special- pur­ pose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnais­ sance missions, for he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance aircraft shou ld be capable of operating under wartime conditions. Pellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn ·s design meet the specifica­ tions for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes, armor plate. and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to reach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights o f the Soviet Bloc. The final result of Leghorn’s concept after its alteration by Pellegrini ·s staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude

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was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952 to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development Planning to the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~ In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the Air Force’s reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol­ lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais­ sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance. Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup­ plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584 (Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to 90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn­ ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn, Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to 65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would not be activated. 9 The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, un­ like Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar technology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of im­ proved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many ad­ vocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft flying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars.

’ Leghorn interview (S). ’ Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U).

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iHret NOFORN Chapter 1 8

The Air Force Search for a Ni:tw Reconnaissance Aircraft With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growi ng, several Air Force agencies began to develop ain aircraft to conduct such mis­ sions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development Command gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine the high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft to give it long, high-l ift wings and tlhe American version of the new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that Richard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year.“’ At about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air Development Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examin­ ing ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with two German aeronautical experts—Woldemar Voigt and Richard Vogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air Force Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft that would combine the high-altitude perfonnance of the latest turbo­ jet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh alti­ tudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought Corporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was serving as assistan t chief of the New Developments Office of WADC’s Bombardment Branch. By March 1953, Seaberg had expanded his ideas for a high-alti­ tude aircraft into a complete request for proposal for “an aircraft weapon system having an operational radius of 1.500 nm [nautical miles) and capable of conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance missions during daylight, good visibility conditions.” The require­ ment stated that such an aircraft must have an optimu m subsonic cruise speed at altitudes of 70,000 feet or higher over the target. carry a payload of 100 to 700 pounds of reconnaissance equipment. 11 and have a crew of one. The Wright Air Development Command decided not to seek pro­ posals from major airframe manufacturers on the grounds that a smaller company would give the new proj ect a higher priority and

’” Phi lip G. Strong. Chic:f. Operations Staff. OSI. Memorandum for the Record. ’” Recon­ naissance Capabilities.” 21 August I 953. OSI records (S). ” Jay Miller. uKkheed U-2. Aerograph 3 (Aus:tin. Texas: Acrofax. 1983). p. 10.

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9 produce a bener aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study con­ tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al­ titude performance of the 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild’s entry was a singl.e-en­ gine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potc!ntial of 67,200 feet; Bell’s was a twin-engine craft called the Modd 67 (later the X- 16), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 feet; and Martin’s design was a big-wing version of the 8-57 called the Model 294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend­ ing designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell proposals. They considered Martin’s version of the B-57 an interim project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more advanced concept from Bell was still being developed. 11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin’s proposal to mod•ify” the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, which submitted an unsolicited design. Lockheed had first become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft competition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who, had recently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed’s Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend and colleague from the Air Force’s Office of Development Planning (more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office symbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suit­ able for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance . Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian official in the Air Force’s Office of Development Planning) that

” The request for proposal. known as ··Design Study Requirements. ldentiticatic1n No. 53WC-J6j07:· has been reprinted in Miller, Lockheed U·Z, pp. 10- 11.

Secret ld0F8RN

Chapter 1 10

Designs for the Air Force competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft

Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft would have co reach altitudes of between 65. 000 and 70,000 feet and correctly forecast, “If extreme altitude performance can be realiz:ed in a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0.8. it should be capable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960.” Carter added, ··To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which will have a reasonably useful operational life during the period before 1960 will. of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary procedures, as well as nonstandard design philosophy.” Some of the “nonstandard” design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the elimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications. and the use of very low load factors. Carter’s memorandum closed with a warning that time was of the essence: ” In order that this spe­ cial aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful l ife, it is obvious that its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that consid­ ered normal. .. 1•1 Lockheed’s senior officials approved Carter’s proposal, and early in 1954 the corporation’s best aircraft designer-Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson-began working on the project, then known as the CL-282 but later to become famous under its Air Force designa1tor­ the U-2. Already one of the world’s leading aeronautical engirneers, Kelly Johnson had many successful military and civi lian designs to his credit. including the P-38, P-80, F-I04. and Constellmtion. Johnson quickly came up with a radical design based upon the fuselage of the F-I04 jet fighter but incorporating a high-aspect—ratio sailplane wing. To save weight and thereby increase the aircraft”s al­ titude. Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of

” Milkr. U1”kheed U-2. p. 12.

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11

gravity (g’s) instead of the mi litary specification strengLh of 5.33 g’s. For the power plant he selected the General Electric 173/GE-3 nonaf­ terburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the same engine he had chosen for the F- 104, which had been the basis 1 for the U-2 design). ” Many of the CL-282’s design features were adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detacihable. Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing- a common saillplane technique-and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other tea­ tures included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15-cubic-foot prnyload area that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL—282’s maximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2, 000-mile range. Essentially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled I er. .~• gl “d Early in March 1954, Kelly Johnson submitted the CL-282 de­ sign to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever’s Office of Development Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Wienberg studied the design and recommended it to General Schriever. who then asked Lockheed to . sµbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson _presented a full description of the CL-282 and a proposal for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s that included Schriever·s superior. Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force. Afterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civi lian officials were very 16 much interested in his design but the generals were not.

Kelly Johnson

The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. in early April by Eugene Kiefer. Bud Wienberg, and Burton Klein from the Office of

” Lockheed Corporation. ··strategic Reconnai ssance and Intelligence … Development Planning Note #I. 30 November 1953 (U). ” Miller. locklctted U-2. p. 12. For more: J.:tails on Kdly Johnson’s original pr,:,posal. see ‘“Profile of CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft prepared by Lockheed Aircrati Corporation. 5 March 1954’” in Helen H. Kkyla and Robert D. o ·Hem. Hiswrv of the Office of Special Activities. DS&T. Directorate of Science an<l Technology Hi~:torical Series OSA-1. 16 vols. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). chap. I. annex 2 (TS Codeword). Th,: 16 volumes of this history contain 20 chaptr:rs . .:ach paginated separately. Future rd,:rcm;,;;s will be shorten,:d to OSA Hiswry. follow<:!d by the rekvant chapter and pag<:! numbers. •· Kelly Johnson Papers. ··Log for Project x:· April 1954. Lo.:khec:d Corporation. Advanced Devdopmcnt Projec:ts Divi~ion. Burbank. California.

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Chapter 1 12

The Lockheed CL-282

Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth, and told the briefers that, if he wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not interested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time.” Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air Development Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues care­ fully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson’s choice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at Wright Field considered the Pratt aind Whitney J57 to be the most powerful engine available, and the de:signs from Fairchild, Martin, and Bell all incorporated this engine. The: absence of conventional landing gear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design.” Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson’s submission was the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force re­ connaissance experts had gained their practical experience during

” C. F. Wienb<!rg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 23 July 1988 (U). ” Miller. Lockheed U-2. p. 12.

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Sect et NOFORN Chapter 1

13

World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre­ ferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with the development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de­ vice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed. Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that two engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation re­ cords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already committed to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for 28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force’s selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began seeking new sources of support for the aircraft.

Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA Although the Air Force’s uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of the Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials contin­ ued to favor the Lockheed design. The most prominent proponent of the Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott. Gardner had many contacts in west coast aeronautical circles because before coming to Washington he had headed the Hycon Manufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena, California. He had been present at Kelly Johnson’s presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon in early April 1954 and believed that this

’” Allen F. Donovan, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar, California, 20 May 1985 (S). ’” Johnson, “Log for Project X,” 7 June 1954.

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Chapter 1 14 design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner’s special assistant, Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary Talbott.~’ According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri­ marily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intell igence. But General LeMay had already showni that he was not interested in an unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA support for the high-flying aircraft. At that rime the Agency·s official involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the A ir Force on the problems of launiching large camera-carryi ng bal­ loons for reconnaissance flights· over hostile territory (for the details of this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong. however. served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in­ formed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.!! Trevor Gardner

Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve lopment Command began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly Johnson’s proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force·s search for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:

Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re­ ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell. … The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of 1,400 nautical miles. … The CL-282 can be manufactured

” Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Wt!lzcnbach . tape recording. Wa.shington. DC. 23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayd”y: Eisenhower. Kltrmhchev and the U-2 Affuir (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79. ” Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that tille even though he was not on active duty. He later ad,·anced to• the rank or brigadier general in the reserve. For S1rong·.~ contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning 1he CL-282. see the Norton interview (S).

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Set1 el NOP’OAN Chapter 1

15

mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . … The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order: Five planes could be delivered for operations within two years. The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor­ mal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. :; Gardner’s enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false impression that most A ir Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de­ sign. (n reality, the Air Force’s uniformed hierarchy was in the pro­ cess of choosing the modified version of the Mart in B-57 and the new Bell X- 16 to meet future reconnaissance needs. During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282 because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence’s newly hi red Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell . Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:”’

Philip Strong

Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be­ fore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud­ ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M IT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. A fter the war, he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 unt il the end of 195 1, when he became a staff member of the Ford Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953, when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United

’·’ Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo Reconnaissance,” 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl. ” Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series OSI- I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS Codeword).

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Chapter 1 16

States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up­ rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: “I know I emerged from that exercise feeling that very little could be done.” This belief would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than 25 human means of intelligence collection. Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became involved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoc­ cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad­ vise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the 0 Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.!

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al­ titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles’s memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met on several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air Force finally turned down in October I 954.!’ Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over­ flight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA un­ dertaking such a project. Few detaiils about Dulles’s precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be­ come involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.

” Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89. ,. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence. from Chief. Support Staff, OSI. ” Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and Technical Collection Techniques:· 13 May 1955. p. 6. OSI (OSWR) records. job S0R-0 1424. bo” I (S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Farmington. Connecticut. 8 November 1984 {S). ” Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Speci,al Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination. from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. —overflight of Kapustin Yar.” 15 October 1954. OSI (OSWR) records, job S0R-01424. bo” I (TS. down­ graded 10 S).

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Chapter 1

17 Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli­ gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage, 1 which relied on agents rather than technology. s At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed’s CL-282 proposal still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To make Kelly Johnson’ s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov­ ernment advisory boards.

SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had played a major role in advising the government on technical matters during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific advisory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek scientific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•

The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be­ cause the Strategic Air Command’s requests for information about targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air

” Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and ’.!0 Septembc:r 198.t (TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}. ”’ For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<’ USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC: USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U).

DC/ Allen W. Dulles

Secret ~OfiORN

Chapter 1 18

defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head­ quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The con­ sultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group. The study group’s chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P. Overhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M. Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation; Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col. Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer. 30 During January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re­ connaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess­ ful) proposals examined by the panel was an “invisible” dirigible. This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted, nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using a large lens to photograph targets of interest. 31 After completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel mem­ bers spent the next three months writing a report detailing their recommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality of in­ telligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified

”’ USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app. A (S. downgraded to C). ” Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985 (U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington, DC, 24 April 1985 (S}.

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Chapter 1 19

document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel­ ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo­ graphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad­ vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report’s key recommenda­ tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:

We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl­ edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten­ tially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it with the maximum amount of information obtainable through aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of detection or interception. 1J

Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon­ naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11 To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili­ tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap­ peared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in the area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than US ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union deto­ nated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech­ nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US

” BEACON Hill Report, pp. 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by Allen Donovan and Louis Ridenour. ” Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).

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Chapter 1 20 scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And, at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen­ sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a menace to peace and world order. The Soviet Union’s growing military strength soon became a threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed out the vulnerability of the SAC’s US bases to a surprise attack by Soviet long-range bombers.-’• Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the turboprops of Russia’s other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel­ ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex­ perts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union’s large numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of 1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlight­ ing the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison bomber featured prominently in such stories. 1;

” RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. ··V11/11aahi/ity of U.S. Strategic Power to a Surprise A/lack in /956, .. RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California: the RAND Corporation, April 15, 1953 (TS. dcclassiticd May 1967).

” “AF Cites Red Bomber Progress,” Aviation Week. May .2-t 1954. p. 14; “Is Russia Winning the Arms Race?, .. US News cmd World Report, June: 18. 1954, ‘pp. 28-19; “Russia Parades Airpower as ‘Big Stick’.” Aviation Week. June .28. 1954. p. 15; “Red Air Force: The World’s Biggest.” Newsweek. August .23, 1954. pp. 28-33.

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Sec, et NOf’Oft~

Chapter 1 21

•.. g,., au£

•

Soviet Myasishchev-4 bomber (the Bison)

..

: … . :-.··~ .’ .

 
The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel
Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison· raised fears
that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that o f the
United States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory
body to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the
BEACON HILL Report-the construction of high-flying aircraft and
high-acuity cameras. Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems
Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL Study
Group: Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the
Air Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represent«!d by
Edward L. Allen of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and
31
Philip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). '
The chairman of the new panel was Dr. James G. Baker. a re­
search associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been
involved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940, when he first advised
the Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses. He then estab­
lished a full-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Hrnrvard
University Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-quality
 
"' Mc:moram.lum for Rolxrt Amory. Jr.. Dt::puty Direclor. lnlelligence from Edward L .
Allen. Chief. Economic Research. ORR and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operation:s Staff.
OSI. "Meeling of lhe Intelligence Systems Panc:l of th.: Scientific Advisory Board.
USAF:· 26 Augusl 1953. OSI (OSWR) records. job 80R-0l 424. bo:< I (S).
 
Seeret
 
Secret l\'JOFOAl\1
 
Chapter 1
 
22
lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing
cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory
moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as
long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at
Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new
head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research
Laboratory (8 UORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not
end with the transfer of the optical laboratory to Boston University,
because he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnais­
sance. 17
The [SP first met at Boston University on 3 August 1953. To
provide background on the poor state of US knowledge of the Soviet
Union, Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best
intelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photog­
raphy taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War [l. Since the
German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the
Urals, primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not
included. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide
up-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force
agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments
and proposed future projects in the area of aerial reconnaissance, in­
cluding new cameras, reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites.
Among the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multi­
ple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and
RB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for "fighter conversion"-for
adapting a giant, I 0-engine 8-36 bomber to enable it to launch and
retrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; re­
connaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles; the high-alti­
tude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by
the summer of 1955; and the search for a new high-altitude reconnais­
sance aircraft. 3~
 
" Baker interview (S). In 1957. after the Air Force decided to cut back its funding of
BGORL. Duncan Macdonald and Richard Leghorn (by then retired from the Air Force)
formt:d their own corporation-ltek-an<l purchased the laboratory from Boston
University (Leghorn interview [SJ).
" :\lemorandurn for Robert Amory. Jr.. Deputy Din.:ctor. lntc:lligence. from Edward L.
Allen. Chief. Economic Research, ORR. and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operations Staff.
OSI. "Meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Scientitic Advisory Boar<l. USAF,''
26 August I 953; Memorandum for H. Marshall Cha<lwell. Assistant Director/Scientific
lnrelligence. from Chief. Support Staff. OSI. .. Review of OSA Activities Concerned with
Scientific an<l Technical Collection Techniques... 13 May I955. p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records.
job S0R-01424. bo:< I (S); Donovan interview. 22 May 1985 !S) .
 
..Sasret
 
See1 et NOFOftN
 
Chapter 1
 
23
 
The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were
all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect
intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be­
yond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying
balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political
consequences.
 
British Overflight of Kapustin Var
The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air­
craft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN,
which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude
reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard
Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in
195 I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the
Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls­
Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The
range of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on
29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.n
Sometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a
high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to
photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad­
vanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli­
gence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise.
Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.")
Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of
1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come
until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study
aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific
Advisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence offi­
cials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23
March 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board
at Langley AFB, Virginia.
 
'" Van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, p. 18; Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff. OSI.
Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting of Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 18-21
October 1953," 26 October 1953, OSI (OS WR) records, job 80R-0 1424, box I (TS,
downgraded to S).
~, Stewart Alsop, The Center, (New York: Popular Library. 1968), p. 194; Beschloss,
Mayday, pp. 78-79. Both of these books state that the project included the CIA. but there
is no evidence to support this assertion.
 
GeeFot
 
Sec, et NOFOAP~
 
Chapter 1
24
 
Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's
Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its
members about the British overflight of Kap~stin Yar because they
were not cleared for this information . The panel did. however. discuss
the modi fications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US
Canberra, the B-57."
 
The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282
 
Allen F. Donovan
 
The next Intell igence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25
May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem­
ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval­
uated the changes bei ng made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft
Company. Even wichout Martin 's specifications or drawings,
Donovan had been able to estimate what cou ld be done to the 8-57 by
lengthening the wings and l ightening the fuselage. He had determined
that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not sol ve the reconnais­
sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically,
he explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built accordiing to
military specifications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly
above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep­
tion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need
10 fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.':
Developme nt of such an aircraft was already under way.
Donovan continued. for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly­
ing aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel t9
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas
on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.
When he was finally able to make this tri p in late summer,
Donovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had. been
seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954. Donovan met wiith L.
Eugene Root. an old Air Force acquai ntance who was n,ow a
Lockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competi­
tion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then
showed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A life­
long sailplane enthusiast. Donovan im mediately recognized that the
 
.,: Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S).
 
Geeret
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 1
 
25
CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain­
ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais­
sance of the Soviet Union successfully: 1
Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with
James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence
Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how­
ever, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24
September 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several
members, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did at­
tend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com­
petition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them.
But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design
for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis­
tened intently.
Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception.
Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re­
quirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane
wing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored
single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli­
able than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could
theoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained,
it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet,
where it was sure to be shot down.
The second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in
technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing). was
needed to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a jet en­
gine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because
of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers esti­
mated that the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6
percent of its sea-level thrust.
Finally, low structural load factors, like those used by transport
aircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and thereby achieve maxi­
mum altitude. Donovan explained that strengthening wings and
 
" Donovan interview (S)
 
Seeret
 
Set1et NOl'ORN
 
Chapter 1
26
wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man­
dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much
weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail­
plane wing.
In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000
feet, but only by making certain that al l parts of the aeronautical
equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. T he only plane
meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's
CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the
CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft
because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters.....
Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel
of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the ·
A ir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and
high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back­
ers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds
to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was
already committed to the Martin RB -57 and the Bell X- I6. Additional
support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282
project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on
high-level advisory committees.
 
The Technological Capabilities Panel
The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned
over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on
the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed
by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack
might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met
with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the Cal ifornia Institute of
Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization 's
Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not
deal ing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise
attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the
Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After l istening to
 
" Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}.
 
~ et PdOfiOP\r\J
 
Chapter 1
27
 
Gardner. the committee members decided to approach President
Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March l 954. the President told them
about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that
these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United
States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of mili­
tary surprise, the President asked the committee to advise him on this
problem.is
T he President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the
most prominent members . MIT President James R. Killian. Jr. , to
meet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston
area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assess­
ment of the nation's defenses. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April
1954, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the
President endorsed the concept.
On 26 July 1954. President Eisenhower authorized Killian to re­
cruit and lead a panel of experts to study "' the country's technologi­
cal capabilities to meet some of its current problems." Killian
quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office
B_u_ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into
three special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive.
and i ntelligence capabilites. with an additional communications
working group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabi lities
Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the
next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa­
rate occasions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings
with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish­
ments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on
the nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members
began drafting their report to the National Security Council.'A
 
James R. Killian, Jr.
 
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was
ready. one of the three working groups took actions that would have a
major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had
 
" Beschloss. MC1ydav. pp. 73-7-': Technolog ii:al C:1pabi li1ies Pan.:I of 1he Science
Advisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Auack. I-i February 1955. p. 185
(hereafter cited as TCP Report) CTS/ Rcs1ri<:1eJ Dat:1. <lowngrnJed to S) .
 
.. Jamc:s R. Killian. Jr.. Spmnik. Scie111ists. and Eisettlww,:r: A Memoir of the r;;_~t
Special Assiswnr to the Pre.~ide11t for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press .
1977), p. 68: Beschloss. ,W<1yJay. p. 7-i: TCP Reporr. pp. 185- 186 (S).
 
Secret
 
Secf@t NOl'OPU'-.t
Chapter 1
 
28
 
Technological Capabilities Panel
 
IThe President of the United States I
Director, Office of
Defense Mobilization
Executive Staff
 
Technological Capabilities
Panel of the Science
Advisory Committee
 
David Z. Beckler, ODM
Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF
 
Military Advisory
_ _ Committee
Lt. Gen. L. L Lemnitzer, USA
RAdm. H. 0. Felt, USN a
Brig. Gen. 8. K. Holloway,
USAF a
Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper a
 
Steering Committee
Administrative Staff
J. R. Killian, Jr., Director
J. B. Fisk, Deputy Director
L. A. OuBridge
J. P. Baxter
M. G. Holloway
J. H. Doolittle
L. J. Haworth
E. H. Land
R. C. Sprague, Consultant
 
William Brazeal
M. Comerford
C. Klett
L Wiesner
E. Hockett
D. _Le_wis
K. Welchold
 
• Constitute military consultant
group.
 
Project 1
 
Project 2
 
Project 3
 
M. G. Holloway, Dir.
E. P. Aurand
R. L. Belzer
S. C. Hight
R. Mettler
E. H. Plesset
W. Stratton
J. West
C. Zimmerman
B. Horton
 
L. J. Haworth, Dir.
E. Barlow
 
J. G. Baker
 
D. Dustin
R. Emberson
A.G. Hill
B. McMillan
R. Rollefson
H. Scoville. Jr.
M.A. Tuve
R. Gilruth
J. L Morton
J. Mouzon
 
Consultant for Technical
Personnel
 
Communications
Working Group
 
E. H. Land, Dir.
J.Kennedy
A. Latham, Jr.
E. Purcell
J. W. Tukey
 
J. 8. Wiesner, Chmn.
G. W . Gilman
H. T. Friis
W. H. Radford
Subcommittee
H. A. Affel
W. 8. Davenport, Jr.
R. H. Scherer
 
Agency Contacts
 
LKacl.We.he.r._e;IA
H. D. Chittim
 
___JCIA
S. R Clements, DOD
 
Sec, ct NOl'OP\111
Chapter 1
29
 
the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capab ilities. Its
chairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fi l­
ter and the instant camera. When James K illian asked Land to head
Project Three, Land had to make a major dec ision about his caree:r. At
the time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on a leave of absence from
Polaroid and was living in Hollywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on
the technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. Land
decided to give up his interest in cinema's th ird dimension and return
1
east to Polaroid and the panel appointmem!
Land's Project T hree was the smallest of the three Technological
Capabilities Panel projects, for he preferred what he called " tax icab
committees··-committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab.
The Project Three committee consisted of Land; James Baker and
Edward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of
Washington University, St. Louis: mathematician John W. Tuke:y of
Princeton University and Be ll Telephone Laboratories : and A llen
Latham, Jr.. of Arthur D. Little. l nc., an engineer and former treasurer
of the Polaroid Corporation:~
 
Edwin H. Land
 
[n mid-August 1954. Land and Baker went to Washington t,o ar­
range for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project
Three study group. As the briefings progressed. the pane l members
became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation' s in­
telligence resources. Land later noted, "We would go in and interview
generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away wor­
ried. Here we were, five or six young men. asking questions that these
high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that the Prnject
Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central
Intelligence Agency.~·1
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly
Johnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the: Air
Force had rejected it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan
 
'' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. C:imbridgc.
Massachusetts. 2 November 198-' (S); Land interview (TS Codcword).
 
" TCP Report. p. 188 (S).
,., Land interview (TS Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
Sec, et NOFORM
 
Chapter 1
30
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the
24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not
realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same.
As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however,
he telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are
after." 50
A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual
drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all be­
came enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker
had heard Allen Donovan ·s brief mention of the Lockheed design in
May, he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan
did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24
September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing
a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51
At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen
Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard
Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas
as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais­
sance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un­
clear to him why he had even been contacted. 51 Bissell's outstanding
academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian
through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access
to DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel
members to consider him the best CIA point of contact.
Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282
project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he
could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954,
Bissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his
staff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance pro­
grams. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF,
on 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's
 
'" Baker interview (S).
" Ibid.
'' Bissell interview (S).
 
iaeret
 
Secret l'<JOFOAN
 
Chapter 1
31
 
attention to a section of the report about a "stripped or specialized
aircraft" called the Lockheed CL-282. 53
By September 1954, Land's Project Three study group had be­
come very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their in­
terest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Allen
Donovan's strong case for the CL-282 at the 24-25 September meeting
of the ISP. It is not possible to determine exactly when the Land com­
mittee decided to back the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been
a formal decision as such. In view of Land's impulsive nature, he
probably seized upon the CL-282 design as being a workable concept
and immediately began developing it into a complete reconnaissance
system.
During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design and the reconnaissance
equipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer
than IO participants; Garrison Norton was often the only government
official in attendance. At times outside experts joined in the proceed­
ings. When the discussion turned to cameras and film, Land invited
- Dr. Henry Yutzy, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard S.
Perkin, President of the Perkin-Elmer Company, to participate. For
discussions on the 157 engine, the panel members asked Perry W.
Pratt, Pratt and Whitney's chief engineer, to attend. Kelly Johnson
also met with the panel to review plans for the CL-282 system. 5~
By the end of October, the Project Three meetings had covered
every aspect of the Lockheed design. The CL-282 was to be more
than an airplane with a camera, it was to be an integrated intelli­
gence-collection system that the Project Three members were confi­
dent could find and photograph the Soviet Union's Bison bomber
fleet and, thus, resolve the growing "bomber gap" controversy. It was
not just the Lockheed aircraft that had captured the Land group's fan­
cy; the plane was seen as the platform for a whole new generation of
aerial cameras that several committee members had been discussing
since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings.
James Baker was in the process of developing a revolutionary new
 
·'·' Memorandum for DOC! Charles Pearre Cabell from R. M. Bissell, Special Assistant
to the Director for Planning and Coordination, "Aerial Reconnaissance,"' 24 September
I954, DCI Records, job 80-B- I 676R. box 25 (TS. downgraded to S).
"' Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82.
 
Sec,et
 
Secret NelFOAN
 
Chapter 1
32
 
camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and
the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight
film. 55
By October l 954, the Project Three study group had drafted a
complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the
CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct
the overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were
not in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime.
Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro­
voke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked
aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission
was the Central Intelligence Agency. 56
In late October l 954, the Project Three panel discussed the
CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of
the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development,
Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the
project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even
ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore, the
DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu­
man operatives and secret communications. the classic forms of intel­
ligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the
impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair
play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced
that technology, particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new
camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems. 57
 
A Meeting With the President
Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did
not stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it
was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President.
Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence
Systems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on
how to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were deter­
mined to present to the highest levels of government. They were able
 
" Land interview (TS Codeword).
" Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).
" Land interview (TS Codeword).
 
Scere~
 
Secret NOfiORN
 
Chapter 1
33
 
to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis­
sioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence
community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct
line to the White House through James Killian's contacts there:
Early in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President
Eisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's mem­
oirs contain an account of this crucial meeting:
Land described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and
recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to
our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower ap­
proved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it
should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not
become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department
or troubled by rivalries among the services. 58
The scientists from the advisory committees and the President
were thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should
be controlled by the CIA, not the military.
 
- ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282
Meanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were work­
ing to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed
overflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly
urging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:
Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think
overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure
that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons
why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force
assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action
and technique that is right for the contemporary version of
CIA: a modem and scientific way for an Agency that is always
supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we
feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in
scientific techniques for collecting intelligence-and choosing
such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present op­
portunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to
start. 59
 
" Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82. The exact date of the meeting cannot
be detennined, but it occurred during the first half of November 1954.
,. Letter, Project Three Panel to DCI Allen F. Dulles, 5 November 1954, in OSA History,
chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Chapter 1
 
34
 
The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com­
plete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the
CL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a
three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for
Comprehensive Intelligence."
Aware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the
Project Three memorandum stressed the superi.ori.ty of the CL-282
program over traditional espionage methods:
 
We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them
go efficiently and safely, and that no amount offragmentary and
indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to
such positive information as can thus be provided. 60
The Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the
CIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air
Force, noting that "For the present it seems rather dangerous for one
of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The
committee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282
rather than an Air Force aircraft:
 
The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of present Russian interceptors and high enough to have a
good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light
(15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military
usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if
through some remote mischance it were detected and identi­
fied_ 61
One additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air
Force's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster
completion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee
that his aircraft would be flying by August 1955, just eight months
after he proposed to start construction. The Bell X-16 prototype was
not scheduled for completion before the spring of 1956.
The strong advocacy of Killian and the other scientists on the
various advisory committees concerned with overhead reconnais­
sance, combined with President Eisenhower's support, finally won
 
"'' Memorandum for DCI Allen F. Dulles from Project Three Panel, "A Unique
Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence," 5 November 1954, p. 3 (TS, downgraded to
S) in OSA History, chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).
•• Ibid.
&eaFet
 
~eeret NOF6ftr<J
 
Chapter 1
35
 
over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the
support of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared
that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's
own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October
1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Lt. Gen. Donald L.
Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar­
gued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more air­
worthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force
in different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and
an armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If 157 engines were
diverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there
would not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs
of the X-16 prograrn. 62
Having heard of the Wright Air Development Command attack
on the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met
with General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor of the Lockheed
design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists
from the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to
discuss the merits of the four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also
present as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air
Development Command, who later recalled:
What I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of
all four designs. I showed the relative high altitude performance
capabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically the
Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin '.s B-57,
being a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in
my opinion, the 173 [General Electric engine] would not be
good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I
overlaid a curve showing that with the 157 [Pratt & Whitney en­
gine} installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and
Fairchild designs. 63
This meeting-along with the knowledge that President
Eisenhower also supported the CL-282-helped win over the Air
Force. To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon
the X-16 program until the Lockheed aircraft had begun flying .
 
•, Donovan interview (S).
•-' Quoted in Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 13.
 
Secret
 
Sec, et NOP'ORl\1
 
Chapter 1
36
 
On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci­
sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary
Talbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,
Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin
Land-all agreed "that the special item of material described by
Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was
agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that,
regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA
unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,
It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de­
veloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to
promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in
November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed
to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson
received a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to
come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions
from Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any
program during the visit, but to get the information and return."
When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that
"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner
that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence
from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 05 Of course,
Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak­
ing such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned
to California on the evening of I 9 November.
Four days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the
CL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page mem­
orandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell. asking President Eisenhower to
approve the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at
a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior
Air Force officials. Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the
 
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record...Luncheon Meeting with the
Secretary of the Air Force,.. 19 November 1954. in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS
Codeword).
"" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 17 and 19 :-.:ovember 1954.
 
6eerati
 
Sec, et NOi-ORN
Chapter 1
37
 
President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower
told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and
that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it
operational. 66
Thus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technol­
ogy primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the
Agency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft,
President Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project
conducted by a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all,
the determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais6,
sance system.
 
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting at the White House:·
24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2. annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss.
Mayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the
President, 24 November 1954," White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL) (TS.
declassified).
" Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In
February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly
urged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed
the panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations
by June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report
was to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members of the Project
Three Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of
electrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific
Advisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land
Panel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency, particularly in the field of over­
head reconnaissance.
President Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice
he was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence mat­
ters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and
upgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which be­
came the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the
first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position
Killian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by
the President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence.
 
See,et
 
. ~--·-·· ~8 ~.
~l0-,vi
 
.,..
 
.
 
.
 
: .
 
l
 
Sec, et NOPOPU~
 
Chapter 2
39
 
Developing the U-2
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U-2 PROJECT
On 26 November 1954, the day after Thanksgiving, Allen Dulles
called his special assistant. Richard Bissell, into his office to te:ll him
that President Eisenhower had just approved a very secret program
and that Dulles wanted Bissell to take charge of it. Saying it was too
?~cret for him to explain, Dulles gave Bissell a packet of docuiments
and told him he could keep it for several days to acquaint himself
with the project. Bissell had long known of the proposal to build a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, but only in the most general
terms. Now he learned in detail about the project that proposed send­
ing aircraft over the Soviet Union.
Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to
go to the Pentagon on the following day to represent the Agency at an
1
organizational meeting for the U-2 project. Before leaving, Bissell
asked Dulles which agency was to run the project. The DCI replied
that nothing had been clearly decided. Bissell then asked who was
going to pay for the project. Dulles answered: "That wasn'li even
2
mentioned. You'11 have to work that out."
Bissell was accompanied by Herbert I. Miller, chief of the Office
of Scientific Intelligence's Nuclear Energy Division, who soon be­
came the executive officer of the overflight project. When Bissell and
Miller arrived at the Pentagon on the afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they
 
' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U-2 until July 1955, this
study will use the more widely known designator to avoid confusion.
1
 
Bissell interview {S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 1 {TS Codeword).
 
5earet
 
Secret 1\101'0~1\1
 
Chapter 2
40
 
sat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor
Gardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very lit­
tle time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the !Pro­
ject, taking for granted that the CIA would handle the secuirity
matters. Much of the discussion centered on methods for diverting
Air Force materiel to the program, particularly the Pratt & Whitney
J57 engines, because a separate contract for the engines might jeop­
ardize the project's security. The Air Force promised to tum ov,er a
number of J57 engines, which were then being produced for B-:52s,
KC- l 35s, F-100s, and RB-57s. Eventually Bissell asked who was
going to pay fo r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was
greeted with silence. Everyone present had their eyes on him because
they all expected the Agency to come up with the funds. Bissell rose
from his chair, said he would see what he could do, and the rnee1ting
3
adjoumed.
 
James A. Cunningham, Jr.
 
After the meeting. Bissell told Dulles that the CIA would hav,e to
use money from the Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project
going. The DC! used this fu nd to pay for covert activities, following
approval by the President and the Director of the Budget. Dulles 1told
Bissell to draft a memorandum for the President on funding the over­
fli ght program and to start putting together a staff for Project
AQUATONE. the project's new codename.
At first the new " Project Staff" (renamed the Development
Projects Staff in April 1958) consisted of Bissell. Miller, and the
small existing staff in Bissel l's Office of the Special Assistant to the
DCI. During the months that followed the establishment of the pro­
ject, its administrative workload increased rapidly, and in May 1955
the project staff added an administrative officer, James A.
Cunningham, Jr., a former Marine Corps pilot then working in the
Directorate of Support. Cunningham stayed with the U-2 project for
the next lO years. Two other key project officials who began their du~ in 1955 wer~
] the finance officer, and
L _ l the contracting officer."
 
c==i
 
' OSA History, chap. 3. p. 2 (TS Codeword): Bissell interview, 8 November 1984 (S);
Beschloss, Maydt1y. p. 89.
• OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 6-7. chap. 4, pp. 1-2. chap. 5. pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword);
Chronology of rite Office of Speda/ Activities. 195.J• /968. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). p. 2-4 (TS
Codeword) (hereafter cited as OSA Chronology).
 
Gee, ct NOfOftN
Chapter 2
41
 
============
AOUATONE
Project
 
Personnel
 
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Planning and Coordination
 
I
Headquarters
CIA
USAF
 
J
 
-1]
25
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
US Field Test Base
26
CIA
 
Foreign Field Base A
CIA
16
USAF
34
Contract
52
 
Foreign Fielcj Base B
16
CIA
USAF
34
Contract
52
 
Foreign Field Base C
CIA
16
USAF
34
52
Contract
 
26
 
102
 
102
 
102
 
Total employees: CIA
USAF
Contract
 
During the firs t hal f of 1955. the project staff grew slowly: many
of the individuals working on overhead reconnaissance remained on
the rolls of other Agency components. To achieve maximum security,
Bissell made the project staff self-sufficient. Project AQUATONE had
its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistic, com­
munications, and security personnel , and, thus, did not need to tum
to the Agency directorates for assistance. Funding for Proj,ect
AQUATONE was also kept separate from other Agency components;
its personnel and operating costs were not paid out of regular Agency
accounts. As approving officer for the project, Richard Bissell could
obligate funds in amounts up to $100,000; larger sums requ ired i.he
1
DCl's approval.
At the end of April 1955, Bisselrs staff developed, and the
Deputy Director for Support approved, the firs t table of organization
for Proj ect AQUATONE. Once operational. the project would have a
 
' OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 5-7 (TS Ccxkword).
 
Sec.ct NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
42
 
The Matomic Building
 
total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test­
ing faci lity. and three foreign field bases. C IA employees represented
only one-fourth (92) of .the total. The Air Force personnel commit­
ment was larger, with l09 positions on the 1955 table of organization
(th is total does not include many other Air Force personnel, such as
SAC meteorologists. who supported the U-2 project in addition to
their other duties). The largest Project AQUATONE category was
contract employees, with 156 positions in 1955. This category in­
cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel from other contractors for
6
items such as photographic equipment.
The first project headquarters was in CIA's Administration (East)
Building at 2430 E Street, NW. Continued growth caused the
AQUATONE staff to move several times during its first two years.
On l May l 955, the project staff moved to the third floor of a small
red brick building (the Briggs School) at 2210 E Street, NW. Then on
3 October. the staff moved to Wings A and C of Quarters Eye, a
World War fI "temporary" building on Ohio Drive. NW. in the West
Potomac Park area of Washington. On 25 February l956, the project
staff moved again. this time to the fifth floor of the Matomic Building
 
• Proj,:ct AQUATONE Table of Organization. 28 April 1955 in OSA History. chap. 3, an­
neK 15 (TS Codeword).
 
Secret
 
Seth!l NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
43
 
at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years
until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in
March 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project
staff (by that time known as the Office of Special Activities) moved
1
to the Tyler Building in Tysons Comer, Virginia.
Bissell reported directly to the DCI, although in reality the
DDCI, Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved
in the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project.
Cabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly
in overhead reconnaissance, made him ideally qualified to oversee the
U-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the
U-2 for the DCI.
 
FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AOUATONE
Although Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding
for the reconnaissance project, many financial details remained to be
settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on
the U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29
November and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a
team of 25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take
them off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why
to their former supervisors. T he engineers immediately began to work
45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expanded
to a total of 8 1 personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65
8
hours.
 
DDCI Charles Pearre Cabell
 
Kelly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft with­
out a contract illustrates one of the most important aspects of this pro­
gram: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement.
Lockheed was well acquainted with the covert procurement process,
having previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CI A.
Covert funding for sensiti ve projects sirnpli fies both procure­
ment and security procedures because the funds are not attributable to
the Federal Government and there is no public accountabi lity for their
 
' OSA History. chap. 18. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword); OSA Chronology. pp. 4. 7. 10. 45 (TS
Codeword).
 
• Johnson. '"Log for Project X ... 29 November-3 December 1954 (U).
 
-Sec.et
 
Sasret NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
44
 
use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949,
designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government
employee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouch­
ers. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible to eliminate competi­
tive bidding and thereby limit the number of parties who know about
a given project. The use of unvouchered funds also speeds up the
Federal procurement cycle. A general contractor such as Lockheed
can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed for a project
without resorting at each step to the mandated procurement proce­
dures involving public, competitive bidding. Covert contracting also
permits the use of second and third parties, many of them dummy
corporations or unwitting suppliers, thus hiding the intended destina­
tion or use of the various purchases.
In mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI
Dulles to use $35 million from the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund
to finance the U-2 project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project
OARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed "performance
specifications., rather than the standard Air Force "technical specifica­
tions," which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed
that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed's original pro­
posal to the Air Force in May l 954 had been $28 million for 20 U-2s
equipped with GE 173 engines. During negotiations with CIA General
Counsel Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to $26
million for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the Air
Force was to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could
only budget $22.5 million for the airframes because it needed the balance
of the available $35 million for cameras and life-support gear. The two
sides finally agreed on a fixed-price contract with a provision for a re­
view three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were
going to exceed the $22.5 million figure. The formal contract, No.
SP-1913, was signed on 2 March 1955 and called for the delivery of the
first U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to
keep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check for
~nd mailed it to Kelly Johnson's
$1,256,000 I
9
home on 21 February 1955.
 
• John S. Warner. Oftice of the General Counsel, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach,
Washington, DC, tape recording, 5 Aug 1983 (S): OSA History, chap. 5, pp. 1-2 and annex
42 (TS Codeword): Johnson, "Log for Project X," 21 February 1955 .
 
.Searet
 
6eeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
45
 
As it turned out, no review of the contract was necessary at the
three-fourths point. Lockheed delivered the aircraft not only on time
but under budget. During the final contract negotiations in the spring
of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed on a price for the
original 20 aircraft of $17,025,542 plus a profit of $1,952,055 for a
total of $18,977,597-less than $1 million for each aircraft. Because
its design was based on Lockheed's F-104, the U-2 was relatively in­
expensive even though only a small number of aircraft had been or­
dered. Only the wings and tail were unique; Lockheed manufactured
the other portions of the aircraft using the F-104's jigs and dies.
 
MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES OF THE U-2
Aware of the great need for secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson
placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at Burbank,
California, known as the Skunk Works. 10 Lockheed had established
this highly secure area in 1945 to develop the nation's first jet aircraft,
the P-80 Shooting Star. The small Skunk Works staff began making
the _detailed drawings for the U-2, which was nicknamed the "Angel"
because it was to fly so high.
Kelly Johnson's approach to prototype development was to have
his engineers and draftsmen located not more than 50 feet from the
aircraft assembly line. Difficulties in construction were immediately
brought to the attention of the engineers, who gathered the mechanics
around the drafting tables to discuss ways to overcome the difficul­
ties. As a result, engineers were generally able to fix problems in the
design in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. There was no empha­
sis placed on producing neatly typed memorandums; engineers sim­
ply made pencil notations on the engineering drawings in order to
keep the project moving quickly. 11
A little more than a week after he had been authorized to begin
the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23-page report detailing his most
recent ideas on the U-2 proposal. The aircraft, he explained, would be
designed to meet load factors of only 2.5 g's, which was the limit for
transport aircraft rather than combat planes. The U-2 would have a
 
'" The Lockheed '"Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known
as the .. Skonk Works" in Al Capp·s comic strip Li'/ Abner.
Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach
and Gregory W. Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988.
 
11
 
6eeret
 
Secret NOfi6fltN
 
Chapter 2
46
 
·\......,. - ~... :: ·
 
..
 
··•:Jt·1 "' .... 1._.,
 
~ .
 
·• ~i~·;'"; ~·- . ·•.
 
< >. ~)\~~,-~,
 
Skunk Works Design Staff
 
speed of Mach 0.8 or 460 knots at altitude. Its initial maximum alti­
tude would be 70,600 feet and the lllltimate maximum altitude would
be 73,100 feet. According to these early December 1954 specifica­
tions, the new plane would take off at 90 knots, land at 76 knots, and
be able to glide 244 nautical miles from an altitude of 70,000 feet.
After discussing the reconnaissance bay with James Baker, Johnson
had worked out various equipment combinations that would not ex­
ceed the weight limit of 450 pounds. Johnson ended his report by
promising the first test flight by 2 August l 955 and the completion of
four aircraft by I December I955.':
 
" Kell y Johnson. ·• A High-Altitude: Rcconnai~san(;C: Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i.
Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ).
 
SeeFet
 
Secr&t PJOFOFU'd
 
Chapter 2
47
 
In designing the U-2 aircraft, Kelly Johnson was confronted with
two major problems-fuel capacity and weight. To achieve interconti­
nental range, the aircraft had to carry a large supply of fuel, yet, it
also had to be light enough to attain the ultrahigh altitudes needed to
be safe from interception. Although the final product resembled a typ­
ical jet aircraft, its construction was unlike any other US military air­
craft. One unusual design feature was the tail assembly, which-to
save weight-was attached to the main body with just three tension
bolts. This feature had been adapted from sailplane designs.
The wings were also unique. Unlike conventional aircraft, whose
main wing spar passes through the fuselage to give the wings continu­
ity and strength, the U-2 had two separate wing panels, which were
attached to the fuselage sides with tension bolts (again, just as in sail­
planes). Because the wing spar did not pass through the fuselage,
Johnson was able to locate the camera behind the pilot and ahead of
the engine, thereby improving the aircraft's center of gravity and re­
ducing its weight.
The wings were the most challenging design feature of the entire
airp~ane. Their combination of high-aspect ratio and low-_drag ratio
(in other words, the wings were long, narrow, and thin) made them
unique in jet aircraft design. The wings were actually integral fuel
tanks that carried almost all of the U-2's fuel supply.
The fragility of the wings and tail section, which were only
bolted to the fuselage, forced Kelly Johnson to look for a way to pro­
tect the aircraft from gusts of wind at altitudes below 35,000 feet,
which otherwise might cause the aircraft to disintegrate. Johnson
again borrowed from sailplane designs to devise a "gust control"
mechanism that set the ailerons and horizontal stabilizers into a posi­
tion that kept the aircraft in a slightly nose-up attitude, thereby
avoiding sudden stresses caused by wind gusts. Nevertheless, the U-2
remained a very fragile aircraft that required great skill and concen­
tration from its pilots.
The final major design feature was the lightweight, bicycle-type
landing gear. The entire structure-a single oleostrut with two light­
weight wheels toward the front of the aircraft and two small,
solid-mount wheels under the tail-weighed only 208 pounds yet
could withstand the force of touchdown for this 7-ton aircraft. Because
both sets of wheels were located underneath the fuselage, the U-2 was
also equipped with detachable pogos (long, curved sticks with two
small wheels on them) on each wing to keep the wings level during
takeoff. The pilot would drop the pogos immediately after takeoff so
 
Seeret
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
 
48
 
U-2 at testing site before
attachment of wings and
tail assembly
 
that they could be recovered and reused. The aircraft landed on its
front and back landing gear and then gradually tilted over onto one of
1
the wingtips, which were equ ipped with landing skids. )
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMERA SYSTEM
By December 1954, Kelly Johnson was at work on drawings for the
U-2's airframe and Pratt & Whitn•:!Y was already building the J57 jet
 
" For the design ft:atures of the U-'.! in early 1955. see R. F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report:
Reconnaissance Aircraft . Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January 1955.
pp. 7-9. OSA Records. job 74-B-6-l5. box I (S).
 
Sec. et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
49
 
.. ·-
 
. ·. •
 
• ~:; ..:. ~ .::,,
 
, ',t •... . , "
 
,•
 
..
 
.:;~~~~;.\i ~1i:
 
•.
 
h -;.:
 
. .-:.:.~~... : ~·-'~•-·
...___
,:..- ....
: .~:~~·~-~~~~:~;\ ~f~ ' •
 
.. :-'·· ~: ....:,,.;_:,-:/~~ ~-
 
:·.'.:~-:---·~,...
 
engine, but no firm plans existed for the all-important cameras.
Existing cameras were too bulky and lacked sufficient resolution to
be used in high-altitude reconnaissance.
 
U-2 landing gear and pogos
 
The workhorses of World W'ilf II aerial photography had been the
Fairchild K-19 and K-21 framing cameras with lenses of varying focal
lengths from 24 to 40 inches. Late in the war, the trimetrogon K-17
.mapping-camera system came into use. This system consis~ed of lhree
separate cameras which made three photographs simultaneously: a
vertical, an oblique to the left, and an oblique to the right The major
shortcomings of the trimetrogon system were the large amount of film
required and the system's lack of sharp definition on the obliques.
The standard aerial cameras available in the e'ilfly 1950s c:ould
achieve resolutions of about 20 to 25 feet (7 to 8 meters) on a side
when used at an altitude of 33,000 feet (10,000 meters), or about 25
lines per millimeter in current tenns of reference. Such resolution was
considered adequate because aerial photography was then used pri­
marily to choose targets for strategic bombing, to assess bomb dam­
age after air raids, and to make maps and charts. Unfortunately, a
camera with a resolution of only 20 to 25 feet at a height of 33,000
feet was too crude to be used at twice that altitude. lndeed, for intelli­
gence purposes a resolution of less than 10 feet was necessary to dis­
cern smaller targets in greater detail. This meant that any camera
carried to altitudes above 68, 000 feet had to be almost four times as
good as existing aerial cameras in order to achieve a resolution of less
than 10 feet As a result, some scientists doubted that useful photogra­
phy could be obtained from altitudes higher than 40,000 feet.'"
 
" Baker imervil!w (S).
 
.Sea,et-
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
50
 
+
 
·~;~ ,·\ ·~~:f~: .i ~ ~~\ ~~
;.;.,-::., .
 
James G. Baker
 
The first success in designing very-high-acuity lenses came in
the mid- I940s, when James G. Baker of Harvard and Richard S.
Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company of Norwalk, Connecticut,
collaborated on a design for an ex.perimental camera for the Army Air
Force. They developed a 48-inch focal-length scanning camera that
was mounted in a modified B-36 bomber. When tested over Fort
Worth, Texas, at 34,000 feet, the new camera produced photographs
in which two golf balls on a putting green could be distinguished (in
reality. however, the "golf balls··· were 3 inches in diameter). These
photographs demonstrated the high acuity of Baker's lens, but the
camera weighed more than a ton and was much too large to be carried
aloft in an aircraft as small as the U-2.
Realizing that size and weiglht were the major restraining factors
in developing a camera for the U--2. James Baker began working on a
radically new system in October 1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would need almost a year to produce a working model of such a com­
plex camera. Since Kelly Johnson had promised to have a U-2 in the
air within eight months, Baker needed to find an existing camera that
could be used until the new came:ra was ready. After consulting with
his friend and colleague Richard Perkin. Baker decided to adapt for
the U-2 an Air Force camera krnown as the K-38. a 24-inch aerial
framing camera built by the Hycon Manufacturing Company of
Pasadena, California.
Perkin suggested modifying several standard K-38 cameras in
order to reduce their weight to the U-2's 450-pound payload limit. At
the same time, Baker would ma:ke critical adj ustments to existing
K-38 lenses to improve their acuiity. Baker was able to do this in a
few weeks, so several modified K-38s, now known as A-1 cameras,
were ready when the first "Angel" aircraft took to the air in
15
mid-1955.
CIA awarded Hycon a contract for the modified K-38 cameras,
and Hycon, in tum. subcontracte:d to Perkin-Elmer to provide new
lenses and to make other modifications to the cameras in order to
make them less bulky. In its tum, Perkin-Elmer subcontracted to
Baker to rework the existing K-38 lenses and later design an im­
proved lens system. To keep his liens-designing efforts separate from
 
" Ibid.
 
See,et
 
Secret NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
51
 
A-1 camera
 
his research associate duties at Harvard and his service on go,vem­
ment advisory bodies, Baker established a small firm known as Spica,
Incorporated, on 31 January 1955.
The A-1 camera system consisted of two 24-inch K-38 framing
cameras. One was mounted vertically and photographed a 17.2° swath
beneath the aircraft onto a roll of 9.5- inch fi lm. The second K-38 was
placed in a rocking mount so that it alternately photographed the left
oblique and right oblique out to 36.5° onto separate rolls of 9.5-inch
fi lm. The film supplies unwound in opposite directions in ordler to
minimize their effect on the balance of the aircraft. Both cameras
used standard Air Force 24-inch focal-length lenses adjusted for max­
imum acuity by Baker. The development of the special rocking mount
by Perkin-Elmer's Dr. Roderic M. Scott was a major factor in neduc­
ing the size and weight of the A- I system, because the mount pro­
vided broad transverse coverage with a single lens, ending the need
for two separate cameras. 16
 
•• OSA History. chap. I. annt!x 3, pp. 1-3 (TS Co1kword).
SeGF&t
 
Settet N0FORl)I
Chapter 2
52
 
A-2 camera
 
U-2s equipped with the A- I camera system also carried a
Perkin-Elmer tracking camera using 2.75-inch film and a 3-inch lens.
This device made continuous horizon-to-horizon photographs of the
terrain passing beneath the aircraft. Because the A - I system was: new,
it also included a backup camera system. a K-17 6-inch three-camera
trimetrogon unit using 9-inch film.
W hi le the A -1 system was still being developed, James )Baker
was already working on the next generation of lenses for high-alrtitude
reconnaissance. B aker was a pioneer in using computers to synthesize
optical systems. His software algorithms made it possible to model
lens designs and determine in advance the effects that variatio,ns in
lens curvatures. glass compounds. and lens spacings would have on
rays of light passing through a lens. These .. ray-tracing" programs re­
quired extensive computations, and, for this he turned to the most
modem computer available, an IBM CPC (card-programmed callcula­
17
tor) installation at nearby Boston University.
 
" Ibid.. chap. I. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword).
 
-Seeret
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
53
 
Baker's new lenses were used in a camera system known as the
A-2, which returned to a trimetrogon arrangement because of prob­
lems with the A-1 system's rocking mount. The A-2 consisted of
three separate K-38 framing cameras and 9.5-inch film magazines.
One K-38 filmed the right oblique, another the vertical, and a third
the left oblique. The A-2 system also included a 3-inch tracking
camera. All A-2 cameras were equipped with the new 24-inch f/8.0
Baker-designed lenses. These were the first relatively large photo­
graphic objective lenses to employ several aspheric surfaces. James
Baker personally ground these surfaces and made the final bench tests
on each lens before releasing it to the Agency. These lenses were able
to resolve 60 lines per millimeter, a 240-percent improvement over
existing lenses. 18
Once Baker and Scott had redesigned the 24-inch lens for the
K-38 devices, they turned their attention to Baker's new camera de­
sign, known as the B model. It was a totally new concept, a high-reso­
lution panoramic-type framing camera with a much longer 36-inch
f/10.0 aspheric lens. The B camera was a very complex device that
- used a single lens to obtain photography from one horizon to the
other, thereby reducing weight by having two fewer lenses and shutter
assemblies than the standard trimetrogon configuration. Because its
lens was longer than those used in the A cameras. the B camera
achieved even higher resolution-100 lines per millimeter.
The B camera used an 18- by 18-inch format, which was
achieved by focusing the image onto two counterrotating but overlap­
ping 9. 5-inch wide strips of film. Baker designed this camera so that
one film supply was located forward, the other aft. Thus, as the film
supplies unwound, they counterbalanced each other and did not dis­
turb the aircraft's center of gravity.
The B camera had two modes of operation. In mode I, the
camera used a single lens to make seven unique exposures from 73.5°
on the far right and far left obliques to vertical photos beneath the air­
craft, effectively covering from horizon to horizon. Mode II narrowed
the lateral coverage to 21 S on either side of vertical. This increased
the available number of exposures and almost doubled the camera's
 
" "Basic Configuration and Camera Data:· 24 January 1956. OSA Records (TS
Codeword); OSA History, chap. 5. annex 44 (TS Codeword).
 
Seeret
 
&ee1 et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
 
54
 
B camera .
 
operating time. Three of the seven B-camera frames provided stereo
coverage. The complex B cameras were engineered by Hycon's chief
designer, William McFadden.'"
James Baker's idea for the ultimate high-altitude camera wa:s the
C model that would have a 240-inch focal length. In December 1954,
he made preliminary designs for folding the optical path using three
mirrors, a prism, and an f/20.0 lens system. Before working ouIt the
detai ls of this design, however, Baker flew to California in early
January 1955 to consult with Kelly Johnson about the weight and
space limitations of the U-2·s payload compartment. Despite eve~y ef­
fort to reduce the physical dimensions of the C camera, Baker ne,eded
an additional six inches of payload space to accommodate the bigger
lens. When he broached this subject to Johnson, the latter replied,
" Six more inches? I'd sell my grandmother for six more inches!I" ~
 
•·• Ibid.: Bakl!r interview (S),
'' Bakc:r intl!rvkw (S).
 
6ee1 et NOFOfitM
 
Chapter 2
 
55
 
Realizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too
heavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch
f/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, re­
sulting by July 1955 in a 120-inch fl 10.9 lens that met both the weight
and space limitations. Later in the year, Baker decided to make the
mirrors for the system out of a new, lightweight foamed silica mate­
rial developed by Pittsburgh-Coming Glass Company. This reduced
the weight significantly, and he was able to scale up the lens to a
180-inch f/13.85 reflective system for a 13- by 13-inch format. In the
past, the calculations for such a complex camera lens would have
taken years to complete, but thanks to Baker's ray-tracing computer
program, he was able to accomplish the task in just 16 days.
When a C camera built by Hycon was flight-tested on 31 January
l 957, project engineers discovered that its 180-inch focal length,
which was five times longer than that of the B camera, made the
camera very sensitive to aircraft vibration and led to great difficulty
in aiming the C camera from altitudes above 68,000 feet. The engi­
neers, therefore, decided to shelve the camera. More than five years
later, a redesigned C camera was employed during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 0ctober 1962, but the results were not very satisfactory.
The failure of the C camera design was not a serious setback to
the high-altitude reconnaissance program, because the B camera
proved highly successful. Once initial difficulties with the film-trans­
port system were overcome, the B camera became the workhorse of
high-altitude photography. An improved version known as the B-2 is
still in use. Both of the earlier A-model cameras were phased out after
September 1958.
During the period when he was designing lenses for the CIA's
overhead reconnaissance program, James Baker was also working on
classified lens designs for the Air Force and unclassified designs for
the Smithsonian Institution. To protect the security of Baker's work
for the Agency, Herbert Miller of the Development Projects Staff told
Baker to work on lenses for the U-2 in the open and not make any
effort to classify the documents connected with the project. Miller be­
lieved that by not calling attention to the effort through the use of spe­
cial security measures, the project could be completed faster and still
not be compromised. This "hiding in the open" strategy proved very
successful?
 
" Ibid.
 
$ee,et
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
56
 
In addition to the camera systems, the U-2 carried one other im­
portant item of optical equipment, a periscope. Designed by James
Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, the optical peri­
scope helped pilots recognize targets beneath the aircraft and also
proved to be a valuable navigational aid. 22
 
PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2
As work progressed in California on the airframe, in Connecticut on
the engines, and in Boston on the camera system, the top officials of
the Development Projects Staff flew to California and Nevada to
search for a site where the aircraft could be tested safely and secretly.
On 12 April 1955 Richard Bissell and Col. Osmund Ritland (the se­
nior Air Force officer on the project staff) flew over Nevada with
Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's
chief test pilot, Tony Le Vier. They spotted what appeared to be an air­
strip by a salt flat known as Groom Lake, near the northeast corner of
the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Nevada Proving Ground.
After debating about landing on the old airstrip, LeVier set the plane
down on the lakebed, and all four walked over to examine the strip.
The facility had been used during World War II as an aerial gunnery
range for Army Air Corps pilots. From the air the strip appeared to be
paved, but on closer inspection it turned out to have originally been
fashioned from compacted earth that had turned into ankle-deep dust
after more than a decade of disuse. If Le Vier had attempted to land on
the airstrip, the plane would probably have nosed over when the
wheels sank into the loose soil, killing or injuring all of the key fig­
ures in the U-2 project. 23
Bissell and his colleagues all agreed that Groom Lake would
make an ideal site for testing the U-2 and training its pilots. Upon re­
turning to Washington, Bissell discovered that Groom Lake was not
part of the AEC proving ground. After consulting with Dulles, Bissell
and Miller asked the Atomic Energy Commission to add the Groom
Lake area to its real estate holdings in Nevada. AEC Chairman Adm.
Lewis Strauss readily agreed, and President Eisenhower also ap­
proved the addition of this strip of wasteland, known by its map des­
ignation as Area 51, to the Nevada Test Site. The outlines of Area 51
 
" Information supplied by James Baker to Donald E. Welzenbach, 12 May 1986 (U).
 
'·' OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
 
Sea,at
 
~ M t N6f0Ri\J
 
Chapter 2
 
57
 
are shown on current unclassified maps as a small rectangular area
adjoini ng the northeast comer of the much larger Nevada Test Site. To
make the new facility in the middle of nowhere sound more attractive
to his workers. Kelly Johnson called it the Paradise Ranch, which was
soon shortened to the Ranch. !•
 
Area 51, the Ranch
 
Although the dry lakebed could have served as a landing strip.
project managers decided that a paved runway was needed so that
testing could also take place during the times when rainwater runoff
from nearby mountains filled the lake (at such times the base acquired
yet another unofficial name, Watertown Strip). By July 1955 the base
was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began
moving in.
 
x:·
 
'' OSA History, chap. 8. pp. 2-6 (TS Co,kword): John:;on, "Log for Project
::?5-29
April I955: Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnso n with Maggi<! Smith. Kelly: More Thun My
Share of Ir All (Washington. DC: Smithsonian Institute Press. 1985). p. 123.
 
Sec,et
 
.. . .. ·. .
.•.
 
.... ... ....
Area 51
 
Oregon
 
0
 
20-
 
&f-_...._,........- -:i-1o Mileo
Area 5 1
 
_,,.,...
 
- ~
·: -
 
.
AEC/Vevada
 
.......
 
Springs
 
Nevada
 
California _
 
-- -·-
 
Spriaga
 
•
 
LasVega
 
North
Pacific
Ocean
.+
 
""o ~
 
0
 
Edwards AFB
 
Arizo11a
 
·1.osAllgeles
 
,oo-..
 
50
 
1--......-.-~-"'"J,ooMilet
 
Q
 
50
 
Secro~ NOFORl<I
 
•·.
 
·. ' . •...
··· . •,.
. ·.··
 
·
 
• ..
 
Sec,et NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
59
 
SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT
On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air
Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2)
in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary respon­
sibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project
(AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for
the security of overhead programs. This responsibility has placed a
heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to
keep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine
which contractor employees require security clearances and has had
to devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing fa­
cilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has
been a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 25
The most important aspect of the security program for the U-2
project was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for
the product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the
U-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of
_CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions.
The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also
played a part in maintaining the security of the overhead reconnais­
sance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the
Agency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as "articles," with
each aircraft having its own "article number." Similarly, the pilots
were always called "drivers." In cable traffic the aircraft were known
as KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise air­
craft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article num­
bers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as
KWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot).
Thus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell
into unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords
or at worst to "articles" and "drivers," giving no indication of the
nature of the program. '6
Even the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement
of CIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altime­
ters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the
 
" OSA History. chap. 7, pp. 4-6 (TS Codeword).
,. lnfonnation supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).
 
Secret
 
Sec,st NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
60
 
devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised
eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000
feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi­
cials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on
experimental rocket planes. 27
 
THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP
At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in
December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation
of responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed
only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency
would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still
unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an
interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for
the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this
subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan
Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.
Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were
ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF
talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that
SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.
Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this
whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uni­
formed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over
Russia, it is an act of war-legally-and I don't want any part of it." 28
With the issue of control over the program settled, the two agen­
cies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles
and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic
agreement, titled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities­
Project OILSTONE" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codename for the
project). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection
and training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational
support. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contract­
ing, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also
had a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the
 
n Ibid.
 
,. OSA History. chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.
 
ieare:&
 
See, el N61-0ftN
Chapter 2
61
 
project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex­
9
clusive province of Lockheed.~
As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the
program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well. As
Richard Bissell later remarked about the U-2 project, "The Air Force
wasn't just in on this as a s upporting element, and to a major degree it
wasn't in on it just supplying about half the government personnel;
but the Air Force held, if you want to be precise, 49 percent of the
30
common stock."
One of the first Air Force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE
was Col. Osmund J. Rieland. He began coordinating Air Force a:ctivi­
ties in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell in December 1954. On 27
June 1955, Rieland became Bissell's deputy, although Air Force Chief
of Staff Twining did not officially approve this assignment until 4
August, the day after the signing of the CIA- Air Force agreement. ln
March 1956, Colonel Ritland returned to the Air Force and was fol­
lowed as deputy project director by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.
Osmund J. Rieland
 
. . . - Another Air Force officer. Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary. joined the: pro­
gram in June 1955 and remained with it until August 1966. l1onger
than any of the other project managers. Using the Air !Force
Inspector General's office as cover with the title of Project Otificer,
AFCIG-5, Geary served as the focal point for all Defense
Department support to the U-2 and OXCART programs. His 11 years
with the overhead reconnaissance projects provided a high degree of
Air Force continuity.J•
 
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT
To get the U-2 aircraft ready to Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the
need for a fuel that would not boil off and evaporate at the very high
altitudes for which the aircraft was designed. Gen. James H. Doolittle
 
,. OSA History. chap. 3. p. 15 and annex 14 (TS Codeword).
•• Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquaners. 12 October 1965 (TS Codc::word).
" Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary (USAF-Ret.). interview by Donald E. Wc:lzc:nbach. tape re­
cording, 3 April 1986 (S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 3 (TS Codtword).
 
Secret
 
See, el N61'0Rl\1
Chapter 2
62
 
(USAF. Ret.), a vice president of the Shell Oil Company who had
long been involved in overhead reconnaissance (most recently as a
member of the Technological Capabilities Panel), arranged for Shell
to develop a special low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure kerosene fuel
for the craft. The result was a dense mixture, known as LF-1 A, JP-TS
(thermally stable), or JP-7, with a boiling point of 300°F at sea level.
Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts that
Shell normally used to make its "Flit" fly and bug spray. In order to
produce several hundred thousand gallons o f LF-1 A for the U-2 pro­
ject in the spring and summer of 1955. Shell had to limit the produc­
tion of Flit. causing a nationwide slhortage. Because of the new fuel' s
density, it required special tanks .:11nd modifications to the aircraft's
fuel-control and ignition systems.)~
 
Leo P. Geary
 
Even more important than the problem of boiling fuel was the
problem of boiling blood, namely the pilot's. At altitudes above
65,000 feet, fluids in the human body will vaporize unless the body
can be kept under pressure. Furthermore, the reduced atmospheric
pressure placed considerable stress on the pilot's cardiovascular sys­
tem and did not provide adequate oxygenation of the blood. Keeping
the pilot alive at the extreme altitudes required for overflights there­
fore called for a totally different approach to environmental equip­
ment; it required a system that coul,d maintain pressure over much of
the pilot's body. The technology tha,t enabled U-2 pilots to operate for
extended periods in reduced atmospheric pressure would later play a
major role in the manned space program.
Advising the Agency on high-•altitude survival were two highly
experienced Air Force doctors, Col. Donald D. Flickinger and Col. W.
Randolph Lovelace, 11. Dr. Lovelace had begun his research on
high-altitude flight before World War II and was a coinventor of the
standard Air Force oxygen maslk. In the early 1950s, he and
Flickinger made daring parachute jiumps from B-47 bombers to test
pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. Flickinger served as the
medical adviser to Project AQUATONE for almost a decade.H
Flickinger and Lovelace suggested that the Agency ask the
David Clark Company of Worcester, Massachusetts, manufacturer of
environmental suits for Air Force pilots. to submit designs for more
 
" Land interview (TS Codeword): Bissell inte,rview (S): James A. Cunningham. Jr.. inter­
view by Donald E. Welzenbach. Washington. DC. tape recording. 4 October 1983 (TS
Codeword).
'·' OSA History. chap. 10. pp. 29-34 (TS Codeword).
 
SacFat NQFOAN
 
Chapter 2
63
 
MC-2 partial-pressure suit (seen
on pilot Francis Gary Powers)
 
advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Rus•!ckas
then developed a complex life-support system, which was the first
partially pressurized "spacesuit" for keeping humans alive for
lengthy periods at ultrahigh altitudes. The effort to provide a safe en­
vironment for pilots at high altitudes also involved the Fi1rewel
Company of Buffalo, New York, which pressurized the U-2 cockpit to
create an interior environment equivalent to the air pressure at an alti­
tude of 28,000 feet. The system was designed so that, if the interior
cockpit pressure fell below the 28,000-feet level, the pilot's suit
would automatically inflate. In either case, he could obtain oxygen
only through his helmet.·~
 
"' Ibid.. chap. 5. p. 19 (TS Codeword).
 
Secret
 
6eeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
64
 
The early models of these MC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits
were very uncomfortable for the pilots. To prevent loss of pressure,
the heavy coverall had to fit tightly at the wrists and ankles (in the
early models of these suits, the feet were not included in the pressur­
ization scheme). The pilot had to wear gloves and a heavy helmet that
tended to chafe his neck and shoulders and was prone to fogging.
Problems with the pilot life-support system were believed to have
been the cause of several early crashes of the U-2.
Having gotten a pilot into this bulky suit and shoehorned him
into his seat in the cockpit, the next problem was how to get him out
in an emergency. The U-2 cockpit was very small, and the early mod­
els did not have an ejection seat. Even after an ejection seat was in­
stalled, pilots were reluctant to use it because they were afraid they
would lose their legs below the knees when they were blown out of
the cockpit. To save weight, the first pilot's seat was extremely simple
with no height adjustment mechanism. Designed for pilots of
above-average height, the seat could be adjusted for shorter pilots by
inserting wooden blocks beneath the seat to raise it. In later versions
of the aircraft, Kelly Johnson added a fully adjustable seat. 35
The Air Force undertook bailout experiments at high altitudes
from balloons in the autumn of 1955 to determine if the suit designed
for the U-2 pilot would also protect him during his parachute descent
once he was separated from the life-support mechanisms inside the
aircraft. To avoid getting the "bends" during such descents or during
the long flights, pilots had to don their pressure suits and begin
breathing oxygen at least 90 minutes before takeoff so that their bod­
ies would have time to dissipate nitrogen. This procedure was known
as prebreathing. Once the pilots were in their suits, eating and drink­
ing became a major problem, as did urination. The first model of the
pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for uri­
nation. A subsequent model required the pilot to be catheterized be­
fore donning his flying suit. This method of permitting urination
during flight proved very uncomfortable and, by the autumn of 1955,
was replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made the
catheter unnecessary. To reduce elimination, pilots ate a low-bulk,
high-protein diet on the day before and the morning of each mission.
 
" Lecture by Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Halloran (former Air Force U-2 pilot) at the National
Air & Space Museum, 24 April 1986 (U).
 
iearet
 
&ee, et Pd6p;Ofllrd
 
Chapter 2
65
 
Pilot undergoing prebreathing
 
To prevent pilots from becoming dessicated during the long
missions-a condition aggravated by their having to breathe pure
oxygen-provision was made for them to drink sweetened water. This
was accomplished by providing a small self-sealing hole in the face
mask through which the pilot cou ld push a strawlike tube attached to
the water supply. Project personnel also pioneered in the development
of ready-to-eat foods in squeezable containers. These were primarily
bacon- or cheese-flavored mixtures that the pilot could squeeze into
his mouth using the self-sealing hole in the face mask. Despite all
these precautions. U-2 pilots normally lost 3 to 6 pounds of body
weight during an eight-hour mission:"'
Food and water were not the only items provided to pilots on
overflight missions: they also received a suicide pill. During the early
l950s, tales of Soviet secret police torture of captured foreign agents
 
•• lnforma1ion supplied by fames Cunningham and former U-2 pilots Carmine Vi10.
Hervey Stockman. Jacob Krall. and Gkndon Dunaway 10 Donald E. Wel1.cnbach. May
 
1986.
 
•
 
Seccet
 
Se1.ret NOfiORN
 
Chapter 2
 
66
led Bissell and Cunningham to approach Dr. A lex Batlin of Technical
1
Services Division in the Directorate ,of Plans ) for ideas to help "cap­
tured" U-2 pilots avoid such suffering. Battin suggested the method
used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule
containing liquid potassium cyanide. He said a pilot had only to put
the ampule in his mouth and bite down on the glass; death would fol­
low in 10 to 15 seconds. Project AQUATONE ordered six of the poi­
son ampules, called L-pills, and offered one to each pilot just before a
mission. It was up to each pilot to decide if he wanted to take an
33
L-pill with him. Some did; most did not.
 
DELIVERY OF THE FIRST U-2
On 25 July. less than eight months after the go-ahead call from Trevor
Gardner, Kelly Johnson was ready to ,deliver the first aircraft, known as
article 341, to the " Paradise Ranch" site. With its long, slender wings
and tail assembly removed, the airc:raft was wrapped in tarpaulins,
loaded aboard a C-124, and flown to Groom Lake, where Lockheed me­
chanics spent the next six days readyi.ng the craft for its maiden flight.
Before "Kelly's Angel" could actually take to the air, however,
it needed an Air Force designator. Col. Allman T. Culbertson from the
Air Force ·s Office of the Director of Research and Development
pointed this out to Lieutenant Colonel Geary in July 1955, and the
two officers then looked through the aircraft designator handbook to
see what the options were. They decided that they could not call the
project aircraft a bomber, fighter, or transport plane, and they did not
want anyone to know that the new plane was for reconnaissance, so
Geary and Culbertson decided that i t shou ld come under the uti lity
aircraft category. At the time, there were only two utility aircraft on
the books, a U- l and a U-3. Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed
CL-282 was going to be known officially as the U-2.39
 
" At the time this Direc1ora1e was known as th,e Deputy Directorate/Plans. with the slash
interpreted to mean eith.:r "for" or "of."· Terminology for the major subdivisions of the
CIA and their directors ha.~ varied over the pa.~t four decades. For the sake of consistency.
all titles of Directorates and Deputy Directors h,1vc bc:c:n placed in the curre nt Agency for­
mat: the organization is known a., the "Directorate of
and the head is known as the
··Deputy Di rector for
 
x:·
 
x··
 
" Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Wdzenbach: Sayre Stevens.
Memorandum for the Record. ·•Discussion with Dr. Alex Batlin Re Project MKNAOMI."'
July 1975 (S).
•• Geary intervic:w (S).
$1)Qf8t
 
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 2
 
67
 
Arrival of U-2 prororype ar Area 51
(left); Article 341, the U-2
prototype (below}
 
;. ;:;-~
 
;t~
 
~~ .
 
...~.,, •i~;:t~
 
Johnson had designed the U-2 to use the Pratt & Whitney
(P&W) J57/P-3 I engine. which developed 13,000 pounds of thrust
and weighed 3.820 pounds. giving it a power-to-weight ratio of 3.4: 1.
When the U-2 firs t took to the air. however, these engines were not
available because the entire production was needed to power spedally
configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first U-2s there­
fore used P&W 157/P-37 engines, which were 276 pounds heavier
and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting
Secret
 
Sec,el NOFOPIN
Chapter 2
68
 
power-to-weight ratio of 2.7: I was almost 20 percent less efficient
than the preferred P-31 version:"
To conduct lengthy missions over hostile territory, the U-2
needed to carry a large amount of fuel. Kelly Johnson used a
'·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was not stored
in separate fuel tanks but rather in the wing itself. Each wing was di­
vided into two leak-proof compartments, and fuel was pumped into
all the cavities within these areas; only the outer 6 feet of the wings
were not used for fuel storage. The U-2 also had a I 00-gallon reserve
tank in its nose. Later, in 1957, Johnson increased the fuel capacity of
the U-2 by adding 100-gallon "slipper" tanks under each wing, pro­
jecting slightly ahead of the leading edge.
One of the most important considerations in the U-2's fuel sys­
tem was the need to maintain aircraft trim as the fuel was consumed.
The aircraft therefore contained a complex system of feed lines and
valves draining to a central sump, which made it impossible to pro­
vide the pilot with an empty/full type of fuel gauge. None of the first
50 U-2s had normal fuel gauges. Instead there were mechanical fuel
totalizer/counters. Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set
the counters to indicate the total amount of fuel in the wings, and then
a flow meter subtracted the gallons of fuel actually consumed during
the flight. The pilot kept a log of the fuel consumption shown by the
counters and compared it with estimates made by mission planners
for each leg of the flight. As a double check. U-2 pilots also kept
track of their fuel consumption by monitoring airspeed and time in
the air. Most pilots became quite expert at this. Several who did not
came up short of their home base during the 20 years these planes
were flown:'
 
INITIAL TESTING OF THE U-2
Preliminary taxi trials began on 27 July 1955, when the first run down
the newly completed runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's
chief test pilot, Tony Le Vier, was at the controls. A second taxi trial
 
"' OSA Hiswry. chap. 8. p. 13 (TS Codeword).
" Information supplied by Norman Nelson. former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works.
10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller, ltickheed U-2. pp. 77, 96.
 
SeeFet
 
Sect et NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
69
 
followed on I August. Le Vier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try
the ailerons. ·'It was at this point that I became aware of being air­
borne.'' LeYier noted afterward. "which left me with utter amaze­
ment, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately
started back toward the ground, but had difficulty determining my
height because the lakebed had no markings to judge distance or
height. I made contact with the ground in a left bank of approximately
l 0 degrees." The U-2 bounced back into the air, but Le Vier was able
to bring it back down for a second landing. He then applied the brakes
with little effect, and the aircraft rolled for a long distance before
.
,,
coming to a stop. Bissell, Cunningham. and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and
bounce. Leaping into a jeep, they roared off toward the plane. They
signaled to Le Vier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put
out a fire in the brakes. At a debriefing session that followed. LeYier
complained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence
of markings on the runway. Damage to the prototype U-2 was very
minor: blown tires, a leaking oleostrut on the undercarriage, and dam­
aged brakes. This unplanned flight was but a foretaste of the airwor­
thiness of the U-2. New pilots all had difficulty in getting the U-2's
wheels on the ground because at low speeds it would remain in
ground effect and glide effortlessly above the runway for great dis­
tances.
Taxi trials continued for one more day and were followed by the
first planned flight on 4 August 1955. LeVier was again at the con­
trols and had been instructed by Kelly Johnson to land the U-2 by
making initial contact with the main or forward landing gear and let­
ting the plane settle back on the rear wheel. LeVier had disagreed
with this approach. believing that the U-2 would bounce if he tried to
touch down on the forward gear first. After flying the aircraft up to
8,000 feet, Le Vier leveled off and began cycling the landing gear up
and down: then he tested the flaps and the plane's stability and control
systems. Finally. LeYier made his first landing approach. As the U-2
settled down. the forward landing gear touched the runway and the
plane skipped and bounced into the air. Le Vier made a second attempt
to land front wheels first. and again the plane bounded into the air.
 
'' Transcripts of th.: test pilors· and obs.:rv.:rs· comments on the initial U-2 tt:st flights
have been published in ··secret First Flight of Artide 0OI ... Spyplanes vol. 2. 1988. pp.
64• 7 I. 82-85.
 
Sesret
 
Sec,et NOfO"N
 
Chapter 2
70
 
First flight of the U-2,
4 August 1955
 
With Kelly Johnson watching from a chase plane and giving a con­
stant stream of instructions, LeYie:r made three more unsuccessful
landing attempts. With the light fading and a thunderstorm fast ap­
proaching from the mountains to the west, LeVier made one last ap­
proach using the method he had advocated: letting the aircraft touch
on its rear wheel first. This time the U-2 made a near-perfect landing,
which came just in the nick of tim<!. Ten minutes later, the thunder­
storm began dumping an unheard-of 2 inches of rain , flooding the dry
1
lakebed and making the airstrip unusable:
Now that the first problems in flying and landing the U-2 had
been worked out, Kelly Johnson scheduled the "official" first flight
for 8 August 1955. This time outsiders were present. includi ng
Richard Bissell. Col. Osmond Ritla1nd, Richard Homer. and Garrison
Norton. The U-2 flew to 32,000 feet and performed very well. Kelly
Johnson had met his eight-month deadline."
 
•• Ibid.. pp. 21 -22: Johnson, .. Log for Project X." 4 August 1955.
.. Johnson. " Log for Project X," 8 August 1955.
 
Seeret
 
Sectel NOFORP•
Chapter 2
 
71
 
Le Vier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before mov­
ing on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September.
This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took
the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its
speed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed
of Mach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti­
tudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier
took the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the
42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit
training program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even
higher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its
initial design altitude of 65,600 feet. 05
On 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at
64,000 feet-more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the 157/
P-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft
descended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers
from Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The
P-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris­
_ti~~ than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore
tended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually
became apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from
57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the "bad­
lands" or the "chimney." F\ameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until
sufficient numbers of the more powerful P-31 engines became avail­
able in the spring of 1956:0
Meanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven,
Lockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of
even the second-choice 157/P-37 engines became a major problem.
Pratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the
next year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters
and KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help of a colleague in
the Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion
of a number of these engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's
KC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the
U-2s. 47
 
" OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).
" Geary interview (S ).
 
SeeFet
 
Secret ~Q~OR~I
 
Chapter 2
72
 
As the deliveries of U-2 airframes to the testing site increased, a
major logistic problem arose: how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal of curiosity.
The project staff decided that the simplest approach would be to fly
the essential personnel to the site on Monday morning and return
them to Burbank on Friday evening. Frequent flights were also neces­
sary to bring in supplies and visitors from contractors and headquar­
ters. Therefore, a regularly scheduled Military Air Transport Service
(MATS) flight using a USAF C-54 aircraft began on 3 October 1955.
James Cunningham promptly dubbed this activity ·•Bissell's
Narrow-Gauge Airline." Less than seven weeks after it started, a
MATS aircraft bound for Area SI crashed on 17 November. killing all
14 persons aboard the plane, including the Project Security Officer,
CIA's William H. Marr, four members of his staff, and personnel from
Lockheed and Hycon. This crash represented the greatest single loss
of life in the entire U-2 program:"
 
U-2s, UFOs, AND OPERATION BLUE BOOK
High-altitude testing of the U-2 soon led to an unexpected side
effect-a tremendous increase in reports of unidentified flying objects
(UFOs). In the mid- l 950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes
between 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B-47s
and B-57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet. Consequently,
once U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic con­
trollers began receiving increasing numbers of UFO reports.
Such reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours
from pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun
dropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20,000 feet, the
plane was in darkness. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the
airliner at the same time, its horizon from an altitude of 60,000 feet
was considerably more distant, and, being so high in the sky, its silver
wings would catch and reflect the rays of the sun and appear to the
airliner pilot, 40,000 feet below. to be fiery objects. Even during day­
light hours, the silver bodies of the high-flying U-2s could catch the
sun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower alti­
tudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned
flight was possible above 60,000 feet, so no one expected to see an
object so high in the sky.
 
" OSA Hisrory. chap. 7. pp. 17-19 (TS Co<lcwor<l).
 
.Saeret-
 
Seeret PJOFORN
 
Chapter 2
73
 
Not only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic
controllers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to
the Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton
charged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the
Air Force's Operation BLUE BOOK. Based at Wright-Patterson, the
operation collected all reports of UFO sightings. Air Force investiga­
tors then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natu­
ral phenomena. BLUE BOOK investigators regularly called on the
Agency's Project Staff in Washington to check reported UFO sight­
ings against U-2 flight logs. This enabled the investigators to elimi­
nate the majority of the UFO reports, although they could not reveal
to the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. U-2 and later
OXCART flights accounted for more than one-half of all UFO reports
during the late 1950s and most of the I 960s!"
 
HIRING U-2 PILOTS
In authorizing the U-2 project, President Eisenhower told DC! Dulles
that he wanted the pilots of these planes to be non-US citizens. It was
his belief that, should a U-2 come down in hostile territory. it would
be much easier for the United States to deny any responsibility for the
activity if the pilot was not an American.
The initial effort to find U-2 pilots was assigned to the
Directorate of Plans Air/Maritime Division (AMO). The DDP had exAMO op­
~e_ra_t~iv-e~---------------~-a~sk~e-d~th,---,at discreet
~ ~ - ~ - - - ~ - - - , - - - - - - - - r = ._
 
inquiries be made to see if an
 
high-paying covert project
1
 
_J
 
fliers were interested in a
 
~---~
 
brought to the United States---.t_o_r...,.tr_a_t_m_n_g_.~r,.;~i-e-an-w~h~1,~e-,~A~N~l~D~h-,r~e~a~a-nlflier residing in England, and he also came to the
United States for training.
 
In theory the use of foreign pilots seemed quite logical: in prac­
tice it did not work out. Th ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ a n d
could only tly light aircraft. Language was also a barrier for the
although several were good fliers. Because Lieutenant
~C_o_l_o_n_e_l Geary \ad taken a class~ ofl
~hrough tlyincr
school at Randolph AFB in 1950, he got the job of training t h e =
 
" Information suppli.:d by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzcnbach (U).
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
74
 
recruits in mid-1955. Geary arranged for an Air Force officer of
I
Jto stay with the group during a preliminary training
program at Lu e Air Force~e plan to use foreign pilots soon
ran into trouble when onlyl _ _ __ _ _ _ ___,pilots passed the
school and reported to Area 5 1. T hey made only a few flights in the
51
U-2, and by the autumn of 1955 they were out of the program. '
Even before the elimination of the I
lit was clear that there
would not be enough trained foreigrn pilots available in time for de­
ployment. Bissell therefore had to start the search for U-2 pilots all
over again. Lt. Gen . Emmett (Rosy) O' Donnell, the Air Force's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, authorized the use of Air Force
pi lots and provided considerable assistance in the search for pilots
who met the high standards established by the Agency and the Air
Force. The search included only SAC fighter pilots who held reserve
commissions. The use of regular Air Force pilots was not considered
because of the complexities involved in having them resign from the
Air Force, a procedure that was necessary in order to hire them as ci­
vilians for the AQUATONE project.
SAC pilots interested in the U-2 project had to be willing to re- ·
sign from the Air Force and assume c ivil ian status-a process known
as sheep-dipping-in order to conduct the overflights. Although Air
Force pilots were attracted by the challenge of flying U-2s over hos­
tile territory, they were re luctant to leave the service and give up their
seniority. To overcome pilots' reluctance, the Agency offered hand­
some salaries, and the Air Force promised each pilot that, upon satis­
factory conclusion of his employment with the Agency. he could
return to his unit. In the meantime, he would be considered for pro­
motion along with his contemporari,es who had continued their Air
Force careers.~'
The selection process for Agenc:y U-2 pilots was very rigorous.
Because of the strain involved in flying at extreme altitudes for long
periods of time, painstaking efforts were made to exclude all pilots
who might be nervous or unstable in any way. The physical and psy. chological screening of potential U--2 pilots was conducted by the
Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, under a contract signed with the CIA on
 
'' OSA History, chap. 10. pp. 1-10 (TS Codeword): Geary interview (S).
' ' OS..\ History. chap. 10. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword) ; Geary interview (S); Francis Gary
Powers with Curt Gentry. Openuion Overflight (New York: Holt. Rinehart. and Wilson.
1970). pp. 25-27.
 
~eeret NOFOAPJ
Chapter 2
75
 
28 November 1955. The CIA's insistence on more stringent physical
and mental examinations than those used by the Air Force to select
pilots for its U-2 fleet resulted in a higher rejection rate of candidates.
The Agency's selection criteria remained high throughout its manned
overflight program and resulted in a much lower accident rate for
CIA U-2 pilots than for their counterparts in the Air Force program. 51
 
PILOT TRAINING
Even before the recruiting effort got under way, the Air Force and
CIA began to develop a pilot training program. Under the terms of the
OILSTONE agreement between the Agency and the Air Force, re­
sponsibility for pilot training lay with SAC. This essential activity
was carried out under the supervision of Col. William F. Yancey. who
was assigned to March AFB and flew to nearby Area 51 each day.
Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed test pilots to fly the U-2. Once they became
qualified, these SAC pilots would become the trainers for the
··_sheep-dipped" former Reserve SAC pilots. who would fly U-2 missions for the CIA.
•
The original U-2 test pilot. Tony Le Vier, trained several other
Lockheed test pilots in the difficult art of flying the U-2. Eventually
there were enough trained Lockheed pilots available to test the air­
craft coming off the assembly line and also train the SAC pilots.
Training was difficult because there was no two-seat model of the
U-2. All instruction had to be given on the ground before takeoff and
then over the radio once the craft was airborne. Almost 15 years
elapsed before a two-seat U-2 was available for training new pilots.
Despite the difficulties involved in training U-2 pilots. Colonel
Yancey had a cadre of six qualified Air Force U-2 pilots by
September 1955. These six were now ready to train the Agency's pi­
lots. 51
Training pilots was not easy because the U-2 was a mixture of
glider and jet. Although those chosen for the overflight program were
all qualified fighter pilots, they now had to learn to fly the delicate
U-2. Its large wings had tremendous lift but were also very fragile
 
" OSA History, chap. 10. pp. 5-6: chap. 5. p. 18 (TS Codeword).
" OSA History. ch,1p. 11. pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).
 
..Searct --
 
Seerct NOFORN
Chapter 2
76
 
and could not survive the stresses of loops and barrel rolls. Moreover,
the original U-2s were placarded, which meant that they could not be
flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in
rough air. At operational altitude, where the air was much less dense,
they could not exceed Mach 0.8 (394 knots). Speeds in excess of
these limits could cause the wings or tail section to fall off.
Airspeed was a very critical factor for the U-2. At maximum alti­
tude only 6 knots separated the speeds at which low-speed stall and
high-speed buffet occurred. Pilots called this narrow range of accept­
able airspeeds at maximum altitude the .. coffin corner" because at
this point the U-2 was always on the brink of falling out of the sky. If
the aircraft slowed beyond the low-speed stall limit, it would lose lift
and begin to fall, causing stresses that would tear the wings and tail
off. A little too much speed would lead to buffeting, which would
also cause the loss of the wings or tail. Flying conditions such as
these required a U-2 pilot's full attention when he was not using the
autopilot. Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson
added a vernier adjustment to the throttle to allow the pilot to make
minute alterations to the fuel supply. 50
Among the unique devices developed for the U-2 was a small
sextant for making celestial .. fixes" during the long overflights.
Because cloud cover often prevented U-2 pilots from locating naviga­
tional points on the earth through the periscope, the sextant turned out
to be the pilots' principal navigational instrument during the first
three years of deployment. When clouds were not a factor, however.
the periscope proved highly accurate for navigation. During the final
tests before the aircraft became operational. U-2 pilots found they
could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less than I nautical
mile over a 1.000-nm course. 5'
 
FINAL TESTS OF THE U-2
Flight-testing of the U-2 continued throughout the fall and winter of
1955-56 in order to test all the various systems. By mid-January
1956. SAC officials were so impressed that they also wanted to pur­
chase a fleet of these planes. On 30 January. DCI Dulles agreed to
" Cunningham int.:rview (TS Codeword): John Parangosky. intt:rview by Donald E.
Wdzenhach. tape recording. 6 March 1986 (S): information supplied by James
Ch..:rbonneaux to Donald E. Wdzenhach (S).
" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
 
Seci:et
 
Sec, et MOFOKI\I
 
Chapter 2
 
77
 
A-2 camera being installed
in U-2
 
have CIA ace as executive agent for this transaction, which the A ir
Force called Project DRAGON LADY. To maintain secrecy, the Air
Force transferred funds to the CIA, which then placed an order with
Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be determined by the Air
Force. The Air Force later bought two more U-2s, for a total of 31 .
The aircraft purchased for the Air Force were known as the
Follow-On Group, which was soon shortened to FOG.56
Once enough pilots had been trained, Project AQUATONE man­
agers concentrated on checking out the complete U-2 system: planes,
pilots, navigation systems, life-support systems, and cameras. From
10 through 14 April 1956, U-2s equipped with A-2 cameras took off
from Area 5 1 and made eight overflights of the United States in order
to test the various flight and camera systems as part of the standard
Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection. Colonel Yancey and his
detachment served as observers during this weeklong exercise.
 
•· OSA Historv. chap. 5. pp. '.!5-26 (TS Code.word).
 
Scc,et
 
Secret NOfORN
Chapter 2
 
78
 
U-2 detachment in formation
over Nevada
 
Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the
U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission pro­
grammers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the de­
tachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level
Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's detem1i­
57
nation that the U-2 was ready for deployment.
During these final tests in the spring of 1956, the U-2 once again
demonstrated its unique airworthiiness. On 14 April 1956, James
Cunningham was sitting in his office in Washington when he received
a call from Area 51 informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had
experienced a flameout over the Mississippi River at the western bor­
der of Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a sec­
ond flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to
get the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and
Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of
the Air Force, had arranged for sealled orders to be delivered to every
airbase in the continental United States giving instructions about what
to do if a U-2 needed to make an e:mergency landing.
Cunningham had the project office ask the pilot how far he could
glide so they could determine which SAC base should be alerted. The
pilot, who by this time was over Arkansas. radioed back that, given
the prevailing winds and the U-2·s 21:1 glide ratio, he thought he
could reach Albuquerque. New Mexico. Within minutes Cunningham
was on the phone to Colonel Geary in the Pentagon, who then had the
Air Force's Assistant Director of Operations. Brig. Gen. Ralph E.
 
" Bbscll imcrvicw (S); OSA flisrory. chap. 11. pp. 15-16 (TS Codeword).
 
Geeret
 
Sec. et NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
79
 
Koon, call the commander of Kirtland AFB near Albuquerque.
General Koon told the base commander about the sealed orders and
explained that an unusual aircraft would make a deadstick landing at
Kirtland within the next half hour. The general then instructed the
base commander to have air police keep everyone away from the craft
and get it inside a hanger as quickly as possible.
After a half hour passed, the base commander called the
Pentagon to ask where the crippled aircraft was. As he was speaking,
the officer saw the U-2 touch down on the runway and remarked,
"It's not a plane, it's a glider!" Even more surprised were the air po­
lice who surrounded the craft when it came to a halt. As the pilot
climbed from the cockpit in his "space" suit, one air policeman re­
marked that the pilot looked like a man from Mars. The pilot, Jacob
Kratt, later reported to Cunningham that, from the beginning of the
first flameout until the landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had covered
over 900 miles, including more than 300 by gliding. 58
Aside from this extraordinary gliding ability, however, the U-2
was a very difficult aircraft to fly. Its very light weight, which enabled
it to achieve extreme altitude, also made it very fragile. The aircraft
-was also very sleek, and it sliced through the air with little drag. This
feature was dangerous, however, because the U-2 was not built to
withstand the G-forces of high speed. Pilots had to be extremely care­
ful to keep the craft in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at
operational altitude. If the nose dropped only a degree or two into the
nose-down position, the plane would gain speed at a dramatic rate,
exceeding the placarded speed limit in less than a minute, at which
point the aircraft would begin to come apart. Pilots, therefore, had to
pay close attention to the aircraft's speed indicator because at 65,000
feet there was no physical sensation of speed, without objects close at
hand for the eye to use as a reference. 59
 
THREE FATAL CRASHES IN 1956
The first fatality directly connected with flying the U-2 occurred on
15 May 1956, when test pilot Wilburn S. Rose, flying article 345A,
had trouble dropping his pogos, the outrigger wheels that keep the
 
,. Bissell interview (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary,
interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 12 October 1988 (S).
'" James Cherbonneaux, Carmine Vito, and Hervey Stockman (former U-2 pilots), inter­
view by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, May 1986 (S).
 
Secaet
 
~eerct NOPORl<I
 
Chapter 2
80
wings parallel to the ground duriing takeoff. Once airborne, Rose
made a low-level pass over the airstrip and shook loose the lefthand
pogo. When he attempted to make a righthand turn to come back over
the runway to shake loose the remaining pogo. Rose stalled the U-2
and it plunged to earth, disintegratiing over a wide area. Three months
later. on 3 1 August 1956, a second fa tal crash occurred during a
night-flying exercise. Frank G. Grace stalled article 354 at an altitude
of about 50 feet when he tried to climb too steeply at takeoff. The
craft fell , cartwheeled on its left wing. and struck a power pole near
the runway. More experienced U-2 pilots always cut back abruptly on
the throttle as soon as the pogo sticks fell away in order to avoid such
stal Is.
Before the year was out, two more U-2s were destroyed in
crashes. one of them fatal. On 17 September 1956, article 346 lost
part of its right wing while on its takeoff ascent from Lindsey Air
Force Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. The aircraft disintegrated in mid­
air. killing pilot Howard Carey. T he loss of article 357 on l 9
December 1956 resulted from pilot hypoxia. A small leak prema­
turdy depleted the oxygen supply and impaired Robert J. Ericson's
judgment as he flew over Arizona. Because o f his inability to act
quickly and keep track of his aircraft's speed. the U-2 exceeded the
placarded speed of 190 knots and literall y disintegrated when it
reached 270 knots. Ericson managed to jettison the canopy and was
sucked out of the aircraft at 28,0001 feet. His chute opened automati­
cally at 15,000 feet, and he landed without injury. The aircraft was a
total loss."''
 
COORDINATION OF COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
From the very beginning o f the U-2 program. it was apparent that
some sort of an interagency task force or office would be needed to
develop and coordinate collection requirements for the covert over­
head reconnaissance effort. In a 1three-page memorandum to DCI
Dulles on 5 November 1954 setting forth the ideas of the
Technological Capabilities Panel's Project 3 on this subject. Edwin
L and wrote:
It is recommended that . .. a permanent task force. including Air
 
Force supporting elements. he set up under suitable cover to
provide guidance on procurement, to consolidate requirements
 
· • U-2 Acci<l.:nt R.:port~. folders -1. 10. and 1-1. OSA records. job 67 -8--115. box I (S).
 
-&ec:t et rc:iOFORN
 
Chapter 2
81
 
and plan missions in view of priority and feasibility, to maintain
the operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissem­
ination of rhe resulting information in a manner consistent with
its special security requirementsY
When the U-2's deve lopment and testing approached comple­
tion, Land's recommendation was put into effect. Following a mt!et­
ing with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles and Trevor
Gardner (who had been promoted from his special assistant post co
become Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and
Development), Richard Bissell establ ished an Ad Hoc Requirements
Committee (ARC) on I December 1955. He then named James Q.
Reber to be Intelligence Requ irements Officer for the U-2 project and
chairman of the ARC. Reber was already experienced in coordination
with other intelligence agencies, for he had headed the Directorate of
Intelligence DI Office of Intelligence Coordination for four years.
The first full-scale ARC meeting took place on I February 1956 with
representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force present.
Attending for the CIA were representatives from the Office of
Research and Reports (ORR) and the Office of Scienti fic Intell igence
. (QS I). The CIA membership later expanded to include the Office of
Current Intell igence (OCI) and a representative from the Directorate
of Plans. In 1957 the National Security Agency (NSA) also began
sending a representative. The State Department followed suit in 1960.
although it had been receiving reports from the committee all along.'~
A RC's main task was to draw up lists of collection requirements.
primarily for the U-2. but also for other means of collection. These
lists prioritized targets accordi ng to their ability to meet the three ma­
jor national intelligence objectives concerning the Soviet Union in the
mid- 1950s: long-range bombers, guided missiles, and nuclear energy.
The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli­
gence community using all available means of collection, not j ust for
63
the CIA with the U-2.
 
" OSA History. chap. I. annex I (TS Codeword).
 
' ' Minu1es of lh<! Ad Hoc Rcquiremc:n1s Commiuc:e of I February 1956. lmclligence
Communi1y (IC) Staff records. COMIREX. job 33 -B -1 21 A. boll I. "ARC Minu1cs.
1956-1957:'" Memorandum for the Joim Study Group from James Q. Reber. "Handling of
Requirements for the U-2:· 15 August 1960. IC Staff records. job 33-T-123A. box 10.
"CHALICE (GeneralJ" (TS Codeword>.
" t,,lemorandum for lhc Joint S1udy Group from James Q. Rc:bcr. "Handling of
Requirements for 1he U-2:· 15 August 1960. IC Staff records. job 33-T-123A. box I 0.
" CHALICE (Gen.:rall" (TS Cod.:worJ>.
 
James 0. Reber
 
Gee, et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
82
ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and
tlie project staff's operations section then used the list to plarn the
tlightpachs for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee
was not responsible for developing fl ight plans. it assisted the plan­
ners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan
was ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee
drew up a decailed justi fication for the selection of the targets. This
paper accompanied the flight plan.(J
[n developing and pnontIz1ng lists of targets, the committee
members had to take into account the varying needs and interesIts of
their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally
emphasized strategic intelligence: ai rcraft and munitions factories,
power-generating complexes. nuclear establishments. roads. bridlges.
inland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually plac,ed a
heavier emphasis on order-of-baule data. The Air Force. in panicular.
had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of
Soviet and East European airfields and radars.
Arthur C. Lundahl
 
A lthough the committee members kept the interests of their ser­
vices or agencies in mind. their awareness of the vital nature of their
mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted
to reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations, although oc­
casionally this was not possible and one or more agencies would add a
5
dissent to the recommendation o f the committee as a whole."
 
PREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE
PRODUCT OF U-2 MISSIONS
On 13 December 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant. Richard
Bissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl. the chief of CIA's Photo­
Intelligence Division (PID), on Project AQU ATONE. At !DC[
Dulles's direction, Lundahl immediately set in motion within his divi­
sion a compartmented effort, known as Project EQUINE, to plan for
the exploication of overhead photography from the U-2 project. With
only 13 members, the PID staff was too small co handle the expe,cted
 
~
 
lbi<l.: Jam.:s Q. Reber. interview by Donald E. Wd·l enbach and Gregory W. Pedlow.
Wash ington, DC. 21 May 1987 (S).
 
"' Reber interview (Sl.
 
Gec,et
 
-see,, et P.OFQRPJ
Chapter 2
 
83
 
The Steuart Building, home
of the Photo-lntelligel"lce
Division
 
flood of photographs that the U-2 would bring back. so in May 1955
. t~~ Directorate of Support (DS) authorized expanding PID to 44 per­
sons. Soon afterward the division moved from its room in M Building
to larger quarters in Que Building.
The Photo-[ntelligence Division continued to expand in anticipa­
tion of large quantities of U-2 photography. lts authorized strength
doubled in January 1956 when a new project known as
HTAUTOMAT came into existence to exploit U -2 photography. All of
the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys­
tem. By the summer of 1956, the PlD had moved to larger quarters in
the Steuart Building at 5th Street and New York Avenue, NW. PID
photointerpreters had already begun to work with U-2 photography
following a series of missions in April 1956. when U-2s photo­
graphed a number of US installations that. were considered analogous
to high-priority Soviet installations. As a result of these preparations,
PrD was ready for the mass of photography that began coming when
U-2 operations commenced in the summer of 1956.""
 
~
 
For a more detailed history of photointerpretation in the CIA. sec Urban J. Lim:han. The
National Photographic lmerpretation Center. vol. I . Antecedents anti Early Years.
Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Sc:ries NPIC-2. December 1972. pp.
171 -19~ (S).
 
Geeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
84
 
•
Project GENETRIX balloon
launch
 
•'
 
'
 
it-
 
THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FOR:CE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS
W hile the Agency was mak ing its f i nal preparations for U -2 over­
fli ghts. the Air Force started a reconnaissance proj ect that would
cause considerable protest around the world and threaten the exist­
ence o f the U-2 overfl ight program before it even began. Project
GENETRI X involved the use of camera-carrying balloons to obtain
high-altitude photography of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union. and
Seeret
 
Sec.el NOfOftN
Chapter 2
85
 
the People's Republic of China. This project had its ongms 10 a
RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of I 955, the Air
Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design
and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal­
loons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval
on 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases
in Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force
had launched a total of 516 balloons. 67
Project GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors
had hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the pre­
vailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and
then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal­
loons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher
latitudes. Large numbers of balloons did not succeed in crossing the
Soviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hos­
tile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast
supplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually
recovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958)
from the 5 16 balloons that had been launched. In four of these payJoads the camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight _the photog­
raphy was of no intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded
in obtaining useful photographs.""
The low success rate of the Project GENETRIX balloons was not
the only problem encountered; far more serious was the storm of pro­
test and unfavorable publicity that the balloon overflights provoked.
Although the Air Force had issued a cover story that the balloons
were being used for weather research connected with the International
Geophysical Year, East European nations protested strongly to the
United States and to international aviation authorities, claiming that
the balloons endangered civilian aircraft. The Soviet Union sent
strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations
from which the balloons had been launched. The Soviets also col­
lected numerous polyethelene gasbags, camera payloads, and trans­
mitters from GENETRIX balloons and put them on display in
Moscow for the world press. ~9
 
., P. G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DCI Dulles. "Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956 (S).
"' Final Report. Project I 19L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 Mar~·h 1956. D-582, Genernl Summary (S. declassitic:d 1979).
 
"'' New Yr,rk Times, IO February 1956. p. I: Omaha World Herald, 11 February I 956, p. I.
 
Sea,et
 
Secret NOFORN
 
Chapter 2
86
 
Photograph of Dodonovo Atomic
Energy complex taken by a
Project GENETRIX balloon
 
All of this publicity and protest led President Eisenhower to con­
clude that ··the balloons gave more legiti mate grounds for irritation
than could be matched by the good obtained from them," and h,e or­
dered the project halted. On 7 February 1956 Secretary of State
Dulles in formed the Soviet Union that no more "weather research"
balloons would be released. but he did not offer an apology for the
. hts. ;n
over ft ,g
Despite the furor caused by GENETRIX. Air Force Chief of
Staff Twining proposed yet another balloon project only fi ve weeks
later, in mid-March 1956. This project would employ even higher fly­
ing balloons than GENETRIX and would be ready in 18 rnoinths.
President Eisenhower informed the Air Force. however, that he was
··not interested in any more balloons.·· 1 '
 
'" Andrew J. Goo<lpastcr. Memorandum for th.: R.:i:ord. •• 10 Fcbrnary 1956 Confonmcc of
Joint Chids of Scaff with thc President... WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS. dcclassiticd 1980):
St.:phcn E. Ambrose. Eiserzhmn:r. The Pri:sid,:111 vol. 2 (Ncw York: Simon and Schuster.
1984). p. J 10.
" Q uoted in Ambrose:, £isenltm,·a: Tiu: Pri:sidi:111. p. J 10.
 
See,et
 
Seeret NOFOAN
Chapter 2
 
87
 
Although the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX
was limited in quantity, it was still some of the best and most com­
plete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War IL It
was referred to as "pioneer" photography because it provided a base­
line for all future overhead photography. Even innocuous photos of
such things as forests and streams proved valuable in later years when
U-2 and satellite photography revealed construction activity.
Of still greater importance to the U-2 program, however, was the
data that US and NATO radars obtained as they tracked the paths of
the balloons-whose average altitude was 45,800 feet-over the
Soviet Bloc. This data provided the most accurate record to date of
high-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later
able to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.
One completely fortuitous development from Project
GENETRIX had nothing to do with the cameras but involved a steel
bar. This bar served a dual purpose: the rigging of the huge polyethyl­
ene gasbag was secured to the top of the bar and the camera-payload
_and automatic-ballasting equipment was attached to the bottom. By
sheer chance, the length of the bar-91 centimeters-corresponded to
the wavelength of the radio frequency used by a Soviet radar known
by its NATO designator as TOKEN. This was an S-band radar used
by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled intercept.
The bar on the GENETRIX balloons resonated when struck by
TOKEN radar pulses, making it possible for radar operators at US
and NATO installations on the periphery of the Soviet Union to locate
a number of previously unknown TOKEN radars.
These radar findings, coupled with other intercepts made during
the balloon flights, provided extensive data on Warsaw Pact radar net­
works, radar sets, and ground-controlled interception techniques.
Analysis of these intercepts revealed the altitude capabilities and
tracking accuracy of radars, the methods used by Warsaw Pact nations
to notify each other of the balloons' passage (handing off), and the
altitudes at which Soviet aircraft could intercept the balloons. All of
this information could be directly applied to future U-2 missions.'~
 
'' Final Report. Project l 19L, 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 March 1956. D-582, General Summary (TS, declassified 1979).
 
i,eeret
 
Seeret NOFORP•
 
Chapter 2
88
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protesLS. CIA officials be­
came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights. including those
by the U-2. which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the ..additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights. thus increasing the di ffi.culties of policy decisions which
73
would permit such operations in the: future."
In addition to its concern for tlhe future of the U-2 program. the
Agency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over­
flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee-a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany-used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.
 
AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR :SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although know ledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded se­
cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956. Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell , the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom­
mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem­
bers of the House of Representati ves should also be in formed. As a
resu lt of the senators' recornmendllttion that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee shou ld be briefed, Dul les later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congress.ional knowledge of the U-2 pro­
ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcomrninee
did not recei\·e a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss
7
of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Sov iet Union in May 1960. "
" Philip G. Strong. Attachment 10 Mcmoran<l um for DCI Dulks...Projcct GENETRIX
Summary." 15 Fcbruary 1956. OSI records (S)1.
" John S. Warn.:r. Lcgislativc Counsel. McrnoranJum for the Rccord ...AQUATONE
Bri.:tings:· 18 Novc:mbc:r 1957. Office of C,ongressional Affairs rci:onJs. job 61-357.
box 2 (S): Wam.:r interview (S).
 
Secr:et
 
~eeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 2
89
 
THE U-2 COVER STORY
In February 1956, while the controversy over balloon flights was still
raging and the U-2 was completing its final airworthiness tests,
Richard Bissell and his staff began working on a cover story for over­
seas operations. It was important to have a plausible reason for de­
ploying such an unusual looking plane, whose glider wings and odd
landing gear were certain to arouse curiosity.
Bissell decided that the best cover for the deployment of the U-2
was an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). Such a cover
story, however, needed the approval of all concerned: Air Force intel­
ligence, the Air Weather Service, the Third Air Force, the Seventh Air
Division, the SAC U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters
project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr. Hugh Dryden. Moreover,
the CIA Scientific Advisory Committee was also consulted about the
cover plan.
Senior CIA officials and the other agencies involved in provid• ing cover for the U-2 approved the final version of the overall cover
story at the end of March 1956. The project staff then began working
on contingency plans for the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory.
Bissell advised the project's cover officer to "produce a document
which sets forth all actions to be taken ... not only press releases and
the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of operations and
at least an indication of the diplomatic action.... We should at least
make the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really
orderly fashion." The cover officer then prepared emergency proce­
dures based on the overall weather research cover story, and Bissell
approved these plans. There was one final high-level look at the cover
story on 21 June 1956, the day after the first U-2 mission over Eastern
Europe, when Bissell met with General Goodpaster, James Killian,
and Edwin Land to discuss the pending overflights of the Soviet
Union, including the proposed emergency procedures. Killian and
Land disagreed with Bissell's concept and made a much bolder and
more forthright proposal: in the event of the loss of a U-2 over hostile
territory, the United States should not try to deny responsibility but
should state that overflights were being conducted "to guard against
surprise attack." This proposal was put aside for further thought
(which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re­
mained the basis for statements to be made after a loss. The project
staff then went on to prepare a number of different statements to be
 
See,et
 
Sec, et NOfORN
 
Chapter 2
90
 
used in various scenarios, including one in which the pilot was cap­
tured. Even in such a case, however, the proposed policy was for the
United States to stick to the weather research cover story, a course of
action that would prove disastrous in May 1960. 75
 
" OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 30-35; chap. 11, annex 73 (TS Codeword).
 
Secrei
 
~ q) ~
 
QI C0V\L
 
.~ 7~­
 
BlanL
 
iee,et NOFORN
Chapter 3
93
 
U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968
 
By January 1956, everyone working on Project AQUATONE could
see that the U-2 was nearing the time for operational deployment.
During tests the aircraft had met all the criteria established in late
I954. Its range of 2,950 miles was sufficient to overfly continents, its
altitude of 72,000 feet was beyond the reach of all known antiaircraft
weapons and interceptor aircraft, and its camera lenses were the finest
available.
Because the main targets for the U-2 lay behind the Iron Curtain.
Bissell and his staff began looking for operational bases in Europe.
The United Kingdom, America's closest ally, seemed the logical
choice for U-2 bases, and, on 10 January 1956, Bissell flew to
London to discuss the maner with Royal Air Force (RAF) and MI-6
officials. Their initial response was favorable, but they told Bissell
that the proposal needed approval at a much higher level.
Bissell reported his findings to DCI Dulles, who promptly ar­
ranged to meet with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in Londcin to
explore the possibility of winning the British Government's approval
for the project. Dulles presented his case to Lloyd on 2 February, and,
by early March. Prime Minister Anthony Eden approved the basing of
U-2s in the United Kingdom. The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB,
an RAF base also used by the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC).'
 
' OSA History. chap. 11. pp. 10-15 (TS Codeword).
 
Secaet
 
~eo,et PIIOFOAN
Chapter 3
 
94
 
THE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A
TO LAKENHEATH
The first Agency U-2 detachment, consisting of four aircraft and
pilots, was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance
Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The "provisional" designation
gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air
Force units did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1,
known within the Agency as Detachment A, began deploying to the
United Kingdom on 29 April 1956. By 4 May, all of the detachment's
personnel and equipment, including four aircraft, had arrived at
Lakenheath. !
Shortly after deployment, on 7 May, the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) released an unclassified U-2
cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown
by the USAF Air Weather Service to study such high-altitude phenom­
ena as the jet stream, convective clouds, temperature and wind struc­
tures at jet-stream levels, and cosmic-ray effects up to 55,000 feet. 3
Before overflights could begin from Lakenheath, however, sev­
eral incidents occurred that dampened Prime Minister Eden ·s interest
in having the U-2s on British territory. In mid-April 1956, a Soviet
naval squadron brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai
Bulganin on an official visit to the United Kingdom. Although the
ships were docked in Portsmouth Harbor, a British counterintelli­
gence operative and underwater expert, retired Royal Navy
Commander Lionel Crabb, apparently undertook a mission to exam­
ine the hulls of these vessels but vanished in the process. His headless
body was later found washed up on a beach. This so-called Frogman
Incident caused an uproar in Parliament and a protest from Moscow
that soured relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union. To avoid further deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, the
Prime Minister wrote to President Eisenhower on 16 May asking that
overflights be postponed. Only two days later, a U-2 on a training
flight from Lakenheath inadvertently penetrated the British radar net­
work, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry
made a public announcement that a special NACA aircraft was con­
ducting high-altitude research in the United Kingdom. At about the
' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword).
' Press Release of 7 May 1956 (U) in OSA History. chap. 7. annex 60 (TS Codeword).
 
Sec1et
 
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 3
95
 
same time, Richard Bissell learned that the State Department had told
Prime Minister Eden that only one U-2 was based at Lakenheath,
when in reality there were four.'
 
THE MOVE TO WIESBADEN
To avoid arousing further reaction in the United Kingdom and to
begin the program of U-2 overflights beyond the Iron Curtain without
further delay, Bissell moved Detachment A on 11 June I 956 to
Wiesbaden, one of the busiest airfields in West Germany, without
notifying West German authorities. The detachment commander, Col.
Frederick McCoy, was disappointed in his hope that the redeployment
of the U-2s could be accomplished without drawing undue attention.
The strange-looking planes, with bicycle-type wheels and wings so
long they touched the ground after landing, aroused considerable in­
terest. Wiesbaden was to be only a temporary home for Detachment
A; the Air Force began preparing Giebelstadt near the East German
border for use by the U-2s. Giebelstadt was an old World War II
airbase that had been one of the launching sites for the GENETRIX
balloons. 5
Soon after the four U-2s arrived in Wiesbaden, they were refitted
with the more powerful J57/P-3 l engines. The new engines were bet­
ter suited for operations behind the Iron Curtain because they were
less likely to suffer flameouts than the earlier model. Once the new
engines were installed, the aircraft received the designation U-2B. 6
Bissell was anxious to get the overflights started by late June
because SAC weather experts had predicted that the best weather for
photographing the Soviet Union would be between 20 June and 10
July. Bissell, however, had not yet received final authorization from
President Eisenhower to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. On 28
May 1956, when DCI Allen Dulles met with the President to discuss
the U-2's readiness for operations, Eisenhower still made no decision
on overflights. Three days later Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff
' Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British
Intelligence Community (New York. 1986). pp. 495-496; Beschloss, Mayday, p. I 16; OSA
History, chap. 11, pp. 18-21 (TS Codeword).
' OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 21-23 (TS Codeword).
 
• Ibid .. pp. 23, 26 (TS Codeword).
 
Secret
 
See1 et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 3
 
96
 
Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining
"AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President
Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi­
nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During
his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision
on the overflight program. 7
 
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS
The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet
Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence
about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con­
cerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war.
From the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower
had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to
hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft
were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the
Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of
the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the
same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to
take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.
In fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance mis­
sions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his
famous "Open Skies" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2
was still under development but making good progress. At the
Geneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower
offered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for
the Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military in­
stallations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with
similar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer.
Although the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept
his proposal. he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was
still being considered, Eisenhower had stated, 'Tl\ give it one shot.
Then if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2."x
' Ibid., pp. 23-25 and anne:( 73. "AQUATONE Operational Plans,.. 31 May 1956 (TS
Codeword).
·' Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105.
 
Secaet
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
 
97
 
Even though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of
the U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being
built to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize
such flights was very difficult for him. He remained concerned that
overflights could poison relations with the Soviet Union and might
even lead to hostilities. One argument that helped overcome the
President's reluctance was the CIA's longstanding contention that U-2
flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not
be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes. This belief was based
on a 1952 study of Soviet World War II-vintage radars and on 1955
tests using US radars, which-unknown to US officials-were not as
effective as Soviet radars against high-altitude targets. Shortly before
U-2 operations began, however, the CIA's Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study of the U-2 that was
published on 28 May 1956. The study's conclusion was that "Maxi­
mum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at ele­
vation in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles....
In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed." The OSI study
added, however, "It is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consis. tent tracking of the Project vehicle." 9 Completed just thr~e weeks be­
fore the initation of overflights, this study seems to have had little
impact on the thinking of the top project officials. They continued to
believe that the Soviets would not be able to track the U-2 and might
even fail to detect it, except for possible vague indications. 10
Soviet radars were not President Eisenhower's only concern.
Also fearing that a malfunction might cause a U-2 to crash inside the
Soviet Union, he asked Allen Dulles what the consequences would
be. The President's staff secretary, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who
was present at virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project
and served as the President's intermediary to the CIA on this issue,
later recalled:
Allen '.s approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did
lose one, the pilot would not survive. . . . We were told-and it
was part of our understanding of the situation-that it was al­
most certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could
 
• OSA Histor;,; chap. 11, p. 31 (TS Codeword). For the belief that the U-2 might go unde­
 
tected see the Leghorn interview and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961
(New York, 1965), p. 41.
"' Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, tape recording, Farmington,
Connecticut. 28 October I988 (S).
 
Secaet
 
ioe,et ().IQFORN
Chapter 3
98
 
Colonel Goodpaster with
President Eisenhower
 
wke it as a certainty that no pilot would survive .. . and that al­
though they would know where the plane came from, it would be
difficult to prove it in any con vincing way."
CIA assurances that the U-2 would probably not be detected. and
that a crashed U-2 could not be traced back to the United States,
helped overcome the President's worries about overflights. The most
important reason why President Eisenhower decided to send recon­
naissance aircraft over the Soviet Union, however, was the urgent
need for accurate intelligence to confirm or disprove claims of Soviet
advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of
the new Soviet Bison bomber in the spring of 1954 had been followed
by reported sightings of more than 30 of these bombers in the spring
and summer of 1955 (in reality these were sightings of the same
group of IO aircraft that circled around out of sight and made several
passes during a Soviet air show). Soon members of Congress were
calling for investigations into the relative strength of the US and
 
" Quoted in Bc:schloss, Mayday. p. 118.
 
6eeret
 
Seu et ftlUFOHN
 
Chapter 3
99
 
Soviet Air Forces. 12 Early in 1956, concern about a possible Soviet
advantage in long-range bombers grew as Air Force Chief of Staff
Twining informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the
Soviet Union already had more Bisons than the United States had
B-52s and that the Soviets would be able to "maintain this advantage
for some time if they keep on the production curve we are now pre­
dicting." 13 By May 1956, reporting on the growing Soviet air
strength was no longer confined to aviation journals; U.S. News and
World Report, for example, featured articles headlined "Can Soviets
Take the Air Lead?" and "Is U.S. Really Losing in the Air?" 1"'
Alongside fear of possible Soviet superiority in long-range
bombers came a new potential threat: Soviet progress in guided mis­
sile research. Trevor Gardner, Air Force Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development, warned in September 1955 that "the
most complex and baffling technological mystery today is not the
Russian capability in aircraft and nuclear weapons but rather what the
Soviet progress has been in the field of guided missiles." 15 On 30
January 1956, Time magazine made the guided missile its cover story.
. The article began by describing a hypothetical crisis set in 1962 in
which the United States suffered a humiliating defeat because it had
lagged behind the Soviet Union in guided missile development. 16 Just
two weeks after this story appeared, the Soviets successfully tested a
missile with a range of 900 miles, and President Eisenhower admitted
at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the
United States in some areas of the missile field. Administration critic
Senator Stuart Symington then claimed, "The facts are that our missile
development may be ahead in the short-range area, but their mis­
sile development is ahead in the area that counts by far the most-the
 
" Robert Hotz. "Russian Jet Airpower Gains Fast on US," Aviation Week, 23 May 1955,
pp. I 2-15; "Aviation Week Story Spurs Debate on US, Red Airpower Positions," Aviation
Week. 30 May 1955. pp. 13-14.
'' Claude Witze. "Russians Outpacing US in Air Quality, Twining Warns Congress."
Aviation Week, 27 February 1956. pp. 26-28; Robert Hotz, "Russian Air Force Now
Gaining in Quality," Aviation Week. 12 March I956, p. 286.
" "Can Soviets Take the Air Lead? What LeMay, Wilson, Ike Say,"' US News and World
Report. 11 May 1956, pp. 108-114; "ls U.S. Really Losing in the Air?" US News and
World Report. I 8 May I956. pp. 25-27.
" William Coughlin. "Gardner Defends Greater R&D Spending," Aviation Week. 26
September 1955, p. 14.
" "Missiles Away," Time. 30 January 1956, pp. 52-55.
S&&fCt
 
Seoret NOFOAN
Chapter 3
 
100
 
long-range area." 17 Fears of Soviet missile progress increased when
Nikita Khrushchev stated on 23 April 1956, "I am quite sure that we
shall have very soon a guided missile with a hydrogen-bomb warhead
which could hit any point in the world." 18
Faced with growing Congressional and public anxiety over
Soviet offensive capabilties, President Eisenhower approved the pro­
posed overflight program. Colonel Goodpaster relayed this decision
to Bissell, Land, and Killian at a meeting on 21 June. The President
nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized
only 10 days of overflights when operations over the Soviet Union
were ready to start in early July 1956. 19
 
FIRST OVERFLIGHTS OF EASTERN EUROPE
The CIA initiated U-2 flights over hostile territory even before the
President granted final approval for overflights of the Soviet Union.
After consulting with the Commander of US Air Force Europe,
Richard Bissell used existing Presidential permission for Air Force
overflights of the Soviet Union's East European satellites as his au­
thority to plan a mission over Poland and East Germany. Bissell had
informed the President of his intention to conduct such missions in
the "AQUATONE Operational Plan" submitted on 31 May.
The first operational use of a U-2 took place on Wednesday,
20 June 1956. Carl K. Overstreet flew a U-2 equipped with an
A-2 camera over Poland and East Germany. At the end of the mis­
sion, Detachment A immediately rushed the exposed film to the
United States for processing. The developed film arrived at the
Photo-Intelligence Division (PIO) on 22 June 1956. PIO personnel
considered the pictures obtained by mission 2003 to be of good
.
quaI1ty.0()
 
" Robert Hotz, "Firing of900-Mile Russian Missile Spurs US Changes," Aviation Week,
20 February 1956, p. 27.
" "Is Russia Really Ahead in Missile Race?." US News and World Report, 4 May 1956,
p. 34.
'" OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword): A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for
the Record, 21 June 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
"' OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 2003 (20 June 1956),
OSA records, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).
 
Secaet
 
6eeret NOFGRN
Chapter 3
 
101
 
Following the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to
begin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President
granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take
place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a
CIA and State Department recommendation that West German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to
overfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with ex­
isting policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of
Eastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had
invited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show,
which opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff
Nathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a
week, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet
Union be staged until the Air Force delegation had left. 11
Both of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union
were cleared up by the end of June. Accompanied by General Cabell
and the Chief of Station for Germany, Tracy Barnes, Bissell briefed
Chancellor Adenauer and his trusted adviser, State Secretary Hans
_ Globke, on 27 June. Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the project. 11
A few days later the Air Force delegation returned from
Moscow, but now unfavorable weather prevented the start of opera­
tions against the Soviet Union.
While waiting for the clouds over the Soviet Union to clear,
Detachment A carried out two more overflights of Eastern Europe on
2 July 1956: mission 2009 over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria; and mission 2010 over East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
Romania. That afternoon Bissell and DDCI Cabell gave President
Eisenhower a detailed briefing on the first U-2 overflight, which the
President found "very interesting, very positive." Eisenhower was
anxious to know, however, whether radars had tracked the aircraft.
Bissell replied that, although East European radars had picked up the
20 June flight, radar operators had misread the altitude as only 42,000
feet. He added that the Agency was awaiting reports on that morn­
ing's flights to see if they, too, had been detected. Noting that the U-2
 
" Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1966), pp. 259-260; OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword).
"' OSA History, chap. 11. p. 28 (TS Codeword).
 
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Chapter 3
 
104
 
detachment had four aircraft working and could average up to two
flights per day, Bissell told the President that the crews were "ready
and eager to go in beyond the satellites" and overfly the center of the
Soviet Union. 23
Eisenhower replied that he thought it "urgent" to know whether
the recent flights had been tracked by hostile radars. The President
was obviously concerned that CIA estimates that the U-2 could fly
virtually undetected were proving false. One of the reasons why he
had approved the overflight program was the CIA's assurance that the
Soviet Union would remain unaware of the flights or-at the very
worst-receive only occasional, vague indications.
 
FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION
 
The question of how well the Soviets could track U-2 flights had not
yet been settled when the first overflights of the Soviet Union took
place. On Wednesday, 4 July 1956, the U-2 known as Article 347 be­
gan the first flight over the Soviet Union. Final authorization for mis­
sion 2013 had come shortly before takeoff. Late on the evening of 3
July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building to
give the "Go" or "No go" decision. Although the President had ap­
proved the overflight, the final decision to start a mission depended
on a number of factors, especially the weather over the target area and
at the takeoff and landing sites. Bissell made the decision just before
midnight Washington time, which was six o'clock in the morning in
Wiesbaden. This pattern of last-minute approvals continued for the
duration of the U-2 overflight program. 2•
When Wiesbaden received the "Go" signal, a U-2 equipped with
an A-2 camera and flown by pilot Hervey Stockman took off on a
course that took it over Poznan, Poland, where riots had occurred on
28-30 June. After Poznan, Stockman headed for Belorussia, where he
turned north to Leningrad. The last leg of the mission took the U-2
over the Soviet Baltic states before returning to Wiesbaden. The main
target of this mission was the naval shipyards in Leningrad, center of
 
" Andrew J. Goodpaster·s handwritten notes on 2 July 1956 meeting, WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).
,. Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
 
-ieerct
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
105
 
the Soviet Union's submarine construction program. Mission 2013's
route also overflew a number of major military airfields to make an
1
inventory of the new Bison jet-engine heavy bomber. s
The second overflight, on the following day, continued the
search for Bison bombers. Pilot Carmine Vito's route was similar but
somewhat to the south of Stockman's and also flew farther east, more
than 200 kilometers past Moscow. Although the Soviet capital was al­
most completely hidden by clouds, the A-2 camera with haze filters
took some usable photographs of the city. These turned out to be the
only U-2 photographs of Moscow because no other mission was sent
over the Soviet capital. Among the key targets photographed during
mission 2014 were the Fili airframe plant, where the Bison was being
built; the bomber arsenal at Ramenskoye. where the Bisons weire test­
ed; the Kaliningrad missile plant; and the Khimki rocket-,engine
plant.=0
When Allen Dulles returned to work on Thursday. 5 July 1956.
he asked Bissell if any overflights had taken place during the
Independence Day holiday. One had been made on the fqurth and an­
other just that morning, Bissell replied. (Because of the six-hour time
difference, the 5 July flight was safely back in Wiesbaden by the
time Dulles spoke to Bissell.) When Dulles asked the routes of these
missions. Bissell told him that they had overflown both Moscciw and
Leningrad. "Oh my Lord." Dulles exclaimed, "do you thi1:1k that
was wise the first time?" "Allen." Bissell replied. "the first is the
safest." :,
President Eisenhower also wanted to know the results of the 4
and 5 July flights, but his principal concern was whether there had
been any indication that either flight had been discovered or tracked
by radar. Eisenhower told Colonel Goodpaster "to advise Mr. Allen
 
" Urban J. Linehan. Na1io11al Phowgraphic /merpretatio11 Center: The Years of Project
HTAUTOMAT. 1956- 1958. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series
NPIC-3. December 1974. 6 vols. (hereafter cited as NPIC History). vol. l, p. 20 (S):
Mission folder 2013 (4 July 1956). OSA records. job 67-8-328. bo,c 7 (TS Codeword).
Note on mission numbers: each proposed mission received a number. but not all of these
missions were flown.
'" NP/C History. vol. I. p. 21 (S): Mission folder 2014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job
67-8-328. box 7 (TS Codeword).
 
" Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S).
 
Sect et NOFOffN
 
Chapter 3
 
106
 
Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the
flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus­
pended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that
reports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be
available for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials
met with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime.
Goodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive
was that the operation should continue "at the maximum rate until the
first evidence of tracking was received." 1"
Although President Eisenhower had originally spoken of sus­
pending the overflights if they were ''discovered or tracked," his
main concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions,
meaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for
most or all of the missions and thus have numerous opportunities to
attempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights
could not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June over­
flight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unre­
alistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the
Soviets could successfully track U-2 missions. he wanted the over­
flights halted. ! 9 Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two
overflights of the Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These re­
ports showed that. although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and
made several very unsuccessful attempts at interception. they could
not track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage
was weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and
Leningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown
these two cities. 30
Detachment A carried out three more overflights of the Soviet
Union during the 10-day period authorized by the President. Two of
the missions (2020 and 2021) took place on a single day, 9 July 1956.
They covered much of Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine and
Belorussia in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately. a broken camera
 
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 5 July 1956. WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).
'" Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washington. DC. 8 July 1987 (S).
"' Mission fold.:rs 2013 (4 July 1956) and 1014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job
67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).
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Chapter 3
108
 
shutter ruined much of the photography of one of the flights. The
third mission (2023), on the following day, included the Crimean
Peinsula. 31
The film from the first overflight (4 July) was flown to the
United States immediately after the U-2 landed at Wiesbaden. Several
members of the Photo Intelligence Division were on hand when the
film was developed to check on the results. Also present was James
Baker, who had accepted an offer by project officials to get a first­
hand look at how the new A-2 lenses were working.·' 1
The photos from July overflights were generally good, despite
occasional problems caused by cloud cover. The huge amount of film
taken by these missions provided more information about the Soviet
Union's ability to track and intercept U-2s. Photointerpreters examin­
ing the films eventually discovered the tiny images of MiG-15s and
MiG- l 7s beneath the U-2s in various pursuit and attack attitudes:
climbing, flipping over, and falling toward Earth. It was even possible
to determine their approximate altitudes. These photographs showed
that the Soviet air defense system was able to track U-2s well enough
to attempt interception, but they also provided proof that the fighter
aircraft available to the Soviet Union in l 956 could not bring down a
U-2 at operational altitude. )l
One problem with early U-2 photography became apparent only
after the first films were developed. If there was surface water on the
runway at Wiesbaden when the U-2 took off, the camera windows be­
came begrimed. Although the water dried during the flight, the oily
scum it left behind degraded the photographic image. To combat this
problem, AQUATONE ground crews took brooms and spent several
hours before takeoff sweeping puddles of water from the runway to
be used by the U-2. Kelly Johnson eventually designed a jettisonable
cover for the camera windows, which was released at the same time
as the pogos so that it could be recovered and reused. 34
 
" Mission folders 2020 (9 July 1956), 2021 (9 July 1956), and 2023 ( 10 July 1956), OSA
records. job 67-8-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).
" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
'"' Baker interview (S).
 
Sec, et
 
Sect et NOFORl'1
 
Chapter 3
 
109
 
SOVIET PROTEST NOTE
The 4 and 5 July overflights brought a strong protest from the Soviet
Union on 10 July in the form of a note handed to the US Embassy in
Moscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a
"twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force" and
gave details of the routes flown by the first two missions. The note
did not mention Moscow or Leningrad, however, because the Soviets
had not been able to track these portions of the overflights. The
Soviet note stated that the flights could only be evaluated as "inten­
tional and conducted for the purposes of intelligence .., As soon as the
note arrived at the White House on the evening of 10 July 1956,
Colonel Goodpaster called Bissell and told him to stop all U-2 over­
flights until further notice. The next morning Goodpaster met with
Bissell to review the U-2 situation. Bissell said three additional flights
had taken place since the missions mentioned in the Soviet note but
added that no more were planned. 35
__ - Later Eisenhower told Goodpaster that he "didn't like a thing"
about the Soviet note and was going to discuss the matter with
Secretary of State Dulles. With the strong approval of President
Eisenhower, Goodpaster informed DCI Dulles that "there is to be no
mention of the existence of this project or of operations incident to it,
outside the Executive Branch, and no mention within the Executive
Branch to others than those who directly need to know of the opera­
tion, as distinguished from output deriving from it." 36
During these initial overflights, the U-2 flew above 69,000 feet
and could be seen only fleetingly by pilots of the Soviet interceptor
aircraft. Thus, it appears that the Soviet claim that the intruder was a
twin-engine bomber was probably based on the assumption that this
was another overflight by a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine
Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in
1953. The US reply, sent to the Soviets on 19 July, truthfully denied
that any US "military planes" had overflown the Soviet Union on the
days in question. Meanwhile, on 16 July the Polish Ambassador to
 
" "Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I0, I 956 with U.S. Reply, ..
US Department of State Bulletin, 30 July I 956, pp. 19 I- I92: Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
 
Seeaet
 
Sec,el NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
 
110
 
the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of
Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note
from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was
sent to the two Soviet satellite states. 37
The details of the flightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish pro­
tests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence of Soviet in­
terception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected
over the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked
for extended periods of time. This news greatly disturbed President
Eisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the
President recalled how he had been told that "not over a very minor
percentage of these (flights) would be picked up." He went on to
question "how far this should now be pushed, knowing that detection
is not likely to be avoided." After discussing the possibility of basing
U-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had
"lost enthusiasm" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United
States were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, "the
reaction would be drastic." The President was also concerned that the
American public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that
their country had violated international law. He stated, "Soviet pro­
tests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would
• ano th er. ,, 38
be quite
The President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not
lost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he
met with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to
help make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to
reduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less sus­
ceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and sug­
gested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore
them. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a
project known as HTNAMABLE to establish a proprietary firm called
the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge. Former Air
Force Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the
Agency when it began on 26 November 1956. SEI was staffed by sev­
eral MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into
·" .. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I0, 1956 with U.S. Reply,"
US Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp.
32-33 (TS Codeword).
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
 
Searet
 
Sec, et NOFOAP4
 
Chapter 3
 
111
 
radar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The ef­
fort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end of the
39
year.
 
THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP
During the three-week period of 20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had
made eight overflights beyond the Iron Curtain, including five over
the Soviet Union. PID's photointerpreters were busy until the end of
August with their initial evaluation of the photography obtained by
these flights. Their efforts were complicated by the division's move
on 9 July from Que Building to the Steuart Building, but, when the
photo interpreters were finished, they were able to write "finis" to the
controversy over Soviet bomber strength.
Although the Air Force had claimed that the Soviet Union pos­
sessed almost 100 of the new Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers,
U-2 photography proved this assertion wrong. There were no Bison
6ombers at any of the nine long-range bomber bases photographed by
the July missions. DCI Allen Dulles was particularly impressed by
the photographs of the Soviet bomber bases, which in later years he
called "million-dollar" photography. The actual value of the U-2
photos was probably even greater because, on the strength of their ev­
idence, the White House was able to deny Air Force requests for ad­
ditional B-52 bombers to "catch up" to the Soviets."0
Because of the need to protect the source of the information
about Soviet bomber strength, the controversy surrounding this issue
did not immediately die down. In November 1956, when the CIA
began providing new Bison production figures based on U-2 photog­
raphy without identifying the source, some members of Congress­
unaware of the existence of the U-2-questioned the motivation be­
hind the reduced estimates. They suggested that either the earlier es­
timates of Soviet bomber strength had been inflated to increase Air
Force appropriations or the new estimates had been reduced by
White House direction in order to hold down military expenditures.
 
•• Records of Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records (TS
Codeword).
~• NP!C History, vol. I. p. 23 (S).
 
Seeret
 
Seeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 3
112
 
No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal
that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for
this change in the estimates."
The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused
problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply
restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to
U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba­
sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot"
could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure
room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the
room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information
too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts
did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the
production of intelligence estimates: 1
 
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of
President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used
elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for
U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gama! Abdel
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de­
cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi­
nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked
an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2
program.
Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to
deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I
May 1956, US Charge d' Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime
Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETRIX pro­
gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in­
volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet
plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the
" John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military
Strength (New York: Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
 
~eeret
 
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 3
 
113
 
Bases for U-2 Operations in the Middle East, 1956
 
NORTH
 
ATLANTIC
 
OCellN
 
~·
 
;;·,,.
 
&eeret f'40FOAP◄
 
Suez takeover, however, the second contingent of U-2 aircraft and pi­
lots was still being trained in Nevada. This unit would not be ready
for redeployment before the end of August and would not become es­
tablished at Incirlik airbase near Adana, Turkey, until early September
1956. The Agency referred to the AQUATONE detachment at Adana
as Detachment B, cryptonym KWCORK; the Air Force covername
was Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional 2; and the unit's
unofficial name was Tuslog Detachment 10-10. By whatever name,
the Adana detachment became the mainstay of U-2 activity for the
next three and a half years.' 3
The fast-moving events of the Suez Crisis would not wait for
Detachment B pilots to complete their training. With tension growing
between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company's former owners, the
United Kingdom and France, as well as between Egypt and Israel.. US
'·' OSA History. chap. 11. pp. 9. 39-40: chap. 12. pp. 5. 12 (TS Codeword).
 
Geeret
 
Secret NOFORI\I
Chapter 3
114
 
military and foreign policy planners needed immediate information
about developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Detachment A was,
therefore, assigned the first Middle East overflights. On 29 August,
U-2 missions 1104 and 1105 left Wiesbaden and overflew the eastern
Mediterranean littoral, starting with Greece, then Egypt, Israel,
Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Because these target areas were beyond
the round trip range of the Wiesbaden-based U-2s, the planes landed
at Adana for refueling. The next day, the same two planes, with dif­
ferent pilots, took off from Adana and overflew the same Middle East
territory, this time including the Gaza Strip, before returning to
Wiesbaden. The film contained evidence of large numbers of British
troops on Malta and Cyprus and more new French-made aircraft in
Israel than had previously been reported."'"'
As the situation around Suez grew more tense, the Eisenhower
administration decided to release some of the U-2 photos to the
British Government. On 7 September, James Reber, chairman of the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, and Arthur Lundahl, chief of the
Photo Intelligence Division, flew to London, taking with them photos
of the eastern
Mediterranean area, including the Suez Canal, taken on
.
30 August. These were the first and the only photos of the Middle
East that the President authorized to be given to the British during the
1956 crisis! 5
.
 
The Eisenhower administration viewed the developments in the
eastern Mediterranean with great concern. To keep the President and
Secretary of State abreast of developments in the area, Deputy
Director for Intelligence Robert Amory established on 12 September
a multiagency group known as the PARAMOUNT Committee to
monitor the situation on a round-the-clock basis. The PARAMOUNT
Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building.
Composed of members from CIA, State, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air
Force, this committee met daily-frequently several times a day-to
produce reports based on information obtained from U-2 photogra­
phy, communications and electronic intelligence, and agents. The
photointerpreters working for the PARMOUNT committee also came
from several agencies: the CIA, the Army, and the Navy. 46
.... Mission folders 1104 (29 August 1956) and 1105 (29 August 1956), OSA records, job
67-8-972, box 6 (TS Codeword).
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword); NP/C History, vol. I, pp. 56-58 (S).
 
.. NP/C History, vol. I. pp. 47-49, 54-56 (S).
 
Secret
 
~etNOFORN
Chapter 3
115
 
The Suez Crisjs was a major turning point in the use of the U-2
airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector
of strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more
important than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the
manufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in
Washington using the most up-to-date devices. Now. because of the
Middle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like
a tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after
landing for instant interpretation or "readout." Photo-Intelligence
Division personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film ex­
ploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing of the
U-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on
tactical developments around Suez.
PIO acted quickly co carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and
Reber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe head­
quarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September to make arrangements for
processing and inte retin U-2 film in West Gennany. They had
been preceded by:.,;--,r;,.,.-.,...,..-,.-,.,..,....,-..,.1 hief of PIO's Special · Projects
sions with Air Force photoBranch. Following eta1 e
. intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a por­
tion of a nea,by Air F-; photo laboratory for developing U-2 film.
With the assistance ofl
lchi7~TAUTOMAT
photo laboratory, and 1r t-orce personnel,L _ _ J had the lab
ready for processing on the following day, when the next U-2 mission
f m the Middle East. After quickly developing the film,
d his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel stud1 d 1t or indications of British and French preparations for hostilities
and sent their first report to Washington on 15 September.
 
C
 
Although the Air Force provided considerable assistance in es­
tablishing!
[photo laboratory, Air Force officials did not
like the idea of CIA personnel controlling overseas photo processing
and interpretation centers, which were normally under Air Force con­
trol. Further negotiations led to a CIA-Air Force agreement at the end
of October. under which the Air Force would name the commanding
officer for such installations and the CIA would designate the deputy,
who was responsible for technical and intelligence matters:'
PIO soon added two photointerpreters and a lab technician to the
West German operation, which continued to develop and interpret
U-2 photography of the Middle East throughout September and
' ' Ibid.. pp. 49-52 (S).
 
Geeret
 
Secret NOPOAN
 
Chapter 3
116
 
October 1956. This unit's timely and accurate information enabled the
PARAMOUNT Committee to predict the j oint Israeli-Bri tish-French
attack on Egypt three days before it took place.
On I I September, Detachment A pilot Jacob Kratt overflew the
French Mediterranean naval base at Toulon. He brought back imagery
revealing that France was loading troopships at Toulon. During the
rest of the month, Detachment A pilots flew another eight missions
over the Middle East. By this time, the new Detachment B in Turkey
was ready for operations, and it was better positioned to provide cov­
erage of the Middle East. Detachment B began flying missions in
September and soon became the primary detachment for Middle East
overflights, conducting nine out of the IO such missions flown in
October...s
Detachment B's first U-2 flight, on 11 September 1956, made
passes over Turkey, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The next flight, more than
two weeks later, covered much the same ground but flew as far west
as Malta, Sicily, and Crete. Both were "special" missions aimed at
maintaining surveillance of the British and French fleets and forces as
they prepared for the attack on Egypt. Meanwhile, Detachment A pi­
lots flew four missions in the Western Mediterranean.
During this period, the PARAMOUNT Committee's photo­
interpreters developed the new science of "tent-ology"-counting the
tents of British forces on the islands of Cyprus and Malta to deter­
mine the number of troops deployed. The photointerpreters used
changes in the number of tents to determine that the British forces
were beginning to move toward the beaches, where they were eventu­
ally lightered to offshore troopships."
Noting the U-2 activity in the Middle East, President Eisenhower
wrote in his diary on 15 October 1956: "Our high-flying reconnais­
sance planes have shown that Israel has obtained some 60 of the
French Mystere pursuit planes, when there had been reported the
50
transfer of only 24... Other U-2 photographs revealed the presence
 
"' OSA History. chap. 19. annex 120. "CIA U-2 Missions Flown. 1956-1968." pp. 1-2 (TS
 
Codeword).
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
'" Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary. 15 October 1956. DDEL.
 
Sec. et N6fOFU~
Chapter 3
 
117
 
.9f British Canberra bombers at Akrotiri, Cyprus: The Anglo-French
military buildup greatly irritated President Eisenhower, who consid­
ered these activities a violation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in
which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had agreed
to m~ntain the status quo in armaments and borders in the Middle
EastXfo Arthur Lundahl he remarked, "It's a hell of a note when you
have to G-2 your friends." s(
 
c
 
U-2 photography continued to keep the President and other key
officials well informed about the progress of the crisis. }lights over
Israel and Rhodes on 21 October and Cyprus on 25 October revealed
heavy military concentrations and an increase in the number of troop
transports and air forces. On the basis of this information,: Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles told the President on 28 October that he
believed an Israeli attack on Jordan was imminent, adding that he
thought the British and French would take advantage of such an at­
tack to occupy the Suez Canal. 51
The 10-day Middle East war began on the afternoon of 29
October 1956 with Israeli paratroop drops in the Sinai peninsula, fol­
lowed by mobile columns striking deep into Egyptian territory. tfhe
next day, 30 October, Francis Gary Powers conducted mission 1314.
He overflew Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and finally the Sinai.Jwhere he
photographed black puffs of smoke from the fighting between Israel
and Egypt. Adana-based U-2s were in the air for the next two days
filming the Suez Canal area@fld neighboring countrie£f3
The United Kingdom and France entered the fray on the evening
of 31 October with bombing raids against major Egyptian airfields.
The Anglo-French bombing campaign continued for the next 48
hours. Ear)Y on the morning of 1 November, an Adana-based U-2, pi­
loted by LWilliam Hall, took off to gather intelligence on the
Anglo-French military activity. After photographing Cyprus, Hal]
flew south to the Sinai Desert, where he made several passes to obtain
complete coverage of the Israeli-Egyptian fighting there. [He then
headed west to Cairi passing directly over the main Egyptian airbase
 
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
" Telephone calls, 28 October 1956, DOE Diary, DDEL.
'' Powers, Operation Overflight, pp. 308-309; Mission folder 1314 (30 October 1956),
OSA records, job 67-B-972, box I (TS Codeword).
 
-Secret
 
Mission 1316, 1 November 1956
 
Turkey
lncirlik Airbase
 
_/\
 
o/
 
t.
 
</
\
 
f
Cyprus ',
(U.K .)
 
'·
 
Syria
 
Mediterranean Sea
 
Sinai
 
Egypt('!
 
(~ Pemnsula
 
\ t
 
{1
 
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Jz
 
Saudi
Arabia
 
..........
 
1====\=°'=l=
(""
====l (
........,~
...._...
1t:=============:::l Secret NOFORN l=:=:±:::::::::===========
==:!J
7:14' "" (l!OOa<131
:I ---'----r-...&.100-_--,,oo....,.
 
44?•
 
Sec, et NOFOA~
Chapter 3
119
 
at Almaza, where he filmed neatly arranged rows of Egyptian military .' ============::i
.
. .
.
.
r: ! U-2 photography of Egyptian
aircraft. Contmumg past Cairo to film another a1rfield,U:lal.!Jturned · airbase at Almaza,
southeast and then north to fly along the Nile, again crossing directly i 29 October 1956
,,.... .....
over Almaza. The photography from this leg of the mission rev,eaJed
the burning wreckage of the Egyptian aircraft During the short period
of time that had passed betweenCHall's tw~ passes, a combined
Anglo-French air armada had attacked the airbase. When shown the
before and after photos of Almaza, President Eisenhower told Arthur
Lundahl: "Ten-minute reconnaissance, now that's a goal to shoot
for!" Eisenhower was pleased with the aerial photography but
)4
 
~
 
'"' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword); i3eschloss (Mayday. p. 138) mistak­
enly identifi~ this quote as coming from the British, but they did not receive copies of
these photos:__i
 
See,et
 
Seeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 3
120
 
angered by what it depicted: an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. He
quickly called for a cease-fire ~and denied the United Kingdom any
further U-2 photographs of the Middle Eaaj
The l November mission over Cyprus and Egypt also photo­
graphed Anglo-French preparations to invade Egypt. President
Eisenhower was informed of this impending invasion on Sunday, 4
November. On the following day, British and French paratroopers
dropped near Port Said at the north end of the Suez Canal. This action
prompted Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin to send messages to
France, Britain, and Israel warning that the Soviet Union was ready to
use force to crush the aggressors. 55
Early on the morning of election day, 6 November, the
Anglo-French invasion armada arrived at Port Said and began landing
troops. Back in Washington President Eisenhower met with Allen
Dulles to discuss the deepening international crisis. Worried that the
Soviet Union might be poised to intervene in the war, the President
ordered Dulles to have the Adana-based U-2s fly over Syria to see
whether the Soviets were moving planes to Syrian airbases in
preparation for a strike against the forces attacking Egypt. The answer
to Eisenhower's question came much sooner than expected because
on the previous day a U-2 had already overflown Syria before making
a run across northern Egypt. The film from this flight had reached
Wiesbaden for processing and readout during the night. The results
were in the hands of the PARAMOUNT Committee by midmorning
on 6 November, while the President was motoring to Gettysburg to
cast his ballot. By the time the President returned to the White House
by helicopter at noon, Colonel Goodpaster was waiting for him with
an answer: there were no Soviet aircraft in Syria. Because of the
President's concern about possible Soviet moves, Syria was the target
of 14 additional U-2 flights between 7 November and 18 December
1956. 56
The increasing reliance on Adana-based U-2s for coverage of the
Middle East during the Suez Crisis made it difficult for the
photointerpreters to supply timely information. When Detachment B
aircraft returned to their base at Adana, there were no film-processing
" Donald Neff, Warriors at Sue:-.: Eisenhower Takes America intv the Middle East (New
York: Simon and Schuster. 1981 ), p. 403.
'" Memorandum of Conference. 6 November 1956. Eisenhower Diary, Whitman File,
DDEL (U); OSA History, chap. 19, annex 120, p. 3 (TS Codeword).
 
iearet
 
~.,et NOFORP4
Chapter 3
121
 
facilities available, and the film had to be flown to Wiesbaden, adding
a 10- to 15-hour delay. During the gradual buildup of the crisis, this
delay had been tolerated, but, once actual hostilities broke out, US
decisionmakers needed a more rapid response. On 29 October,
Richard Bissell ordered Lundahl to establish a fi lm-processing facility
at Adana. Two PlD employees went to Adana on 13 November to set
up the facility, and two photointerpreters moved from Wiesbaden to
Adana to help in the effort. Forward processing was, however, ham­
pered by the location of the Adana facility on a tlat, arid plain in
southern Turkey, 35 miles from the Mediterranean at the very end of a
long supply line.
The PID team obtained and outfitted a trailer for film processing,
but many problems had to be overcome. The first major problem was
obtaining enough clean water. Detachment B personnel, therefore,
purchased large amounts of borax locally for use in purifying water.
In fact, they bought so much borax on the local market that one of
them was arrested by the Turkish police. who believed he was using
the chemical to make drugs. It was also difficult to obtain a constant
source of developers and fixers for processing the U-2 film, si nce the
large Air Force supply facility at Wheelus AFB in Libya refused to
provide the needed photographic chemicals. When PIO personnel ac­
companied processed film from Turkey to the United States, they re­
turned to Turkey sitting atop cartons of chemicals for the next day's
processing. At first, film was developed in improvised tanks using
flimsy wooden spools and hand-turned cranks to move the film
through the solutions. Later, the Adana facility moved from its trailer
to a building and received more up-to-date processing equipment. As
was the case with the photo lab in Germany, the Adana lab's person­
57
nel came from the Agency and the armed forces.
The need to produce very timely intelligence diminished after
the British and French agreed to a cease-fire on 7 November 1956. By
the end of the month, foreign troops began evacuating Egyptian terri­
tory, and the pressure on the Adana photointerpretation unit eased.
The facility remained in existence, however, and was used twice in
December 1956 and 11 times in the first half of 1957. It was then
placed in caretaker status, for emergency use only.
 
" NP/C History. vol. I. pp. 53-54 (S): Lun<hhl ~nd Brugioni in terview (TS Codeword).
 
Geeret
 
Sec,el NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
122
 
RENEWED OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Throughout the fall of 1956, U-2s provided valuable coverage of the
Middle East crisis, but they were not conducting their original mission
of strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower
had halted all such overflights by his order of 10 July, and, in the
months that followed, he remained unconvinced by CIA arguments in
favor of a resumption of overflights. On 17 September 1956, DDCI
Cabell and Richard Bissell went to the White House to ask President
Eisenhower to authorize more flights over the Soviet Union. Adm.
Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also at­
tended the meeting. Bissell and Defense Department representatives
reviewed the valuable intelligence from the July U-2 flights, and
Bissell then informed Eisenhower that many important intelligence re­
quirements remained unfilled. To fill these requirements, Bissell not­
ed, would require photography of approximately 15 separate areas of
the Soviet Union. Pleading for the authority to resume overflights,
Bissell stressed that conditions for photography were becoming less
favorable as the days grew shorter. While the U-2 was then still safe
from interception, he added, it might not be in the future. 5K
President Eisenhower aclrnowledged the value of the U-2 but
emphasized that the international political aspects of overflights re­
mained his overriding concern. He said he would talk further with
John Foster Dulles about the matter, noting that the Secretary of State
had at first seemed to belittle the political risk but had later found it
increasingly worrisome.
A little more than two weeks later, on 3 October, when the
President again met with Bissell, Cabell, and Radford, John Foster
Dulles was also present. In opening the meeting, Eisenhower said he
had become discouraged regarding Project AQUATONE. Although
he had been assured that "there would be a good chance of not being
discovered on most, if not all, operations, just the opposite had
proved true." The President observed that arguments in favor of re­
suming U-2 operations did not take world opinion into consideration.
He added that great efforts had been made for many years "to create
an opinion in the world that we are not truculent and do not want
war," and, if knowledge of the U-2 overflights got out, world opinion
would view them as "provocative and unjustified." 59
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference. 17 September 1956, WHOSS,
Alpha, DDEL (TS).
,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 3 October 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
-Se&FOt
 
-5-ec,-et NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
123
 
Secretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially
agreed with the President's comments, he thought that "really impor­
tant results" might be obtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He,
nevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the results. DDCI
Cabell replied that U-2 photographs would be useful much longer
than the Secretary of State had implied because they would establish
a reference bank of geographic and manmade features. Siding with
Cabell, Admiral Radford pointed out the need for more intelligence to
make estimates better.
President Eisenhower was not convinced by these arguments.
Although willing to consider extensions of the radar-seeking ferret
flights he had authorized along the Soviet borders. he remained op­
posed to penetration flights over the Soviet Union.
Events in Eastern Europe in the fall of l 956 helped to change the
President's mind. In October the Soviet Union backed away fro m a
confrontation with nationalist Communist leaders in Poland only to
find itself facing a similar situation in Hungary, where mass demon­
strations led to the formation of a new government under Imre Nagy
• on· 23 October 1956. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily withdrew
from Budapest while awaiting reinforcements. By early November,
however, the Kremlin leadership decided that events in Hungary were
getting out of hand-particularly when Premier Nagy announced his
nation's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact-and ordered Soviet
troops to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Although President
Eisenhower deplored the Soviet intervention. he turned down CIA re­
quests for permission to airdrop arms and supplies to the Hungarian
rebels. In fact, the President forbid all overflights of that nation, in­
60
cluding those by U-2 aircraft, and none was made.
Although President Eisenhower had not been willing to allow
overflights during the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union's actions in
Hungary convinced him to authorize renewed overflights of the
Soviet Bloc, a decision that was made easier by his reelection by a
large margin in early November. Initially. however, the President only
authorized overflights of Eastern Europe and Soviet border regions,
not the deep penetration overfl ights that had been requested by CIA.
At a 15 November 1956 meeting with Acting Secretary of State
Herbert Hoover, Jr. (John Foster Dulles was recovering from cancer
 
~• Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
 
Sec, et NOf6ftN
 
Chapter 3
124
 
surgery). JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur Radford. DCI Allen Dulles, and
Richard Bissell, Eisenhower explained why he refused to allow over­
flights of the Soviet Union: "Everyone in the world says that, in the
last six weeks, the United States has gained a place it hasn't held
since World War fl. To make trips now would cost more than we
would gain in form of solid information." Hoover agreed and rnoted,
"If we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic."
Tom between his desire to maintain a "correct and moral" position
and his wish to know what the Soviet Union was up to. the Pres.idem
finally authorized several overflights of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet border, "but not the deep one," adding that the aircraft should
"stay as close to the border as possible."
(>I
 
The first of these fl ights, mission 4016 on 20 November 1956,
was the first overflight of Soviet territory since IO July. This mission
left Adana and flew east over Iran, then reversed and flew west along
the Soviet-Iranian border to Soviet Armenia. where it crossed into the
Soviet Union and photographed Yerevan. An electrical malfunction
then forced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, to return to Adana. Soviet
interceptor aircraft made sev.eral unsuccessful attempts to reach this
U-2, and the Soviet Government sent a secret protest note to
.
6'
Was h ington. On IO December. Bulgaria was the target of two U-2 missions.
one (40 I 8) from Detachment B at Adana and another (2029) from
Detachment A at Giebelstadt. Bulgarian fighter aircraft made lO dif­
ferent attempts to intercept the first mission. but the flight proceeded
without difficulty.6 J
The second flight came close to crashing but not through the ef­
forts of interceptors. The pilot of mission 2029 was Carmine Vito,
who had flown the first U-2 mission over Moscow on 5 July. He was
known co his colleagues as the Lemon-Drop Kid because he always
carried these hard candies in the knee pocket of his flight suit. Despite
 
•• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President. ~ovember IS.
1956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS): Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 374.
•' M ission folder 40 16. 20 November 1956. OSA records. job 67-8 -972. bo)( 7 (TS
Codeword).
• ·' Mission folders 1019 (IO December 1956) and 4018 (10 December 1956). OSA re­
cords. job 67 -B-328. box 7 and job 67-B-972. box 7 (TS Codeword).
 
_secret
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
125
warnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet face­
plate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate
candy bars; Vito favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10
December, while Vito was undergoing prebreathing, the Air Force en­
listed man who oversaw his preflight regimen placed an L-pill in the
righthand knee pocket of Vito's flight suit, unaware that this pocket
also contained Vito's supply of lemon drops. After he took off. Vito
began indulging in his habit of sucking lemon drops. About midway
into the mission, he opened his faceplate and popped into his mouth
what he thought was another lemon drop. After closing the faceplate,
he began sucking on the object and thought it strange that it hard no
flavor and was much smoother than the previous lemon drops.
Although tempted to bite down, Vito decided instead to reopeIn his
faceplate and see what it was he had in his mouth. Spicting the object
into his hand, he saw that he had been sucking on the L-pi ll wi1th its
lethal contents of potassium cyanide. Just a thin layer of glass. had
stood between him and death. The loss of his aircraft over Bulgaria
would have exposed the U-2 program to worldwide publicity and
would probably have resulted in an early end to overflights.""
. . . _ Detachment A's security officer overheard Vito relating: the
L-pill story to a fellow pilot several days later and promptly reported
the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call
reached Washington. James Cunningham immediately ordered L --pills
placed in boxes so that there wou ld be no chance of mistaking them
for anything else. The L-pill continued to be available for another
three years. Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachmernt B.
Col. William Shelton, raised an important question that had niever
been considered: what would happen if an L -pill with its volati le con­
tents accidentally broke inside the cockpit of a U-2? Realizing that
such an accident would result i n the death of the pilot, James
Cunningham ordered the destruction of all L-pills and then turned to
the Technical Services Division (TSO) for a better idea. By this time
the state of the art in lethal devices was a needle poisoned with cJ1lgal,
an extremely deadly shellfish toxi n. The needle was hidden in a tiny
hole in a silver dollar supplied by Cunningham. Only one poison--nee­
dle coin was made because Cunningham decided that, if any pilo1t had
to use it because of capture, there would probably not be any more
overfl .1gh ts.6s
"' Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Carmine Vito. interview by Donald E.
Welzenbach. Washington, DC. 7 May 1986 (S).
~• Cable from Detachment B to Development Projects Division (DPD). 4 January 1960;
cabk: from DPD to Detachment 8, 7 January 1960. OSA records, job 67-B-972. box 18,
"Operation KNIFE EDGE" (TS Codeword).
 
Sceret NOFORN
Chapter 3
126
 
Although the U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe in late 1956
caused renewed Soviet protests, the sharpest protest came on 15
December 1956, after three specially modified USAF RB-57D bomb­
ers photographed the city of Vladivostok in a high-speed dash over
the Far Eastern coast of the Soviet Union (as part of the Air Force's
Operation BLACK KNIGHT). President Eisenhower had approved
the mission after being told by the Air Force that the high-speed
RB-57Ds would probably not be detected. 66
Reacting strongly to the Soviet protest. the President told
Secretary of State Dulles on 18 December that he was going to "order
complete stoppage of this entire business." As for a reply to the
Soviet protest, Dulles said, "I think we will have to admit this was
done and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it." Dulles noted that
"our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment."
Eisenhower agreed, noting that this was no time to be provocative. He
then instructed Colonel Goodpaster to call Secretary of Defense
Wilson, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Radford, and DCI Dulles to
order: "Effective immediately, there are to be no flights by US recon­
naissance aircraft over Iron Curtain countries." 67
Flights along the borders of Iron Curtain countries continued,
however, and, on 22 December 1956, Detachment B flew the first
mission (4019) by a U-2 equipped for electronic intercept. The elec­
tronic-detection equipment known as the System-V unit (see appendix
C) was installed in the bay normally used by the main camera, and the
plane flew along the Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian
Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System-V unit worked well. 68
Early in 1957, a mission along the Soviet border accidentally
turned into an overflight. On 18 March 1957, a U-2 collecting elec­
tronic intelligence along the Soviet southern border entered Soviet
•~ Goodpaster interview (S).
'' Telephone calls 18 December 1956. DDE Diary. DDEL. (U); Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Memorandum for the Record, 18 December l956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS. down­
graded to S); the Soviet protest note of 15 December 1956 and the U.S. reply of I I
January 1957 are contained in .. Alleged Overflight of Soviet Area by American Planes ...
US Department of Stare Bulletin. vol. 36. 28 January l 957. p. 135. Although Dulles"s ini­
tial inclination had been to offer an apology. the U.S. reply stated that the "only autho­
rized United States Air Force flights in the general area of the Sea of Japan were normal
training activities."
.. Mission folder 4019 (22 December 1956). OSA records. job 67-B-972, box 7 (TS
Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
Sec1 et NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
127
 
airspace because of compass error compounded by a slight error in
the pilot's dead reckoning. Because of heavy cloud cover, the pilot,
James W. Cherbonneaux, did not realize he was over the Soviet
Union until he saw Soviet fighters attempting to intercept him. These
attempts at interception once again demonstrated the Soviets' ability
to track the U-2 and their inability to harm it. 69
At this point in early 1957, the U-2 program was in limbo.
Although the President would not allow U-2s to fly their primary mis­
sion of reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, he did not cancel the pro­
gram and continued to authorize flights along Soviet borders. The
CIA's overhead reconnaissance program also faced a renewed bid by
the Air Force, which now had its own growing U-2 fleet, to gain con­
trol of the overflight program in the spring of 1957. The uncertainty
surrounding the future of the project made planning and budgeting
extremely difficult. In April 1957, Richard Bissell asked the DCI and
DDCI to push for a decision on whether the U-2 program was to con­
tinue in civilian hands and what its scope was to be. In briefing papers
prepared for the DCI, Bissell argued for maintaining a nonmilitary
overflight capability, which could "maintain greater security, employ
deeper cover, use civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside military
control, and, therefore, make possible more plausible denial of US
military responsibility in the face of any Soviet charges." In urging
the resumption of overflights, Bissell stated that four U-2 missions
over border regions of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe had been
detected by the Soviets without causing any diplomatic protest. He
also noted that the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities had unanimously recommended the resumption
of overflights. 70
All of these issues were discussed on 6 May 1957, when
President Eisenhower met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
Quarles, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining, Acting Secretary
of State Christian Herter, and three CIA officals-DCI Dulles, DDCI
Cabell, and Richard Bissell. The President expressed concern about
the impact of overflights on US-Soviet relations and about possible
Soviet responses such as closing off access to Berlin. Although
 
"" Information supplied by James W. Cherbonneaux to Donald E. Welzenbach (S);
Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7 (TS Codeword).
 
'" OSA History, chap. 4. pp. 15-16; annex 22 (TS Codeword).
 
Seeret
 
ieeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
128
 
remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union,
Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral
areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the
Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights
could be staged from Pakistan if the Pakistani Government consent­
ed. The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over the
U-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by
civilians "during operations of this kind." 71
The President had once again agreed to allow overflights of the
Soviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to
learn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union
was too compelling. In particular, the President and top administra­
tion officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's mis­
sile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting-but
no hard data-was available.
Even after he had authorized the resumption of overflights,
President Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He
personally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard
Bissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes
marked on them for the President to examine. More than once, accord­
ing to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk
for detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving
as a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his
shoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and elimi­
nate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan. 71
 
RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS"
One additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho­
 
rized overflights of the Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that
Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May
1957 meeting with the President, Richard Bissell reported on the
progress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and
 
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conft:rence with the President. 6 May 1957
(TS); "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6. 1957," WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
'' Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday. p. 140.
 
SeoFat
 
'"'Sll,tc et NQFQRN
 
Chapter 3
129
 
Chordwise wire
 
absorption devices for the U-2. Once these devices_were install,ed on
the operational U-2s, he explained, the "majority of incidents would
73
be undetected."
 
/Spanwise wire
 
"Trapeze• antiradar attachments
to the U-2
 
Work on methods of reducing the U-2's vulnerability to radar de­
tection had begun in the fall of 1956 as the result of President
Eisenhower's disenchantment with the overflight program following
Soviet detection and tracking of the first series of U-2 missions. The
CIA proprietary firm Scientific Engineering Institute was condutcting
this research under a project codenamed RAINBOW. SEI Chief
Engineer Dr. Franklin A. Rodgers, formerly of MIT, converted the
theories of Harvard physicist Edward Purcell into systems that ,could
be used on aircraft. SEI's radar-deception system consisted of a series
of attachments to the U-2 . First bamboo poles and later fiberglass
rods were attached to the wings. where they would not interfere with
the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely circling
 
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President. 6 Ma:y 1957
(TS); ..Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
SU&Fet
 
Sec. et NOFetU~
Chapter 3
 
130
 
the aircraft, was a small-gauge wire with precisely spaced ferrite
beads. The wire and beads were supposed to capture incoming
70-MHz radar pulses and either trap them in the loop or weaken them
so much that they would not register as a valid radar return. This con­
figuration was called the trapeze and was not very successful.
A second approach, tested in early 1958, involved the use of
plastic material containing a printed circuit designed to absorb radar
pulses in the 65- to 85-MHz range. Nicknamed "wallpaper," this ma­
terial was glued to parts of the U-2's fuselage, nose, and tail.
Although the "trapeze" and "wallpaper" systems provided protection
against some Soviet radars, the systems proved ineffective against ra­
dars operating below 65-MHz or above 85-MHz. Furthermore, both
of these additions degraded the U-2's performance. The weight and
drag of "trapeze" reduced the aircraft's operating ceiling by 1,500
feet, and "wallpaper" sometimes caused engines to overheat. 74
SEI's research results were tested by another firm known as
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G), which was also composed
of MIT faculty members. Under an Air Force contract to evaluate ra­
dars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian Springs,
Nevada, not far from Area 51. Although Kelly Johnson had been
closely involved with the radar deception project since its early days,
he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that
made his aircraft less airworthy. (Johnson's dislike of the antiradar at­
tachments was reflected in the unofficial nickname for aircraft that
had been so modified-"dirty birds.") After Lockheed mechanics
had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a
Lockheed test pilot would fly the plane over EG&G's Indian Springs
installation. This was little more than a series of radar sets and a
trailer containing instrumentation. EG&G technicians could thus re­
cord and evaluate the U-2's radar returns as it traversed a specified
course over their facility. 75
This method of testing radar-deceptive modifications proved
both time consuming and dangerous. During a test flight on 2 April
1957, the "wallpaper" modification acted as insulation around the
 
" Records of the Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records
(TS Codeword).
" References to EG&G programs for the U-2 are contained in the later Convair contracts
for Projects FISH and KINGFISH. OSA records. job 67-B-415, box I (TS Codeword).
 
Seeret
 
SHret NOFORN
Chapter 3
131
 
·wallpaper"
 
engine of the U-2 known as article 341, causing it to overheat and
tlameout. Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot
Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck and killed in midair lby the
U-2's tailplane. The aircraft crashed in an area of Nevada so remote
that Area 5 1 search teams needed four days to locate the wreoekage.
The extensive search attracted the attention of the press. and a
 
Sec,el
 
Saaret NOF6ftl'II
 
Chapter 3
132
 
Wreckage of Article 34 1,
2 April 1957 .
 
12 April 1957 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune was headliined,
"Secrecy Veils High-Altitude Research Jet; Lockheed U-2 Ca.lied
Super Snooper." 76
•
Because of its large wingspan. an out-of-control U-2 tended to
enter a classical flat spin before ground contact. This slowed descent
and actually lessened the impact. If there was no fire after impact, the
remai ns of crashed U-2s were often salvageable, as was the case with
the wreckage of article 34 1. Kelly Johnson 's crew at the Skunk Works
used the wreckage, along with spares and salvaged parts of other
crashed U-2s, co produce another flyable airframe for about
77
$185,000. The U-2's abi lity to survive a crash in fairly good co1ndi­
tion should have been noted by the Development Projects Staff for
consideration in its contingency plans for a loss over hostile terriItory
because the equipment on board the aircraft could easily compromise
the weather research cover story.
The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the pro­
totype " dirty bird" U-2, led Kelly Johnson to suggest that Lockheed
install a large boom at the Indian Springs radar test facility. Using the
 
,. Accident folder. cr-ish of 2 April 1957, OSA records (S).
" Lockheed contracts. OSA Records (S).
 
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 3
133
 
boom, which could lift entire airframes 50 feet in the air, technicians
could change the airframe's attitude and run radar tests almost contin­
uously without having to fuel and fly the plane.n
By the summer of 1957, testing of the radar-deception system
was complete, and in July the first "dirty bird" (DB) arrived at
Detachment B. The first operational use of this aircraft occurred on
21 July l 957 in mission 4030 over Iran, Iraq, and Syria. On 31 July,
the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a total of
nine DB missions over the USSR. The antiradar system did not prove
very effective, and its use was curtailed in May 1958.79
 
THE NEW DETACHMENT C
On 8 June 1957, a U-2 took off from Eielson Air Force Base in
Alaska to conduct the first intentional overflight of the Soviet Union
since December 1956. This mission broke new ground in two re­
spects: it was the first overflight conducted from American soil and
• -the first by the new Detachment C.
Detachment C (known officially as Weather Reconnaissance
Squadron, Provisional-3) was composed of the third group of pilots to
complete their training in Nevada. In the autumn of 1956, this third
detachment needed a new base because Area 51 was about to become
the training site for a large number of Air Force pilots who would fly
the 29 U-2s purchased by the Air Force. The Agency decided that the
best location for Detachment C would be the Far East and begao
looking for bases there.
Even without the arrival of the Air Force pilots, Detachment C
could not have stayed in Nevada much longer. In June 1957, the en­
tire facility had to be evacuated because the Atomic Energy
Commission was about to conduct a series of nuclear tests whose fall­
out was expected to contaminate the Groom Lake facility. All remain­
ing CIA personnel, materiel, and aircraft were transferred to Edwards
AFB, California, and became known as Detachment G.
 
" Ibid (S).
,., Cunningham interview (TS Codeword}.
 
Soe11et
 
Gee. et NOl'OFUQ
 
Chapter 3
134
 
The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to
ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the
detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the
base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK
KNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not
wish to locate another one there and denied the reques t. The Agency
then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C
to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japan.ese
Government received no notification of the proposed deployment be­
cause at that time it had no control over activities involving US mili­
tary bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early
1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families
of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas
tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on
the base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded
Japan.""
Detach ment C began conducting m1ss1ons in June 1957 alfter
several aircraft and pilots flew to Eie lson Air Force Base near
Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force rndar order-of-battle reports and NSA
studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East,
wi th antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those
in the western Soviet Union, was relati vely ineffective. To take ad­
vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions
from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the air­
craft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable
to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the
Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on
19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined ev;ery
third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars.
but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three
months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the de­
tachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/ 16 September 1957
achieved exce llent results. The radar-deception devices proved in1ef­
fective, however. as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed
by five fighters.s'
 
. , OSA History. ch.ip. l5, pp. 2. 16-19: chap. 16. p. I (TS Co<lcword).
 
" Mission folders 6002 (8 June 1957). 6005 C!0 June 1957). and 6008 (16 September
l 957). OSA records. job 67-8-3'.!8. bo.~ 7 (TS Codeword).
 
-$ee,Fet NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
135
 
DETACHMENT B FLIGHTS FROM PAKISTAN
The most important series of overflights in the summer of l 957 were
those that Detachment B staged to gather intelligence on the Soviet
Union's guided missile and nuclear programs. President Eisenhower
had approved these overflights at the meeting on 6 May 1957, provided that Pakistan allowed the U-2s to operate from its territory (the
•
taroets were too far away from the U-2 base in Turkey).
Richard Bissell 's ersonal assistant, and
met with President
--;l;--: :sk-:-=--;-:-and:.-e:-::r- M.--:.:-irza,
= =--=:-•r=--=r:-:-=--=i me' M.--:,,-i s7cer:-riruse
=-=
--=--:--:y-=-=::-l'.-c:-::a
n
~eed Suhra ward y. and
Anny Commander Gen. Ayub Khan between 3 and 7 June 1957 and
received permission to operate from Lahore. The airfield at Peshawar,
a more desirable location, was not available because of repair work.
Detachment B at Ankara ferried four of its U-2s, two of which were
dirty birds, to Lahore. A C-124 brought in eight pilots and ground
crews to prepare for missions over the Soviet Union and the People·s
Republic of China (PRC) beginning on 4 August {Operation SOFf
TOUCH) . During a 23-day period, these aircraft made nine flights:
seven over the USSR and two over the PRC. Although one of the
seven flights over the USSR was a failure because the camera
. malfunctioned after taking only 125 exposures, the remaining mis­
sions over Central Asia were a complete success. producing a bo­
nanza of information that kept scores of photointerpreters busy for
more than a year.•~
=
01
-·'"'=
 
The 5 August flight, a dirty bird piloted by Buster Edens. was
the first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of
the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. None of the mission planners was certain
just where the range was located, so the U-2 pilot followed the rail
lines in the area. As a result, the plane did not pass directly over the
rangehead and obtained only oblique photography.
Although known in the West today as Tyuratam, this missi le in­
stallation had no name when it was first photographed in August
1957. In preparation for a briefing to President Eisenhower on the
SOFf TOUCH photography, Dino Brugioni, an assistant to PIO chief
Arthur Lundahl, examined all the existing maps of the area to see if
he could find a place name for the missile base. Only one map. made
by the Gennans during World War 11, showed a community in the vi­
cinity of the missile facility. The settlement's name was Tyuratam.
which means "arrow burial ground" in the Kazakh language, and this
 
'' OSA History. chap. 12, pp. 19-20 (TS Codeword): NP/C Hiswry. vol. 1. pp. 159-161
 
(Sl.
 
Seccet
 
Operation SOFT TOUCH Overflights, August 1957
 
---
 
Mission 4036 8 August
Mission 4039 12 August
/.r,.,,- - ··- - Mission 4045 21 August
• • •••• Mission 4048 21 August
•••• •• • - Mission 4049 22 August
- - - Mission 4050 22 August
- - - Mission 4051 22 August
- • - Mission 4058 28 August
r-'t
 
/
 
-
 
• -
 
-
 
-
 
• -
 
Ila
 
,
,
I
 
I
,
 
I ,
I I Sinkiang
 
_,' u·,gh ur
 
1 1
1 1•
I I
II
 
Autonomous
Region
 
II
~
 
/I
/
 
......... ...
Pa
 
Secret NOFORN
 
....eeret N6f'OPUQ
 
Chapter 3
137
 
U-2 photography of 1"yuratam
Missile Testing RangEi
 
was the name Brugioni gave the missile base. Official Soviet releases
concerning this base have always referred to it as Baykonur, but the
community of Baykonyr is actually more than 200 miles north of
11
Tyuratam.
While PID was still analyzing the SOFT TOUCH photography,
the Soviet Union announced the successfu l launch of an interconti­
nental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Baykonyr (Tyuratam). On 26
August l 957 , the Soviet news agency TASS stated that a "su ­
per-long-range multistage intercontinental ballistic rocket" had been
successfully tested, adding "it is now possible to send missiles to any
 
"' Lundahl and Brugioni intcrv i<!w (TS Codeword).
 
&ecuet
 
Set1 et N6F8RN
 
Chapter 3
138
 
Semipa/atinsk Nuclear
Weapons Proving Ground,
22 August 1957
 
part of the world." ,s, The Soviet announcement made the intelligence
community want even more information on Tyuratam, and a second
U-2 piloted by Edwin K. Jones flew over the area on 28 August 1957,
just one week after the Soviet ICBM launch. This mission obtained
excellent venical photographs of the main launch complex. and
photointerpreters soon determined that the Soviets had only one
launchpad at Tyuratam. The base was not photographed again until 9
July 1959, at which time it still had only one launch pad, although
two more were under construction." 5
On 20 and 21 August 1957, U-2s conducted the first overflights
of the Soviet nuclear testing grounds al Semipalatinsk, north-north­
west of L ake Balkhash. The first mission. pi loted by Sammy V. C.
Snider, passed over part of the provi ng grounds, flew on to
Novokuznetsk, and then proceeded to Tomsk, where it began its re­
turn leg that included coverage of a very large uranium-processing fa­
cility at the new city of Berezovskiy. In the second mission, James
Cherbonneaux flew directly over the Semipalatinsk proving grounds
only four hours before a half-megaton device was detonated. In fact,
the U-2 unknowingly photographed the ai rcraft that was to drop the
 
"' .. Is Russia A~ad in Missil.! Raet.'... US News and World Report. 6 September 1957. pp.
30- 3.3.
" Mission fokkrs 4058 (28 August 1957) an<l 4125 (9 July 1959). OSA recor<ls. job
67-8-972. boxes 8 and 11 (TS Codeword).
6e&FOt
 
Sec, et N6f6filN
 
Chapter 3
139
 
On its way to Semipalatinsk. the 21 August m1ss1on tle:w a
search pattern over the western end of Lake Balkash looking for an­
other Soviet missi le-related installation and made the first photo­
graphs of what was later determined to be the new missile test center
at Saryshagan. This faci lity was used to test radars against incoming
missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, I .400 miles to the west. Sarysh:agan
later became the center fo r the development of the Soviet Union's ad­
vanced antiballistic missile (ABM) weapon system .
On 23 August 1957, DDC I Cabell, Richard Bissell, and Air
Force Chief of Staff Twining met with President Eisenhower to re:port
on the results of Operation SOFT TOUCH. T hey showed the
President some of the photographic results of the earlier missions and
reported on the effects of the antiradar measures. Although the
antiradar measures had not proved successful, the photographic yield
from the missions was extremely valuable. Bissell then informed! the
·President that the SOFT TOUCH operation was just about to con­
clude with the transfer of the aircraft back to Adana. He asked per­
mission for one of the U-2s to make another overflight of the Soviet
Union on this return trip, but the President denied the request. not
wishing to conduct any more overflights than were necessary.~'
 
THE DECLINE OF DETACHMENT A
During the summer of 1957, all overflights of the Soviet Union were
conducted by either Detachment B or Detachment C. Detachment A
in Germany was a less desirable starting point for overfl ights of the
Soviet Union because such missions had to cross Eastern Europe first,
increasing the likelihood of detection and diplomatic protests.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union's air defense and radar networks were
strongest along its western borders. so Detachment B missions over
the southern portion of the Soviet Union and Detachment C missions
 
- Mission folder 4045 (10 August 1957) and 4050 (21 August 1957). OSA records. job
67-B-972. box 3 (TS Codeword).
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record, 23 August 1957. WHOSS. Alpha.
 
DDEL (TS).
 
Seu et NOFORP•
 
Chapter 3
 
140
in the Far East were less risky than those conducted by Detachment
A. Finally, the main target of U-2 photography after the bomber issue
receded was Soviet missile and nuclear progress. The testing areas for
these weapons were located in the vast open spaces of the south-cen­
tral and eastern portions of the Soviet Union, which lay beyond the
range of Detachment A's aircraft.
The decline in importance of Detachment A had begun with the
President's standdown order of IO July I 956. During the next three
months, the detachment conducted only 11 missions, all over the
Mediterranean region rather than the original target of the Soviet
Union, and the slow pace of activity and change in mission adversely
affected pilot morale. One of the detachment's aircraft was lost in a
crash on 17 September, killing pilot Howard Carey and garnering un­
wanted publicity. Conditions improved when the detachment moved
to the newly renovated facility at Giebelstadt in early October 1956,
but security now became a problem there. Detachment A personnel
discovered that a long, black Soviet-Bloc limousine was parked at the
end of the Giebelstadt runway whenever the U-2s took off.:s,s
During the next year, Detachment A mounted on ly four over­
flights. The first two were over Eastern Europe: one over Bulgaria on
10 December 1956 and the other over Albania on 25 April 1957.
Then a long period of inactivity folllowed, ending with a third mission
on 11 October 1957, which conducted electronic surveillance of
Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of
Detachment A , mission 2040 on l 3 October 1957, flew north over
Norway to the Bering Sea, turned southeast to overfly Murmansk, and
89
then exited to the north, returning to Germany via Norway.
A lthough the final missions of Detachment A achieved excellent
results. project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe
was not a satisfactory location for overflights of the Soviet Union and
had notified Detachment A on 20 September 1957 that its operations
would cease in November. By 15 November 1957. all of the detach­
ment's personnel and aircraft had returned to the United States.
During Detachment A's 17-month period of operations, seven pilots
 
"" OSA History. chap. 11, pp. -U-42 (TS Codeword).
 
"" Mission folder.; 40 18 (JO December 1956). 2036 (25 April 1957). 2037 ( II October
1957). 2040 ( 13 October 1957). OSA records. job 67-8-972. boll 7, and job 67-8-328, box
6 {TS Codeword).
 
--sec,et --
 
Final Overflight by Detachment A, 13 October 1957
0
0
 
1\)0
 
200 K~ome<e,,
tOO
 
200Miles
 
Barents Sea
Norwegian
Sea
 
Kola
Peninsula
 
'1'v
 
Sweden f
 
/
 
Finlaind
~'
 
Gulf
of
 
Bothnia
 
;
 
~
 
J
 
_
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Baltic Sea
 
.A HEl$1NIO
 
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Secret NOFORN
 
n •1.a <8009501 4-92
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
142
 
had flown a total of 23 missions: six over the Soviet Union, five over
Eastern Europe, and most of the remaining 12 missions over the
Mediterranean area.')()
 
COOPERATION WITH NORWAY
The final missions of Detachment A had one unforeseen result: the
beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian
Intelligence Service on the U-2 program. Norwegian radars tracked
the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957,
and Col. Vilhelm Evan° Chief of the Norweoian Defense Staff
Intelli 0 ence Service
 
In March 1958, Colonel
Evang came to Washington and received a briefing from Arthur
Lundahl together with sanitized photos that did not reveal the altitude
of the aircraft or the focal length of the camera. The Agency provided
additional photos to Norway during a visit by a PIO staff member in
July.~'
Later that year Norway agreed to provide an airfield for the
United States to conduct U-2 flights that did not violate Soviet air­
space. On 15 September l
a Detachment B staging party arrived
at Bodo Air Force Base
·~~~-----c~~~~~\this
was followed by an ELINT collection flight over international waters
(the Kara Sea) on 25 October. On 6 November, the U-2 returned to
Adana by conducting a lengthy ELINT collection flight along the bor­
ders of the Soviet Union and East Germany. During the initial portion
of the mission, when the U-2 flew along the Soviet-Finnish border
and then turned east over the Gulf of Finland to come within 60 miles
of Leningrad (while remaining over international waters), the aircraft
was the target of 23 unsuccessful Soviet intercept attempts. 92
 
•., OSA History, chap. I [. p. 44: chap. I 9. annex 120 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid., chap. 11, pp. 44-45 (TS Codeword); NPIC History. vol. 3. pp. 447-8 (S) .
•,, Mission folders !482 (9 October !958), 4092 (25 October !958). and 4093 (6
November 1958). OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes 3 and 10.
 
.Saeret
 
Sewet NOFOHN
 
Chapter 3
143
 
DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY
 
U-2 at Bodo, Norway
 
·operation SOFf TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high
water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment
B staged one more overflight on IO September 1957. when a U-2 pi­
loted by Wi lliam Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin
Yar M issile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in
1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ball istic missile
(MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted
its successful overflight of the lCBM impact site at Kl yuchi, and
October saw the final two overfl ights of Detachment A . After these
missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be
only six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two. in 1959;
and three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this
period, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of fl ights along
Soviet border areas that occasionally penetrated shon distances inside
the border. but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of
authorizing ' 'deep penetration·• overflights. which invariably brought
protests from Moscow.
The border flights took place under tight controls. Begi nning in
the fall of 1957, all messages from Washington to Adana giving coor­
dinates for flights along the Soviet border contained the statement:
" This is not a penetration overflight'' and warned about flying too
close to Soviet borders. The Soviets even attempted to shoot down
Secret
 
Sec1 et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 3
144
 
U-2s flying well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as
was the case on 27 October I957, when electronic intelligence equip­
ment on a U-2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet
airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception by Soviet fighters.'n
The sole U-2 overflight of 1958 was conducted by a dirty bird
from Detachment C. On I March 1958, mission 6011 overflew the
Soviet Far East and photographed the Trans-Siberian Railroad,
Sovetskaya Gavan', the Tatar Strait, and a strange installation at
Malaya Sazanka, which was eventually determined to be a structure
for mating nuclear devices with their detonators. This was the first
and only U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union staged from Japan. 94
On 5 March 1958, the Soviet Union delivered a vigorous protest
concerning this mission, prompting President Eisenhower to tell
Colonel Goodpaster on 7 March to inform the CIA that U-2 flights
were to be "discontinued, effective at once." 95 This standdown was
to last more than 16 months, until July 1959. The Soviets had not
been fooled by the antiradar devices carried by mission 601 l, as was
demonstrated by the detailed information about the mission contained
in a Soviet aide-memoire delivered on 21 April I958. It was clear that
dirty bird aircraft were not effective and that Soviet radar operators
had little difficulty in tracking them. At this point, the Agency aban­
doned the use of the antiradar devices on the U-2. As a substitute,
Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant
qualities, but this project also proved unsuccessful.
The U-2s were not the only cause for the Soviet protests that so
vexed the President. On 27 June 1958, an Agency C-118 on a courier
flight from Adana to Teheran strayed into Soviet Armenia and was
shot down; the Soviets captured two survivors, including one Agency
employee. Ten days later the Air Force began launching balloons de­
signed to fly across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This new
balloon project (known as WS-461 L) had been authorized by
President Eisenhower on 25 June after Deputy Secretary of Defense
Donald Quarles argued that a small number of balloons should be
'" Mission folder 4061 (27 October 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, bol\ 8 (TS
Codeword).
•• Mission folder 6011 (1 March 1958), OSA records. job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS
Codeword).
'" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 7 March 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS, declassified).
G8GF8t
 
Secret r'10FORN
 
Chapter 3
145
 
launched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the
west-to-east jet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed
at an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned
abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to
110,000 feet, and then reversed direction. One of the key arguments
that convinced the President to approve the project was Quarles 's
claim that the balloons' "chance of being detected is rather small and
their identification or shootdown practically nil." 96
Release of the balloons took place from an aircraft carrier in the
Bering Sea on 7 July 1958. Nothing was heard about them until 28
July, when Poland sent a note protesting the overflight of a US-made,
camera-carrying balloon that had fallen to earth in central Poland.
The loss of this balloon was because of human error. Each balloon
was equipped with a timing device that would cause it to drop its
camera and film payload after crossing the target areas. An Air Force
technician aboard the aircraft carrier had calculated that the balloons
should cross the Eurasian landmass in about 16 days. Thus, he ad­
justed regulators aboard the balloons to cause automatic descent after
. 400 hours aloft. When bad weather delayed the launch for three suc­
cessive days. however, the technician forgot to reset the timing de­
vices. As a result, one payload fell into Poland. None of the three
WS-461 L balloon payloads was recovered.'n
The Polish protest was quickly followed by a Soviet note pro­
testing the balloons' violation of the Soviet Union's airspace. Several
months later, the Soviets placed the US balloon and photographic
equipment on display in Moscow for the world's press. President
Eisenhower was angry that the Defense Department's assurances that
the balloons would not be detected had proved false. Even worse, one
of the balloons had been recovered by the Poles because the Air Force
had disobeyed his instructions for the balloon project. When the Air
Force had proposed the use of timers to bring down the balloons at
the end of the mission, Eisenhower had said no, fearing that a mal­
function could cause the balloons to come down prematurely. Furious
at the Air Force's insubordination, the President ordered General
 
'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 25 June 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
'" Donald E. Welzenbach. "Observation Balloons and Weather Satellites," Studies in
Intelligence 30 (Spring 1986): pp. 26-28 (S).
 
Seere:t
 
Secret NOFORN
 
Chapter 3
146
 
Equipment from a WS-461L
balloon on display in Moscow,
11 October 1958
 
Goodpaster on 29 July 1958 10 rell rhe A ir Force that " the project is
to be discontinued at once and every cent thac has been made avail­
able as part of any project involving crossing the Iron Curtain is 1to be
impounded and no further expenditures are to be made." "'
Two days later Eisenhower followed up this order with a formal
memorandum co Secretary of Defense Nei l McElroy telling him that
"there is disturbing evidence of a deterioration in the processes of
discipline and responsibility within the armed forces." He cited, in
particular, "unauthorized decisions which have apparently resulted in
certain balloons falling within the territory of the Communist B loc"
99
and overflights over routes "that contravened my standing orders."
On 2 September I 958, there was another violation of Soviet ai r­
space when an unarmed Air Force EC-130 on an electronic intelligence
collection mission crossed from Turkey into Soviet Armenia and was
shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft. Six of the men on board were
killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from agai n, despite State
Department attempts to get the Soviet Union to reveal their fate.""'
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, l\lkmorandum for the Record. :!9 July 1958. WHOSS. Alpha,
DDEL (S): Goodpa.~ter interview (S).
•,. Quo1ed in Ambrose. Eiserrhower: The President. pp. 475-476.
"" "US Rc:presen1a1ions to 1he Sovie! Government on C-130 Transport Shoe Down by
Sovie! Fighl<!r Aircr.i.ft." US Departmerrt of State Bulletin. 23 Fd,ruary 1959. pp. 2621-271:
Beschloss, Mayday. p. 159.
 
Secret
 
Seeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 3
147
 
President Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower
tension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US
balloons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms I imita­
tion negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United
States sent a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Soviet answer to
US proposals for a " study of the technical aspects of safeguards
against the possibility of surprise attack... One week later the S,oviets
agreed to participate and suggested that the talks begin in Geneva on
IO November I 958. President Eisenhower was also attempting tt:> per­
suade the Soviet Union to begin talks aimed at eliminating the atmo­
spheric testing of nuclear weapons. These efforts began with a 22
A ugust 1958 offer to suspend US nuclear tests for one year on the
condition that the Soviet Union al so refrain from further tests and join
in negotiations. On 30 August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ac­
cepted the proposal and agreed to start talks on 3 I October 1958 in
Geneva. When the talks began, however, the Soviets refused to agree
to a test ban and carried out nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk on I and 3
November. Nevertheless, during the late summer and early autumn of
1958, President Eisenhower. detennined to reduce to a minimum any
aggravation of the Soviets. kept the U-2 overflight program in
. b 10 1
_ [ 1_ro o.
In November 1958, relations with the Soviet Union worsened af­
ter Khrushchev prec ipitated a new crisis over West Berlin by an­
nouncing plans to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by May
1959. He stated that such a treaty would terminate Allied rights in
West Berlin. Four days later, Soviet troops began harassing US Anny
truck convoys on the highways leading from West Germany to West
Berlin. Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening
as the blockade of l 948-49, President Eisenhower wished to :avoid
any actions that would provoke the Soviets. Tension over West Berlin
was, therefore, an additional reason for continuing to keep the U-2
away from the Soviet Bloc. oo:
 
CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2
Another reason for President Eisenhower's gro~ ing rel!J.~ ance to au­
thorize flights over the Soviet Union may have ~ en c~ ;rn , hat the
Soviets were developing countenneasures that would enable them to
 
" " Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. pp. 489-J9 I.
 
"'' Ibid.. pp. 502-504.
 
Secret
 
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 3
 
148
 
shoot down a U-2. Before the program started, Richard Bissell had
estimated that the U-2 would be able to fly over the Soviet Union
with impunity for only about two years. This period was already over,
and the Soviets were working frantically to devise a means to stop
U-2 overflights. From the very beginning, Soviet air defense units had
not only tracked U-2s with radars, but had also made repeated efforts
to shoot them down with antiaircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft.
In 1956 such attempted interceptions had involved primarily MiG-15s
and MiG- l 7s, which could barely reach 55,000 feet. The advent of
MiG- l 9s and MiG-21 s, which could climb even higher, provided a
greater threat for U-2 pilots.
Realistic training for pilots learning to intercept the U-2 became
possible after the Soviets developed a new high-altitude aircraft, the
Mandrake, which was actually an improved version of the
Yakovlev-25 all-weather interceptor. The Mandrake used a high-lift,
low-drag wing design similar to that employed by the U-2, but its
twin engines made it heavier. The Mandrake's operating altitude was
55,000 to 65,000 feet, and its maximum altitude was 69,000, far less
than the 75,000 feet reached by the U-2. Like the U-2, the
Mandrake's wings would not tolerate great stresses, so it could not be
used as an attack aircraft at the high altitudes at which both planes
operated. Between 1957 and 1959, Yakovlev built 15 to 20 of these
aircraft in two versions: the Mandrake-R or YAK-25RM and the
Mandrake-T, sometimes called the YAK-26. These high-altitude air­
craft were used to overfly the Middle East, India, China, and
Pakistan, as well as border regions of NATO nations in Europe during
the late 1950s and early I 960s. It is not believed that Mandrakes ever
attempted to overfly the continental United States."'-'
Beginning in late 1957, the Mandrake served as a practice target
for pilots of high-performance Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-21 intercep­
tors. The Soviet technique that most concerned U-2 pilots was the
"snap up" or power dive and zoom climb. In this maneuver,
ground-based radar operators would direct the interceptor aircraft
along the same flight path as the U-2. When the MiG pilot achieved
the same compass heading as the U-2 flying more than 10,000 feet
above him, he would put his aircraft into a shallow dive to pick up
 
'
 
01
 
"Yakovlev Yak-25RM Mandrake," Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 3, no. 7, 16 February
 
1985.
 
Seeret
 
Seer et N6F6RN
Chapter 3
 
149
 
speed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and
zoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to
come up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and mis­
siles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black
of space. Using this maneuver, some MiGs were able to climb as high
as the U-2 but seldom got very close. At this height the MiGs were
completely out of control; their small, swept-back wings provided in­
sufficient lift; and their control surfaces were too small to maintain
aircraft stability. U-2 pilots often spotted MiGs that reached the apex
of their zoom climbs and then fell away toward the earth. The US pi­
lots' greatest fear was that one of the MiGs would actually collide
with a U-2 during a zoom climb.
1().1
 
U-2 pilots complained that they felt like ducks in a shooting gal­
lery under these circumstances and suggested that the underside of the
silvery aircraft be camouflaged in some manner. Kelly Johnson had
originally believed the U-2 would fly so high that it would be invisi­
ble, thus eliminating the need to paint the aircraft and thereby avoid­
ing the added weight and drag that paint produced. The paint penalty
was calculated to be a foot of altitude for every pound of paint. A full
_ c_O;J.t of paint cost the U-2 250 feet of altitude, substantially less than
the L,500-foot penalty paid for the addition of dirty bird-devices.
By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done.
After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating
the U-2s with a standard blue-black military specification paint on top
and a lighter cloud-blue paint below. Subsequent tests over Nevada
revealed that the U-2s were less conspicuous when painted all over
with a matte-finish blue-black color, which helped them blend with
105
the dark canopy o f space.
 
MORE POWERFUL ENGINES FOR THE U-2
Less conspicuous paints were not the only answer to the growing
threat of Soviet interceptors. A more powerful engine would increase
the U-2's maximum altitude, which was the surest way to protect the
aircraft from all Soviet threats. During late 1958 and early 1959,
Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2s­
originally the Agency had taken delivery of 20 planes and the Air
"u
Information supplied by Jacob Kratt and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.
Wt:lz.:nbach, May 1986.
 
"" Lockheed contracts, OSA r.:cords (S).
 
Seeret
 
1Su
 
Soviet MiG-21 interceptor (top),
Soviet MiG- 19 interceptor
(middle), Soviet MiG-19
photographed by a U-2,
13 October 1957 (bottom)
 
Sec.et NOFORN
 
--
 
.a.
 
..
 
·--·- - ... -- ----::::::
 
YAK-25RD Mandrake on
display at the Gagarin
Military Academy Museum
(top and middle)
U-2 in the new black
paint scheme (left)
 
Sec.et NOFORN
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
152
 
Force of 31-with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney 175-Pl3 jet
engine. This new power plant generated 4,200 pounds more thrust
while adding only 2,050 pounds more weight. With its greater power,
the engine permitted the U-2 to reach operational altitude more quick­
ly, thereby reducing the telltale contrails that the U-2 produced as it
passed through the tropopause at 45,000 to 55,000 feet. With the new
engine, U-2 passed through this portion of the atmosphere faster and
did so before entering hostile airspace, thus reducing the chance of
visual detection. The 175 power plant also made it possible for the
U-2 to carry a larger payload and gain another 2,500 feet in altitude,
permitting it to cruise at 74,600 feet. The new engines were in very
short supply because of the needs of the Air Force's F-105 construc­
tion program, but Colonel Geary used his Air Force contacts to obtain
an initial supply of 12 engines. The Air Force never equipped its orig­
inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10"
Detachment C in Japan received the first of these re-engined air­
craft, known as U-2Cs, in July 1959, and two more arrived in Turkey
for Detachment B in August. All Agency U-2s had the new engines
by the summer of 1962, but by then only seven CIA U-2s remained in
service.
 
INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958
Although the U-2 was used less and less for its original role of gather­
ing strategic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc, it had acquired the new
mission of providing US decisionmakers with up-to-date information
on crisis situations all around the world. The first use of the U-2 to
gather tactical intelligence occurred during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Afterward, U-2s from the Turkish-based Detachment B conducted pe­
riodic overflights to monitor the situation in the troubled Middle East,
and they became especially active during the summer of 1958.
On 15 July 1958, President Eisenhower ordered US troops to
land in Lebanon in response to a request for assistance by Lebanese
President Camille Chamoun. Three months earlier, Eisenhower had
turned down a similar request because the rioting that had led
President Chamoun to ask for American aid had died down before in­
tervention became necessary. In July, however, President Eisenhower
saw the overall situation in the Middle East as much more threaten­
ing. On 14 July forces aligned toward Egyptian President Gama[
""' OSA History, chap. 16, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Geary interview (S).
 
Geeret
 
Sect et NOFOfU'~
Chapter 3
153
 
Abdel Nasser overthrew the Government of Iraq and assassinated the
royal family. Long concerned by the growing influence of Nasser,
who had close ties to the Soviet Union and now headed both Egypt
and Syria in the new United Arab Republic. President Eisenhower de­
cided that US intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation in
Lebanon and to show Nasser that the United States was willing to use
force to defend its vital interests in the region. Before intervening in
Lebanon, the United States consulted with the United Kingdom,
which also decided to intervene in the Middle East by sending para­
troopers to assist the Government of Jordan on 17 July.
With US Marines and Army troops deployed in a potentially
hostile situation in Lebanon, US military commanders and intelli­
gence community analysts immediately requested tactical reconnais­
sance flights to look for threats to the US units and evidence that
other Middle Eastern countries or the Soviet Union might be prepar­
ing to intervene. The U-2s of Detachment B in Turkey carried out
these missions.
Because tactical reconnaissance required an immediate readout
of-the films taken, the Photographic Intelligence Center (the new
name for the Photo-Intelligence Division from August 1958) quickly
reopened the film-developing unit at Adana and staffed it with lab
technicians and photointerpreters. Throughout the summer of 1958.
Detachment B U-2s brought back photography of military camps. air­
fields, and ports of those Mediterranean countries receiving Soviet
arms. The detachment also kept a close watch on Egyptian-based
Soviet submarines, which posed a threat to US 6th Fleet ships in the
Mediterranean. In addition, U-2s flew occasional electronic intelli­
gence collection missions along the Soviet border and over the Black
Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as the crisis in
the Middle East eased, the United States began withdrawing its
14,300 troops. It was not until 25 October, however, that the last
American soldier left Lebanon. 101
 
BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROJECT
Shortly after the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon, a new group
of pilots joined the U-2 project. In November 1958, four RAF officers
arrived at Detachment B at Adana. thus beginning the United
Kingdom's participation in U-2 operations. The British had first
"" Ambrose, Eisenhower: Tlte President. pp. 462--473.
 
See1et
 
See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
154
 
become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the
United States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To
handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which
later merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation be­
tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to
include frequent consultation between the requirements and photo­
interpretation organizations of both countries. James Reber and
Arthur Lundahl made periodic trips to the United Kingdom for
discussions with Alan Crick's UK Requirements Committee (gener­
ally known as the Crick Committee, later as the Joint Priorities
Committee), the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Air Recon­
naissance Intelligence Center, and MI-6. 108
The idea of using British pilots in the U-2 program first arose in
the spring of 1957, when Richard Bissell-upset that his aircraft had
not been allowed to fly over the Soviet Union since the December
1956 standdown-was searching for ways to reduce the political risks
of overflights and thus obtain more frequent authorization for mis­
sions over the Soviet Union. One of his proposals was to use non-US
pilots-possibly British-to increase the possibility of plausible de­
nial in the event of a loss. At a meeting with key CIA, Defense
Department, and State Department officials on 6 May 1957, President
Eisenhower approved the concept of British participation in the U-2
•
IC>'J
proJect.
During the next six months, Dulles and Bissell met with Sir Dick
White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L.
MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on sev­
eral occasions to discuss the proposal in general terms. At first the
CIA did not push the proposal too hard because at the same meeting
in which he approved British participation, President Eisenhower had
consented to the resumption of U-2 missions over the Soviet Union,
resulting in 10 overflights during the summer and early fall of 1957.
But when flights ceased in October, the thought of British participa­
tion became more attractive. By early 1958, Bissell was pressing the
British to begin training pilots in the U-2 even though no final politi­
cal decision on their participation had been made. On 7 February
1958, Bis sell instructed the Chief of Station in Londonj
to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to
 
~---~__J
 
'"" See, for ex:ample, the trip reports of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee in the
COMIREX records, IC Staff (TS Codeword).
'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 6 May 1957
(TS); idem, "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
 
Scere4i
 
See1 et NOFOAN
 
• Chapter 3
155
 
select a group of pilots for the U-2 project. MacDonald agreed to
Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2. 110
In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came
to project headquarters for an orientation and then sat down with CIA
officials to work out an agreement on plans and procedures for the
joint project. The two sides decided to establish a small RAF contin­
gent that would be integrated into and supported by Detachment B at
Adana. The British missions would be operationally controlled by
CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots began
training in Texas. One of these pilots, Squadron Leader Christopher
H. Walker, died in a training accident in July 1958. Because of the
addition of RAF officers to the program, Project AQUATONE re­
ceived a new codename, CHALICE. By the end of November 1958,
three RAF pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B at Adana
with Turkish approval.
Formal approval by the political leaders of the United Kingdom
and the United States had come several months earlier. On 27 August
-1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British
participation in the project as long as he had the right to approve or
disapprove all operational flights by RAF pilots. On the same day,
President Eisenhower gave his approval in principle for the joint pro.
Ill
Ject.
Both sides stood to gain from the joint nature of the U-2 project.
For Richard Bissell, British participation was a means to gain an addi­
tional source of authorization for overflights of the Soviet Union. Six
months earlier, Bissell had cabled to the London Chief of Station that
he wanted British participation because it would "facilitate operations
by them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of author­
ity accorded by US political authorities." 112
President Eisenhower viewed British participation as a way to
confuse the Soviets as to the sponsorship of particular overflights and
also to spread the risk in the event of a loss. Furthermore, he was used
 
"" OSA History, chap. 13, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword).
 
'" Ibid.. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid., p. I (TS Codeword).
 
Secs et
 
Secret NOFQRO.L
 
Chapter 3
156
 
to working closely with the British from his wartime experience and
believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as­
113
pect of their alliance with the United States.
On the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical ex­
tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two
countries on the U-2 program . T he direct involvement of the British
also enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the
Middle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United
Kingdom than to the United States. T he British also may have rea­
soned that direct participation in the program was the best way to en­
sure that they had a right to share in the U-2 's take. Otherwise, the
United States might decide at some: point to cut off the flow of U-2
photography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
By November 1958, British pi lots had joined Detachment B, and
arrangements had been made for the: title to the aircr.ift they would be
using to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final
exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Macmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of au­
thority for the joint program: "Br iitish missions are carried out on
your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are au­
thorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have
established. In this sense, it could be: said that we are carrying out two
complementary programs rather than a joint one.·· IIJ
Richard Bissell had achieved his goal of gaining another source
of approval for overflights of the Soviet Union. In late 1959 and early
1960 , this arrangement proved its value when British pilots conducted
two highly successful missions over Soviet missile testing facilities at
a time when President Eisenhower had not authorized an overflight
for almost six months (see chapter 4). Most flights by the RAF pilots
in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East. where the
United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi­
lots took part in overflights.
In Britain, the cover story for the RAF participation in the U-2
program was that British fliers were being trained to fly high-altitude
weather-sampling missions for the !RAF weather service. To support
this cover, a U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, in early
'" Goodpaster interv iew (S).
,,. OSA History. ch:ip. 13. pp. I 0-11 (TS Cod,:word).
 
£ee.ot
 
Sec, et MOF'ORI\I
 
Chapter 3
157
 
May 1959, and used to fly weather missions on 7 and 8 May before
returning to Adana. Two more weather-sampling flights took place
over England on 5 and 6 October 1959.
 
THE U-2 PROJECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1959
Early 1959 saw Detachment B aircraft active primarily over Middle
Eastern countries, with occasional overflights of Albania to check for
reported Soviet missile installations. Detachment C mainly collected
high-altitude weather data, although it also flew two missions over
Tibet and Southwest China (see chapter 5). The overflight program
against the Soviet Union seemed to be at a standstill, but pressures
within the government were building to resume deep-penetration
flights to resolve the growing "missile-gap" controversy.
Organizationally, the U-2 project underwent a major change after
Richard Bissell became CIA's Deputy Director for Plans on I January
1959. At first glance, Bissell's selection seems unusual because he
• liad spent most of his Agency career heading the U-2 project, but his
first major assignment had been coordinating support for the opera­
tion that overthrew the leftist Government of Guatemala in 1954.
Furthermore, Bissell's U-2 project was the major covert collector 0f
intelligence against the CIA's primary target, the Soviet Union.
During his years as head of the Development Projects Staff
(DPS), Bissell had opposed proposals to bring all Agency air activi­
ties together into a single office, fearing that he would lose control of
the U-2 project. Once he became Deputy Director for Plans, his view­
point changed; he was now in a position to consolidate all air activi­
ties under his own control. On 16 February 1959, the DPS became the
Development Projects Division (DPD) of the Directorate of Plans (at
the time known as the Deputy Directorate/Plans or DDP). Despite the
tremendous increase in the scope of his duties after assuming control
of the DDP, Bissell retained personal control of his previous
Development Projects Staff projects: the U-2 program, another pro­
ject to develop a photosatellite, and a third project to design a fol­
low-on aircraft for the U-2 (OXCART). Although the amalgamation
of all Agency air operations and the transfer of the U-2 project to the
DDP made sense, the question remained as to whether one individual
could effectively control all these different activities.
 
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Geern·t NOf'OHN
 
Chapter 4
159
 
_The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960
 
THE U-2 AND THE "MISSILE-GAP" DEBATE
Despite President Eisenhower's reluctance to send U-2s over the
Soviet Bloc, he once again authorized overflights in the summer of
1959, after a pause of more than a year. The overriding factor in his
decision was the growing '• missile-gap" controversy. which had its
•roots in a series of dramatic Soviet announcements during the second
half of 1957. The first announcement revealed the successful test of
an intercontinental ballistic missile in August. Then in October, the
Soviets announced the successful orbiting of the world's first artificial
earth satellite, Sputnik. One month later the Soviets orbited a second
satellite containing a dog and a television camera. To many
Americans, including some influential members of Congress, the
Soviet Union's space successes seemed to indicate that its missile
program was ahead of that of the United States. By the spring of
1958, after the United States had successfully launched several satel­
lites, fears of a space technology gap between the two superpowers
had eased. By the end of the year, however, new concerns arose that
the Soviet Union was producing a missile arsenal that would be much
larger than that of the United States. This was the famous missile gap
1
that received widespread publicity beginning in early 1959.
The missile-gap controversy was fueled by Soviet boasts about
the success of their missile program. On 4 December 1958. a Soviet
delegate to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack stated: "Soviet
ICBMs are at present in mass production." Five days later, Soviet
 
' For an overview of tht: controversy. see Roy E. Licklider. "The Missile Gap
Controversy." Political SL'ience Quanerly 85 ( I 970):600-6 l 5.
 
Secact
 
Sec,et N6F6AN
 
Chapter 4
160
 
Launch of Sputnik,
4 October 1957
 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an
ICBM capable of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles.
These statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this
same month of December, the firs:t attempt to launch the new US
Titan ICBM failed. In reality, all of the Soviet statements were sheer
propaganda; they had encountered difficulties with the SS-6 ICBM,
and the program was at a standstill. As a result, there were no ICBM
launches from Tyuratam between 29 May 1958 and 17 February
1959, a space of almost nine months.:
To conceal the difficulties in their missile program. Soviet lead­
ers continued to praise its alleged successes. At the beginning of
February 1959, Khrushchev opened the Soviet Communist Party
Congress in Moscow by claiming that "serial production of intercon­
tinental ballistic rockets has been organized." Several months later
Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Ma linovsky stated that these missiles
were capable of hitting "precisely ainy point" and added, "Our army
is equipped with a whole series of intercontinental, continental and
other rockets of long, medium and short range." When asked at a
press conference to comment on Malinovsky's statement, President
Eisenhower replied, "They also said that they invented the fly ing ma­
chine and the automobile and the tellephone and other things .... Why
should you be so respectful of this statement this morning, if you are
not so respectful of the other three?'" 3 Nevertheless, the Soviet state­
ments were taken at face value by most Americans, including many
members of the intelligence community.
 
' Lawrence Freedman. US lntell(~ttnce and the Soviet Strategic Threat. 2nd. ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1936). pp. 69-70.
' Ford Eastman. .. Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag:· Aviation Week, 9 Febru.:lf)'
1959, pp. 26-27.
 
Scerel
 
Sec. et NOFORN
 
Chapter 4
161
 
As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in­
terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet
advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were
experiencing difficulties in deve lop ing an operational ICB M. the Air
Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile
was ready for deployment.'
The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when
Secretary o f Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities
for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early
1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United
States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be
temporary and that at its end the Un ited States would enjoy a techno­
logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the
more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num­
ber of obsolescent liquid-fue led missiles, but it was his mention of a 3
to l missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such
as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap
would eventually be even larger.s
Faced with rising publ ic and Congressional concern about the
missile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President
Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in­
fonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a
National Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behi nd to talk to the
President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti­
cism of the missile gap fro m Symington and other Democratic
Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use
of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen
Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances
about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho­
tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of
photographs required.
The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that
the reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he
stated that U-2 flights should be " held to a minimum pending the
 
• Freedman. US Intelligence. p. iO.
' .. What About the Missile Gap'1.. 1irne. 9 Febru:iry 1959. pp. 11-13.
 
Seci:et
 
Sec, et NOfOF'IN
 
Chapter 4
162
 
availability of this new equipment." Quarles objected that the satel­
lites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied
that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build
a first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower
finally conceded that "one or two flights might possibly be permissi­
ble," but he ruled out "an extensive program." In light of the "crisis
which is impending over Berlin" he did not want to be provocative. 6
As the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower
stuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, al­
though the Soviet Union's resumption of ICBM testing almost per­
suaded him to change his mind. On lO April 1959, the President
tentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he
called in McE!roy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdraw­
ing his authorization, explaining that "there seems no hope for the fu­
ture unless we can make some progress in negotiation." Eisenhower
remained worried by "the terrible propaganda impact that would be
occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail." Although he
agreed that new information was necessary, especially in light of the
"distortions several senators are making of our military position rela­
tive to the Soviets," Eisenhower believed that such information
would not be worth "the political costs." 7
The President remained willing to consider flights that did not
overfly Soviet territory, and in June he authorized two electronic in­
telligence collection missions along the Soviet-Iranian border. The
two missions of Operation HOT SHOP took place on 9 and 18 June
1959. The first of these missions was noteworthy because it involved
both an Agency U-2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two air­
craft cruised along the Soviet border and made the first telemetry in­
tercept ever from a Soviet ICBM during first-stage flight, 80 seconds
after launch. 8
Efforts to persuade the President to authorize penetration mis­
sions continued. On 7 July 1959, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell
met with Eisenhower to discuss the possibility of a penetration flight
 
• Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 12 February 1959, WHOSS Alpha.
DDEL (TS); Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 513-514; Beschloss, Mayday, p.
173.
' Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 514-515: Beschloss. Mayday,
p.176.
• Mission folders 4120 (9 June 1959) and 4121 ( 18 June I 959), OSA records, job
67-8-972, boxes 10 and 11 (TS Codeword).
 
iearet
 
~etNOFORPJ
 
Chapter 4
163
 
to gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions con­
tinued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State
Herter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that "the intelli­
gence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped." The strong
backing of the proposed overflight by both CIA and the State
Department finally convinced President Eisenhower to approve the
•
•
9
mIss10n.
On 9 July 1959, more than 16 months after the previous over­
flight of the Soviet Union, a U -2 equipped with a B camera left
Peshawar, Pakistan, flew over the Urals, and then crossed the missile
test range at Tyuratam. This mission, known as Operation
TOUCHDOWN, produced excellent results. Its photography revealed
that the Soviets were expanding the launch facilities at Tyuratam.
Whi le this overflight was under way, another U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border.'0
Despite its success, this overflight remained an isolated incident.
President Eisenhower was unwilling to authorize additional over• flights of I.he Soviet Union. in part because he did not wish to increase
tension before Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States sched­
uled for 15-27 September 1959. Nevertheless, the President still
wanted as much intelligence on the Soviet missile program as possi­
ble. Because the Soviets were conducting an extensive program of
missile tests in mid- I 959, Eisenhower authorized a steady stream of
I.he less provocative electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering mis­
sions (14 in all) along the Soviet border during the remainder of the
II
year.
Within the United States, concern about the Soviet missile pro­
gram continued to grow. On 12 September 1959 the Soviets scored
another space success when their Luna 2 rocket reached the moon,
and Khrushchev stressed this success when he arrived in the United
States three days later. He also boasted of Soviet missile progress in
private conversations with President Eisenhower. while making no
 
• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 7 July 1959 (TS): iJem,
Memorandum of Conference with the President. 8 July !959. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL
(TS).
"' Mission folder 4 115 (9 July 1959). OSA records (TS Codeword).
" OSA Hisrorv. chap. 19. annex 120. pp. 12- 14 (TS Codeword).
 
iiee,et
 
See, et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 4
164
 
mention of overflights by the United States. After the trip was over,
Khrushchev and other leading Soviet officials continued to make ex­
aggerated claims about the extent of their missile force, adding to the
confusion and concern within the US intelligence community. Thus in
November 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev told a conference of
journalists, "Now we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of
atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe
our potential enemies off the face of the earth." He then added that
"in one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the as­
sembly line in the factory we visited." 11 Because the Soviet Union
had been launching at least one missile per week since early fall, US
policymakers placed great weight on his remarks.
Despite the intelligence community's intense interest in the
Soviet Union's nuclear and missile programs, President Eisenhower
did not authorize any more overflights of the Soviet Union during the
remainder of the year. On the other hand, he raised no objections to
(and probably welcomed) the first British overflight of the Soviet
Union in December 1959. For almost a year, the RAF pilots of
Detachment B had been ready to fly over the Soviet Union, but Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan had not previously authorized any such
missions because of his own visit to the Soviet Union, several interna­
tional meetings, and other state visits. As a result, British U-2 mis­
sions had been confined to the Middle East. Now that the Prime
Minister's approval had been obtained, Detachment B conducted
Operation HIGH WIRE with an RAF pilot. Squadron leader Robert
Robinson left Peshawar on 6 December and overflew Kuybyshev,
Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range
before landing at Adana. The mission photography was excellent, but
it did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at
Tyuratam, not Kapustin Yar. 13
Because there had been so few overflights in 1958 and 1959,
many questions about the Soviet missile program remained unan­
 
swered. Within the intelligence community there was still consider­
able disagreement over the size of the Soviet missile force. Thus,
during testimony before the US Senate in January 1960, DCI Allen
Dulles, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Air Force Chief of
 
" William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York:
Random House, 1987), p. 10 I.
 
" OSA History, chap. 11, p. 33 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 8005 (6 December 1959),
OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS Codeword).
 
&earet
 
Sec. et NOFORl'J
 
Chapter 4
 
165
 
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Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of
deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on
evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to
14
the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning.
As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determinced to
obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the mis­
sile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelli­
gence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing
the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. Alt this
time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the
Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was e:<tremely large
and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only bie de­
ployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed rai!lroad
tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles. tlhere­
fore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying
along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the
 
" Licklider. " Missile Gap Controversy." pp. 608-609.
 
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6 December 1959
 
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Chapter 4
 
167
President"s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle
urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to
the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as
summarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed
that the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in
his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one
tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free
world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were
lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could
15
be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness."
A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over
the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mis­
sion had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 Felbruary
1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacAnthur at
the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE
EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratarn Missile Test Range, headed
northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long
stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from
tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid dis­
16
cover a new Soviet bomber. dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'.
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con­
tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as
many as 100 missiles . The Army, Navy, and C IA, however, doubted
that any had been deployed, because none could be found . Add itional
U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,
President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis­
sions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence
of Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consideir a re­
sumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one missiorn to be
flown during the month of March. The President's continued riestric­
tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo­
randum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting
that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile
deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein."
 
'' Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 568; Beschloss. Mayday, p. 233.
" Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960). OSA records. job 67-8-972, box 13 (TS
Codeword): OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword).
 
" OSA Chronolog_v. p. 25 (TS Codeword): Philip K. Edwards. "The President's Board:
1956-60." Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969):l 18 (S).
 
5eeret
 
Sec, et N6f6IU4
Chapter 4
168
 
In authorizing another overflight of the Soviet Union, President
Eisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of
complications in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield
at Peshawar, however, the mission could not be staged in March, and
the President agreed to extend his dleadline until l 0 April 1960. One
day before the expiration of this cle.adline, a U-2 equipped with a
B-camera took off from Peshawar on the last successful overflight of
the Soviet Union, Operation SQUARE DEAL. As had been the case
during the previous two overflights, a second U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border. After leaving Peshawar, mis­
sion 4155 headed first for Saryshagan, where it obtained the first pic­
tures of two new Soviet radars, the HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST
installations. The U-2 then flew to the nuclear testing site at
Semipalatinsk. Returning to the Saryshagan area, it crisscrossed the
railroad network there and then proceeded to Tyuratam. where it pho­
tographed a new two-pad, road-served launch area that suggested a
18
new Soviet missile was in the offing.
In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev remarked that this U-2 should
have been shot down. "but our antiaircraft batteries were caught nap­
ping and didn ' t open fire soon enough." Khrushchev explained that
Soviet missile designers had developed a high-altitude antiaircraft
missile and batteries of this missile had been deployed near known
19
targets of the U-2.
The CIA already had strong indications of improvements in the
Soviet air defense system, and early in 1960 the Development
Projects Division had asked Air force experts at the Air Technical
Intelligence Center (ATIC) for a frank assessment of Soviet capabili­
ties against the U-2. On 14 March ll960, Col. William Burke, acting
chief of the DPD, relayed the ATIC assessment to Richard Bissell:
 
The sreatest threat to the U-2 is the Soviet SAM. Although the
AT!C analysis concedes a remote possibility thac the SAM may
be less effective than estimatea~ their present evaluation is that
the SAM (Guideline) has a high probability of successful inter­
cept at 70,000 feet providing th.at detection is made in sufficient
time lO alert the site. 10
 
,. Mission folder 4155. 9 April 1960. OSA records. job 67-8 -328. box 6 (TS Codeword).
•• Nikita S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little.
Brown. & Co.. 1974). pp. 443-444.
"' Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy· Director (Plans). from Col. William Burke.
Acting Chief, DPD ...Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations:· 14 March 1960, IC
Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A. box I0 . ..CHALICE (General).. (TS Codeword).
 
Operation SQUARE DEAL, 9 April 1960
 
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~eeFet J.\IOFOAN
 
Chapter 4
 
170
 
One of the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been se­
lected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that
penetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest
chance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense system.
Colonel Burke's 14 March letter recommending SQUARE DEAL as
the preferred route for the next overflight had stated, "There is a rea­
sonable chance of completing this operation without detection."
Escaping detection had become important because, if the Soviet
SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major
threat to the U-2.
CIA hopes that flights from Pakistan or Afghanistan might go
undetected proved false. On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's
ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet tracking at a very
early stage of the mission. Although the Soviets failed to intercept the
U-2, their success at tracking it should have served as a warning
against future overflights from Pakistan (or anywhere else, for that
matter). On 26 April 1960, Colonel Burke informed Richard Bissell
that "experience gained as a result of Operation SQUARE DEAL
indicates that penetration without detection from the Pakistan/
Afghanistan area may not be as easy in the future as heretofor." 11
Unfortunately, neither Colonel Burke nor Richard Bissell took the
logical step of recommending the cessation of overflights now that
the risks had increased substantially. The lure of the prospective intel­
ligence gain from each mission was too strong, and the Soviets' lack
of success at interception to date had probably made the project staff
overconfident. Furthermore, both DCI Allen Dulles and the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
were pressing for more photos of the Soviet Union in order to settle
the missile-gap debate raging in the intelligence community and
Congress.
 
THE LAST OVERFLIGHT: OPERATION GRAND SLAM
Even before the 9 April overflight took place, President Eisenhower
had consented on 28 March to an additional overflight during the
month of April. His willingness to allow yet another overflight was
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans), from Colonel Burke,
Acting Chief, DPD. "Operational Priority of Proposed CHALICE Missions," 26 April
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A, box 10. "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
 
Secaet
 
Sec, et NOPORICJ
Chapter 4
 
171
 
SA-2 surface-to-air missile
 
strengthened when the Soviet Union did not protest the 9 April mis­
sion. As Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky later re­
marked about the lack of protest, ''This was virtually inviting us to
repeat the sortie ... ~=
Although President Eisenhower had authorized another over­
flight for April, he left the designation of its targets up to the experts
at the C lA. Of the three missions that remained under consideration.
one-Operation SUN SPOT-would overfly southern targets,
Tyuratam and Vladimirovka, while the other two would cover rail­
road networks in the north-central portion of the Soviet Union. The
intelligence community had been interested in this area ever since late
1959, when there were indications that the Soviets were building an
SS-6 launch facility there. This was the first indication that :SS-6s
might be located anywhere other than Tyuratam testing facility. where
the missi les were launched from a general purpose launching pad.
T he intelligence community was anxious to obtain photography o f a
 
" George B. Kistiakowsky. A Scientist lll rlie \¥/,ire House (CamhriJg.:: l·t.1rvarJ
Univ.:rsity Press. 1976). p. 3::8.
SeG:ret
 
6eeret l).!Qi;QRPJ
 
Chapter 4
172
 
deployed SS-6 site because it could provide exemplars for
photointerpreters to use in searching subsequent overhead photogra­
phy for similar installations. 13
The two proposed overflights that would cover the northern rail­
road lines received the strongest consideration. Both plans contained
new features. Operation TIME STEP called for a U-2 to take off from
the USAF base at Thule, Greenland, which would be the first over­
flight staged from this base. The aircraft would then fly over Novaya
Zemlya on its way to cover the railroad lines from the Polyamyy Ural
Mountains to Kotlas. The return flight would be over Murmansk with
the landing to take place at either Bodo or Andoya on Norway's
northeast coast. The other proposed overflight, Operation GRAND
SLAM, was the first U-2 mission planned to transit the Soviet Union;
all previous missions had penetrated not more than halfway and then
left in the general direction from which they came. GRAND SLAM
proposed to fly across the Soviet Union from south to north, departing
from Peshawar, Pakistan, and landing at Bodo, Norway. The mission
would overfly Tyuratam, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Kotlas, Severodvinsk,
and Murmansk.
The two preferred missions both required the use of the airfield
at Bodo, which had been authorized by senior Norwegian intelligence
and military officers. Because the Bodo airfield was involved in
NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area, Bissell in­
formed the White House that neither mission could be flown before
19 April. Once the maneuvers ended, bad weather over the Soviet
Union kept the mission from taking place when it was originally
scheduled. Richard Bissell, therefore, asked President Eisenhower for
more time. and, on 25 April, General Goodpaster relayed the
President's instructions to Bissell that "one additional operation may
be undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation
is to be carried out after May l. " 14 The President did not want to fly
missions any later than that because the Paris Summit was scheduled
to begin on 16 May 1960.
By this time, CIA planners were concentrating on Operation
GRAND SLAM as the most likely route for the proposed mission be­
cause it offered the best chance of photographing suspected locations
'·' OSA Hi.1·tory, chap. 12. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).
" Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 569; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 10.
 
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Operation GRAND SLAM, 1 May 1960
 
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-~:,~-~~-::. ~-'.0
.. •
 
• •
 
a\
.
 
Turkmen
 
.....,
 
. :·;, :·~~ .
 
200
 
TEHERAN
 
*
 
·
 
Sec, el NOFOAN
 
Chapter 4
174
 
of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME
STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather
(which would affect both navigation and photography) because the
flightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire
mission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of
its greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bis sell on 14 March 1960,
Colonel Burke stated:
 
Operation "TIME STEP" is our last choice because we can as­
sume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will
be detected on entr_,; tracked accurately throughout the period in
denied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a
strong PVO [Soviet Air Defense} reaction. This flight plan would
permit alerting of SAM sites, and pre-positioning of missile
equipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point of exit) thus
enhancing the possibility of successful intercept. In addition, we
must assume that even were the Soviets unable to physically in­
terfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be avail­
able to permit them to document a diplomatic protest should they
desire to do so. 15
The concerns raised by Colonel Burke about TIME STEP should
also have been raised about Operation GRAND SLAM, which would
be the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed
covering so much of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the
U-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to
intercept the aircraft.
The pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis
Gary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers
had joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational mis­
sions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China
as well as six along the Soviet border.
To prevent the U-2 from being seen at Peshawar, project manag­
ers decided to ferry the aircraft from Adana to Pakistan the night be­
fore the scheduled flight. Once the plane was refueled and its camera
was loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure
to local residents because of darkness and its short stay-less than six
 
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William
Burke. Acting Chic:f. DPD, "Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A. box 10, "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
 
6ec,et
 
Sect et N6f6RN
 
Chapter 4
175
 
hours on the ground. Originally scheduled for Thursday, 28 April,
GRAND SLAM was canceled because of bad weather over the north­
ern Soviet Union. This had been the case for the past several weeks.
When this flight was canceled, the U-2 returned to Adana before sun­
rise. That evening the U-2 flew back to Peshawar for another attempt
to stage the mission early on the 29th, but bad weather again forced
cancellation of the mission, and the U-2 returned to Adana. Because
of continued bad weather over the target areas, no mission was
planned for Saturday, 30 April. 20
Meanwhile, the plane ferried to Peshawar on 27 and 28 April
had accumulated so many hours of flight time that it had to be
removed from service for periodic maintenance. A different aircraft
was, therefore, ferried to Peshawar on Saturday night, 30 April. This
aircraft, article 360, had made a crash landing in Japan during the pre­
vious September (see chapter 5). Although it had been refurbished by
Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would give
it greater altitude, pilots did not completely trust this aircraft and con­
sidered it a "hangar queen." As Powers noted in his memoirs, .. Its
current idiosyncrasy was one of the fuel tanks, which wouldn't feed
all its fuel." 27 The aircraft was equipped with a B-model camera. a
System-YI electronic intelligence unit, and a System-lXB device,
which generated false-angle information in response to the radar
pulses used by some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems.
Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep-pen­
etration overflight of the Soviet Union, began almost 30 minutes late
on Sunday, I May 1960, a delay due to difficulty in getting takeoff
approval from Washington. This delay was caused by
communications problems that are typical at sunrise and sunset
during spring and autumn, when the ionosphere will not support reli­
able communications. In attempting to relay the authorization mes­
sage, the radio operator in Adana was unable to reach the base in
Peshawar, whose codename was HBJARGON. Realizing that neither
the prearranged nighttime nor daytime frequencies were working, the
operator began sending a message in the clear, using one of the guard
frequencies in the transition area between the daytime and nighttime
frequencies. The radio operators at Peshawar kept hearing the Morse
 
'' Mission folder -115-1 ( I May 1960). OSA records (TS Codeword).
" Powers. Operation Overflight, p. 76.
 
Se&ret
 
Sec.et rdOFOAN
Chapter 4
 
176
 
code letters JGOHB, JGOHB as they tuned from one prearranged fre­
quency to the other. Then one of the Peshawar operators decided to
tune in the guard frequency where the Morse transmission was stron­
gest. He was able to discern a break in the letters, making the mes­
sage read "HBJGO HBJGO." The Peshawar operators realized this
stood for "HBJARGON Go." The detachment chief, Col. William
Shelton, who had been waiting anxiously inside the radio van for a
"Go" or "No Go" message, leaped from the van and ran across the
field to give the signal for takeoff to Powers, who was sitting in the
U-2C at the end of the runway. 28
Powers started his takeoff roll at Ol 59Z on l May 1960. Once
airborne, Powers guided his aircraft toward Afghanistan. Following
standard operating procedure, Powers clicked his radio switch when
he reached penetration altitude of 66,000 feet, which signaled the op­
erations unit at Peshawar that everything aboard the aircraft was
working and the mission would proceed as planned. Aside from this
simple signal, Powers and all U-2 pilots maintained strict radio si­
lence during penetration missions.
Powers' first target was- the Tyuratam Missile Test Range after
which he headed for Chelyabinsk, just south of Sverdlovsk. The
planned route would take him over Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk, northwest
to Kirov. north over Yur'ya and Plesetsk, then to Severodvinsk. north­
west to Kandalaksha, north to Murmansk, and, finally, west to Bodo,
Norway.
May Day turned out to be a bad time to overfly the Soviet
Union. On this major holiday, there was much less Soviet military air
traffic than usual, so Soviet radars could easily identify and track
Powers' U-2. In addition, the Soviets responded to the intrusion by
ordering a ban on civilian air traffic in a large portion of the Soviet
Union. Soviet radar began tracking the U-2 when it was still 15 miles
south of the Soviet-Afghan border and continued to do so as the air­
craft flew across the Central Asian republics. When Powers reached
the Tashkent area, as many as 13 Soviet interceptor aircraft scrambled
in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept his plane.
Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into
the mission, an SA-2 surface-to-air missile detonated close to and just
behind his aircraft and disabled it 70,500 feet above the Sverdlovsk
'·' Richard K. Pero, "Message Received-Unfortunately," Studies in Intelligence 27
(Winter 1983 ):29 (S).
 
Sec,et
 
See, et NOFORN
Chapter 4
 
177
 
area. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers
looked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifu­
gal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy
and prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the
last minute, so that it would not go off while he was still in the plane.
When he released his seatbelt, however, he was immediately sucked
out of the aircraft and found himself dangling by his oxygen hose, un­
able to reach the destruction switches. Finally, the hose broke and he
tlew away from the falling aircraft. After he fell several thousand
feet, his parachute opened automatically, and he drifted to earth where
he was quickly surrounded by farmers and then by Soviet officials. 29
His aircraft had not been destroyed by the crash, and the Soviets were
able to identify much of its equipment when they put it on display 10
days later. Even if Powers had been able to activate the destruction
device, however, it would not have destroyed the aircraft. The small
explosive charge was only designed to wreck the camera.
How had the Soviets succeeded in downing the U-2? Although
some CIA project officials initially wondered if Powers had been fly­
i_ng too low through an error or mechanical malfunction, he main­
tained that he had been flying at his assigned altitude and had been
brought down by a near miss of a Soviet surface-to-air missile. This
turned out to be the case, for in March 1963, the US air attache in
Moscow learned that the Sverdlovsk SA-2 battery had fired a
three-missile salvo that, in addition to disabling Powers' plane, also
scored a direct hit on a Soviet fighter aircraft sent aloft to intercept
the U-2.'0 Mission planners had not known about this SAM site be­
fore the mission because they always laid out flight plans to avoid
known SAM sites.
 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE U-2 DOWNING
The first indication that something was wrong with Powers' m1ss1on
came even before he was overdue at Bodo, Norway. The CIA
Operations Center learned on l May at 0330 hours Washington time
'' Powers, Operation Overjliglzt. pp. 82-84; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 26-28: Transcript of
Debriefing Tapes of Francis Gary Powers, 13 February 1962. Board of Inquiry on the
Conduct of Francis Gary Powers, Operations MUDLARK tiles, OSA records. job
74-8-605, box 6 (S).
"' Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); OSA History, chap. 14, p. 55
(TS Codeword).
 
&eeret
 
Secret l'JOFORl'J
 
Chapter 4
178
that the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight 's pro­
gress two hours earlier (0529Z), southwest of Sverdlovsk. Although
there was no word from the Soviet Union concerning the mi:ssing
U-2. key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center
that morning (with the exception of Bissell. who was out of town and
did not arrive until 1530) to analyze the latest information and discuss
courses of action. They quickly established a new project. known as
Operation MUDLARK. co gather and evaluate all available informa­
tion about the downed U-2."
Bissell and the other project officials did not know wh,ether
Powers was dead or if the plane and camera had been destroyed', but
they believed chat there was no way that a pilot could survive a crash
from an altitude above 70,000 feet. They. therefore, decided to stick
with the standard cover story for U-2 fl ights: that they were we:acher
flights staged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administr:ation
(NASA)-originally the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics. renamed in 1958. This cover story had been approve:d by
the President in 1956.
By the end of the day, the Operation MUDLARK officials had
prepared a statement based on the standard cover story but modified
to fie the available information on Powers· flight and to show Adana
as the aircraft's base in order to conceal Pakistan's role in the mission.
This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent
with it, was sent to the field commander at Adana, co Air Force
Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara to replace
the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of
the mission. The first announcement of the new cover story came, late
on 2 May by the Adana base commander, but it did not appear in print
until the following day. On Tuesday, 3 May, NASA released a state­
ment about a high-altitude weather plane that was missing on a flight
inside Turkey. The statement had been designed to provide an e>epla­
nation for the presence of wreckage inside the Soviet Union by noting
that "the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was ex­
periencing oxygen difficulties.,. .,: Thus. if the Soviets protested and
pointed to wreckage inside their borders, NASA could claim that the
pilot had lost consciousness and the aircraft had then flown into the
Soviet Union before crashing.
'' Geary incerview (S).
'' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 39.
 
gee1 et NOFORl'ii
 
Chapter 4
 
179
 
This statement had been prepared for a "best case·· scenario, that
is to say, one in which neither the pilot nor the plane and film sur­
vived. However, pilots had bailed out from extremely high altitudes
and survived, and there was even evidence from previous U-2 crashes
that much of the aircraft itself could be salvaged. The small destruc­
tive charge aboard the U-2 was not sufficient to destroy much more
than the camera. The tightly rolled film, which could reveal the exact
purpose of the mission even if the pilot and aircraft did not survive,
was very hard to destroy. Kelly Johnson later conducted an experi­
ment that revealed film taken out of a completely burned-out aircraft
could still provide usable imagery. 33 After almost four years of suc­
cessful U-2 missions, Richard Bissell and the rest of the Development
Projects Division had become overconfident and were not prepared
for the ··worst case" scenario that actually occurred in May I 960.
This failure played directly into the hands of Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, who shrewdly decided to release information about the
downed U-2 a little at a time, thereby encouraging the United States
to stick with its vulnerable cover story too long. As he later wrote,
"Our intention here was to confuse the government circles of the
United States. As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead,
they would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had acci­
dentally strayed off course and been shot down in the mountains on
the Soviet side of the border."'" The first word from the Soviet Union
came on Thursday, 5 May, when Premier Khrushchev announced to a
meeting of the Supreme Soviet that a US "spyplane" had been
downed near Sverdlovsk. He made no mention of the fate of its pilot.
Khrushchev's announcement aroused considerable interest in the
media in the United States, and that same day the State Department
and NASA issued another statement that continued the "weather
plane" cover story, adding that the pilot became lost during a routine
mission near the Caucasus Mountains. Soon afterward. the US
Ambassador to Moscow cabled a report to the State Department indi­
cating that the pilot might be alive after all. Two days later, on 7 May
1960. Khrushchev confirmed this report by revealing that the U-2 pi­
lot was alive and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet
Union.
 
" Geary intt!rview.
'" Khrushcht!v. Khrushchev Remembers: The Lase Teswmem. p. 507.
 
Sec1et
 
Secret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 4
180
 
•.. ~--~
 
-===-------· -,-
 
'
 
Khrushchev and the U-2
wreckage
 
• ')
 
This revelation completely demolished the US cover story., and
senior administration officials then debated what the appropriate
course of action should be . Allen Dulles offered to take responsibility
for the overflight and resign. but President Eisenhower did not want
to give the world the impression that he was not in control of his ad­
ministration. On Wednesday, 11 May, the President read a statement
to the press in which he assumed full responsibility for the U-2 mis­
sion but left open the question of future overflights, even though four
days earlier he had approved the recommendation of his key foireign
policy advisers to terminate all provocative intelligence operations
against the Soviet Union:'~
The U-2 affair had its greatest consequences when the
long-awaited summit meeting in Paris began less than a week latc:r on
16 May. Soviet Premier Khrushchev insisted on being the firs t
speaker and read a long protest about the overflight, ending with :a de­
mand for an apology from President Eisenhower. In his reply
" OSA H istorv. chap. I ➔ , pp. 14-16 (TS CocJ,:worcJJ: Bcschloss. Mayday. pp. 43-66.
 
243-J58.
 
Gea,et
 
Sec, et ~OFORI\I
 
Chapter 4
181
 
Eisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not
be resumed, but he refused to make a formal apology. At that point
the summit ended, as did all hopes for a visit to the Soviet Union by
President Eisenhower.
 
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS
The loss of Powers' U-2 ultimately resulted in the end of Detachment
B in Turkey. As soon as the Development Projects Division learned
that Powers was alive in Soviet hands, it immediately evacuated the
British pilots from Adana to protect the secret of their involvement in
the project. Project officials hoped that tlights might eventually re­
sume from Adana, but President Eisenhower's order ending over­
flights of the Soviet Union made this very unlikely. Less than four
weeks later. a coup ousted the government of Turkish Premier Adnan
Menderes on the night of 27 May 1960. Because the new government
had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to al­
l_Qw any U-2 tlights from Adana, even those necessary for maintain­
ing the aircraft's airworthiness. As a result, no more U-2s flew out of
Adana. Instead of being ferried home, three of the four remaining
U-2s were disassembled and loaded aboard C-124 cargo planes for
the return trip to the United States."'
The fourth U-2 remained inside a hangar at Incirlik airbase for
several years, looked after by a skeleton crew, in case the Adana in­
stallation needed to be reactivated. Finally the decision was made to
close down the Adana U-2 facility. During Detachment B's 44 months
of active existence, 21 pilots had flown its aircraft, including four
RAF pilots and three pilots transferred from the deactivated
Detachment A. Fourteen Detachment B pilots were later assigned to
other U-2 detachments, but the closing down of Detachment B marked
the end of Britain's direct involvement in U-2 operational overflights.
A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G,
Edwards AFB, until the end of the CIA U-2 program in I 974, but
RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U-2.
The loss of Powers' U-2, the resultant failure of the Paris
Summit, and the end of U-2 operations in Turkey were just the first in
a series of setbacks for the U-2 program. On 8 July 1960, the
'• OSA History. chap. 12. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).
 
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Secret NOFOfUd
 
Chapter 4
182
 
Japanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment
and complaints in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on
Japanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The
very next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s were disman­
tled and returned to the United States aboard C-124s. 37
[n the midst of the furor in Japan. on l July 1960, just six weeks
after the Paris Summit, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down an Air Force
RB-47 on an electronic intelligence collection mission over interna­
tional waters near the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula. Two survivors
were captured. The Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had vio­
lated its airspace, while the United States denounced the Soviets for
downing the plane over international waters. The acrimony exacer­
bated an already tense international atmosphere. 3"
One additional blow to the U-2 program came in the summer of
 
I960. NASA, concerned about the damage to its reputation from its
involvement in the U-2 affair and hoping to obtain international coop­
eration for its space program. decided to end its support of the cover
story that U-2s were conducting weather research under its auspices.'''
These developments resulted in a complete halt to all U-2 opera­
tions from overseas bases for more than six months. Pilots and air­
craft from Detachments B and C were consolidated into Detachment
G at Edwards Air Force Base, California. the unit formed after the
C[A had vacated the Nevada testing site in 1957 as a result of AEC
nuclear testing. Detachment G now comprised eight pilots from
Detachment B and three pilots from Detachment C. Because Powers'
capture had compromised Project CHALICE, the Agency assigned a
new cryptonym to the U-2 effort; henceforth, it was called Project
IDEALIST.""
 
" OSA Chronology. p. 28 (TS Codeword).
" "Mystery of the RB--+7," Newsweek. 25 July 1960. pp. 36-37: .. Nikita and the RB--+7."'
Time. 25 July I960. pp. 30-31.
,., At a meeting of high-levt:1 CIA. NASA. and State Department ofticials on 31 May 1960,
NASA was willing to continue its association with U-2 flights for the time being. but the
Administrator of NASA. Dr. Keith Glennan. believed that his agency "would be well ad­
vised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible." James A. Cunningham.
Memorandum for the Record. ··Tdephont: Conversation with Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy
Director, NASA," I June 1960. DPD chrono tile #.+553-60. OSA records (S).
"' OSA Hisrorv, chap. !2. pp. -H--+9; chap. 16. p. 10 (TS Codeword).
 
Se&Fet
 
Secret NOFORN
 
Chapter 4
183
 
THE FATE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers underwent extensive interro­
gation at the hands of the Soviets. His instructions from the CIA on
what to do in the event of capture were meager, and he had been told
that he might as well tell the Soviets whatever they wanted to know
because they could get the information from his aircraft anyway.
Nevertheless, Powers tried to conceal as much classified information
as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap­
tors. To extract the maximum propaganda value from the U-2 Affair,
the Soviets prepared an elaborate show trial for Powers, which began
on 17 August 1960. Powers continued to conceal as much information
as possible, but, on the advice of his Soviet defense counsel, he stated
that he was sorry for his actions. The Soviet court sentenced him to
IO years' "deprivation of liberty," with the first three to be spent in
•
01
pnson.
During the next 18 months, confidential negotiations to obtain
the release of Powers took place as the United States explored the
possibility of trading convicted Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel for
_Powers. These negotiations were conducted by Abel ·s court-ap­
pointed defense counsel, former OSS lawyer James Donovan. in cor­
respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East
Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI Pearre Cabell wrote to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk supporting such a trade, and on l 0
February 1962 the actual exchange took place in the middle of the
Glienecke Bridge connecting East and West Berlin. As part of the
deal, American graduate student Frederick Pryor, who had been jailed
in East Germany for espionage, was released at another location.
After Powers returned to the United States, he underwent exten­
sive debriefing, for many questions about his mission remained unan­
swered. To conduct the debriefing, the Agency immediately
reconvened the Damage Assessment Team that had met for two
months in the summer of 1960 to estimate what Powers knew about
the overflight program and could have told Soviet interrogators.
Given Powers' long involvement with the U-2 program, the team had
concluded in 1960 that his knowledge was extensive and he had prob­
ably revealed most of it to the Soviets. After two weeks of debriefing
Powers in February 1962, however, the team found that the damage
was much less than had been estimated, and they were quite satisfied
 
" Powers. Operation Overjlight, pp. 160-192; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 33 1-335.
SeGFet
 
Seu et N0F0flN
Chapter 4
184
 
.......
'
 
·'
 
-::-"
 
""'
 
"' --~ ,,
 
Trial of Francis Gary Powers
 
with Powers· behavior.'J After reading the debriefing reports. Allen
Dulles expressed support of Powers· actions and told Powers. ·--we
are proud of what you have done." but Dulles had already resigne:d as
DCI in November 1961.'' The new DCI, Joh n A. McCone. demanded
a closer look at Powers· actions and set up a Board of Inquiry headed
by retired Federal Judge E. Barrett Prettyman. After eight days of
hearings and deliberation. the board reported on 27 February that
Powers had acted in accordance with his instructions and had "c:orn­
plied with his obligations as an American citizen during this period. "
The board, therefore, recommended that he receive his back pay.
 
'' James J. Whit.:. ..Franci$ Gary Powcr.;- Th.: Unmaking of a Hero. 1960-1965," (drafti.
CIA History Staff. 1974. p. 19 ISL
" Powas. Or,acuion O verjfigfrt. p. .307.
 
Seeret
 
Secret NOfiotUd
 
Chapter 4
185
 
The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evi­
dence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of
I May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers
after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with
testimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and
his commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board;
the results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to un­
dergo; and the evidence provided by photographs of the wreckage of
his aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent
with Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical.
He asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check
Johnson's assessment of the photographs of the U-2. The Air Force
quickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings.
McCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted
Powers' testimony-a report by the National Security Agency (NSA)
that suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude
and turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being
downed-and ordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on I March
for another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by
NSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days lat­
er, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2
Affair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA.-'-'
Although all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted prop­
erly, they did not release many of their favorable findings to the pub­
lic, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior
from sensational press reports and statements by public figures who
were not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers· actions
while in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the
impact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI
McCone on 6 March 1962: "Don't you think he is being left with just
a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is
supposed to do, why leave it hanging?" ,s Doubts about Powers did
remain in the public mind because he received no public recognition
for his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also
"' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 352-35-k Thomas Powers. Man Wlzo Kept the Secrets. p. 328;
Prettyman Board. DCI records (S).
" United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze
Sencae Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). vol. 12. 86th Congre.~s. Second
Session ... Report on the U-2 Incident." 6 March 1962. p. 265 (declassified 1982).
 
Seccet
 
Sec, et NO,-OPU~
Chapter 4
 
186
 
snubbed by President Kennedy, who one year earlier had warmly wel­
comed two Air Force RB-47 fliers released by the Soviet Union.
McCone remained hostile to Powers. and in April 1963 he awarded
the Intelligence Star to all of the U-2 pilots except Powers. Finally on
25 April 1965, just two days before McCone's resignation became ef­
fective, Powers received the Star (which was dated 1963 on the back)
6
from DDCI Marshall S. Carter:
Powers' return from captivity raised the question of what his fu­
ture employment should be. This issue had already been discussed
one year earlier by John N. McMahon, executive officer of the DPD.
who noted that he and Col. Leo P. Geary (the Air Force project offi­
cer) were concerned about a major dilemma for the CIA and the US
Government: " On the one hand we have gone to considerable lengths
to prove that the U-2 program was a civilian undertaking and not mil­
itary aggression; on the other hand there is on fi le a document that
assures Francis Gary Powers that if he so desires he may be reinstated
into the USAF.'' On 21 March 1961 McMahon wrote:
 
If we grant him [Powers/ the right that is now his, namely rein­
statement in the Air Force, then we would be subjecting our­
selves to probable adverse propaganda by the USSR. Admitting
little appreciation for the finer points of political and psycholog­
ical warfare, should Francis Gary Powers return to the USAF I
suspect that the Soviets would have a "PP" field day illustrating
our big lie. The question then. since we cannot permit Powers to
return to the USAF. is what do we do with him."
Despite this negative recommendation, the Air Force agreed on
4 April I 962 to reinstate Powers effective I July, a decision that was
approved by the Agency, State Dep•artment, and White House. Then
Powers· divorce proceedings began. and the Air Force, concerned
about adverse publicity, postponed reinstatement until the end of the
proceedings. In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed
as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963, he met with Colonel Geary to discuss
his future plans and decided to stay with Loc kheed."11 Powers re­
mained at Lockheed until U-2 testing ceased in September 1969.
Earlier in the year, he had published an account of his experiences on
 
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 14. p. 54 (TS Codeword): Beschloss. Mayday. p. 397.
" John N. McMahon to Chief. Cover Staff. DPD. 21 March I 961. Operation MUDLARK
files. OSA records. job 74-B-605. box 6 (S).
 
" OSA History. chap. 14, p. 52 (TS Codeword).
 
See, el NGfiOAN
 
Chapter 4
187
 
the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a
light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and
then a helicopter for a television station. On l August 1977, he and a
cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the
•
-19
way to an assignment.
 
CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER MAY 1960
One of the most important changes in the overflight program after the
loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution of more formal
procedures for the approval of U-2 missions. During the first four
years of U-2 activity, very few members of the Eisenhower adminis­
tration had been involved in making decisions concerning the over­
flight program. The President personally authorized all flights over
the Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the
DCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to
CIA officials, the President's discussions of individual U-2 missions
or of the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State
or his Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense or his deputy. and the President's secretary.
Colonel (later General) Goodpaster.
The approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very
unstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with re­
viewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his
hands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advis­
ers before reaching a decision. In 1959 the U-2 program had gained a
second approval authority when British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan became the approval authority for missions conducted by
the RAF pilots in Detachment 8.
The loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in
the approval process. For all practical purposes, Prime Minister
Macmillan ceased to be a source of approval because the RAF pilots
who remained in the U-2 program did not conduct any more
operational missions (although the use of British pilots was consid­
ered on several occasions). In the United States the approval process
•• Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 396-401. Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which he had shown to the Agency in draft
form). but Kelly Johnson's "U-2R Log" records on 25 September 1969: "We havt: no
Right test activity at all. I must let Gary Powers go. Have protected him for about seven
years. but he doesn't have an ATR (Air Transport Rating), so we have no other job for
him-not even flying the Beechcraft."
 
Seccet
 
Chapter 4
188
 
became more formal as the National Security Council became
involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the
National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the
early 1960s, the Sptcial Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Military
Adviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, his
place on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 50
Before requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2
mission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission
giving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the
targets to be photographed. flight times, and emergency landing sites.
Such submissions came to be known as "black books" because they
were placed in black. looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special
Group was generally final, although on occasion controversial issues
were presented to the President for his decision.
This approval process did not come into play immediately after
May 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the
detachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October
1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred. this time over Cuba. By
this time the full approval procedure had been established, and the
Special Group approved the mission (sec chapter 5).
The approval process was not the only part of the U-2 program
that changed after May l 960. The process for establishing require­
ments for overhead reconnaissance missions also became more for­
mal. In August 1960 the US Intelligence Board took over the Ad Hoc
Requirements Committee and merged it with the Satellite Intelligence
Requirements Committee to form the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance. DCI Directive 2/7 tasked COMOR with the '·coor­
dinated development of foreign intelligence requirements for
overhead-reconnaissance projects over denied areas." The DCID
defined "overhead reconnaissance'' to include "all reconnaissance
for foreign-intelligence purposes by satellite. or by any vehicle over
 
'" The Special Group. which had becn creatcd by NSC lntcl!igen,e Documt:nt 54 l 211 in
1955 to ovcrsc.: covert a,tivitics. was originally known as the 54 l 2 Committ.:e. Later the
Sp,xial Group bccame known as the: 303 Committce and then thc 40 Committee. Unitcd
States Congress. Senate. Sckct Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Rcspcct to lntt:lligcnce Activities. Foreign and .Wiliwry l111elligence. book l. (Washington.
DC: US Government Printing Office. 1976). pp. 4S-53.
 
Sec,et="
 
See. et NOFORN
 
Chapter 4
189
 
denied areas, whether by pho1ographic, EUNT. COMfNT, infrared,
RADINT, or ocher means... The only exception to COMOR 's area of
responsibil ity was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces ." s,
By this lime the Air Force had developed a large overhead re­
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa­
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibili1y of
COM OR and the military services for colleccion requiremencs. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958. when it claimed
that the While House had given responsibility for peripheral recon­
naissance of the Soviet Union 10 the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctan1 to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this clai m. and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements comm ittee study.
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho­
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union.5! The last CIA
U-2 miss ion along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
. 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union·s southern border with Iran and
Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrange­
ments with the host governments .
Until the spri ng of 1961 , there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na­
tional level, the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immed iately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month, assigning each a risk fac­
tor of Critical. Sensitive, Unique, or Routi ne. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
C[A received a copy of the Activities Book.
 
" DCID '217. cffo::1.:tive 9 August 1960 (S ).
 
·' ' Memorandum for DCI McCon.: from James Q. Reber. Chai rman. COMOR. "Proposo::<l
Procedure~ for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance. " 2 1 March 1962. COMIREX r~cor<ls
(TS Co<kwor<l).
 
Seerct
 
Sec, et NOfiO~N
Chapter 4
190
 
Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap­
proved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit­
ted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for
approval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the
military services could also submit requirements through the DCI us­
ing their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military ser­
vices had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the
Special Group. The Agency had only one-COMOR. 51
The main conflicts between the requirements committee and the
military services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early
I 960s, North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the
US Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan
missions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions. however,
came very close to China. which was a denied area and, therefore,
came under COMOR ·s area of responsibility. Once the war in
Southeast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received re­
sponsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5).
To reduce the number of disputes between the competing CIA
and Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing
satellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to pro­
vide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national
level. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961,
and it was followed by three additional agreements during the next
four years. 50
Interest in coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military
services and the CIA also affected the field of photographic interpre­
tation. In the wake of the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May
1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency
group to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community.
Formed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the lead­
ership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the
study group's key recommendations in the report it issued in
December 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation
'' Ibid (TS Codeword).
" Problems of classitication prevent a more detailc:d discussion of this aspect of the recon­
naissance program. which will be covered in a future history of satellite reconnaissance at
a higher level of classification.
 
Seeret
 
Sec, et NOF'ORl<J
 
Chapter 4
191
 
center that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency
and the military services. The report further recommended that the
CIA be placed in charge of the new center. Ignoring Air Force claims
that it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the
report's recommendation, and, on 18 January 1961, National Security
Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8 established the
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Henceforth, the
director of NPIC would be designated by the DCI and approved by
the Secretary of Defense, and the deputy director would come from
one of the military services. The first director of NPIC was Arthur S.
Lundahl, head of the CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division. 55
One additional major change in the U-2 program in the years im­
mediately following the May Day incident-although not directly re­
lated to the loss of Powers' U-2-was the departure of Richard
Bissell from the CIA and the subsequent reorganization of the
Agency's reconnaissance and scientific activities. The roots of
Bissell's downfall went back to 1 January 1959, when he became
Deputy Director for Plans and decided to place all Agency air assets
in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais­
sance projects (the U-2 and its two proposed successors, the
OXCART aircraft and the reconnaissance satellite). The previously
independent Development Projects Staff became the Development
Projects Division (DPD) of the DDP and now controlled all Agency
air operations, including air support for covert operations. As a result,
U-2s were occasionally employed for gathering intelligence to sup­
port DDP operations in addition to their primary mission of gathering
strategic and tactical intelligence.
Although the reorganization made sense in terms of increasing
the efficiency of Agency air operations, the use of the U-2 to support
covert action disturbed Bissell's backers among the scientists advising
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, especially James Killian and
Edwin Land. They were concerned that Bissell was becoming too in­
volved in covert action and was not able to devote sufficient time to
the overhead reconnaissance program. Then came the disastrous Bay
of Pigs invasion in April 1961, which discredited Bissell with the
Kennedy administration in general and the two scientists in particular.
Later that year, Bissell lost another important source of support when
Allen Dulles resigned as DCI in November 1961. During his final
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
 
See,et
 
Sec, et NOFORl'd
 
Chapter 4
192
 
months as the Deputy Director for Plans, Bissell found himself in­
volved in a major struggle with Killian and Land, who were serving
on President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (succes­
sor to the Eisenhower administration's President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities). These two influential
Presidential advisers strongly advocated removing the Agency's over­
head reconnaissance programs from the DDP and placing them in a
new, science-oriented directorate. but Bissell resisted this proposal.
With his position in the Agency becoming increasingly untenable,
Bissell resigned on 17 February 1962, after turning down an offer
from the new DCI, John A. McCone, to become the CIA's first
Deputy Director for Research. 56
Two days after Bissell's departure, the new Directorate came
into existence, and it absorbed all of the Development Projects
Division's special reconnaissance projects. Only conventional air sup­
port for the Clandestine Services remained with the DDP in the new
Special Operations Division. The U-2 program was no longer con­
nected with covert operations.
The first half of 1962 was a confusing period for the
Development Projects Division. After losing the individual who had
created and supervised it for seven years, the DPD also lost its feeling
of autonomy when it was transferred from its own building to the new
CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli,
who had headed the DPD since 1960, returned to the Air Force. Then
on 30 July 1962, the overhead reconnaissance projects underwent a
major reorganization with the formation of the new Office of Special
Activities (OSA) to replace the DPD. The original organization of
OSA with IO division or staff heads reporting directly to the director
of the office (at that time known as the Assistant Director for Special
Activities) proved too cumbersome, and, on 30 September 1962, a re­
organization divided most of these offices between two major
 
subordinates, the Deputy for Technology and the Deputy for Field
Activities (see chart, page 193). The Office of Special Activities
(OSA) continued to control reconnaissance activities and related re­
search and development after the Directorate of Research was en­
larged and renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and
Technology (DDS&T) on 5 August 1963 (along with the other
 
'" Killian interview (S); Land interview (TS Codeword); Richard M. Bissell to John A.
McCone, 7 February 1962. DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 18. folder 10 (S).
 
Seeret
 
Secret NOF'OAN
Chapter 4
 
193
 
Office of Special Activities
Assistant Director for Special
Activities
Special Assistant
for Liaison
 
Deputy Assistant Director
Executive Officer
 
Programs Staff
 
Security Staff
 
I
 
I
 
Deputy for Field Ac tivities
 
Deputy for Technology
I
 
I
 
Advanced
Projects
Division
 
Engineering
Analysis
Division
 
Development
Division
 
Contracts
Division
 
Support
Division
 
Intelligence
Division
 
Communi­
cations
Division
 
Operations
Division
 
Materiel
Division
 
Directorates, DDS&T dropped the "Deputy" from its title in 1965
and became known as the Directorate of Science and Technology). In
1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special
Activities. The Office of Special Activities remained in control of the
CIA's overhead reconnaissance activities until 1974, when the
Agency ended its involvement with manned reconnaissance aircraft. 57
 
" OSA Chronology, pp. 34-35 (TS Codeword).
 
..Soe,er
 
.....
 
•· :··
 
1lJ'Jf<0 .•.·.
t,bl
 
. r.
 
Sec, et N6f8AN
 
J•.·
l
 
_,.
 
.
 
•
 
· ..
 
Chapter 5
195
 
U-2 Operatiqns After
May 1960
 
The loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on l
May 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc.
Soon after the May Day incident. President Eisenhower ordlered an
end to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F. Kennedy, told a 25
January 1961 press conference, " I have ordered that the flights not be
resumed, which is a conti nuation of the order gi ven by President
.. ..Eisenhower in May of last year." T his was not a bind_ing pledge, as
John A. McCone (who became DCI in November 196 1) poi nted out
to President K ennedy's successor. Lyndon 8 . Johnson, on 15 January
1964 in response to the new President's request for information on
U-2 overflight policies:
 
Contrary to popular assumption, President Kennedy did not
make any pledge or give an assurance, at least publicly. that
there would be no further overflights. He limited his response to
a statement that he had ordered that the flights not be r,':?sumed.
An order, obviously, is valid only until countermanded.'
Technically, McCone was correct, but no President was l ikely to
order a resumption of overflights of the Soviet Union without very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began to fill the gap left by the end of
U-2 coverage.
A lthough there were several proposals to resume overflights of
the Soviet Union in the years that followed, none reached the mission
planning stage. T he Kennedy administration came closest to resuming
 
' Memorandum for President Johnson from DCI McCone... Response to Query
Concerning U-2 Overflight Policy:· 15 January 1964. DCI records. job 80-8-1676R. box
17. folder 14 (TS Codeword).
 
Seerec
 
Sec1et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
196
 
overflights of the Soviet Union during the Berlin Crisis in the summer
and fall of 1961. On 14 September 1961, Kelly Johnson noted in his
project log:
 
Have had request from Mr. Bissell to propose ways and means
for increasing safety of the U-2 on probable overflights . ... It
seems that President Kennedy, who publicly stated that no U-2 '.s
would ever be over Russia while he was president, has requested
additional flights. Some poetic justice in this. 2
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up­
grade six older U-2s into U-2Cs with the more powerful engines on a
priority basis, even if it meant taking people off the work on the suc­
cessor aircraft in order to speed up the conversions.
Shortly thereafter, the resumption of overflights became a major
topic of discussion within the intelligence community. On 25
September 1961, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance pre­
pared a detailed "Justification for U-2 Photography over the USSR,"
which argued in favor of U-2 missions over selected, high-priority
targets such as ICBM complexes. The COMOR paper stated that sat­
ellite photography did not provide sufficient detail to answer many
critical questions about the Soviet ICBM program. To back up this
contention, the report placed U-2 and satellite photography of the
same Soviet targets side by side, clearly demonstrating the far supe­
rior resolution of the U-2's cameras. Not all members of COMOR
supported the resumption of overflights, however. When COMOR
formally recommended this course of action to the USIB on 1
October 1961, the State Department and CIA members dissented,
having found "insufficient justification for resuming U-2 overflights
of the USSR at this time." 3
 
' Johnson. "Log for Project X," 14 September 1961. In preparation for the possible re­
sumption of overflights. Kelly Johnson began thinking about what to do in a worst case
scenario like that of I May 1960. He noted in the project log on 21 September 1961:
One ofthe greatest technical problems and. ofcourse. a great moral one, is how we insure
destroying the aircraft and the pilot should the mission fail. I have proposed a rime-alti­
tude fusing setup for multitude bombs, that looks like it should do the trick. Beerli [Col.
Stanley Beerli, USAF. Director of the Office of Special Activities/ doesn 'r want anything to
do with this. bur we will go ahead and develop it in case someone decides it is necessary.
·' Memorandum for USIB from COMOR. "Justification for U-2 Photography over the
USSR." 25 September 1961, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T- l 23A. box 10,
"COMOR (General)" (TS Codeword); Memorandum for USIB from COMOR, "Require­
ments for Resumption of U-2 Overt1ights of the USSR," 1 October 1961, IC Staff.
COMIREX records, job 33-B- l l 9A, box I (TS Codeword).
 
-
 
Seerat
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 5
197
 
Nothing came of the proposal to resume overflights in the fall of
1961, as both the USIB and the Special Group came out against it,
but, as long as U-2 photography remained clearly superior to satellite
photography, the thought of obtaining U-2 coverage of the Soviet
Union remained tempting. In February 1962, the USIB seriously con­
sidered a COMOR proposal to send a U-2 over Kamchatka to photo­
graph Soviet antiballistic-missile facilities but finally decided to wait
for the results of an Air Force peripheral mission. The board later ac­
cepted DCI McCone's recommendation to seek satellite rather than
U-2 coverage of the area. 4
With both the CIA and the State Department strongly opposed to
sending the highly vulnerable U-2 over the Soviet Union, prospects
for resuming flights remained slight unless the international situation
worsened to such a degree that overflights would be worth the risks
involved. Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l
May 1960 proved to be the last CIA overflight of the Soviet Bloc.
Yet, the U-2 remained useful, for it could operate successfully in
other areas with less developed radar and air defense systems. After
May 1960, the main focus of U-2 activity shifted to two new areas:
- Latin America, where U-2s would play an extremely important role
during the early 1960s, and the Far East, where CIA U-2s were active
from 1958 until 1974, when the Agency's involvement in manned re­
connaissance finally ended.
 
U-2 OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion
During late summer 1960, the Directorate of Plans was planning a
counterrevolutionary invasion of Cuba for the following year. To sup­
port this effort, the Agency asked the National Security Council's
 
' Memorandum for the Special Group from COMOR, "Illustrations of Policy Restraints
on the Collection of Information through Overflight of Denied Areas during 1962," 14
December 1962, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-8-1 I9A, box 1 (TS Codeword);
James S. Lay, "The United States Intelligence Board, 1958- I965," (draft) CIA History
Staff MS-2, 1974, p. 385 (TS Codeword). One year later Saryshagan was the topic of US
Intelligence Board deliberations. In October 1963 the board asked COMOR to prepare
recommendations on the need for an electronic intelligence-gathering mission against the
Soviet ABM installations at Saryshagan. The proposed mission would not, however, vio­
late Soviet airspace; instead, the U-2 would fly over the portion of the People's Republic
of China closest to Saryshagan. Lay, "USIB History," pp. 393-94 (TS Codeword).
 
SHret
 
Seu et NOFORN
Chapter 5
198
 
Special Group to approve U-2 overflights of Cuba. Known as
Operation KICK OFF, these flights were designed to obtain intelli­
gence on Cuban air and ground order of battle and to provide geo­
graphic data for choosing an invasion site.
To allay fears that mechanical problems could lead to the loss of
a U-2 over Cuba, the submission to the Special Group for overflights
emphasized that, if a U-2 had a flameout anywhere over Cuba, it
could still glide back and make a safe landing in Florida. The Special
Group approved Operation KICK OFF but stipulated that only two
overflights could be made. Detachment G staged the Cuban missions
from Laughlin AFB near Del Rio, Texas, a base used by SAC U-2
aircraft. Agency photointerpreters went to Del Rio to read out the
photography after these missions. The two flights, on 26 and 27
October 1960, were very long missions, covering 3,500 miles and
lasting over nine hours. Because of cloud cover over Cuba, the results
of both missions were poor. The Agency, therefore, asked the Special
Group to approve additional missions. After receiving authorization,
Detachment G conducted three missions (Operation GREEN EYES)
on 27 November and 5 and 11 December 1960 with good results.
Overflights of Cuba continued under the new administration of
President Kennedy. Under the codename Operation LONG GREEN.
two overflights on 19 and 21 March 1961 photographed Cuba exten­
sively to aid the final preparations for the invasion. Two weeks later
Detachment G again deployed from Edwards AFB, California, to
Laughlin AFB. Texas. Beginning on 6 April, Detachment G U-2s
made 15 flights over Cuba to provide photographic coverage of the
ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and its aftermath. These flights were
known as Operation FLIP TOP. 5
 
Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2
Long missions conducted over Cuba in late 1960 and over Southeast
Asia in early 196 l pointed out the need to increase the range of the
U-2. In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that
they could be refueled in flight to extend their operating range. The
six Agency aircraft that were modified to achieve this capability re­
ceived the designation U-2F. All Agency U-2 pilots then underwent
training in the techniques of in-flight refueling.
 
' OSA History, chap. 16, pp. I 3-15 (TS Codeword).
 
See,et
 
Sec, el NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
 
199
 
Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
invasion, 20 April 1961
 
Refueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully
loaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed
• w-200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the U-2s,
they were in a very vulnerable position when approaching a tanker at
200 knots because their frai l wings could not stand much stress. As a
result, U-2 pi lots had to approach the KC- 135 tankers very carefully
in order to avoid the vonexes from the wingtips of the tanker and the
turbulence caused by the four large jet engines. During the first few
years of refueling operations, two U-2s crashed after their wings
broke off as they crossed into the turbulent area behind the tai11kers;
one of the pilots was killed."
The in-flight refueling capability was a useful modificati.on to
the U-2, but it could not dramatically extend mission length. The
main limiting factor remained pilot fatigue, which prevented missions
from lasting longer than approximately 10 hours.
 
U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuba remained a high-priority target even after the Bay of Pigs inva­
sion failed in April 1961. Soon afterward, Detachment G U-2s ibegan
flying monthly missions over Cuba in a program known as Project
 
• Ibid .. p. 11 -12 (TS Cod~word).
 
Secret NOfOflN
Chapter 5
200
 
In-flight refueling of a U-Z
 
NIMBUS. Most of the flights were s1taged from Laughl in AFB, Texas,
but three were flown from Edwards AFB, California, using in-flight
refueling to extend the range of the aircraft. By the spring of 1962,
having received reports of increased Soviet activity in Cuba. the CIA
requested permission for additional photographic coverage of the is­
land. The Special Group authorized increasing the number of Cuban
overflights to at least two per month, beginning in May 1962. At the
same time, the National Photographic Interpretation Center began
7
publishing a Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba series.
By early August 1962, CIA analysts had noted a substantial in­
crease in Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba during the preceding weeks.
The first U-2 overflight in August, mission 3086 on the 5th, flew too
soon to detect the Soviet construction program j ust getting under way
at various sites in Cuba. A second mission (3088) was originally set
for 8 August, but bad weather forced repeated postponements until 29
August. This mission's photography provided the first hard evidence
 
' Ibid.. pp. 19-20 (TS Codc:word).
 
Seeret
 
Chapter 5
20 1
of the nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Two days after the mis­
sion, the CIA reported in the President '.s Intelligence Checklist that
there were at least eight surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites in the
8
western half of Cuba. (The map on page 202 shows the routes taken
by the two August overflights.)
On 5 September the next U-2 overflight (mission 3089) provided
more evidence of the Soviet buildup. The mission's photography
showed three more SAM sites and also revealed a MiG-2 I , one of the
newest Soviet fighter aircraft. at the Santa Clara airfield.
The discovery of SAMs in Cuba had a twofold effect on the US
reconnaissance effort over Cuba. First, it added substance to DCI
McCone·s fears that Cuba might become a base for Soviet medi­
um-range ballistic missiles (he argued that SAM sites would only be
set up to protect high-priority facilities such as missile bases). Al this
time. however. McCone's suspicions were not shared by other offi­
cials in the Agency or the administration. The second and most signif­
icant effect of the discovery of SAMs in Cuba was to make the
administration far more cautious in its use of U-2s for reconnaissance
. o_f_the island. As the loss of Francis Gary Powers· U-2 in May 1960
had demonstrated, the U-2 was very vulnerabk to the SA-2 missile.
Within the administration. concern mounted about the U-2's vul­
nerability to SAMs in Cuba and the possibility that a loss could cause
a major diplomatic crisis. Such fears increased as the result of two
incidents in other parts of the world. On 30 August 1962, a SAC U-2
on a peripheral reconnaissance mission overflew Sakhalin Island in
the Far East, prompting a Soviet protest on 4 September. The United
States apologized for the intrusion. Then on 8 September. a U-2 with
a Nationalist Chinese pilot was shot down over the People's Republic
of China (this CIA reconnaissance program is discussed later in this
chapter in the section on Asian operations). Increasing concern about
U-2 vulnerability led to an impromptu meeting on lO September 1962
of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy, and DDCI Marshall S. Carter (in place of the DCI ,
who was on his honeymoon in France). The Secretary of State ob­
jected to the CIA's plans for two extended overflights covering the re­
maining areas o f Cuba not covered by the last two missions. Rusk
wanted peripheral flights over international waters kept separate from
 
• Richard L.:hman. ··CIA Handling of the Soviet Buildup in Cuba. I July-16 October
1962." 14 November 1962 (Hereafter cited as Lehman Report). DCI rc:cords. job
80-B-1676R. bol\ 17. folder I 8 (TS Codeword).
 
DC/ John A. McCone
 
U-2 Overflights of Cuba, August - October 1962
 
Gulf
of
Mexico
 
... ...
 
... .....
 
Mission 3086 5 August
Mission 3088 29 August
 
NORTH ATLANTIC
 
OCE..AN
 
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Sec, el NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
205
 
overflights of Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on
a mission that combined both types of flights would make it difficult
for the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international wa­
ters. Bundy and Carter therefore agreed to split the proposed recon­
naissance program into four missions: two overflights and two
peripheral flights, all planned for maximum safety. The overflights
were thus designed to be quick "in-and-out" operations across the
narrow width of the island instead of flights along the entire length of
Cuba, as had been the case previously. (As the map on page 202 illus­
trates, the 5 September mission was the last one to fly along the
length of the island.) As an additional precaution, flightpaths would
be laid out to avoid known SAM sites. Although these changes
greatly reduced the danger to the U-2, they slowed the gathering of
information on the Soviet buildup by reducing each mission's
9
coverage.
To ensure that the photographs taken by these missions were of
the highest quality, the CIA decided to conduct flights only when the
weather along the flight routes was less than 25 percent overcast.
Weather proved to be a major problem during the month of
Se.ptember. Unfavorable forecasts (along with a brief standdown of
U-2 overflights after the loss of the Nationalist Chinese U-2) pre­
vented the launching of any missions from 6 through 16 September.
Moreover, when mission 3091 finally flew on 17 September, the fa­
vorable weather forecast proved inaccurate and heavy clouds pre­
vented the mission from obtaining usable photography. Bad weather
continued to rule out missions until 26 September, when mission
3093 covered eastern Cuba and found three additional SAM sites.
Three days later mission 3095 flew over the Isle of Pines and Bay of
Pigs area, finding one more SAM site and a coastal-defense cruise
missile site. 10
The cautious series of U-2 flights in September had turned up
many more SAM sites but no concrete evidence of the presence of
surface-to-surface missiles. Growing impatient with the restrictions
 
' Lehman Report, pp. 12-13 (TS Codeword).
'" DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, ··U-2 Overflights of Cuba. 29
August through 14 October 1962,"" 27 February 1963, DCI n:cords, job 80-8-1676R. box.
17, folder 18 {S). Although this DCI memo states that ··the delay in completing the photo­
graphic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period,"
a more contemporary COMOR memo re~orted a standdown of U-2 overtlights until 16
September as a result of the loss of mission No. GRC-127 over China on 8 September.
Memorandum for DOC! Carter from James Q. Reber. Chairman, COMOR. "Historical
Analysis of U-2 Overflights of Cuba,"" 24 October 1962. IC Staff. COMIREX records. job
33-B- I 22A. box I. "Cuba Requirements. 1961-63" (TS Codeword).
 
~eeret
 
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
206
 
that had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told
the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding
SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's
southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this was a reasonable
restriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost cer­
tainly not operational." 11 The Special Group then requested the
preparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time
for its next meeting on 9 October.
In the meantime, C[A U-2s continued the reconnaissance pro­
gram that the Special Group had approved in September. In early
October two peripheral missions-3098 along the southeastern coast
on 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see
map on page 203)-discovered an additional five SAM sites. This
brought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of sur­
face-to-surface missiles.
Evidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the
September and early October missions had avoided was the most
likely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
On 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance rec­
ommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in partic­
ular to the need for renewed coverage of western Cuba:
The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29,
coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means
that there may well be many more sites now being built of which
we are una;vare. Ground observers have in several recent in­
stances reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4
(SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or
denied hy photo coverage.,: Attached to this memorandum was a
list of targets, ~vith the area around San Cristobal at the top.
On 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's rec­
ommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the
.. suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This mission was
also designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites that was thought to
be most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2
" Minutes of the Special Group meeting. 4 October 1962. in Memorandum for DC!
:\lcCone from J. S. Earman. Inspector General, ··Handling of Raw Intelligence
Information During the Cuban Arms Buildup." 20 November 1962, DC! records, job
80-B- 1676R. box I 7 (TS Codeword).
" Lehman Report. p. 30 (TS Codc::word).
 
Seeret
 
Sec, el PdOfOFmi
Chapter 5
207
 
defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction.
the study recommended "maximum coverage of the western end of
the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." u Because the danger
posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special
Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford
(USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a
vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over
Cuba at I in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight
over San Cristobal.
As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force repre­
sentative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it
would be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mis­
hap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance
mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel
Ledford"s opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the
.DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were
much more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior
electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford
then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiv­
ing familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting.
McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the
San Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots.'"
Two days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives
met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA
Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air
Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot
should not be used until he had received adequate training. The con­
versation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission,
the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the
U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI
McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left
'·' Ibid., p. 31 (TS Codeword).
" Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington.
DC. 20 February I 987 (S); Memorandum for DCI McCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr..
Deputy Director (Research). "The Chronology of Evt:nts Leading to tht: Trans for of Cuban
Overflight Responsibility," 28 February I 963, DC! rt:cords, job 80-B-1676R. bo~ 17.
folder 18 (S).
 
Seara~
 
secret 1\JoFonra
Chapte r 5
208
 
Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsi bility, to include com­
mand and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 re­
connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
05
Defense. The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.
 
DOC/ Marshall S. Carter
 
The Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, " I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
16
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra­
tion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial cimi::. T he Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pi lot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu­
nication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn 't
make a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary." " DDCI Carter admit­
ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point. "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit. •· •~ Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration of ficials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing
over command and control. Carter's efforts were i n vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra­
tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
 
" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. "'Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.
•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).
' ' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October
I 962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).
 
See,et
 
Secret NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
209
 
perceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for
National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that
"the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children." 19
Furthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision that the
President had already made.
Once the decision was clearly irrevocable, the Agency gave its
complete support to the Air Force in preparing for the upcoming
overflight. A SAC U-2 pilot had already arrived unannounced at the
CIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and
the CIA U-2 detachment put him through a hasty training program to
familiarize him with the U-2C. By Sunday, 14 October 1962, the
weather over Cuba had cleared, and the first SAC overflight of the
island took place.
When the U-2 returned, its film was rushed to the National
Photographic Interpretation Center. By the evening of 15 October,
photointerpreters had found evidence of the presence of MRBMs in
the San Cristobal area. NPIC Director Arthur Lundahl immediately
notified DD[ Ray Cline, who in turn notified DDCI Carter (DCI
McCone had again left town). As the readout progressed and the evi­
dence became firmer, the DOI notified National Security Adviser
Bundy and Roger Hilsman of the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, who informed Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. On the following morning, 16 October, DDCI Carter briefed
the President on the results of the 14 October mission."0
Now that the presence of Soviet medium-range surface-to-sur­
face missiles in Cuba had been confirmed, the rules for U-2 mission
approval changed. The Strategic Air Command received blanket ap­
proval to fly as many missions as needed to cover Cuba completely,
without again consulting the Special Group. During the week that fol­
lowed the discovery of the missiles, SAC U-2s conducted multiple
missions each day (see map on page 203). U-2 photography was sup­
plemented by low-level photography taken by high-performance
Navy and Air Force aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Agency's U-2 pilots remained idle, but the
photointerpreters at NPIC did yeoman service in studying the
 
,., Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 12 October 1962,
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo" 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
,. For a more detailed account of NPIC's discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. see
Dino Brugioni. The Cuban Missile Crisis-Phase I. 29 August-16 October 1962, DDS&T
Historical Series. NPIC-1 (CIA: NPIC. 1971) (S).
 
Seeret
 
Sec. et NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
210
 
Soviet MRBM site in Cuba,
1 October 1962
 
thousands o f feet of film returned by Air Force and Navy reconnais­
sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate
his address to the nation on 22 October I 962. when he revealed lhe
Soviet missile buildup in Cuba and declared his " naval quarantine"
to prevent the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba.
On 27 October, at the height of the crisis, one of the U-2Cs knt
by the Agency to the Air Force was shot down over Cuba. killing rthe
pilot, Maj. Rudolph Anderson. T his loss again illustrated the U-2's
vulnerability to the SA-2 missi le. Nevertheless, SAC U-2 overflights
continued, both during and after the crisis. Responsibility for photo­
graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots
never flew another mission over the island.
Although SAC carried out most of the U-2 activity during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Agency 's U-2 missions had made vital con­
tributions during the i nitial stages of the crisis. In all. Proj,ect
IDEALIST pi lots had spent 459 hours overflying Cuba during 1916 1
and 1962. They had provided concrete evidence of the Soviet buildlup
on the island, evidence that was simply not available through any
 
Seeret
 
Sec,et NOfORN
 
Chapter 5
 
211
other means. Although by late 1962 photographic satellites had be­
come an integral part of the overhead collection program, only U-2s
could provide the highly detailed photography that photointerpreters
needed to spot the early stages of work on missile sites. Attempts had
been made to photograph Cuba with satellites, but to no avail because
the satellites' normal orbits placed them over Cuba at the wrong time
of day, after clouds had formed.
 
U-2s Over South America
Agency U-2s again conducted operations in the Western Hemisphere
in December 1963. The Directorate of Plans had requested photo­
graphic coverage of Venezuela and neighboring British Guianm be­
cause of guerrilla acti vities conducted by a pro-Castro movement
inside Venezuela. Supplies for this movement appeared to be coming
across the border from British Guiana. On 30 November 1963, the
NSC Special Group approved overflights of the British Guiana­
Venezuela border to determine the scope and rate of buildup of guer­
rilla forces. The Special Group stipulated that the entire effort w:as to
be conducted without the knowledge of either the British or the
Venezuelans.
Within three days, several Detachment G aircraft and pilots de­
ployed to Ramey AFB. Puerto Rico, from which they made: six
flights over the border areas between 3 and I 9 December 1963 in an
operation known as SEAFOAM . The results of the effort were in­
conclusive, and the task force returned to Edwards AFB on 22
December. z,
 
U-2 OPERATIONS IN ASIA
Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958
U-2 operations in Asia began even before the end of overflights of the
Soviet Bloc. By 1958 the Eisenhower administration, although very
reluctant to approve U-2 flights over or near Soviet and East
European borders, was not averse to using the spyplanes in the Third
World, where radar detection was unlikely. Thus. in the spring of
1958, Agency U-2s from Detachment C conducted a major reconnais­
sance effort over Indonesia. Operation ROBIN HOOD.
'' OSA History. chap. 16. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).
 
6ee,et
 
Seeret NOFOftN
 
Chapter 5
212
 
Long unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sym­
pathy to Communism and his institution of "guided democracy" in
Indonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, be­
gan in early l 957 to supply financial assistance to a group of dissident
Indonesian Army officers on the island of Sumatra. By 25 September
1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the
course of events in Indonesia and on its recommendation President
Eisenhower authorized the Agency to "employ all feasible covert
means" to support the dissidents. Planning for increased aid of all
types began immediately, and in January 1958 a US arms shipment
for the dissidents arrived in Sumatra. Then on 10 February, the situa­
tion came to a head. While Sukarno was out of the country on a state
visit to Japan, the dissident army colonels, without consulting CIA,
organized a Revolutionary Council in Padang, West Sumatra, and de­
manded the abolition of President Sukarno's "guided democracy."
Five days later, this council proclaimed itself the new "Revolutionary
Government" of Indonesia. President Sukarno's armed forces re­
sponded swiftly to this threat. In late February the Indonesian Air
Force began bombing dissident strongholds, and by mid-March gov­
ernment forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against
the rebel-held areas in central Sumatra. Although the Sumatran rebels
were falling back, additional unrest broke out over 1,800 miles away
in the islands of Celebes (Sulawesi), and CIA quickly began supply­
ing weapons to these dissidents, too. 11
Increasingly involved in Indonesia, the Agency urgently needed
accurate information on the situation there. As in previous crises,
U-2s flew reconnaissance missions. On 24 March 1958, the
Development Projects Staff moved the entire complement of
Detachment C's pilots and planes from Japan to a base more easily
accessible to Indonesia: Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the
Philippines. Cubi Point was far from any facility that could develop
and interpret the U-2 photographs, so two Photo-Intelligence Division
employees went to Clark Airfield, just 30 minutes by air from Cubi
Point, to establish a forward processing center. They arrived on 28
March and had the photo lab ready to go on the following day.:?J
 
"I
 
Fovert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary Government. /957-1958.
2 vols., Clandestine Service Historical Series, CSHP-53 (CIA: History Staff, 1970) (S):
John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World
War I/ (New York. William Morrow: 1986). pp. 133-144.
0'
 
Sec,et
 
OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).
 
Philippine
Sea
 
f.
.·'
 
IND/AN
 
0
 
300
0
 
- 300
 
IIOOMlloo
 
OCEAN
 
SechH rdOFORP•
 
Chapter 5
 
214
 
The first U-2 mission over Indonesia took place on 28 March
1958. By 12 June, when the operation was phased out, Detachment C
U-2s had flown 30 missions over the major islands of Indonesia.
Sanitized photos from these missions were used to brief members of
the DDP's Covert Action Staff (CAS), who were in charge of a small
force of World War II-vintage aircraft such as P-5 ls and B-26s used
to support the rebel troops. The CIA's proprietary, Civil Air
Transport, supplied the aircraft, which were based on the Indonesian
island of Morotai and flown by mercenary pilots. Desperately short of
pilots, the CAS asked if some of the U-2 pilots with experience in
World War II aircraft could be detailed to the Morotai effort.
Although such a request represented an improper use of the highly
trained U-2 pilots and posed a potential threat to the entire U-2 pro­
gram if one of them were captured, Richard Bissell agreed to send pi­
lots James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito to help. Both were expe­
rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the
rebels' fighter aircraft, the P-51 Mustang. After arriving on Morotai,
Cherbonneaux explained to Vito how to fly the fast and powerful
Mustang while the two were sitting at a makeshift bar on the edge of
the airfield.
Several days later, when Cherbonneaux was off the island on an­
other mission, a flight of Indonesian twin-engine bombers of
Czechoslovak manufacture was spotted making its way toward the is­
land. Exclaiming, "I'm not going to sit around and wait to be
bombed," Vito had a Filipino mechanic start up a P-51 sitting on the
tarmac. In his first and only flight in a P-51, Vito managed to get the
plane off the ground. Once he was airborne and turned in the direction
of the lumbering bombers, they all took flight in as many directions
as there were aircraft. After firing a few . SO-caliber rounds in the di­
rection of the closest bomber, Vito circled the field and landed the air­
craft safely. 1"
Agency efforts in support of the rebel government proved fruit­
less. By early May, Central Government forces had taken most of the
remaining rebel strongholds, and the Sumatran rebellion was deterio­
rating into small-scale guerrilla activity. Then on 18 May, an
American mercenary pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down on a
bombing mission over Ambon Island. Pope's capture ended Allen
Dulles's enthusiasm for the effort, and President Eisenhower also
" Information supplied by Carmine Vito and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.
Welienbach, May 1986.
 
&ee,et
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
215
 
wanted no more part of it. The US Government rapidly withdrew its
support, and the remaining remnants of the rebellion collapsed. Four
years later, the Indonesians freed Pope after Attorney General Robert
Kennedy personally appealed to President Sukarno.
When the revolt ended, the U-2s returned to Atsugi. On the way
back, one of the planes, which was equipped with a System-Y elec­
tronic intelligence unit, flew along the coast of China to gather data
on Communist Chinese radars. ' 5
 
China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958
During the summer of l 958, tension between the People's Republic of
China and Nationalist China (Taiwan) increased to such an extent that
on 18 June Detachment C mounted a U-2 mission to film the Chinese
mainland coast and adjacent island areas. On 11 August, People's
Liberation Army (PLA) artillery began bombarding the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy, where the Nationalists had
stationed large numbers of troops to ward off any invasion. On 23
~!,!gust the Communists increased the shelling. After five days of
intense bombardment, which made resupply of the islands from
Taiwan impossible, the PLA commander ordered the Nationalist
garrisons to surrender, intimating that an invasion was imminent.
The Nationalists refused to surrender and received support from
the United States in the form of warships from the 7th Fleet, which
began escorting Nationalist ships carrying supplies to the beleaguered
garrisons.
During this period, Detachment C U-2s flew four missions over
the mainland, searching for troop movements that would indicate that
the PRC was planning to invade the islands. Photos from these mis­
sions showed no evidence of a PRC buildup, but the atmosphere in
the region remained tense. Detachment C U-2s flew two more mis­
sions (9 September and 22 October) to monitor PRC troop move­
ments and again found no indications of preparations for an invasion.
The Offshore Islands Crisis receded in late October 1958 after the
PRC learned that it would not receive support from the Soviet Union
if the crisis escalated into a confrontation with the United States. "6
 
" Mission folder 1773, (10 June 1958), OSA n:cords, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS
Codeword): OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).
,. OSA History. chap. 15, p. 27 (TS Codeword).
 
-Seeret _
 
Seu et NOi-ORN
 
Chapter 5
216
 
While the Offshore Islands Crisis was still in progress,
Detachment C began conducting flights in support of its weather re­
connaissance cover story. On 14, 15, and 16 July 1958, U-2s flew
high above Typhoon Winnie, which was causing great damage on
Taiwan. These missions provided the first photography ever obtained
of such a massive storm system. Photographs of the storm were the
subject of articles in the magazine Weatherwise and the 21 July edi­
tion of Aviation Week. In September, Detachment C aircraft photo­
graphed two more typhoons.
 
U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet
The consolidation of all Agency air activities under the DDP in l 959
led to increased involvement of the U-2 program with clandestine ef­
forts against Communist governments. One important area of DDP
activity during this period was Tibet. In March l 959, the PLA
suppressed an uprising against the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and
several thousand Tibetans fled the country along with their spiritual
leader, the Dalai Lama. Afterward, Agency operatives from the
DDP's Far East Division began training some of these Tibetan refu­
gees for paramilitary operations inside Tibet. Once the Tibetans com­
pleted their training, FE Division planned to parachute them back into
Tibet. Such missions, however, required detailed maps and aerial pho­
tographs of the areas of operation. Richard Bissell, therefore, obtained
permission from the President to use Detachment C U-2s to provide
the necessary photography.
Operation MILL TOWN, as the reconnaissance missions over
Tibet were known, consisted of two missions staged from Cubi Point
Naval Air Station on 12 and 14 May 1959. The photography revealed
that Communist China had built new roads with supply and defense
points. Agency photointerpreters also discovered two large new air­
fields at elevations above 13,000 feet. Later in the year, the Far East
Division needed photographs and maps of another area of Tibet. To
conceal the target of this new operation, which was codenamed
SOUTH GATE, the Development Projects Division planned and flew
a total of six missions coverinf. much of Southeast Asia-Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia!
as well as the desired area in Tibet.
Only four of the m1ss1ons involved the area of operational interest.
Five of the flights took place between 29 August and 9 September,
and one additional flight (Operation QUICK KICK) followed on 4
November. All of these missions were "Fast Move" operations in
which necessary supplies and personnel flew to a remote staging area
in a C-130, where they rendezvoused with a U-2 that had been ferried
Se&Fat
 
Sec. et NOfllOlltN
 
Chapter 5
217
 
>·
,, ,,;_
_-e ~ .
......, ....
 
,-·. .
 
in. The staging base in this case was Ta Khli, Thailand. These flights
did not go unnoticed; on 13 September 1959, Hong Kong's China
Post published a story headlined "U-2 of USAF Said Reconnoit,ering
Red China at Unreachable Altitude."~
 
U-2 photography of Typhoon
Winnie, July 1958
 
U-2Cs for Detachment C
Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining
U-2s with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75/P-13 jet engine.
The first of these U-2Cs arrived at Detachment C in the summer of
1959. During a test flight of this aircraft (article 360) on 24
September 1959, the pilot decided to set a new altitude re,:ord.
" Ibid.. chap. 18. pp. 6-7, 12; chap. 15. p. 29 (TS Codeword).
 
Sce,ef
 
Secfei NeF8AN
Chapter 5
218
 
Lhasa, Tibet, November 1959
 
A lthough the plane was equipped with a camera. it carried no film
and did not have a full load of fuel, which made it considerably
lighter than an operational U-2C. As a result, the plane reached
76.400 feet-the highest altitude achieved by any of the original U-2
aircraft. In the process. however, the aircraft consumed more fuel
than was called for in the test fligh t plan, causing the engine to flame
out during the return to base. The pilot then made an emergency
wheels-up landing at a glider-club strip near Fujisawa. south of
Atsugi .
The crash did not cause any injuries or serious damage 10 the air­
craft, but it did bri ng unwanted publicity to the U-2 program. Much of
the publicity resulted from the actions of Detachment C's security
unit. whose conspicuous Hawaian shirts and large pistols drew the
 
Seeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 5
219
 
attention of Japanese reporters. One reporter even flew over the area
in a helicopter, taking pictures of the U-2. These photographs ap­
peared in many Japanese newspapers and magazines. 18
 
U-2 Crash in Thailand
Flights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet and western China contin­
ued during the first half of 1960 under Operation TOPPER. The first
mission on 30 March was very successful. The second mission on 5
April took good photographs but encountered mechanical problems.
At the start of the mission, the landing-gear doors failed to close com­
pletely, resulting in increased drag and higher fuel consumption. With
no fuel gauge to warn the pilot of the critical fuel situation, the air­
craft ran out of fuel far short of Ta Khli, forcing the pilot to make a
crash landing in a rice paddy. The area was inaccessible to large vehi­
cles, and the plane, article 349, had to be cut into pieces in order to
remove it. With the help of local villagers, the retrieval team
dissassembled the aircraft for transport to the base, where the pieces
were loaded onto a C-124 under cover of darkness. The crash and
subsequent recovery of the U-2 did not attract the attention of the
p~e.ss; there was only one report in a local Thai newspaper, which
simply referred to the crash of a jet plane. In appreciation for the as­
sistance provided by the villagers, the Agency's Thailand Station
gave the headman funds to build a new school. 19
 
End of Detachment C Operations
The loss of two aircraft in slightly more than six months left
Detachment C with just two aircraft. Fortunately, the level of mission
activity remained low because Detachment C was no longer conduct­
ing overflights of the Soviet Union.
One important remaining mission was high-altitude air sampling
(HASP), in which specially equipped U-2s gathered upper-altitude air
samples to look for evidence of Soviet nuclear testing. The direction
of the prevailing winds made Detachment C ideally situated for this
activity, which began in the fall of 1958 and continued in 1959. In
late April 1960, Detachment C was preparing to stage to the
Philippines to conduct additional air-sampling missions, when the
loss of Powers' U-2 temporarily halted all U-2 activities.
 
" Ibid.. chap. 15, p. 30 (TS Codeword).
'"' Ibid.. chap. 15. pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword).
 
Searet-
 
secret i'JOFORN
Chapter 5
220
:.·.·,·;-.... .; ..
_·
 
.._ \..
 
. . •,...•~..,. •.. ......
 
. ,. :. > '.';... . . ... . .....-.' -~.:.. . . ~ ..~ ..;,
 
... ...•
 
Recovery of Article 349,
April 1960
 
The publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred consider.able
controversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the
continuing presence of U-2s in Japan. On 6 June 1960, project h,ead­
quarters decided on a phased-out withdrawal of Detachment C
between 15 July and l September, but this timetable had to be ac:cel­
erated when the Japanese Government formally requested the re­
3
moval of the U-2s on 8 July. "
 
" Ibid.. chap. 15, pp. 33-36 (TS Codeword).
 
-Seere1
 
Seei et PdOFOF\1'1
 
Chapter 5
221
 
Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam
In the aftermath of the Powers loss, both of the overseas U-2 detach­
ments returned to the United States and their aircraft and personnel
were incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base in
California. This detachment was now responsible for providing cover­
age in Asia, and its first mission came in Laos. After the neutralist
Laotian Government of Souvanna Phouma collapsed in early
December 1960, reports began circulating that leftist antigovernment
forces were using Soviet arms. Then on 30 December, a new Laotian
Government appealed for UN aid against what it said was an invasion
from North Vietnam and possibly Communist China. Alarmed over
the possibility of the civil war expanding because of the introduction
of foreign troops, the Eisenhower administration ordered Detachment
G to gather more information on the events in Southeast Asia.
Five Detachment G pilots and planes were ferried to Cubi Point
Naval Air Station in the Philippines to conduct an operation known as
POLECAT. During the period 3 to 18 January 1961, these U-2s made
. s~yen flights over Laos and North Vietnam. To search for the reported
foreign troops, these missions concentrated on the lines of communi­
cations leading into Laos from North Vietnam and China. In addition,
the U-2s scanned North Vietnamese airfields for Soviet aircraft to
determine the magnitude of the airdrop operation allegedly supporting
the Pathet Lao troops. NPIC sent photointerpreters to Clark Air Force
Base in the Philippines to obtain an immediate readout of the results
of each mission. The photography did not substantiate the Laotian
claims, and on 26 January the Laotian Government retracted its
charges of a foreign invasion. Detachment G's U-2s returned to
California in early February l 96 I. 31
During the final stages of Operation POLECAT, there was a ma­
jor threat to the security of the mission. The film from the flights
made on 16 and I 8 January had been sent to the United States for du­
plicate processing. Afterward the film was put aboard an Agency
C-47 on 14 March to ferry it to Washington. During the flight one of
the aircraft's engines failed, forcing the crew to jettison 43 boxes of
highly classified film over mountainous terrain around Williamsport,
Pennsylvania, to keep the craft airborne. After making an emergency
 
" Ibid., chap. 16. p. 17 (TS Codeword).
 
SeeFat
 
Sec. et NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
222
 
landing at the Scranton-Wilkes-Bame Airport. the pilot reported the
incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con­
tacted the Pennsylvania State Police, who sealed off the wooded area.
Agency security officers soon arrived to search for the boxes. They
recovered all 43 containers; not one had broken.32
Detachment G's only other activity during the summer of 196 l
was a solitary overflight of North Vietnam, known as Operation
EBONY. In preparation for this mission, a U-2 deployed to Cubi
Point on 13 August l 96 l. Two days later it successfully conducted
the overflight and subsequently returned to the United States.JJ
 
New Detachment on Taiwan
Long before the Nationalist Chinese became involved in the U-2 pro­
gram, they were flying covert reconnaissance missions for the CIA . In
1952 the CIA began recruiting Nationalist Chinese crews to replace
US personnel from the proprietary ti.rm Civil Air Transport, who had
_ been flying Agency aircraft to drop leaflets. agents, and supplies over
the Chinese mainland. This •project (BGMARQUE) aJso provided
photographic coverage of the rail li.ne from Shanghai to the border
with French Indochina. CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance over the
mainland increased substantially in 1955 with the establishment of
Project STPOLLY. which used Agency aircraft with Nationalist
Chinese crews to gather Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and conduct
psychological warfare against the Pe,ople's Republic of China. At first
the SIGlNT equipment was installed in World War II-vintage aircraft
such as PB-4Ys and B-17s, but in 1958 the project received a new
aircraft procured covertly by the Agency from Lockheed, the P2V7,
with an extremely sophisticated airborne SIGINT system. STPOLLY
added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and
1967, when the CIA terminated the project, STPOLLY conducted 399
overflights of the People's Republic of China, losing a total of eight
aircraft and crews.
In addition to CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance projects, the
Nationalist Chinese Air Force had ii:s own reconnaissance capability
with US-supplied RB-57 aircraft. ln 1958 the US Air Force proposed
 
" Ibid.. chap. 7. p. 24 (TS Codeword).
·'·' Ibid.. chap. 16. p. 18 (TS Cod.:word).
 
Su,et
 
!ec, et NOFORN
Chapter 5
 
223
 
supplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most ad­
vanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The C[A opposed a
Nationalist Chinese U-2 program because such flights would des.troy
the existing unclassified cover for the U-2. In discussions with the, Air
Force, DDCI Cabell only consented to having Nationalist p.ilots
trained to fly U-2s so that they would be ready in case they were
needed in the future; he opposed any Nationalist overflights. The
training of the Nationalist Chinese pilots began in March 1959 . By
the end of the year, there was a group of trained pilots ready for oper­
ations, and DCI Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to dis,cuss
the program's future. Dulles reaffirmed the Agency's opposition to
Nationalist Chinese U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
 
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A
reconnaissance aircraft
 
Sec.et NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
224
 
wanted the Nationalists to be allowed to begin operations, reluctantly
agreed to wait until conditions were favorable.'"' The situation
changed radically in May 1960 after the loss of Powers' U-2 de­
stroyed the existing cover story for U-2 operations. Now there was no
longer any reason not to use the Nationalist pilots. In addition, the
Agency soon found itself in need of a base of operations in the Far
East after Detachment C had to leave Japan.
During discussions with Nationalist officials on 6 May 1960, the
CIA's Chief of Station in Taipei, Ray Cline, raised the possibility of
assigning U-2s to the Chinese Air Force. Two weeks later, Gen.
Chiang Ching-kuo, head of the National Security Bureau, approached
Cline informally to propose that the U-2 aircraft based in Japan be
moved to Taiwan. This was followed three days later by an official
offer on behalf of General Chiang's father, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. President Eisenhower learned of Nationalist China's pro­
posal on 18 June. Several weeks later, Richard Bissell suggested that
two U-2s be turned over to the Nationalists for use in overflying the
mainland. The project would be conducted along the lines of Project
STPOLLY. 35
On 26 August l 960, President Eisenhower and the State
Department approved Bissell 's proposal to tum U-2s over to the
Nationalist Chinese rather than move an American detachment to
Taiwan. Using Nationalist pilots for overflights had the advantage of
providing complete deniability for the United States, even if an air­
craft was lost over hostile territory. The U-2s would belong to
Nationalist China and would have Nationalist pilots, and there was no
overt US involvement with the overflights. In reality, however, the
United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be
flown. 36
On 7 December l 960, two U-2s were officially licensed for ex­
port to Nationalist China as part of a new effort codenamed TACKLE.
These planes came from the Agency's U-2 inventory and arrived in
 
'" Andrew J. Russo, Low-Level Technical Reconnaissance Over Mainland China
( 1955-1966) (draft), Clandestine Services Historical Program, CSHP-2.348 (CIA: History
 
Staff, 1972) (S).
'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).
 
'• Ibid., chap. 17. pp. 12-13, 44 (TS Codeword).
 
-SeeFet
 
Saaret N0FORN
Chapter 5
 
225
 
Taiwan on 14 December. Within the Agency the Nationalist pilots and
aircraft were known as Detachment H, and they were based a1t the
Nationalist Chinese Air Force Base at T'ao-yuan. One of the U-2s
was painted with the Nationalist Chinese insignia, and the other was
left unmarked so that it could also be used by Agency pilots as need­
ed. The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con­
tract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to maintain at least two U-2s
in Detachment H, so lost or damaged aircraft were replaced from the
·Agency's inventory.
 
Detachment H U-2 at T'ao-yuan
Airfield
 
During 1961, Detachment H conducted training missions with
both U-2s, and one Nationalist pilot was killed in a crash on 19
March. Although the detachment was ready to begin operations, the
new Kennedy administration was not yet ready to authorize over­
flights of the PRC. In a 3 March 1961 meeting between S tate
Department and CIA officials to discuss the possibility of such over­
flights, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles noted that "the
President was feeling his way on the international scene, and time
was needed to evaluate the new Sino-Soviet posture with relation to
the United States." 37 In July 1961 the USIB considered the possibility
of conducting overflights of the PRC, but the State Department re­
mained opposed.
By the fall of 196 l , interest in overflights of the PRC was grow­
ing because of indications that the Chinese were making progress in
nuclear energy and missile development. As a result, on 4 Oc1tober
 
" James A Cunningham. Jr., Assistant Chief, DPD-DD/P, Memorandum for the Record.
··TACKLE STPOLLY Briefing for State Depanment Officials," 6 March 1961, IC Staff,
COMIREX records, job 33-B-119A. bol( I, " IDEALISTffACKLE. 1961" (S).
 
Gearet
 
Seeret NOFO"N
Chapter 5
226
 
1961 PFIAB recommended the initiation of a limited number of U-2
photographic missions over the Chinese mainland. The President ap­
proved the board's recommendation.
Because the US-Nationalist Chinese overflight program (Project
TACKLE) was a joint effort, both countries participated in the ap­
proval process and also shared in the results of the missions. The
USlB COMOR established the requirements for Detachment H's
overflights, which had to be approved by the NSC's Special Group
(5412 Committee) and the President. The Nationalist Chinese
Government also approved all missions flown by its pilots. Under the
terms of an agreement reached with the Nationalist Chinese
Government, film from the overflights of the mainland would be pro­
cessed in the United States, with a duplicate positive copy returned to
Nationalist China within IO days. NPIC was responsible for the initial
reporting on these missions.'"
Project TACKLE overflights began early in 1962. Following a 5
January Special Group decision to approve three missions, a
Detachment H U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pilot flew its first mis­
sion over the PRC's missile-testing range at Shuangchengzi on 12
January 1962. Unfortunately, because of faulty navigation or faulty
maps, the aircraft was poorly positioned and obtained only oblique,
rather than vertical, photography of the range. En route to and from
Shuangchengzi, the U-2 overflew Fukien and Chekiang Provinces
looking for suspected deployed missiles, but none could be found in
the mission photography. 39
The second Project TACKLE mission took place on 23 February
1962, when a U-2 overflew the PRC's nuclear weapons establishment
at Lan-chou. Photography from this mission revealed that the installa­
tion was at least two years away from operational capacity. Two more
missions on 13 and 26 March flew over K'un-ming and central China
covering numerous airfields that had been discovered in satellite pho­
tography. The U-2 photographs showed more detail than the satellite
pictures, thereby, providing additional intelligence data, particularly
 
" OSA History, chap. 17, pp. 18-19, annex 107 (TS Codeword).
,., Ibid., chap. 17, p. 45 (TS Codeword); Mission folder GRC I 00 ( 12 January 1962), OSA
records.job 67-B-972, box 19 (TS Codeword). Note: The numbers for missions flown by
Nationalist Chinese pilots began with GRC (Government of the Republic of China).
 
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Initial Overflights of China, January - March 1962
 
··:~~:;~.•
 
Mission GRC 100 13 January 1962
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Mission GRC 104 13 March 1962
 
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Chapter 5
228
 
Lan-chou, PRC, 23 February 1962
 
for air order of battle. In addition to the primary targets already de­
scribed, the initial series of Project TACKLE missions obtained pho­
tography of the submarine construction facilities at Shanghai and
Wu-ch'ang, which showed a low levd of activity. Other photographs
revealed tremendous expansion of the industrial complexes at
Nanking and Ch'ang-sha and the pre:sence of a previously unknown
0
industrial area at Chiang-yu.•
Encouraged by the success of the first TACKLE missions,
COMOR recommended in May 1962 that Detachment H cover as
many as possible of the highest priority industrial and airfield targets
in northeast China and the missile! test ranges in north China.
COMOR noted that, with the exception of the areas around Peiping
and the Shuangchengzi missile test range, the chances of a U-2 being
downed were low. The USIB concurred with COMOR's recommen­
dations, and Detachment H therefore conducted three more over­
flights of the PRC during the month of June:'
 
~• OSr\ History. chap. 17. p. -l5 (TS Codeword;,: Mission folders GRCI02 (23 February
1962). GRCIO-l ( 13 March 1962). and GRCI06 (26 March 1962). OSA records. j ob
67-8-972. box 19 (TS Codeword).
 
" Lay, "USIB History." vol. 2. pp. 385-386 (T:S Codeword).
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
229
Before the month was over, however, another confrontation be­
tween Nationalist China and the PRC over the Formosa Strait erupted.
The Nationalist Government reported a massive buildup of PRC
troops and aircraft in Fukien Province opposite the Nationalist-held
Quemoy and Ma-tsu Islands. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
immediately ordered U-2 coverage of the Strait area to determine the
extent of the PRC buildup. In response, Detachment H flew six mis­
sions over the Strait between 25 June and 28 July 1962. To speed up
the readout of this photography, the films were processed at the Asian
Photographic Interpretation Center (ASPIC) at Yokota, Japan, a joint
military-CIA endeavor. The U-2 coverage ended in late July when it
became apparent that the PRC did not intend to mount an invasion of
the offshore islands:~
The pace of Detachment H m1ss10ns slowed considerably in
August 1962; the sole Project TACKLE overflight covered Peiping
and Manchuria. The following month the detachment mounted two
missions. one over south China on the eighth and the second over
Kiangsu Province on the ninth. Unfortunately, mechanical difficulties
led to the loss of the latter aircraft near Lu-shan. A flameout forced
- the U-2 down to an altitude where PRC interceptors were able to hit
the U-2 with an air-to-air rocket. The Nationalist Chinese pilot para­
chuted and was captured. At this point, President Kennedy ordered a
standdown of overflights of the PRC."'
Following the capture of the Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilot, the
People ·s Republic of China accused the United States of
masterminding the overflights, but the State Department denied any
involvement. Nationalist China then revealed that the United States
had granted it a license to purchase two U-2 aircraft. In a l 3
September 1962 response to the Chinese protest, President Kennedy
denied any responsibility for the sale of the U-2s to Taiwan. noting
that the sale had occurred under the previous administration. He
stated that there were no current plans to sell any more U-2s to
 
Nationalist China. Eight months later, however, the President ap­
proved an export license for the delivery of another U-2 to Taiwan.
Such licenses were needed only for cover purposes. The Agency con­
tinued to maintain two U-2s on Taiwan, bringing new ones in to
replace aircraft lost in training or on missions.
'' OSA History, chap. 17, p. 46 (TS Codeword).
'·' Ibid.. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 125 ( 11 August 1962). GRC 126
(8 September 1962), and GRC 127 (9 September 1962), OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes
20 and 21 (TS Codeword).
 
Sec1et
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
230
 
Detachment H resumed overflights of mainland China in
December 1962, but its missions now concentrated on the southern
portion where there were fewer radars and SAM sites. During
December l 962 and January 1963., the detachment conducted two
successful overflights of Sichuan, but a mission over south China had
to be aborted prematurely. The results of Detachment H's continuing
coverage of the People's Republic of China remained of considerable
interest to the United States. On 17 December 1962, the Special
Group approved plans for fiscal year 1963/64 that included require­
ments for photo coverage of mainland China and for maintaining at
least two operational U-2 aircraft in Detachment H.....
 
Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots
Detachment H's importance did not lie solely in the missions carried
out by its Nationalist Chinese pilots against targets in mainland
China; the detachment also provided! aircraft for use by American pi­
lots flying missions in other parts of Asia. Indochina was an area of
particular interest as American involvement there began growing dur­
ing the early 1960s. Beginning in February 1962, Detachment G pi­
lots went to Tao-yuan to use the unmarked Project TACKLE U-2 for
overflights of North Vietnam. During the first half of 1962,
Detachment G pilots made seven overflights of North Vietnam from
the Tao Yuan base. Thereafter, Detachment G pilots could use their
own aircraft because the unit began staging teams and aircraft from
Edwards AFB to Ta Khli AFB in Thailand.
Between 1962 and 1964, Agency U-2s staged a total of 36 pho­
tographic missions over North and South Vietnam. By April 1964,
however, photographic requirements were changing from strategic re­
connaissance to tactical support as the Viet Cong became more active,
taking advantage of the weakness of the South Vietnamese central
government following the coup tha1t overthrew President Ngo Dinh
Diem in 1963 and subsequent coups by disgruntled army officers.
During this period the South Vietnamese "strategic hamlet" concept
began breaking down, and the Viet Cong forces stepped up the pace
of their attacks. As a result of the: increasing level of combat in
Indochina, the USIB gave responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of
the areas where fighting was taking; place to the SAC. Henceforth,
SAC U-2s would be used over South Vietnam. parts of Cambodia
.. OSA History. chap. 17. pp. 48-49 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 134 (25
December 1962). GRC136 (28 December 1962). and GRC138 {20 January 1963). OSA
records. job 67-B-972. bo;,c 21. and job 66-8 -664, bo;,c I (TS Codeword).
 
Se&reL
 
Sect et NOFOFll'\I
 
Chapter 5
231
 
within 30 miles of South Vietnam, all of Laos south of Paksane, and
all of North Vietnam within 30 miles of South Vietnam or the coast.
The remaining portions of Indochina remained the responsibility of
the Agency's U-2s. Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for all of
Indochina:5
 
U-2s in India
In October 1962, the People's Republic of China launched a series of
massive surprise attacks against India's frontier forces in the western
provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier
Agency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north
of the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.
The Indian Government appealed to the United States for mili­
tary aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that
Indian claims concerning the extent of the Chinese incursions could
not be reliably evaluated. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith,
therefore, suggested to the Indian Government that US aerial recon­
_naissance of the disputed areas would provide both governments with
a more accurate picture of the Communist Chinese incursions. On 11
November 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the
proposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel
the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace:6
In late November, Detachment G deployed to Ta Khli, Thailand,
to carry out the overflights of the Sino-Indian border area. Since the
U-2s were not authorized to overfly Burma, they had to reach the tar­
get area via the Bay of Bengal and eastern India and, therefore, re­
quired midair refueling.
Because of severe winter weather conditions, the first flight did
not take place until 5 December. Poor weather and air turbulence
hampered the mission, and only 40 percent of the target area could be
photographed. A second mission on 10 December was more success­
ful, but the U-2 experienced rough engine performance because of
icing of the fuel lines. 47
 
" OSA History, chap. I 6, pp. 18- I 9 (TS Codeword).
 
"' Ibid., chap. 16, pp. 26-27 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid., p. 28 (TS Codeword); Mission folders 320 I (5 December 1962 and 3203 ( I 0
December 1962), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 26 (TS Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
Sec, et NOFORP~
 
Chapter 5
232
Detachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the
Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest
to India. Photography from these missions was used in January and
again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then in­
formed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop move­
ments along the border. Although Nehru did not reveal the source of
his intelligence, a UPI wire story surmised that the information had
been obtained by U-2s.
The United States had provided photographic coverage of the
border area to India for two reasons. First of all, US policymakers
wanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the intel­
ligence community wanted to establish a precedent for overflights
from India, which could lead to obtaining a permanent staging base in
India for electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM
site at Saryshagan and photographic missions against those portions
of western China that were out of range of Detachment H. In April
1963, Ambassador Galbraith and the Chief of Station at New Delhi
made the first official request to India for a base. The following
month, President Kennedy agreed to DCI McCone's suggestion to
raise the question of a U-2 base in India when he met with India's
President Savepalli Radhakrishnan on 3 June. This meeting resulted
in an Indian offer of an abandoned World War II base at Charbatia.
south of Calcutta.48
The Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed consider­
able renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on
the base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so
Detachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties
over Tibet from 29 September to l O November 1963. In addition to
the coverage of the Sino-Indian border during this series of flights,
the U-2s also photographed all of Thailand to produce a photomap of
the border regions as a quid pro quo for the Thai Government. During
one of these photomapping missions, a U-2 pilot conducted the lon­
gest mission ever recorded in this aircraft- I I hours and 45 minutes.
At the end of this flight on IO November 1963, the pilot was in such
poor physical condition that project managers prohibited the schedul­
ing of future missions longer than IO hours.'''
"' OSA History: chap. 16. p. 30 (TS Codeword).
 
·• Mission folder 3238 (l O November ! 963 ). OSA records. job 67-B-971. bo)( 29 (TS
Codeword).
 
Seo,et
 
Sec, et NO!iORN
 
Chapter 5
233
 
Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964
Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission
out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days
later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were post­
poned. The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment re­
mained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when
Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G re­
turned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions,
satisfying all of COMOR's requirements for the Sino-Indian border
region. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for
Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a
forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967. 50
 
Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia
The main focus of Agency U-2 activity in Asia remained the U-2s of
Detachment H on Taiwan. In March and April 1963, the USIB met to
consider COMOR proposals for aerial reconnaissance of Laos, North
__Vietnam, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. All of
COMOR's intelligence requirements could best be met by the U-2 be­
cause heavy cloud cover made it difficult to obtain satellite photogra­
phy of the region. At the 28 May 1963 meeting of the Special Group,
DCI McCone requested authorization for a series of overflights to
meet these requirements and stressed the need for additional intelli­
gence on the atomic energy facilities of the PRC. The Special Group
then established a "bank" of four authorizations for overflights of the
PRC, subject to monthly review by the Group. 51
As a result of the increasing intelligence community interest in
the Far East, both Agency U-2 detachments became very active in the
region. Detachment G conducted a number of missions over the bor­
der areas of China, North Vietnam, and Laos during April and May of
1963. At the same time, Detachment H became more adventurous,
sending U-2s deeper and deeper into the PRC. These missions in­
cluded renewed overflights of the missile test range near Baotou and
the Lan-chou nuclear facilities, as well as targets in northern China,
Manchuria, and west-central China (as far as Koko Nor).
 
" OSA History. chap. 16, pp. 30-3-1 (TS Codeword).
 
" Lay, "USIB History," vol. 3, pp. 391-392 (TS Codeword).
 
6eeret
 
Sec,et N6FOfU\1
Chapter 5
234
 
The increased level of U-2 activity in the Far East during the
spring of 1963 exposed a serious weakness in Projects IDEALIST and
TACKLE, a shortage of aircraft. The Agency only had seven flyable
U-2s when the TACKLE overflights of the PRC began in January
1962, and one of these aircraft had already been lost during an over­
flight in September 1962. To deal with this shortage, DCI McCone
asked Defense Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
IO June 1963 to transfer two U-2s from the Air Force to the CIA. The
Defense Department quickly approved this request. Before the two
Air Force aircraft were placed in service, however, the Agency had
them upgraded with J75/P- l 3A engines and various electronic de­
vices, a process that took more than four months. 52
As overflights over the PRC increased, so did concern about the
growing number of Chinese surface-to-air missile sites. The Office of
Special Activities, therefore, got permission from the Defense
Department to equip Project TACKLE aircraft with System-XII
SAM-warning units. These devices alerted the pilot that his aircraft
was being tracked by the FAN SONG acquisition radar, part of the
SA-2's electronic targeting system. The System-XII units also re­
corded each radar-tracking sequence. Analysis of these recordings re­
vealed changes in the FAN SONG radar's characteristics, information
that proved useful in designing electronic-countermeasure (ECM) de­
vices for US aircraft operating over Vietnam during the late l 960s. 51
Despite the addition of System-XII in the spring of 1963, the
Nationalist Chinese-piloted U-2s of Project TACKLE had far fewer
ECM devices than other Agency U-2s. Project IDEALIST aircraft
possessed a complete suite of ECM gear in addition to the previously
mentioned System-XII unit. Among this ECM equipment was a de­
vice that told the pilot that an SA-2 missile had been launched
(nicknamed the "Oscar-Sierra" unit, which was the acronym for the
expletive U-2 pilots used when they learned that an SA-2 missile was
on the way: "Oh, shit!") and a System-XIII unit that produced
false-angle returns to the homing radar aboard the approaching mis­
sile in an effort to steer it away from the aircraft. The Defense
Department opposed installing such devices aboard Detachment H's
U-2s, for fear they could fall into Communist hands.
 
" OSA History, chap. 16, p. 10 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid., chap. 17, p. 50 (TS Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
6eeret NOFORN
Chapter 5
 
235
 
The danger posed by the growing number of SA-2 sites in the
PRC was clearly demonstrated on 1 November 1963, when a second
Project TACKLE U-2 was lost near the Kiangsi-Chekiang border on
its way back from photographing the PRC's Shuangchengzi missile
test range. As was the case after the first operational loss over China
in September 1961, President Kennedy ordered a standdown of over­
flights of mainland China. This standdown lasted almost five months.
As a result of this second loss over the PRC, the Office of
Special Activities began installing a new 30-channel telemetry system
aboard Detachment H U-2s to monitor various aircraft functions.
Known as BIRDWATCHER, this unit periodically broadcast a burst
of data to the airbase that launched the U-2. This data burst contained
a status report on all the major systems aboard the plane, such as air­
speed, altitude, exhaust temperature, fuel supply, film supply, and ox­
ygen supply. BIRDWATCHER provided project managers with a
benchmark of aircraft performance that could be used to determine if
a lost plane had been shot down at altitude or had suffered mechanical
failure. 54
BIRDWATCHER's first operational use came on 16 March
1964, when overflights resumed with a mission over southern China.
The PRC was now a high-priority target for the U-2 because more
data were needed to prepare National Intelligence Estimates due in
the autumn. Of particular concern was the PRC's nuclear program.
Despite the high priority of its missions, Detachment H's resources
remained scarce. It was short of both pilots and planes and never had
more than three U-2s or six qualified Nationalist Chinese pilots at any
one time. By the spring of 1964, crashes during training and the two
losses over the mainland had reduced Detachment H to only two qual­
ified pilots, one of whom suffered from ulcers and a nervous disorder.
Indeed, this pilot had every reason to be nervous; he flew three of the
next four Detachment H overflights and became the third Nationalist
Chinese pilot to be shot down over the mainland.
This loss came on 7 July 1964. The Nationalist Chinese pilot's
last transmission was that his System-XII unit had alerted him that he
was being tracked by the FAN SONG radar. BIRDWATCHER data
revealed that the aircraft was at penetration altitude and all systems
 
'" Ibid., p. 51. 53 (TS Codeword).
 
Sea,et
 
6eeFet AJOl=OSN
Chapter 5
236
 
were normal when the pilot made this report. Project managers pre­
sumed that the U-2 was downed by a direct hit or near miss by an
SA-2 missile. 55
President Johnson ordered a standdown of overflights of the
PRC. This standdown was welcomed by the Nationalist Chinese
Government, which told the Taiwan Chief of Station that it wanted
··to let some time go by" before more overflights were scheduled.
The Nationalists pointed out that the only remaining qualified U-2 pi­
lot had "disqualified" himself because of nervous tension. No new
pilots could be qualified for U-2 flights before mid-August.
The Nationalists then demanded faster and higher flying aircraft
as well as better antimissile equipment for the planes. This request led
some CIA personnel to suspect that Nationalist China had learned
about Project OXCART, the successor to the U-2 that was still under­
going testing. Despite the Nationalists' request for better ECM equip­
ment, the Defense Department remained reluctant to authorize the use
of the System-XIII false-angle radar jammer on Project TACKLE
U-2s. The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with
its highly advanced traveling-wave tube (TWT) would enable
Communist Bloc technicians to devise countermeasures and also
learn how to produce the highly efficient TWT themselves. As an in­
centive for the Nationalist Chinese to agree to more overflights. the
CIA agreed to permit them to process the U-2 film on Taiwan and to
use their own photointerpreters to exploit the film along with US
photointerpreters.
To counter the shortage of pilots in Detachment H, DCI McCone
suggested to the Special Group on 6 August 1964 that civilian CIA
pilots be used to fly missions over mainland China. The group agreed
that the matter should be taken up with President Johnson. On the fol­
lowing day, however, Presidential National Security Assistant
McGeorge Bundy informed McCone that, because Secretary of State
Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara opposed the idea. he
would not take it up with the President. 5~
 
" OS,\ History. chap. 17, pp. 53-55 (TS Codeword): Mission folder Cl 74C (7 July I 964),
OSA records, job 66-8-664, box 7 (TS Codeword). Note: beginning in 1964 Nationalist
Chinese mission numbers began with "C" instead of "'GRC. ••
'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 58-59 (TS Codeword).
 
See,et
 
6ee1 el l\16t-OFU'\1
Chapter 5
237
 
Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H
Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued to grow,
spurred in part by the results of earlier U-2 missions that revealed the
presence of Soviet-made MiG-2ls in the PRC. In addition, there were
indications that Communist China might be producing its own SAMs.
Furthermore, satellite photography revealed that preparations for the
first Chinese nuclear test were almost complete at the Lop Nor test
site.
The need for photographs of the Lop Nor site was considered so
urgent that the Defense Department finally relented and permitted the
System-XIII false-angle device jammer to be installed in Project
TACKLE aircraft, with the proviso that it not be turned on until after
the pilot had been alerted by System-XII that he was being tracked by
FAN SONG radars. Photographing Lop Nor, however, was not a sim­
ple task. Located more than 2,000 miles west-northwest of Taiwan,
Lop Nor lay beyond the round trip range of T'ao-yuan-based U-2s and
in-flight refueling was not possible. Lop Nor was closer to Ta Khli,
Thailand, only 1,650 miles northwest of that base, and much closer to
Charbatia, India, which lay only 1,200 miles south of the testing site.
After refusing DCI McCone's suggestion to stage a Lop Nor
overflight from Charbatia using a CIA civilian pilot, President
Johnson approved a proposal to send a Project TACKLE unit to Ta
Khli for the mission to Lop Nor. A Detachment H U-2 with a
Nationalist Chinese pilot deployed to Ta Khli in mid-October to pre­
pare for the overflight. Before mission preparations could be complet­
ed, however, the Chinese detonated their first nuclear weapon on 16
October 1964, and the mission was canceled. 57
The first overflight of Communist China since the 7 July 1964
loss was a 31 October mission over Lan-chou. By mid-November,
three more overflights had taken place, one over North Korea and
northern China and two over southern and central China. An over­
flight of Manchuria on 9 December 1964 brought back photos of a
G-class ballistic-missile submarine. By this time, the mass of data be­
ing provided by Project TACKLE overflights was overwhelming the
analysts of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR). An ORR
memorandum from 11 January 1965 reported that analysis of the
"large backlog of unexploited photography on Chinese Communist
'' Lay, "USIB History," vol. 6, pp. 751. 753-755.
 
--6ec1er
 
Setret PdOFQRl)I
 
Chapter 5
238
ground force installations .. .would require about two man-years
work, backed up by a larger expansion of photointerpretation ef­
fort.,, S3
 
Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants
Photographic missions were not the only method used by the Agency
to gather information on the PRC's progress in developing nuclear
weapons. fn fact, standard overhead photography was of little value in
determining whether or not various nuclear-related facilities were
producing weapon-grade materials. Such information could onl1y be
obtained from agent reports or infrared imaging of the targets. which
would reveal the heat associated with nuclear-refining activity. Early
in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de­
velop a high-resolution infrared scanner for the U-2 in order to ascer­
tain the operntional status of Chinese nuclear reactors. After this
request was turned down. the Agency decided to fund the develop­
ment of such a scanner itself. In the spring of 1963, the Office of
Research and Development (ORD) signed a contract with the Texas
Instruments C'Jmoration for the :roduction of an infrared scanner that
would operat ~----:---,.~-- ~ To conceal the intended
purpose of the scanner, the dev ices were called forest fire dete,ctors
and assigned model numbers such as "FFD-I ...
Tests conducted in Septe
 
I
 
was ca •
 
~ 3 oro...-ed that model FFD-2
 
f reveal incr activit
 
· - - - - - - -- - ~ ~
~
Further improvements followed, and on 26 October 1964 ORUcleclarecl the
infrared unit operational. In reporting the successful results of the in­
frared testing to DCI McCone. ORD Director Robert Chapman men­
tioned that there was only one such unit in existence. McCone
immedi ately told Chapman to order more, and the Agency then pur­
chased several for Project TACKLE and a stereo-configured FFD-4
for Project OXCART.
DC[ McCone reviewed these infrared detection developments
with Defense Secretary McNamara and his new deputy, Cyrus Vance,
on 30 October. being careful to point out that the new device was a
 
E..-ncv-snnnsored R&D because the Pentagon had ref~
 
'• ORR. M.:moran<lum tor tho: R.:cord. 11 January 1965, OSA records (TS Co<l.:wonJ).
 
So5ret
 
~eeret NOFORN
Chapter 5
239
 
The FFD-2 unit was installed in a U-2C[
 
Nn mnre U-2 fli2:hts over Lnma usea tne mrrareo
 
scannerj
 
I
 
The loss of yet another U-2 and its pilot made Nationalist
Chinese officials reluctant to resume overflights of the mainland.
They insisted that their U-2 pilots be given permission to turn on the
System-XIII false-angle device during the entire time they were over
hostile territory, not just after they had been alerted by the System-XII
radar-detection device. The Defense Department acceded to these de­
mands in order to keep the TACKLE flights going. In addition, the
Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM
•
60
equipment.
•• Mission folders C284C (22 November 1964), C304C (25 November 1964), C344C (19
December 1964), and C0l5C (8 January 1965), OSA records, job 66-B-664, box 8, job
69-B-404, bait 2, and job 66-8-597, bait I; USIB History, vol. 6, p. 758 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid.. chap. 17, pp. 59-61 (TS Codeword).
 
Seoret
 
Secret NOFORl'3
 
Chapter 5
240
 
With their demands met, Nationalist Chinese officials again con­
sented to overflights by Detachment H, and operations resumed in
February 1965 with three missions over the mainland. By this time
US interest in the People's Republic of China was very high because
of the PRC's development of nuclear weapons. The Special Group,
therefore, approved an extensive reconnaissance program directed
against the PRC. By the end of the year, Detachment H had flown 30
missions, the highest annual total during the entire program.
The level of activity declined during 1966, with only IO missions
flown over the mainland. Detachment H also suffered the loss of two
more aircraft and pilots in crashes during training missions in 1966.
In the fall of that year, joint US-Nationalist Chinese relations in the
field of overhead reconnaissance were further strained by the unilat­
eral US decision to kill the longstanding program of low-altitude
nighttime overflights of the mainland (STPOLLY). 61
 
" Ibid., chap. 19. annex 120, pp. 22-24; chap. 17. p. 69 (TS Codeword).
 
-Sesret..
 
Sec, et r~ot=ORl'l1
 
Chapter 5
 
241
 
Sec,ct-
 
Sec, el N6fiOFU'<J
 
Chapter 5
242
 
,--------------------------------------------~
 
I
:Ihe nw missi:r mounted by Project TACKU
ook place on 8 September 1967. The U-2C air­
craft overflew centr; China and fell victim to a SAM in the vicinity
of Shanghai; the fate of the pilot was unknown. This loss reduced the
number of U-2s in the Agency's inventory to five.''
 
The entire U-2 overflight program was temporarily halted in
early November l 967 after an Air Force U-2 in Vietnam was discov­
ered to have cracks in its wing. All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or­
dered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of the wings and
other stress points to check on metal fatigue. Upon completion of this
inspection, both the Air Force and the Agency resumed their over­
flight activity.(,.!
 
The End of U-2 Overflights of Mainland China
Project TACKLE mounted a mission over northeastern China on 13
December 1967 and an overflight of central China on 5 January 1968.
Later that month the Far East became very tense when North Korea
seized the US electronic intelligence ship Pueblo on 23 January. One
"' Ibid .. chap. 17. p. 72 (TS Codeword).
" Mission folder C297C (8 September 1967). OSA records (TS Codeword).
 
~ OSA Histor:,:. chap. 16. p.•q (TS Codeword).
-Seeret
 
Sec, et NOFORl\,I
 
Chapter 5
 
243
 
week later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet of­
fensive in South Vietnam. The 303 Committee (the new name for the
Special Group after 1964) decided on l February 1968 to suspend a
group of overflights scheduled for February and called for mis­
sion-by-mission approval "during this period of tension." The com­
mittee approved one additional overflight of southern China, which
was flown by Detachment H on 16 March 1968, and two overflights
of Cambodia, carried out on 27 March and 3 April 1968 by
Detachment G in its first operations since early 1966. These three
missions turned out to be the last overflights by U-2s in the Far East.
By this time U-2 flights over the PRC had become so dangerous that
the State Department opposed further overflights, and on l O April
1968 the 303 Committee decided not to approve any mission that
would fly closer than 20 miles from the coast of China.
One reason why Detachment H's overflights were stopped was
the steady increase in the PRC's ability to track and engage U-2s, as
evidenced by its success in downing five U-2s. By 1968 PRC radars
along the coast opposite Taiwan were keeping a close watch on U-2
activity from the T'ao-yuan base and actively tracked U-2s as soon as
they became airborne. The U-2s then had to face a growing PRC air
defense system that not only consisted of SA-2 missiles but also the
fast and high~flying MiG-21. The PRC's MiG-21 pilots had become
adept at the power-zoom technique and were threatening almost every
U-2 mission. The risks to U-2s now seemed too great. 65
The decision to end Asian overflights was also rooted in the
Johnson administration's change in its whole approach to the war in
Indochina in the spring of 1968. On 31 March 1968, the President
limited the bombing of North Vietnam in order to improve the
chances for peace talks. The end of flights over the People's Republic
of China was viewed as another way to improve the peace process.
During its six years of overflight operations, Project TACKLE
had been extremely active, staging a total of 104 flights over the
People's Republic of China (see table, page 244). These missions had
brought back huge amounts of data about the PRC but not without a
price: five Project TACKLE aircraft had been downed by the PRC,
with two of the pilots killed and the other three captured (although
later returned). In addition, five other Nationalist Chinese pilots had
been killed in training accidents.
" OSA. "Chronology of Events Leading to Present Impasse on Resumption of TACKLE
Overflights of Mainland China." December 1968, OSA records (TS).
 
6eeret
 
~eeFet NOFOAN
 
Chapter 5
244
 
Overflights by Project TACKLE
 
Fiscal Year
 
Overflights
 
Total
 
104
 
1961
 
18
 
1963
 
17
 
1964
 
13
 
1965
 
30
 
1966
 
10
 
1967
 
14
 
1968
 
1
 
Peripheral Missions by Detachment H
Detachment H did not cease its activities following the termination
of overflights of mainland China. Its next U-2 mission took place on
18 May 1968. This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac­
cordance with the new guidelines, never came closer than 20 miles to
the Chinese coast. All future Detachment H missions against the
PRC also conformed with this restriction but were still the target of
interception attempts by PRC MiG-2ls or hastily erected SAM sites
on offshore islands. The use of peripheral missions prevented any
further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea from un­
known causes shortly after taking off to start a mission on 5 January
1969. Another pilot was killed on 24 November 1970 in a crash durmg a routine training m1ss10n.
•
 
.
 
•
 
.
 
•
 
.
 
f,(,
 
The level of activity gradually increased during the remaining
years of Project TACKLE, as can be seen in the table on page 245.
The U-2s flying these missions were generally equipped with the
B or the newly designed 48-inch H cameras to obtain oblique pho­
tography and with various signal-intelligence-gathering systems.
Beginning in May 1971, Project TACKLE began using a new com­
munications-intelligence collection package known as LONG
SHAFT. This system was used on 32 occasions through 12 December
1973, when the LONG SHAFT collection program ended.
 
"" ·•oftice of Special Activities History. April 1969 to Phase-Out." (draft: hereafter cited
as "OSA History-2") (CIA: DS&T, 1974). chap. 3. pp. 36-41 (TS Codeword).
 
Secret
 
..,See,,e:t NOFORN
 
Chapter 5
245
 
Project TACKLE Peripheral Missions. 1969- 1974
 
Fiscal Year
 
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
 
Display of downed detachment
H U-2s in Peiping
 
Missions
 
9
 
14
19
 
23
31
17
 
Once the United States began seeking a rapprochement with the
People's Republic of China. Detachment H U-2s came under more
and more restrictions. Soon after the impending visit of President
Richard M. Nixon to the PRC was announced, U-2 missions were
ordered to stay even farther away from the mainland: 25 nautical
miles instead of the previous 20. During the months of February and
Seeret
 
Sec, et NOfOPIN
 
Chapter 5
246
 
Nationalist Chinese U-2R
 
March 1972. when the President's: visit took place, Detachment H
ceased all operational missions .~'
In March 1973, the TACKLE agreement with the National ist
Chinese was renegotiated. Although no end date was set, the agree­
ment contained a termination clause that would become effective three
months after notification by either party. This clause provided more
flexibility to the United States, which could now end the Nationalist
Chinese U-2 program whenever US foreign policy considerations
made such a step desirable.
 
Operation SCOPE SHIELD Ovm North Vietnam
In addition to the Project TACKLE peripheral missions against the
PRC. Detachment H (wi th Agency rather than Nationalist Chinese pi­
locs) flew a series of missions known as Operation SCOPE SHIELD
to gather intelligence on activities in North Vietnam . The Indochina
area had become the responsiblity of the Air Force in 1964. but, under
the terms of the cease-fire agreement negotiated with North
 
., lbi<l.. pp. 44-45 (TS Co<lcwor<l).
 
See.et
 
Chapter 5
247
 
Vietnam in January 1973, US mi litary flights in the area were forbid­
den. The Nixon administration, therefore, tasked the CIA with moni­
toring North Vietnam's compliance with the cease-fire accords.
The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover
of Lockheed employees working on a government contract to check
weather conditions. Their high ly sensitive missions had to remain at
least 15 nautical miles away from the North Vietnamese coast, and
they initially flew at low altitude in a deceptive direction in order to
avoid PRC radars. These constraints made the missions diffic­
ult because at low altitude the U-2 consumed more fuel and encoun­
tered more turbulence and the pilocs· pressure suits tended to
overheat.
The first mission on 30 March 1973 was only marginally suc­
cessful because of cloud cover and haze, which prevented it from
photographing most of its targets. A second mission on the following
day had somewhat better luck with the weather. but problems with the
film processing reduced the mission ·s coverage. Afterward, the mon­
soon season prevented any further missions until 21 July 1973. This
·mission obtained usable photography of SAM sites and North
Vietnamese supply operations, although the resolution was not as
high as it should have been because the H camera lens had not been
properly focused. The last SCOPE SHIELD mission, on 6 January
1974. finally succeeded in obtaining high-quality photography. The
mission provided complete coverage of shipping in Haiphong Harbor.
SAM defenses, and North Vietnamese naval order of battle.M
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN U-2 TECHNOLOGY
Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment
In mid-1963 , the Office of Special Activities set in motion Project
WHALE TALE to examine the possibi lity of adapting the U-2 aircraft
for operations from an aircraft carrier. In the past, protest notes from
the Soviet Union to Turkey and Pakistan and from Communist China
to India had been responsible for interrupting overflight operations.
CIA planners believed that. if U-2s could be modified to operate from
aircraft carriers, the United States could avoid the political problems
 
~ Ibid .. pp. 48-51 (TS Codeword).
 
Sec.et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 5
248
 
•-.: ·< :; -~~..i{~~1:;}{~~f:~}'::.•••
 
r-------..,•••••••-.-.-;-
 
·····,~--;)~~t
·
~ 1 i· ~·t..,f
; : ;~
..\;.~:,.~
·~~~:::S
 
··~~~ii: '.
- ·· - -~~
 
-
 
~
 
... ~-:.
 
...
 
-· ..,.,- . _;~
 
U-2 on the USS Kitty Hawk,
5 August 1963
 
- ,_
 
·""!-··· .,>,, •
 
..
 
~
 
•
 
~ -;_
 
involved in seeking permission to bw;e U-::!s in other nations. Kelly
Johnson began working on changes to the aircra ft. and Office of
Special Activities Deputy Director James A. Cunningham, Jr.. a for­
mer Marine Corps aviator. asked the Navy for assistance.
The first test of the U-2's capability for carrie r operations took
place in A ugust 1963 from the USS Kitty Hawk operating in the
Pacific Ocean off San Diego. Cal ifornia. A U-2C, which had been
loaded aboard the carrier at North ls.land Naval Base. took off from
the flight deck with a full load o f fuel and was airborne within 32 1
feet. No assistance from catapults was necessary. A lthough the
takeoff was very successful. the attempted landing was not. The air­
craft bounced, hit hard on one w ing tip. and then just barely
managed to become airborne again before reaching the end of the
deck. Kelly Johnson realized that the airframe would have to be al­
tered in order to make carrier landings possible. These alterations in­
volved strengthening the landing gear. installing an arresting hook at
the rear of the fuse lage, and fining '"spoilers" on the wings to cancel
the aerodynamic lift once the aircraft was over che tlighc deck.
Aircraft thus modified were designat,ed U-2G. While several aircraft
 
See.et
 
Sec, ,et NOFOFIN
Chapter 5
249
 
underwent these modifications. Detachment G pilots began undergo­
ing training in landing on aircraft carriers. The first successful carrier
landing took place on 2 March l 964.69
 
U-2 on the USS Kitty Haw k,
5 August 1963
 
Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a
French Nuclear Test Site
Within a few months after the completion of carrier testing. one of the
carrier-modified U-2s conducted an operation in the Pacitic. Its mis­
sion was to gather information on the activities of an al ly. In
 
~ .. U-2 Aircraft Carri.:r Operations: Proj.:ct ·WHALE TALE." Op,:racion FISH HAWK."
 
OS&T. 1964. pp. 1-13 (TS Co<l.:wordl : Johnson. ··Log for Proj.:ct x.-· 5 August 1963
and 2 March 1964.
 
S:eeret
 
Sec, et PJOFORPJ
 
Chapter 5
250
December 1963, France had announced its intention to detonate a hy­
drogen device over Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago area
of French Polynesia but had given no specific date for the event. The
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance had been following French
nuclear developments since September 1963, when it had apprised the
USIB of the need for overflights of this South Pacific area. At that
time the USIB decided against recommending such overflights be­
cause of State Department concern about potential political difficul­
ties with France in the event the mission was discovered.
Following reports of a buildup of French troops and technical
personnel in neighboring Tahiti, the Special Group on 24 April 1964
approved a mission to overfly the atoll to check for activity. This re­
quired photography with a resolution better than the 3 to 5 feet possi­
ble with the standard B-model camera that had been in use since
October 1956. Work on a very-high-resolution camera had begun in
early 1963, when the Agency contracted with the Itek Corporation to
modify for placement in the U-2 a camera that had been developed
for the satellite program. Known as the Delta-II, or the 112A, this de­
vice could photograph a 28-kilometer swath with 26° convergent ste­
reoscopic lenses, resulting in a 70° lateral coverage and a ground
resolution of 10 inches. This camera was installed in a Detachment H
U-2 and used on two missions conducted over Indochina in late
December 1963. Resolution was not as high as had been expected,
and the unit was returned to Itek for modifications. By early 1964, the
112A had been reworked and was now known as the 112B. In tests it
had proved capable of providing photography with resolution in the
I 0- to 12-inch range.
Detachment G conducted Operation FISH HAWK in May 1964
by sending two pilots, an NPIC photointerpreter. and a U-2G
equipped with the Itek 112B camera to make the first operational U-2
flights from an aircraft carrier. On 19 May the U-2 took off from the
USS Ranger and overflew the French atomic test area. As soon as the
aircraft returned to the Ranger, the film was developed in the carrier's
photo lab, and the NPIC photointerpreter then read out the film to see
if the photography met the requirements for resolution and quality. A
second U-2 flight carried out a similar mission on 22 May. The pho­
tography provided all the detail needed to identify the preparations for
the nuclear test that occurred later that year. 111
 
"' "U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operations: Project 'WHALE TALE,' Operation FISH HAWK,'.
DS&T. 1964, pp. 17-25.
 
See.et
 
Seu et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
251
 
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft
carrier. Although the idea of using a floating airbase to avoid political
sensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor­
mously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels to
protect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big
ships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while
the deployment of a solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place
overnight.
 
A New Version of the U-2
By the summer of 1966, the number of flyable Agency U-2s had
dwindled to six-two at Detachment H in Taiwan and four at
Detachment G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo­
ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20 U-2s in 1954-55
(the Air Force had purchased another 31 of these planes), and Kelly
Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works had managed to assemble four
additional craft for the Agency from leftover spare parts and usable
sections of crashed aircraft. This brought the total number of U-2s ac­
quired by the Agency to 24, for an average cost of $812.500 each.
At this point, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense on I August
1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for eight more aircraft
to be used in the Agency and Air Force U-2 programs-a completely
new version of the aircraft. Kelly Johnson had been working on ways
to improve the performance of the U-2 since early I 965 because he
was concerned that all the modifications and additions to the aircraft
over the years had made it so heavy that it had lost almost half of its
range and several thousand feet in cruising altitude. 11 The new model,
known as the U-2R, had a longer fuselage and a wider wingspan than
the original U-2. The U-2R's wings were 103 feet long with 1,000
square feet of lifting surface, in contrast to the U-2C's 80-foot wings
with only 600 square feet. The longer fuselage of the U-2R made it
possible to provide two pressurized bays with an additional 2.2 cubic
meters of equipment space and also achieve a better weight distribu­
tion. The net result of all these improvements was a much better per­
forming aircraft. No longer did the U-2 pilot have to worry about
keeping the aircraft's speed at altitude within a 6-knot window in the
stall/buffet corner of the flight envelope. The envelope was now ex­
tended to 20 knots, which greatly improved flyability.
 
" Johnson, "Log for Projc::ct X," 2 F.:bruary 1965. June: to Octobc::r 1965. 20 Octobc::r
1965: Johnson, "U-2R Log," January to August 1966.
 
SeoFet
 
3ec. et NOFOfUd
 
Chapter 5
252
 
...
 
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U-2C and U-2R
 
The U-2R used the upgraded Pratt & Whitney J75/P- l 3B erngine
and was able to fly higher-in excess of 74,000 feet-and faster­
Mach 0.72 (41 0 knots). which is 12 knots faster than the U-2C. When
flying at the higher altitude. however. the U-2R·s range was less than
the U-2Cs. T he restart capability of the P- 13B engine was signifi­
cantly better than the P- l 3A power plant As a result. the U-2R could
be restarted at 54.000 feet. which was I 0.000 feet higher tham the
U-2C. Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who
checked out this new aircraft when it first took to the air on 28 Auigust
1967. The last of the U-2Rs was delivered on 11 December 1968.
The increa:-;ed performance of the U-2R did not come cheaply.
At $7. 1 million per aircraft. the new models cost almost 10 times as
much as the original U-2s. M uch of the increased cost was dUte to
inflation. but some was the result of technological advances. The ini­
tial order for eight of the new version of the U-2 was followed on 23
November 1966 by an order from the DC I and the Secretary of
Defense for four more. This brought the total number of U-2Rs pur­
chased by the CIA and the Air Force to 12.n
In addition to a new aircraft. the U-2 program received a new
camera. Agency managers felt that. because the B camera was now I0
years old. the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im­
portant advances that had occurred in recent years. The 112B--the
mod ified version of the satell ite program ·s stereo camera that had
been used in the U-2G-had not proved totally successful. Despite its
stereo capabi lity. this camera's shorter focal length could not provide
 
'' OSr\ ffistory. c.:hap. 5. pp. 34-36 (TS Co(kword): "OSA Hiswry-2."' c.:hap. 5. pp. 1-2
(TS Codcwon.l).
 
SeeFat
 
See, et rdOFORN
Chapter 5
 
253
 
the scale of imagery needed to obtain the highly technical data de­
sired by analysts. As a result, the Office of Special Activities asked
the Hycon Manufacturing Company of Pasadena, California, to adapt
its successful high-resolution 48-inch 9- by 9-inch format camera de­
veloped for the OXCART aircraft for use in the U-2R. This camera
was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a
new lens designed by James Baker. The new camera was designed to
resolve objects smaller than 4 inches.
Hycon began work on the HR-333 camera in 1966. Unlike the
OXCART camera, the new unit was to use the split 18- by 18-inch
format of the B camera, so the lens had to be redesigned. James
Baker's contribution to this effort was a 48-inch f/5.6 system that pro­
vided remarkably sharp imagery. Hycon completed the camera in
time for it to be installed in the first U-2Rs delivered to the Agency in
1968; it is known as the H camera. 71
 
Replacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs
As the new U-2Rs began coming off the production line at Lockheed
_in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the_ Department of Defense had to
decide who would get the new aircraft. At a meeting on 13
November, DCI Richard Helms and Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara agreed that the Air Force and the Agency would each get
six U-2Rs. The six older U-2s remaining from the original 1954-55
production were to be kept in flyable condition and be used as re­
placements if newer models were lost.
Despite the greatly increased capabilities of the new model of
the U-2, the era of overflights of hostile territory was over. The U-2R
would have six years of useful service with the Agency, but its mis­
sions did not include penetration flights over hostile territory.
 
THE FINAL YEARS OF THE U-2
When the OXCART's brief operational career with the Agency ended
in 1968, the U-2 was once again the center of the Agency's manned
reconnaissance program. But by this time, reconnaissance aircraft had
declined in importance as collection systems. Overflights were a thing
of the past. Although Project TACKLE U-2s with Nationalist Chinese
 
" "OSA History-2," chap. 5. pp. 10-l2.
 
~eeret
 
6eeret NOFORN
Chapter 5
254
 
pilots were still flying missions targeted against the People's Republic
of China, these missions did not overfly PRC territory. Increasingly,
Agency U-2s flew missions that did not involve intelligence collec­
tion requirements.
 
Support to Other Agencies
Beginning in 1964, the Agency conducted a program known as RED
DOT for the Department of Defense. RED DOT involved the devel­
opment and testing of various color, black and white, and infrared
films. emulsions. and processing techniques for use in manned and
unmanned high-altitude reconnaissance systems. From 1968 until
1974. Detachment G U-2s photographed areas within the United
States that were analagous to portions of the Soviet Union in order to
test films and techniques for spotting certain targets. This analogous
filming was particularly valuable in connection with agricultural areas
and nuclear test sites.
Some U-2 missions supported agencies outside the intelligence
community. In I968 and 1969, Detachment G U-2s flew high-altitude
photographic missions in conjunction with the Apollo VII and IX
spaceflights in response to a NASA request. These flights provided
photography of the western United States for comparison with the
photography taken by the Apollo crews. The Department of the
Interior also requested U-2 support in early 1969 to help determine
the extent of damage caused by a leak in an offshore oil well in
California's Santa Barbara Channel. After preliminary assessment of
the film at NPIC, the mission photography was given to the US
Geological Survey for further study.
Also in early 1969, Detachment G began providing coverage of
the western United States at the request of the Department of
Commerce. U-2s filmed the Sierra snowfield to aid hydrologists in
forecasting snowmelt and nooding potentials. Later that year,
Detachment G supported the Office of Emergency Preparedness by
photographing 6 l .000 square miles of the southern United States as
part of a Hurricane Baseline Survey. These photographs could be used
for future damage assessment following a major hurricane. A subse­
quent mission in fiscal year 1971 continued the Hurricane Baseline
Survey by photographing the Gulf Coast. When a major earthquake
struck the Los Angeles area on 9 February 1971, Detachment G U-2s
flew four sorties to obtain damage-assessment photos. 70
 
" lbiJ.. chap. 3. pp. 3-29 (TS CoJc:worJ).
 
~eeret
 
Set, et PdOFORPI
 
Chapt er 5
255
 
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Subsequent missions in support of Federal agencies included
COMPASS TRIP in fiscal year 1973, when Agency U-2s photo­
graphed poppy fields that had been planted by the Bureau of
Narcotics in order to provide a standard for comparison with sate:llite
imagery. In the following year, U-2s assisted the Corps of Engirneers
in conducting a geological survey.
 
Earthquake damage, San
Fernando Valley, 1971
 
Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions
With the exception of the Chinese Nationalist-piloted U-2!; of
Detachment H, all of the Agency's U-2 assets were concentrated in
Detachment G in California. To test the ability of Detachment G to
respond to a crisis in Europe or the Middle East, the Agency staged
an overseas deployment exercise known as SCOPE SA INT each year
(unless there was an actual operational deployment, as was the -case
i n 1970, 1973, and 1974). The first of these exercises, SCOPE
SAINT-I, took place o
e 19
when Detachment G deloved a ~ G to the
~
he - con ucted several training flights and then returned
to California. SCOPE SAINT-II followed in April 1969 and dennon­
strated the feasibility of employing a C-14 I aircraft to accompainy a
Secaet
 
Secret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 5
256
U-2 ir;t- tlil!ht to its destination. The C-I41 carried support equipment
to theL
] In October I
•
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es
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t__◊o_k__l_a_ce_,_1 _a_di__f_fe_ren___t lo___c·at__ion_.
 
_________,
 
No overseas deployment exercise was necessary in 1970, for ele­
ments of Detachment G actually deployed overseas to provide photog­
raphy of the Middle East. At the time. President Nixon's National
Security Adviser. Henry A. Kissinger, was mediating between the
Arabs and lsraelis in order to obtain a cease-fire along the Suez Canal.
where a virtual undeclared war was taking place . Once agreement was
reached in August, Kissinger promised both sides that the United
States would monitor the agreed upon 32-mile pullback from the wa­
terway. Originally, Kissinger intended for photosatellites to do the
monitoring. One satellite was tasked to photograph the Suez Canal
area on 10 August, but the qual ity o f its imagery lacked the detail
needed to discover such small targets as gun emplacements and jeeps.
In early A ugust , Kissinger asked the Air Force to provide U-2s
to overtly the Canal, but the A ir Force demurred, saying it would take
several weeks to move a U-2 detachment from Del Rio, Texas. to the
Middle East. At this point. DCI Helms told an NSC meeting that the
Agency's Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base could deploy aircraft to ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' and begin ti I ming the Suez
area with in the week. and it did . In fact. the first U-2 arrived in
r - - -Jonly 71 hours after receiv ing notification to deploy. Between
~ s t and 10 November 1970. Agency U-2s flew 29 missions over
the cease-fire zone as part of Project EVEN ST EVEN . Most flights
used the B camera. but 12 were equipped with the new, high-resolu­
tion H camera. The EVEN STEVEN U-2s also employed a dozen
electron ic-intelligence-collection packages. from System-X to
System-XXIV. After 10 November 1970. Air Force SR-7 1s took over
76
the task of photographing the cease-fire zone.
The M iddle East was again the cause of a Detachment G deploy­
ment in October I 97~ wbea aoorbec Acab-l scaeli war bcol,e anr Two
U-2s d,eployed to the~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '~ n 7
and 8 October 1973. to be ready for possi ble coverage of the confl ict.
Detach rnent G received no such tasking. however. and the last of the
aircraft returned to California on 13 November. The 1973 war did
 
" Ibid.. pp. 5-6. 10- 11 tTS Co<.l.:word).
,. Ibid.. pp. 15-20 (TS Cod.:worJL
 
-Sec, cl--
 
Secret NOfOftN
 
Chapter 5
257
lead to the overseas deployment of Detachment G U-2s in 1974, when
the CIA was tasked to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian and lateir the
Israeli-Syrian disengagement areas. On 21 April l 974, a Detachment
G U-2 with appropriate support elements arrived at Akrotiri, Cyprus,
to conduct Operation OLIVE HARVEST. Between l2 May and 28
July, the detachment conducted six overfli ghts of the disengagement
areas. During these missions the electronic warning systems of the
U-2 registered numerous radar lockons, but no surface-to-air mis:siles
were fired. On l August 1974, responsibility for the OUYE
HARVEST missions as well as the aircraft itself came into the hands
of the Air Force as part of the transfer of the entire Agency U-2 pro­
77
gram at that time.
 
The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities
The Agency's U-2 program had been under review since the autumn
of l 969 to detennine if it should be continued along with the larger
Air Force U-2 program. In December 1969, President Nixon decided
to keep the Agency's program in existence through l 971 and asked
for a formal review by the 40 Committee (the new name for the 303
·Committee/Special Group). ln August 1970, the committee recom­
mended continuing the program through fiscal year 1972. On 12
August 1972, the 40 Committee again favored continuation of the
CIA U-2 program. This recommendation was motivated primarily by
a desire not to alienate the Nationalist Chinese Government by el.imi­
nating Project TACKLE. In June 1973, however, DCI Jame:s R.
Schlesinger informed the 40 Committee that this project could be ter­
minated without causing major difficulties with the Nationalist
Chinese. On 30 August 1973, the 40 Committee approved the C:IA's
plans to tenninate the U-2 program effective I August 1974. The: Air
Force would assume funding responsibility for the four U-2R airicraft
assigned to the Agency and would take physical possession of them
then or shortly thereafter. On l April l 974, Ambassador Walter P.
McConaughy informed the Nationalist Chinese Government of the
US intention to end the U-2 project, and the two countries then
73
worked out a schedule for phasing out Project TACKLE.
The transfer of all Agency U-2s to the Air Force eliminated
Detachments G and H. Their parent organization, the Office of
Special Activities, began its phaseout immediately thereafter. The
20-year career of the U-2 with the CIA had come to an end.
 
,., Ibid.. pp. 31-H (TS Codeword).
,. Ibid.. chap. 10, pp. 1-4 (TS Codeword).
 
Chapter 6
259
 
The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968
 
Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi­
cials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the
Soviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After
overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of
tracking and attempting to intercept the U-2. this estimate seemed
too optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned
·a6out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid
destruction for six months, let alone two years.
To extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first
attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet
radars. Project RAINBOW's efforts 10 mask the radar image of the
U-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more
vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude.
Because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s
equipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project
 
RAINBOW in May 1958.
Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell
and his Air Force assistant. Col. Jack A. Gibbs, had begun to look for
a more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radar detection-an
entirely new aircraft. {n the late summer of 1956, the two officials
visited a number of airframe contractors in a search for new ideas.
Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi­
gantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be
made of metal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its
upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve
 
See,et
 
Setiel NOFOfitN
Chapter 6
260
 
altitudes of 80,000 to 90,000 feet but only at subsonic speeds, just
enough to keep it airborne. 1
The slow-flying Northrop design did not solve the problem of
radar detection, and in 1957 the emphasis switched to supersonic de­
signs. In August 1957, the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI), a
CIA proprietary firm that had been working on ways to reduce the
U-2's vulnerability to radar, began to investigate the possibility of
designing an aircraft with a very small radar cross section. SEI soon
discovered that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of de­
tection by radar. 1 From this point on, the CIA's attention focused in­
creasingly on the possibility of building an aircraft that could fly at
both extremely high speeds and high altitudes while incorporating
the best ideas in radar-absorbing or radar-deflecting techniques.
 
THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR
A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2
By the autumn of 1957, Bissell and Gibbs had collected so many
ideas for a successor to the U-2 that Bissell asked DCI Dulles for per­
mission to establish an advisory committee to assist in the selection
process. Bissell also felt that the support of a committee of prominent
scientists and engineers would prove useful when it came time to ask
for funding for such an expensive project. Edwin Land became the
chairman of the new committee, which included some of the scien­
tists and engineers who had served on previous advisory bodies for
overhead reconnaissance: Edward Purcell, Allen F. Donovan, H.
Guyford Stever, and Eugene P. Kiefer. The Air Force's chief scientist,
Courtland D. Perkins, was also a member. The committee first met in
November 1957 and held six more meetings between July 1958 and
the late summer of 1959. The meetings usually took place in Land's
Boston office and almost always included the Air Force's Assistant
Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, and
his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air­
craft manufacturers also attended some of the meetings. 3
 
' Donovan interview (S).
Minnich, "The OXCART Story,"' Studies in Intelligence 15 (Winter 1971 ):2 (S).
'Clarence L. Johnson, Report No. SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program,"
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. I July 1968, p. I (TS Codeword).
 
Sacr:at
 
--&ec-ret NOFORN
 
Chapter 6
261
 
A-1 , 23 April 1958
 
A-1 , 26 June 1958
 
;:j
 
Johnson's first drawing of the "U-3"
(A-1); revised version of the A-1
 
Seeret
 
6eeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 6
262
 
The two most prominent firms involved in the search for a new
aircraft were Lockheed, which had designed the successful U-2, and
Convair, which was building the supersonic 8-58 "Hustler" bomber
for the Air Force and also working on an even faster model known as
the B-588 "Super Hustler." Early in 1958, Richard Bissell asked of­
ficials from both finns to submit designs for a high-speed reconnais­
sance aircraft. During the spring and summer of 1958, both fiirms
worked on design concepts without government contracts or funds .
Following extended discussions with Bissell on the subject of a
supersonic successor to the U-2, Lockheed's Kelly Johnson begani de­
signing an aircraft that would cruise at Mach 3.0 at altitudes above
90,000 feet. On 23 July 1958, Johnson presented his new high-speed
concept to Land's advisory committee, which expressed interest in the
approach he was taking. At the same meeting. Navy representatives
presented a concept for a high-altitude reconnaissance vehicle that ex­
amined the possibility of developing a ramjet-powered, inflatatble,
rubber vehicle that would be lifted to altitude by a balloon and 1then
•be propelled by a rocket to a speed where the ramjets could produce
thrust. Richard Bissell asked Johnson to evaluate this concept, and
three weeks later, after receiving more details from Navy repre­
sentatives. Kelly Johnson made some quick calculations that showed
that the design was impractical because the balloon would have to be
a mile in diameter to lift the vehicle, which in tum would need a wing
surface area greater than one-seventh of an acre to carry the payload:
By September 1958, Lockheed had studied a number of possible
configurations, some based on ramjet engines. others with both ram­
jets and turbojets. Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to
these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-I," "Archangel-2," and so
fonh, a carryover from the original nickname of "Angel" given tci the
U-2 during its development. These nicknames for the various des:igns
sooo became simply "A-l," "A-2," etc.
In September 1958, the Land committee met again to review all
the concepts then under consideration and to winnow out the few that
were most practicable. Among the concepts rejected were the Navy's
proposal for an inflatable, ramjet-powered aircraft, a Boeing proposal
for a 190-foot-long hydrogen-powered inflatable aircraft, and a
 
'Clarence L. Johnson. '"Development of the Lockheed SR-7 I Blacl.bird:· Srudi.es i n
Intelligence 26 (Summer 1982):4 (U); Johnson. "Archangel log."" 23 July 1958. 1.i
August I 958.
 
iiiel.lret
 
See, et NOFORN
Chapter 6
263
 
Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The
committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this
meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with a very-low-radar cross sec­
tion (the G2A) and a new supersonic design (the A-2)-and did not
accept either one, the former because of its slow speed and the latter
because of its dependence on exotic fuels for its ramjets and its over­
all high cost. The committee approved the continuation of Convair's
work on a ramjet-powered Mach 4.0 "parasite" aircraft that would be
launched from a specially configured version of the B-58B bomber.
The design was termed a parasite because it could not take off on its
own but needed a larger aircraft to carry it aloft and accelerate it to
the speed required to start the ramjet engine. The Convair design was
called the FISH. 5
 
- ~
 
Two months later, after reviewing the Convair proposal and yet
another Lockheed design for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft (the
A-3), the Land committee concluded in late November 1958 that it
would indeed be feasible to build an aircraft whose speed and altitude
would make radar tracking difficult or impossible. The committee,
therefore, recommended that DCI Dulles ask President Eisenhower to
approve further pursuit of the project and to provide funds for addi­
tional studies and tests. 6
On 17 December 1958, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed
the President on the progress toward a successor to the U-2. Also
present were Land and Purcell from the advisory committee,
Presidential Science Adviser James Killian, and Air Force Secretary
Donald Quarles. DCI Dulles reviewed the results of the U-2 missions
to date and stated his belief that a successor to the U-2 could be used
all over the world and "would have a much greater invulnerability to
detection."
Bissell then described the two competing projects by Lockheed
and Convair, noting that the chief question at the moment was
whether to use air launch or ground takeoff. The next phase, he add­
ed, would be detailed engineering, at the end of which it was pro­
posed that 12 aircraft be ordered at a cost of about $100 million.
 
'OSA History, chap. 20, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Johnson. "Archangel log." 17-24
September 1958.
• OSA Chronology. p. 21 (TS Codeword); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p. 3 (S); OSA
History. chap. 20. p. 8 (TS Codeword); Johnson, "Archangel log," 12 November 1958.
 
Secret
 
Secret NOPOftN
._,
 
Chapter 6
 
264
 
444" (37')
 
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Seee:et
 
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265
 
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Chapter 6
266
 
Kelly Johnson's A-3 Qesign
 
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Secret NOF'OFU~
Chapter 6
267
 
Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this
type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had
been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat­
ter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that
CIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were
working on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested
that the Air Force "could support the project by transferring some re­
connaissance money." At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked
the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss
further stages of the project with him. 7
 
COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR
With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available,
Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro­
posals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross section of their designs, with assis­
tance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute.
lri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome­
non that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon­
naissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to
as the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the
strength of a radar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated
by the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar
screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).
Most tracking radars in the late 1950s swept a band of sky 30° to
45° wide and 360° in circumference. Any object encountered in this
area reflected the radar pulse in a manner directly proportional to its
size-the larger the object, the stronger the returning radar signal.
This return appeared on the cathode-ray tube of the radar screen as a
spot or blip, and the persistence of this blip on the radar screen also
depended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from larger
objects remaining on the screen longer. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a human radar operator watched the radar screen and
kept track of the blips that indicated aircraft within the radar's field of
view.
 
'Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President. 17 December
1958. 10:26 a.m.," 22 December 1958, WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
 
See.et
 
Secret NOFOAN
 
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Rodgers determined that a high-altitude object moving two to
three times as fast as a normal aircraft would produce such a small
blip with so little persistence that the radar operator would have great
difficulty tracking it, if indeed he could even see it. Rodgers esti­
mated that for an aircraft to take advantage o!· this Blip/Scan Ratio
phenomenon it must fly at altitudes approaching 90,000 feet and have
a radar cross section of less than 10 square meters, preferably not
much over 5 square meters. However, for a Mach 3.0 aircraft to
achieve such a small radar cross section, its designers would have to
make many concessions in its structural design and aerodynamics.•
By the summer of 1959, both firms had completed their propos­
als. In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched
aircraft known as the A-11. It would have a speed of Mach 3.2, a
range of 3,200 miles, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and a completion date
of January 1961. Kelly Johnson had refused to reduce the aerodynam­
ics of his design in order to achieve a greater antiradar capability, and
the A-11 's radar cross section, although not great, was substantially
larger than that of the much smaller parasite aircraft being designed
by Convair."
The Convair proposal called for a small, manned, ramjet-pow­
ered, reconnaissance vehicle to be air launched from one of two spe­
cially configured Convair B-58B Super Hustlers. The FISH vehicle, a
radical lifting body with a very-small-radar cross section, would fly at
Mach 4.2 at 90.000 feet and have a range of 3,900 miles. Two
Marquardt ramjets would power its Mach 4.2 dash over the target
area. Once the FISH decelerated, two Pratt & Whitney JT-12 turbojets
would bring it back to base. The ramjet exit nozzles and wing edges
would be constructed of Pyroceram, a ceramic material that could
withstand the high temperatures of very high speeds and would ab­
sorb radiofrequency energy from radar pulses. Convair stated that the
FISH could be ready by January I 961."'
Convair's proposal depended on two uncertain factors. First and
foremost was the unproven technology of ramjet engines. At the time,
no aircraft in existence could carry a large, ramjet-powered craft into
the sky and then accelerate to sufficient speed for the ramjet engines
'Unnumbered Convair document on the Blip/Scan Ratio or Rodgers· Effect (TS).
,, Johnson, "Archangel log." Dt:l:ember 1958-July 1959.
'" OSA History. chap. 20. p. 12 (TS Codeword); Convair Division. General Dynamics
Corporation, "Pniject FISH Status Review," 9 June 1959 (S).
 
Seere;t
 
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269
 
Lockheed A · 11
 
to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tun­
nels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would
work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain
factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2
before launching the FISH above 35 ,000 feet. This version of the
B-58 was still in the design stage.
Convair's proposal suffered a major setback in June 1959, when
the Air Force canceled the 8-58B project. Conversion of the older,
slower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was
ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties invol ved.
Moreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from
the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588
program not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal would proba­
bly not have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the
added weight of the FISH would prevent the B-588 from achieving
the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.
The Convai r proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed
design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the
Land committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both
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270
designs and continued the competition. Lockheed continued to work
on developing a design that would be less vulnerable to detection, and
Convair received a new C[A contract to design an air-breathing
twin-engine aircraft that would meet the general specifications being
11
followed by Lockheed .
Following recommendations by the Land committee, both
Lockheed and Convair incorporated the Pratt & Whitney 158 power
plant into their designs. This engine had originally been developed
for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the Glenn L. Martin
Company's P6M Seamaster, and was the most powerful engine
available. [n 1958 the Navy had canceled the Seamaster program,
which had left Pratt & Whitney without a buyer for the powerful 158
•
I~
engine.
Although the Land committee had not yet found an acceptable
design, it informed President Eisenhower on 20 July 1959 that the
search was making good progress. Concerned about the U-2's vulner­
ability to detection and possible interception and aware that the
photosatellite project was encountering significant problems, the
President gave his final approval to the high-speed reconnaissance
aircraft project. 13
 
THE SELECTION OF THE LOCKHEED DESIGN
By the late summer of 1959, both Convair and Lockheed had com­
pleted new designs for a follow-on to the U-2. Convair's entry, known
as the KINGFISH, used much of the technology developed for the
F-102, F-106, and B-58, including stainless steel honeycomb skin,
planiform wing design, and a crew capsule escape system, which
eliminated the need for the pilot to wear a pressurized suit. The
KfNGFISH had two side-by-side 158 engines inside the fuselage,
which significantly reduced the radar cross section. Two additional
 
" OSA History, chap. 20, p. I 5 (TS Codeword).
 
"Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); Joseph V. Charyk. interview
by Donald E. We[zenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC, 5 December 1984 (TS
Codeword).
"Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President," 20 July [959.
WHOSS. ALPHA. DDEL (TS).
 
Secret
 
Sect et NOFOAN
 
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271
 
- - - 60'0" - - - - - - - - - -
 
important design features that contributed to a small radar return were
fiberglass
engine
inlets and wings whose leading edges were made of
.
..., ,.,
Pyroceram.
 
Convair K!NGFISH
 
Lockheed's new entry was much like its first, but with several
modifications and a new designator, A-12. It, too, would employ two
of the powerful J58 engines. Lockheed's major innovation in reducing
radar return was a cesium additive in the fuel, which decreased the
radar cross section of the afterburner plume. This improvement had
been proposed by Edward Purcell of the Land committee. Desiring to
save weight, Kelly Johnson had decided not to construct the A- 12 out
of steel. Traditional lightweight metals such as aluminum were out of
the question because they could not stand the heat that would be gen­
erated as the A- 12 flew at Mach 3.2, so Johnson chose a titanium
alloy.
On 20 August 1959, Lockheed and Convair submitted their pro­
posals to a joint Department of Defense, Air Force, and CIA selection
panel. As the table shows, the two aircraft were similar in performance
 
" Convair Division. General Dynamics Corporation. " KINGFISH Summary Re:port."
1959 (S). Kelly Johnson was very skeptical of the Convair design. noting in the Archangel
project log on 1-20 August 1959: ·'Convair have promised substantially reduced radar
cross seclion on an airplane the size of our A-12. They are doing this, in my view. with
. lOtal disregard for aerodynamics. inlet and afterburner p,:rformance...
 
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Wind tunnel test of A-12 model
 
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
273
 
characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were
slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer­
able in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar
detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size
and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section
than the Lockheed A-12. 15
Comparison of Lockheed and
Convair Designs
 
Lockheed A-12
 
Convair KINGFISH
 
Speed
 
Mach 3.2
 
Mach 3.2
 
Range (total)
 
4,120 nm
 
3,400 nm
 
Range (at altitude)
 
3,800 nm
 
3,400 nm
 
Start
 
84,500 ft.
 
85.000 ft.
 
Midrange
 
91.000 ft.
 
88.000 ft.
 
End
 
97,600 ft.
 
94,000 ft.
 
$96.6 million
 
$ I 21.6 million
 
Cruising Altitude
 
Cost summary (for 12
aircraft without engines)
 
Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair
KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they
were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air
Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost over­
runs and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in
this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under
budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security.
Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the
Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared
by the Agency.
Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection
panel remained concerned about the A-12 's vulnerability to radar de­
tection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for
reducing the A-l2's radar cross section by l January 1960. On 14
September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed
 
" OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).
 
Secret
 
Sec1 et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 6
274
 
to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and en­
gineering designs. This research and all later work on the A-12 took
place under a new codename. Project OXCART. established at the end
of August 1959 to replace its more widely known predecessor, Project
GUSTO.'" The CfA's project manager for OXCART was John
Parangosky, who had long been associated with the U-2 program.
 
EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE A-12'S
RADAR CROSS SECTION
During the spring of 1959, Kelly Johnson's Skunk Works crew­
which then numbered only 50-had begun building a full-scale
mockup of the proposed aircraft. The mockup was to be tested for its
radar cross section by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in
cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small testing
facility at Indian Springs. Nevada. Lockheed objected to this site be­
cause its pylon would not support the full-scale mockup and because
the facilities were in full view of a nearby highway. On IO September
1959, EG&G agreed to move its radar test facility to the former U-2
testing site at Area 51 of the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada
Proving Grounds. 11
When the new radar test facility with its larger pylon was ready.
Johnson put the A-12 mockup on a specially designed trailer truck
that carried it from Burbank to Area 5 I. By 18 November 1959, the
mockup was in place atop the pylon. and radar testing could begin.
These tests soon proved that Lockheed's concept of shape. fuel addi­
tive, and nonmetallic parts was workable, but it would take more than
18 months of testing and adjustment before the OXCART achieved a
satisfactory radar cross section.
It was in the course of this radar testing that the OXCART
received its characteristic cobra-like appearance. Edward Purcell and
Franklin Rodgers had come up with a theory that a continuously
curving airframe would be difficult to track with a radar pulse be­
cause it would present few corner reflectors or sharp angles from
which pulses could bounce in the direction of the radar. To achieve
the continuously curving airframe, Kelly Johnson added thin. curved
extensions to the engine housings and leading edges of the wings and
 
'"Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 19-21 (TS Codeword).
,· OSA History, chap. 20. p. 22 (TS Codeword).
 
-SesreL
 
Settee NOPORN
Chapter 6
 
275
 
Radar testing of A-72 mockup
 
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276
 
L=-=-3=
Wing tooth
 
Spike
 
Antiradar features of the A-12
 
Fin
 
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 6
 
277
eventually to the fuselage itself, creating what is known as a chine on
each side. At first Johnson was concerned that these additions might
impair the airworthiness of the plane, but wind tunnel testing deter­
mined that the chines actually imparted a useful aerodynamic I ift to
the vehicle. Because titanium was very brittle and therefore difficult
to bend, Johnson achieved the necessary curvature by combining tri­
angular-shaped pieces of titanium called fillets. These fillets were
glued to the framework of the chines with a special adhesive, epoxy
resin .
On later OXCART modds the fillets were made from electri­
cally resistive honeycomb plastic with a glass-fiber surface that
would not melt at high speed. When struck by a radar pulse, the com­
posite chines tended to absorb the pulse rather than reflect it. A simi­
lar approach was used for the leading edges of the wings. Again
electrically resistive honeycomb material was fabricated into tn.J1ngu­
lar shapes, known as wing teeth, and fitted into the titanium wings.
Both the metal and composite fillets and teeth were held in place with
the newly developed epoxy cements.
_. The greatest remaining area of concern in the A- l 2's radar cross
section was the two vertical stabilizers. To reduce radar ·reflections,
Kelly Johnson canted the stabilizers inward 15° and fabricated 'them
out of resin-impregnated nonmetall ic materials. Once these changes
were completed, the only metal in each vertical stabilizer was a s.tain­
less steel pivot. The Air Force, which later ordered several versions of
the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated
vertical stabii izers."
 
THE OXCART CONTRACT
By mid-January 1960, Lockheed had demonstrated that its concept of
shape, fuel additive, and nonmetallic parts would reduce the
OXCART's radar cross section substantially. Richard Bissell, howev­
er. was very upset to learn that the changes had led to a reduction in
the aircraft's performance. which meant it would not be able to aiuain
the penetration altitude he had promised to President Eise nhower.
Kelly Johnson then proposed to reduce the aircraft's weight by 1,000
pounds and increase the fuel load by 2.000 pounds, making it possible
 
"Johnson. ··D,:veloprnc:n1 of Lo<:khcci.l SR-71 : · pp. 6-7: OSr\ Hiswry. chap. '.!O. p. ~;5 (TS
 
Codeword).
 
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278
to achieve the desired target altitude of 91,000 feet. Afterward. he
noted in the project log: ··we have no performance margins left; so
this project. instead of being 10 times as hard as anything we have
done, is 12 times as hard. This matches the design number and is ob­
viously right." ,,,
These changes satisfied Bissell, who notified Johnson on 26
January that the CIA was authorizing the construction of 12 of the
new aircraft. The actual contract was signed on 11 February l 960.
Lockheed's original quotation for the project was $96.6 million for l 2
aircraft, but technological difficulties eventually made this price im­
possible to meet. Recognizing that fabricating an aircraft from tita­
nium might involve unforeseen difficulties, the CIA included a clause
in the contract that allowed costs to be reevaluated. During the next
five years. this clause had to be invoked on a number of occasions as
the A-12's costs soared to more than double the original estimate."'
 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES NECESSITATED
BY OXCART'S HIGH SPEED
According to the specifications. the OXCART aircraft was to achieve
a speed of Mach 3.2 (2.064 knots or 0.57 miles per second. which
would make it as fast as a rifle bullet). have a range of 4.120 nautical
miles. and reach altitudes of 84.500 to 97,600 feet. The new aircraft
would thus be more than five times as fast as the U-2 and would go
almost 3 miles higher.
One major disadvantage of the OXCART's great speed was high
temperatures. Flying through the earth's atmosphere at Mach 3.2
heated portions of the aircraft's skin to almost 900°F. An aircraft op­
erating at these high speeds and high temperatures required fuels. lu­
bricants, and hydraulic fluids that had not yet been invented. The
OXCART's fuel requirement called for a low-vapor-pressure fuel
with a low volume at operating temperatures; the fuel would also be
used as a heat sink to cool various parts of the aircraft. The 158 en­
gines required lubricants that did not break down at the very high op­
erating temperatures of Mach 3.2 speeds. This requirement led to the
 
,., Johnson... Archangc I log," 2 I January I960.
'" OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. pp. 27-29. 33-34, 36 (TS Colkword).
 
6ee1et
 
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279
 
invention of synthetic lubricants. Lockheed also had to search long
and hard for a hydraulic fluid that would not vaporize at high speed
but would still be usable at low altitudes. Finding a suitable hydrau lic
pump was just as difficult. Kelly Johnson finally modified a pump
that was being developed for North American's B-70 bomber
.
:1
proJect.
Some of the greatest problems related to the high speeds and
high temperatures at which the OXCART operated resulted from
working with the material chosen for the airframe-titanium. After
evaluating many materials. Johnson had chosen an alloy of titanium
 
:, Johnson. --Devdopm.:nt ot Lockh.:.:<l SR-7 1." pp. I 1- I 2.
 
OXCART production facilities
 
Secret NOF8RN
Chapter 6
 
280
 
OXCART pilot suit
 
(B-120) characterized by great strength. relatively light weight. and
good resistance to high temperatures. bur high in cost As strong as
stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much.
Obtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a quality suitable for
fabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because me1thods
for maintain ing good quali ty control during the milling of titanium
were not fully developed. Up to 80 percent of the early deliveries
from Titanium Metals Corporation had to be rejected. It was not until
1961 . when company officials were informed of the objectives and
high priority of the OXCA RT program, that problems with the tita­
nium supply ended. Even after sufficient high-qual ity titanium was
received, Lockheed·s difficu lties with the metal were not over.
Titanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication
broke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly line produc­
tion was not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well
above original estimates.!~
The high temperatures that the OXCART would encounter also
necessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort becaus,e the
inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. To save
 
"Minnich. ··OXCART Story:· p. 5 (S): OSA Hiswn-. chap. :!O. p. 3J (TS Co<l.:wu,rd).
 
~eeFet PJOFORN
 
Chapter 6
281
 
weight, Kelly Johnson did not attempt to insulate the interior of the
aircraft. The pilot would therefore have to wear a type of space suit
with its own cooling, pressure control. oxygen supply, and other
necessities for survival.
 
DESIGNING THE OXCART'S CAMERAS
Providing cameras for the A-12 posed a number of unique problems.
In late 1959, OXCART managers asked Perkin-Elmer, Eastman
Kodak, and Hycon to develop three different photographic systems
for the new aircraft. These cameras would provide a range of photog­
raphy from high-ground-resolution stereo to extremely-high-resolu­
tion spotting data.
The Perkin-Elmer (P-E) entry. known as the Type-I camera. was
a high-ground-resolution general stereo camera using an f/4.0 18-inch
lens and 6.6-inch film. It produced pairs of photographs covering a
. s~ath 71 miles wide with an approximately 30-percent stereo overlap.
The system had a 5,000-foot film supply and was able to ·resolve 140
lines per millimeter and provide a ground resolution of 12 inches.
To meet severe design constraints in the areas of size, weight.
thermal environment, desired photographic resolution, and coverage,
Perkin Elmer's Dr. Roderick M. Scott employed concepts never be­
fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting
cube rather than a prism for the scanner, a concentric film supply and
takeup system to minimize weight shift. a constant-velocity film
transport that provided for the contiguous placement of stereo images
on one piece of film, and airbars for the film transport and takeup
systems.c3
Eastman Kodak's entry, called the Type-II camera, was a
high-convergent stereo device using a 21-inch lens and 8-inch film. It
produced pairs of photographs covering a swath 60 miles wide with
an approximately 30-percent stereo overlap. It had an 8,400-foot film
supply and was able to resolve 105 lines per millimeter and provide a
ground resolution of 17 inches.
 
'' OSA History. chap. 20. p. 26 (TS Codc:word): Minnich, "OXCART Story," p. ~ (S).
 
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The Hycon entry. designed by James Baker and known as the
Type-IV camera, was a spotting camera with extremely-high-ground
resolution. In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable
B camera developed for the original U-2 program. It used a 48-inch
Baker-designed f/5.6 lens to focus images onto 9.5-inch tilm. Like the
B camera it could provide seven frames of photography covering a
swath 41 miles wide with stereo overlap on 19 miles of the swath.
The Hycon camera carried the largest film supply of the three
cameras, 12,000 feet. It was able to resolve 100 lines per millimeter
and provide a ground resolution of 8 inches. A version of this 48-inch
Hycon camera. known as the H camera, later saw service in u-2R air­
craft.
Each of the three camera systems had unique capabilities and
advantages, so all three were purchased for the OXCART. Before
they could be effectively employed in the aircraft, however, new
types of camera windows were needed. The OXCART's camera win­
dows had to be completely free from optical distortion. Achieving
this goal was difficult in a window whose exterior would be sub­
jected to temperatures of 550"F whik the interior surface would be
only I scrF. After three years and the expenditure of 52 million in re­
search and development, the Corning Glass Works, which had joined
this effort as a Perkin-Elmer subcontractor, solved the problem of
producing a camera window that could withstand tremendous heat
differentials. Its quartz glass window was fused to the metal frame
by an unprecedented process involving high-frequency sound
waves.
 
~.
 
Later in the program, the OXCART received yet another camera
system. In 1964 the Texas Instruments Corporation developed an in­
frared camera for Project TACKLE U-2s that were being used to de­
termine whether the People's Republic of China was producing
weapons-grade nuclear material. This stereo device, known as the
FFD-4. was adapted for use in OXCART. The camera had an effective
focal length of 50 inches and a 150-foot supply of 3.5-inch film. The
camera's resolution was 3°C thermally, I milliradian spatially. and 60
feet on the ground. It could be used for both day and night imagery
collection.
 
'' Baker intcrvicw (S); Minnich. "OXCART Stury." pp. 5-o I Sl.
 
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283
 
CHOOSING PILOTS FOR OXCART
Just as in the U-2 program, the Air Force provided considerable sup­
port to Project OXCART, including training, fuel storage, and weather
service. One of the most important areas of support was the provision
of pilots; all of the OXCART pilots came from the Air Force.
Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters
and be emotionally stable and well motivated. In contrast to 1955,
when cover considerations had limited the U-2 pilot selection process
to individuals with reserve commissions, the Air Force was able to
devise personnel and cover procedures that enabled both regular and
reserve officers to volunteer to become OXCART pilots. Because of
the limited size of the A-12 cockpit, they had to be under six feet tall
and weigh less than 175 pounds. Following extensive physical and
psychological screening, 16 potential nominees were selected for in­
tensive security and medical screening by the Agency. By the end of
this screening in November l 961. only five individuals had been ap­
proved and had accepted the Agency's offer of employment on a
highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. A second
search and screening raised the number of pilots for the OXCART to
eleven. The thorough screening process produced an elite group of pi•tots; all but one of these 11 officers eventually became generals. The
new pilots transferred from military to civilian status and received
compensation and insurance arrangements somewhat better than those
of the U-2 pilots. 15
 
SELECTION OF A TESTING SITE FOR THE OXCART
From the very beginning, it was clear that Lockheed could not test the
OXCART aircraft at its Burbank facility, where the runway was too
short and too exposed to the public. The ideal testing site would be far
removed from metropolitan areas, away from civil and military air­
ways, easily accessible by air, blessed with good weather, capable of
accommodating large numbers of personnel, near an Air Force instal­
lation, and having a runway at least 8,000 feet long. But no such place
was to be found.
After considering 10 Air Force bases programmed for closing,
Richard Bissell decided to upgrade the Area 51 site in Nevada where
the U-2 had been tested. Although its personnel accommodations, fuel
 
'' Minnich. --OXCART Story."· pp. 6- 7 (S); OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. pp. -l8-50 (TS
Codeword); Geary interview with Pedlow (S).
 
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284
storage capacity, and runway lelllgth were insufficient for the
OXCART program. the site 's remot,e location would greatly ease the
task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc­
tion program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in
September 1960; a C-47 shuttle s,ervice ferried work crews from
Burbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.
The new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November
1960. Kelly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard Air Force
runway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the
joints wou ld set up undesirable vibirations in the speedy aircraft At
his suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of
six 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag­
gered. This layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to the di­
rection of airer-aft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.
Additional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of
highway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in
the necessary fuel. The need for additional bui ldings on the base was
met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled.
mo\'ed, and reassembled on the north side of the:: base. and more than
100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to Area 51.
All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery
date of the first A- I 2 on I August 1961.~"
Unfortunately. this delivery date began to slip further and further
into the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and lacer the J58 en­
gines. caused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane.
Eventually, Kelly Johnson and Agency project offic ials decided to be­
gin testing without waiting for the J58 engines by using Pratt &
Whitney J75/l 9W engines. designed for the Convair F- 1.06. to test the
A-12 at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6. Such
a change, however, meant that the engine compartment of the first air­
craft had to be reconfigured to accommodate the J75 engine. Lockheed
hoped that this substitution would petrmit the delivery of the first A-12
by 22 December l 961 and its initial test flight by 27 February 1962.
L ockheed ran into so many technological problems with the
OXCART effort that by October 196 I its costs had swollen to $ 136
million and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done
 
"· OSA History. chap. :!O. pp. 39-10. 4 ). 51 1TS CoJcword): Minnich. ··oxCART Story:·
 
pp. ,.9 (SJ.
 
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See, et NOFOAN
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285
 
to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de­
cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No.
11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number of A- l 2s, for a
total cost of $16 l.2 million. 21
The cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force
order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the
A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- l08A Rapier
interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the
assistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force
entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air­
craft, based on the A- I 2 design but modified to carry a second crew­
man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project
KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de­
signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the
United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to
I 00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes
were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because
Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut­
ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A pro­
jecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. 2~
Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble
containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle.
In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire
OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the
office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy
to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and
Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air­
craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel
Command that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the
transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep­
ing the OXCARTs head above water.~ 9 As it turned out, the 158 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
 
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCART Story...
p. 10 (S).
"OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).
,, Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this
period. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158.
particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine
would be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, "Archangel log.'' 11 September
1961.
 
Seeaet
 
Seeret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
286
 
DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OXCART
The first A- l 2, known as article 121, was assembled and tested at
Burbank during January and February 1962. Since it could not be
flown to the Nevada site, the aircraft had to be partially disassembled
and put on a specially designed trailer that cost nearly S 100,000. The
entire fuselage, without the wings, was crated and covered, creating a
load 35 feet wide and 105 feet long. To transport this huge load safely
over the hundreds of miles to the site. obstructing road signs were re­
moved, trees were trimmed, and some roadbanks had to be leveled.
The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at Area 51
two days later.
After the fuselage arrived in Nevada, its wings were attached and
the 175 engines were installed. but the aircraft was still not ready to be
tested. This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem
that would never be solved completely. Because the A- I 2's high
speeds heat the titanium airframe to more than 500°F. Lockheed
designers had to make allowances for expansion. When the metal was
cold, the expansion joints were at their widest. In the fuel tanks. these
gaps were filled by pliable sealants. but the fuel for the A-12's engines
acted as a strong reducing agent that softened the sealants. causing
leaks. Thus. when fuel was first poured into the aircraft, 68 leaks
developed. Lockheed technicians then stripped and replaced all the
sealant, a tedious and time consuming procedure because the sealant
required four curing cycles, each at a different temperature over a
period of 30 to 54 hours. The engineers were never able to discover a
sealant compound that was completely impervious to the jet fuel while
remaining elastic enough to expand and contract sufficiently. The
A- I 2's tanks continued to leak, so when it was fueled, it only received
enough fuel to get airborne. The plane would then rendezvous with a
tanker, top off its tanks, and immediately climb to operating altitude.
causing the metal to expand and the leaks to stop. 10
 
CHANGES IN THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Richard Bissell, whose concern for the viability of the U-2 in 1956
had led to the establishment of Project OXCART and who had di­
rected its growth all along, was no longer in charge when the first
"' OSA fiistorv. chap. 20. p. 62 (TS C0<.!t:worJJ: \linnich ...OXCART Story." p. 11 (S).
 
Secret
 
secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
 
287
 
Delivery of OXCART aircraft to
Area 51
 
OXCART aircraft took to the air. He resigned from the Agency in
February 1962, and his departure brought a major reorganization of
the reconnaissance program. The Development Projects Division of
the Directorate of Plans. with its two aircraft (OXCART and U-2)
and its satellite project. were transferred to the new Directorate of
Research headed by Herbert (Pete) Scoville. The following year
Scoville resigned and this Directorate was reorganized and its name
changed to the Directorate of Science and Technology, with A lbert
(Bud) Wheelon. Jr. as its first head. The overhead reconnaissance
Geeret
 
6eeret NQI-Omj
Chapter 6
288
 
In-flight refueling of the OXCART
 
projects belonged to the Office of Special Activities, headed by
Col. Jack C. Ledford, who now had the title of Assistant Director for
Special Activ it ies. These project management changes in the ClA
had no immediate impact on the OXCART project because the air­
craft was still in the development stage, handled mainly by the con­
tractors. Moreover, a good deal of continuity was provided by
officers who had served for a numbe:r of years with the U-2 program
and were now involved with OXCART: James Cunningham, the
Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities: Col. Leo Geary, the
A ir Force's project officer for the two aircraft; and John Parangosky,
who oversaw the day-to-day affairs ,of the OXCART project.
 
OXCART'S FIRST FLIGHTS
With new sealant in its fuel tanks, the prototype OXCART was ready
to take to the air. On 25 April 1962, test pi lot Louis Schalk took "ar­
ticle 121" for an unofficial, unannounced tlight. which was an old
Lockheed tradition. He flew the cratft less than two miles at an alti­
tude of about 20 feet and encountered considerable problems
because of the improper hookup c,f several controls. These were
promptly repaired and on the next day, 26 April, Schalk made the
official 40-minute maiden fl ight . After a beautiful takeoff, the air­
craft began shedding the triangular fillets that covered the frame­
work of the chines along the edge: of the aircraft body. The lost
Sec,;ret
 
ieeret NOFORN
Chapter 6
289
fillets, which had been secured to the airframe with epoxy resin. had
to be recovered and reaffixed to the aircraft, a process that took the
next four days.
Once the fillets were in place, the OXCART'S official first flight
t0ok place on 30 April 1962, witnessed by a number of Agency per­
sonnel including DOR Scoville. Richard Bissell was also present, and
Kelly Johnson noted in the project log, ·•1 was very happy to have
Dick see this flight, with all that he has contributed to the pro­
gram ... ·'' This official first flight was also the first flight with the
wheels up. Piloted again by Schalk, the OXCART took off at 170
knots and climbed to 30.000 feet. During the 59-minute flight, the
A-I2 achieved a top speed of 340 knots. Kelly Johnson declared it to
be the smoothest first test flight of any aircraft he had designed or
tested. On 2 May 1962, during the second test flight, the OXCART
broke the sound barrier, achieving a speed of Mach l.1.)1
Four more aircraft. including a two-seat trainer, arrived at the
testing site before the end of the year. During the second delive,y on
. 2~.June 1962. the extra-wide vehicle carrying the aircraft acciderntally
struck a Greyhound bus traveling in the opposite direction. Pr-oject
managers quickly authorized payment of $4,890 for the damage done
to the bus in order to avoid having to explain in court why the
OXCART deli very vehicle was so wide.
 
John Parangosky
 
One of the biggest problems connected with flight testing the
A-I2 was keeping its existence secret. Realizing that the nation's air
traffic controllers would be among the first unwitting people to llearn
about the plane, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities,
James Cunningham, had called on Federal Aviation Administrator
Najeeb E. Halaby in early 1962 to brief him about the craft's existence
and ask his assistance in keeping it secret. Halaby cooperated fully
with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how
to handle reports of unusually fast, high-tlying aircraft. Air contrcillers
were warned not to mention the craft on the radio but to submit written
reports of sightings or radar truckings. The Air Force gave similar
briefings to NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command:''
 
'' Johnson. •• Archangel log:· 30 Apri l 1962.
' ' OSA History. chap. 20. p. 63 (TS CoJewor<l); Minnich. "OXCART Story:· pp. 11-12 (S).
 
"Minnich. ··OXCART Story:· pp. 10-11 (S): OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. p. 60 (TS Co<lcworJ).
 
Gee,et
 
6ee1 et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 6
290
 
First flight of the A-12,
30 April 1962
 
Initial testing could not explore the A-12·s maximum potential,
since the J58 engine was stil l not ready. Developing this power plant
to OXCART specifications was proving much more difficult than
had been expected because the J58 had to reach performance levels
never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating under ex­
tremely difficult environmental conditions. To simulate the stress
that the J58 would undergo during maximum power output (Mach
3.2 at 97,000 feet), the power plant was tested in the exhaust stream
of a 175 engine. ln the course o f this extremely severe testing, the
J58•s problems were gradually overcome. By January 1963, Pratt &
Whitney had delivered 10 J58 engines to the Nevada testi ng site.
T he first flight of an A- 12 with two J58 eng ines took place on
15 January 1963. µ
 
SPEED-RELATED PROBLEMS
As 158-equipped A-12s reached higher and higher speeds. more diffi­
culties arose. Major problems developed at speeds between Mach 2.4
and 2.8 because the aircraft's shock wave interfered with the flow of
air into the engine. greatly reducing its performance. Solving this
problem required long and often highly frustrating experimentation
•· William H. Brown. ··J58/SR-7 I Propulsion lntt!gration." Studies i11 /ntellis:,·11c,e 26
(Summt!r 1981):pp. 17-18 ( U): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 5~. 67 (TS Co<lc:wor<l).
 
SeeFet NOFOfU'il
 
Chapter 6
 
291
that ultimately required a complete redesign of the air-inlet system
that controlled the amount of air admitted to the engine. In the new,
adjustable inlet the cone-shaped projection at the front-known as a
spike-was designed to move in or out as much as three feet in order
to capture and contain the shock wave produced by the aircraft at high
speeds, thus preventing the shock wave from blowing out the fire in. 1s
s1.d e the engine.·
Another 158 engine problem in early 1963 was foreign object
damage. Small objects such as pens, pencils, screws, bolts, nuts, and
metal shavings that fell into the engine nacelles during assembly at
Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial engine testing
at Area 5 1 and damaged impeller and compressor vanes. To control the
problem Lockheed instituted a program that included X-rays, shaking
of the nacelles, installing screens over various air inlets to the engine,
and even having workers wear coveralls without breast pockets.
Another source of foreign object damage was trash on the runways.
The giant 158 engines acted like immense vacuum cleaners, sucking in
anything lying loose on the paving as they propelled the A-12 down
the runway for takeoff. To prevent engine damage, Area 51 personnel
h~~ to sweep and vacuum the runway before aircraft takeoff. 10
 
NEW VERSIONS OF THE OXCART
In 1962 the Agency and the Air Force ordered two more versions of
the OXCART (in addition to the A-12 and the YF-12A). One was a
modification of the A-12 to carry and launch ramjet-powered,
43-feet-long drones capable of reaching Mach 3.3 The two-seater
mothership received the designation M-12; the drone was called the
0-21. This project was known as TAGBOARD. The original develop­
ment of the drones and mothership was sponsored by the CIA, but in
June 1963 the project was turned over to the Air Force, which had
overall responsibility for unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.
Development of the M-12/0-21 combination continued until 1966,
when an unsuccessful D-21 launch caused the loss of its mothership
and the death of one of the crew members. Afterward the Air Force
turned to B-52 bombers to carry the drones.·11
 
" OSA History, chap. 20. p. 67 (TS Codeword).
'• Johnson. '"Development of Lockheed SR-71,'" p. 12.
"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 71; Jay Miller, Lockheed SR-71 (A/2/YF/2/D-2//, Aerofax.
Minigraph I (Arlington. Texas: Aerofax. Inc.. 1985), p. 3.
 
-Secre~
 
Sec, et PdGfORN
 
Chapter 6
292
The second new version of the OXCART was another recon­
naissance aircraft. In December 1962 the Air Force ordered six
"reconnaissance/strike" aircraft, which were designed to conduct
high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance of enemy territory after a
nuclear strike. This new aircraft differed from other A-12 versions in
that it was longer, had a full-blown two-seat cockpit, and carried a
large variety of photographic and electronic sensors. The additional
weight of all this equipment gave the Air Force craft a slower maxi­
mum speed and a lower operating ceiling than the Agency's A-12. In
August 1963, the Air Force added 25 more aircraft to this contract,
for a total of 31. 3'
 
THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART
As the funds being spent on Air Force versions of the OXCART in­
creased dramatically, the Defense Department became concerned that
it could not offer any public explanation for these expenditures. At
the same time, Agency and Defense Department officials recognized
the growing danger that a crash or sightings of test flights could com­
promise the program. This led the Defense Department in late 1962
and early 1963 to consider surfacing the Air Force's interceptor ver­
sion of the A-12 to provide a cover for OXCART sightings or crashes
and an explanation for the rise in Air Force spending. Some journal­
ists had also become aware of the aircraft's existence, raising concern
that the secret would eventually come out in the press. Agency offi­
cials remained reluctant to reveal the existence of any version of the
A-12, and the issue soon came to the attention of the PFIAB. James
Killian and Edwin Land strongly opposed disclosing OXCART's ex­
istence, and in January 1963 they presented their views to President
Kennedy at a meeting attended by DCI McCone and Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara. Killian, Land, and McCone succeeded
in persuading the President and Secretary of Defense to keep the
OXCART's existence a secret for the time being.
Later that year supporters of the idea of surfacing the OXCART
found a more powerful argument for their proposal-the need to dis­
seminate the supersonic technology that had been developed for the
 
'' OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 71- 72 (TS Co1kword) .
 
SeeFet
 
Chapter 6
 
293
 
It !1~~1~,i~~ifi__!fif~~1, ::•:½i
 
!:~~}r0t····
 
" ~:.'".:~
 
~
 
.•.
 
.
 
.
 
:J·;~:~t';.ft~(:.t;;:~;:' '.J::tt,. --;
 
:;<
 
OXCART. This technology would be invaluable for Air Force pro­
jec!s such as the 8-70 bomber and for the civilian supersonic trans­
.po.rt (SST) then being discussed in Congress. [n the fall of 1963,
several Presidential advisers expressed their concern to DCI McCone
that Lockheed had received a $700 million headstart in the develop­
ment of supersonic technology, giving the firm a tremendous ad.van­
tage over other aerospace companies working on a supersonic
transport. McCone passed these concerns on to President Kennedy on
12 November 1963, just 10 days before the fateful trip to Dallas. The
President instructed CIA and the Defense Department to develop a
plan for surfacing the OXCART but to await further discussions with
30
him before taking any action.
 
M-12 carrying D-21 Drone
 
President Lyndon B. Johnson received a detailed briefing on the
OXCART program from McCone, McNamara, Bundy, and Rus:k on
29 November, after just one week in office. McNamara strongly ad­
vocated surfacing a version of the OXCART. McCone was more cau­
tious, calling for the preparation of a statement that could be 1USed
when surfacing became necessary but arguing that such a step was not
 
"John A. McCool!... Memorandum of !vketing in Cabinet Room for the Purpose of
Discussing the Surfacing of the ox:· 21 January 1963. DC! records (TS Codeword);
idem. Memorandum for the Record. Discussion with the President-October 21 st--6:00
p.m.. 22 October 1963. DCl records {S): OSA fliswry. chap. 20. pp. 73- 7-' (TS Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
294
 
yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said
the issue should be reviewed again in February."'
One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was
the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected
over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware
of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL
KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut
one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption
that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic
targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By
coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in­
dividual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying,
very fast objects.·'
By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur­
facing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar
system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be
able to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the
USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART
came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at
which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That
same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an­
nounced the successful development of an .. advanced experimental
jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more
than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet.".~
President Johnson had spoken of the A- I I rather than the
Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub­
lic was the Air Force's YF- l 2A interceptor. a project that had already
been canceled. ➔' Following the President's announcement. two of
 
"'John A. McCone. "Memorandum for the Record. Meeting with the President. Secretary
McNamara. Mr. Bundy and DC!." 29 November 1963. DCI records (TS); OSA History.
chap. 20. p. 73 (TS Codeword).
 
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. I-n-149 (TS Codeword).
'' John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record. "Discussion at the NSC Meeting.
Attended by the President. all members and the four members of the President's personal
staff. 29 February 1964," 2 March 1964. DC! records (S); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p.
14-erroneously identifies the date as 24 February-(S).
" President Johnson ·s use of the designator A-11 at the press conference has sometimes
been called an error, but Kelly Johnson wrote the President's press release and chose this
designator for security reasons because it referred to the earlier version of the aircraft that
lacked the radar-defeating modifi1.:ations of the A-12. Johnson, "Archangel log," 25
February 1964.
 
6eeret
 
Sect et NOFORN
Chapter 6
295
 
these aircraft were hastily flown to Edwards Air Force Base. From
this point on, the Air Force versions of the OXCART were based at
Edwards and provided a diversion so that the faster and higher flying
A- l 2s at the Nevada site could continue testing out of the public eye.
The President's announcement did not mention the CIA's in­
volvement in the project, which remained classified, but keeping the
Agency's extensive role in the OXCART a secret was not an easy task.
The first step had been to separate the Air Force's versions of the A-12
from the Agency's by moving the Air Force aircraft to California.
Next, those firms that were to be given the new technology had to be
briefed on the program and agree to abide by the same secrecy agree­
ments then in force with Lockheed. Moreover, everyone witting of
OXCART (including those no longer associated with the program,
such as Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and General Cabell) had been
briefed about the impending Presidential announcement, so that they
would not think that the need for secrecy about OXCART had ended .....
The process of surfacing versions of the OXCART continued on
. 25.J uly 1964. when President Johnson revealed the existence of a new
Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, which he called the SR-71.
Actually. the President was supposed to say RS-71 (for ··reconnais­
sance-strike"). Deciding that renaming the aircraft was easier than
correcting President Johnson. the Air Force invented a new category­
"strategic reconnaissance"-to explain the SR-7l's designation.
 
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING
The first A-12 crash occurred on 24 May 1963, when a detachment
pilot, realizing the airspeed indication was confusing and erroneous,
decided to eject. The pilot was unhurt, but the plane was destroyed
when it crashed near Wendover, Utah. A cover story for the press de­
scribed the plane as an F-105. All A-l 2s were grounded for a week
while the accident was investigated. The malfunction was found to be
caused by ice that had plugged up a pitot-static tube used to determine
.
d.~5•
atrspee
 
.. OSr\ Hi~wry, chap. 20. p. 76 (TS Cod~word).
 
'' Ibid.. pp. 69-70 (TS Codeword).
 
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So&Fet NOFORN
 
Chapter 6
296
 
Two more A- l 2s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, arti­
cle 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device
froze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an
altitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft.
Although he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open
and he landed during the parachute's first swing. Fortunately he was
unhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out of the base. Eighteen
months later, on 28 December 1965, article 126 crashed immediately
after takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation
system. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely. and there
was no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered
by DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from
negligence, not sabotage.'6
The A-12 made its first long-range, high-speed flight on 27
January 1965. The flight lasted I 00 minutes. 75 minutes of which
were flown at speeds greater than Mach 3.1. and the aircraft covered
2.580 miles at altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. By this time.
the OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera, hydrau­
lic, navigation, and flight-control systems all demonstrated acceptable
reliability.
Nevertheless, as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and
higher, new problems arose. The most serious of these problems in­
volved the aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inlet con­
trols, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit
instruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiring connec­
tors and components had to withstand temperatures above 800'F,
structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands were more
than the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems
could be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials
believed that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees also con­
tributed to malfunctions."
Concerned that Lockheed would not be able to meet the
OXCART's schedule for operational readiness, the Office of Special
Activities' Director of Technology, John Parangosky, met with Kelly
Johnson on 3 August 1965 to discuss the project's problems. Johnson
not only assigned more top-level supervisors to the project but also
'" Ibid.. pp. 80-81 {TS Codeword): Minnich. ··OXCART Story,"' pp. 17-18 tS).
 
"OSA History. chap. 20. p. 9-4 (TS Codr:word).
 
Seeret
 
~eeret NOFOPU''l
Chapter 6
297
 
decided to go to Nevada and take charge of the OXCART's develop­
ment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in
his notes in the project log:
 
I uncovered many items of a managerial, materiel and design nature.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their operation.... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them,
going over in detail all problems on the aircraft .... Increased the
supervision in the electrical group by 500% .... We tightened up
the inspection procedures a great deal and made inspection stick.
It appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer­
ing.... The addition of so many systems to the A-12 has greatly
complicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problem."''
These improvements in on-site management got the project back on
schedule.
By 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART
deployment were finished. During these tests. the OXCART achieved
a maximum speed of Mach 3.29. an altitude of 90,000 feet. and sus­
tained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum
- errdurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22 November.
Kelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. head of the
Office of Special Activities, stating. "'The time has come when the
bird should leave its nest. .. ""
Three years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962.
the OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find
work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.
 
DISCUSSIONS ON THE OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
Although the OXCART had been designed to replace the U-2 as a
strategic reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the Soviet Union, this use
had become doubtful long before the OXCART was ready for
operational use. The U-2 Affair of 1960 made Presidents very reluc­
tant to consider overflights of the Soviet Union. Indeed. Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy had both stated publicly that the United
States would not conduct such overflights. In July 1962. Secretary of
"Johnson, .. Archangel log," 5 August-30 April 1965.
''' Minnich, "'OXCART Story... p. 23 (S).
 
Secret
 
Sect et NOP'ORN
 
Chapter 6
298
 
•_,.,,,._ ~
 
.
 
:/<'.•: ~.,-;_h • ,:s; =;:::~.:....-,- --• :-:••: •
'
 
A-12s at Area 51
 
~ •-r"":">=~.. ;-..
 
.
 
":-,
 
--
 
Defense McNamara told DCI McCone that he doubted that the
OXCART would ever be used and suggested that improvements in
satellite reconnaissance would very likely el iminate the need for the
expensive OXCART program . Strongly disagreeing, McCone told
McNamara that he had every intention of using OXCART aircraft to
fly over the Soviet Union.
McCone raised this issue with President Kennedy in April 1963.
at a time when the nation's photosatellites were experiencing a great
number of failures and the intelligence community was clamoring for
better photography to confirm or disprove allegations of the existence
of an antiballistic missile system at Leningrad. Unconvinced by
McCone·s arguments for OXCART overflights. President Kennedy
expressed the hope that some mean:, might be devised for improving
50
satellite imagery instead.
 
'" John A. McCone. i\,kmorandum fur the Rccord. " Summary of meeting wi1h Secre1ary
McNamara and Secretary Gilpa1ric. Gencr.11 Career and Mr. McCone on 5 July 1962.''
6 July 1962. DCI records (S): McCone. Memorandum for the File. "Meeting wi1h 1he
President-5:30-1 5 Apr 1963 in Palm Beach. Florida:· DCI records (SJ.
 
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 6
299
 
Although overflights of the Soviet Union appeared to be out of
the question, the OXCART's eventual employment elsewhere in the
world remained a strong possibility, particularly after the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1962 demonstrated the continuing need for
manned strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Since satellites had not been
able to supply the kinds of coverage needed, U-2s had carried out nu­
merous overflights of Cuba. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained vulnera­
ble to surface-to-air missiles (as had once again been demonstrated by
the downing of a SAC U-2 during the Missile Crisis), and project
headquarters had even briefly considered sending the A-12 over Cuba
in October 1962, even though the aircraft still lacked the required 158
engines and would have had to use much less powerful ones.'' After
the Missile Crisis ended, Air Force U-2s continued to photograph
Cuba under a tacit superpower understanding that such monitoring of
the withdrawal of the missiles would proceed without interference.
But the possibility of future Soviet or Cuban action against the U-2s
remained, raising the dismaying prospect that the United States would
not be able to tell if the Soviet Union was reintroducing ballistic mis­
siles into Cuba.
Such fears became acute in the summer of 1964 after Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev told foreign visitors such as columnist
Drew Pearson, former Senator William Benton, and Danish Prime
Minister Jens Otto Krag that, once the US elections had been held in
November, U-2s flying over Cuba would be shot down. Project head­
quarters therefore began preparing contingency plans (Project
SKYLARK) for the possible employment of OXCART over Cuba,
even though the new aircraft was not yet ready for operations. On 5
August 1964, the Acting DCI, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered the
project staff to achieve emergency operational readiness of the
OXCART by 5 November 1964, in case Premier Khrushchev actually
carried out his threat to shoot down U-2s. 5 z
To meet this deadline, the Office of Special Activities organized
a detachment of five pilots and ground crews to conduct flights to val­
idate camera performance and qualify pilots for Mach 2.8 operations.
Simulating Cuban missions during training flights, the detachment
 
"On 23 October 1962 Johnson noted in his "Archangel log": that the performance of an
A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for possible use over Cuba)
would be "hardly spectacular."
'' Johnson, .. Archangel log,.. 17 August 1964; Minnich, "OXCART Story, .. p. 19 (S );
OSA History, chap. 20. p. 81 (TS Codeword).
 
&ee,ct
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 6
300
 
demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5
November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the
Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa­
bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these
preparations were valuable training for the OXCART program, even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the
A- l 2s were reserved for more critical situations.
When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer­
gency operational status on 5 November 196-+. the aircraft was still
not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned
electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless. a
senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct
initial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and
jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.
One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic
warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use
of existing ECM devices c_ould, in the event of the loss of an
OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment
used by Air Force bombers and fighters. Even if OXCART's ECM
devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force
still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to
work out countermeasures.
Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach
to antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to
develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen­
erate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar
cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also
developed a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the
OXCART. 53
As the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im­
prove, there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft
overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas­
ing. On 18 March 1965, DCI McCone, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the
 
" OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 1-49-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by
John Parangosky. OSA records (TS Codeword).
 
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See, et NOFOAN
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growing hazards confronting aerial reconnaissance of the People's
Republic of China. In three years the Agency had lost four U-2s over
China, and the Air Force had lost numerous reconnaissance drones.
The three men agreed to go ahead with all the preparatory steps
needed for the OXCART to operate over China so that it would be
ready in case the President decided to authorize such missions.
Project BLACK SHIELD, the plan for Far East operations.
called for OXCART aircraft to be based at Kadena airbase on
Okinawa. In the first phase, three planes would be flown to Okinawa
for 60-day periods, twice a year, an operation which would involve
about 225 personnel. Later there would be a permanent detachment at
Kadena. In preparation for the possibility of such operations, the
Defense Department spent $3.7 million to provide support facilities
and real-time secure communications on the island by early autumn
I 965. 5"
In the summer of 1965, after the United States had begun intro­
ducing large numbers of troops into South Vietnam. Southeast Asia
beca!Ue another possible target for the OXCART. Because the contin­
ued use of U-2s for reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam was
threatened by the deployment of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles.
McNamara asked the CIA on 3 June 1965 whether it would be possi­
ble to substitute OXCART aircraft for U-2s. The new DCI, Adm.
William F. Raborn, replied that the OXCART could operate over
Vietnam as soon as it had passed its final operational readiness tests. 55
Formal consideration of proposed OXCART missions involved
the same approval process that was used for U-2 overflights. In late
November 1965, after the OXCART had passed its final validation
tests, the 303 Committee met to consider a proposal to deploy the
OXCART to Okinawa to overfly Southeast Asia and China. Although
the committee did not approve deployment, it ordered the develop­
ment and maintenance of a quick-reaction capability, ready to deploy
to Okinawa within 21 days after notification.
There the matter remained for more than a year. During the first
half of I 966, DC[ Raborn raised the issue of deploying the OXCART
to Okinawa at five separate 303 Committee meetings but failed to win
" OSA Hiswry. chap. 20, pp. 90-91 (TS Codeword).
 
"Minnich, "OXCART Story," p. 21 (S).
 
6ccaet
 
Secret fdOFORN
 
Chapter 6
302
 
sufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advo­
cacy of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department of­
ficials, however, thought that the political risks of basing the aircraft
in Okinawa-which would almost certainly disclose it to the
Japanese-outweighed any gains from the intelligence the OXCART
might gather. On 12 August I 966, the divergent views were presented
to President Johnson, who upheld the 303 Committee's majority opin­
ion against deployment for the time being. 5'
The CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order
to test the aircraft's ECM systems in a hostile environment. On 15
September the 303 Committee considered and rejected this idea on
the grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba "would disturb the ex­
isting calm prevailing in that area of our foreign affairs." 57
With operational missions still ruled out, proficiency training re­
mained the main order of business. This led to improvements in mis­
sion plans and flight tactics that enabled the detachment to reduce the
time requi~ed to deploy to Okinawa from 21 days to 15. Records con­
tinued to fall to the OXCART. On 21 December 1966, a Lockheed
test pilot tlew an A-12 for 16,408 kilometers over the continental
United States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speed of
2,670 kilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at
speeds as low as 970 kilometers per hour). This flight set a record for
speed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft. 58
Two weeks later, on 5 January 1967, an A-12 crashed after a fuel
gauge malfunctioned and the aircraft ran out of fuel short of the run­
way. Pilot Walter Ray ejected but was killed when he could not
become separated from the ejection seat. To preserve the secrecy of
the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an
SR-71 was missing and presumed down in Nevada. This loss, like the
three preceding crashes, did not result from difficulties caused by
high-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems in­
herent in any new aircraft.
Proposals for OXCART operations continued to surface, and in
May 1967 the CIA forwarded a detailed request to the 303 Committee
to use the OXCART to collect strategic intelligence about a new
'• Minnich ...OXCART Story:· p. 23 (S): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 110-111 (TS
Codeword).
"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 112 (TS Codeword).
 
"Minnich. "OXCART Story:· p. 24 (S).
 
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6ee1 et NOFOFUil
 
Chapter 6
303
 
Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community
began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal­
lations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along
the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo­
graph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by
the prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because of the lack of accu­
rate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence
of views within the intelligence community about their purpose.
These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con­
tained long-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate­
gic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites
represented a deployed antiballistic missile system.
Photointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to
18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern,
and configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys­
tem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about
the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni­
tor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested.
Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
lockon modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre­
quencies or any other performance characteristics of the radar.
To settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations.
Office of Special Activities planners proposed a mission that would
use the high resolution of the OXCART's camera along with the
U-2's sophisticated ELINT-collection equipment. This project's un­
classified name was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was
Operation UPWIND.
The proposed project involved launching an A-12 OXCART air­
craft from Area 51 in Nevada and flying it to a Baltic Sea rendezvous
with a Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great
Britain. The OXCART would fly north of Norway and then turn south
along the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12
would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of
Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Poland. and East Germany before heading
west to return to Area 51. The entire flight would cover 11,000 nauti­
cal miles, take eight hours and 38 minutes, and require four aerial re­
fuelings.
Although the A-12 would not violate Soviet airspace during this
dash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed
for an overflight penetration in the vicinity of Leningrad. It was
&eeret
 
~eerct PJOHHU~
Chapter 6
304
 
hoped that the A- 12's passage would provoke Soviet air defense per­
sonnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift
OXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its
Type-I camera would be filming the entire south coast. If Agency an­
alysts were correct in their assumption that the Tallinn system was de­
signed to counter high-altitude aircraft at long ranges, then the
OXCART would be in jeopardy during this dash down the Baltic.
Nevertheless, Agency weapons experts believed that the A-12 air­
craft's speed and suite of electronic countermeasures would keep it
safe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.
While the A-12 was conducting its high-speed dash along the
Baltic coast of Eastern Europe, the U-2 would be flying farther out to
sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs. The U-2 would be
able to collect the Tallinn radar installation's ELINT emanations.
Agency and Defense Department officials supported the pro­
posed mission, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly opposed it
and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President
Johnson. 5" The Tallinn radar installation remained of great interest to
the intelligence community, and in the late 1960s the CIA attempted
to develop a small, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that could pho­
tograph Tallinn and other coastal areas. The project (AQUILINE) was
abandoned in 1971 (see appendix E).
 
FIRST A-12 DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELD
Although the Tallinn mission was still being considered in May 1967,
another possible employment for the OXCART came under discus­
sion. This time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical
rather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in
Washington about the possible undetected introduction of sur­
face-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson
asked for a proposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the
OXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments were
still examining the proposal's political risks, DCI Richard Helms
 
"Memorandum for DOC! R. L. Taylor from C. E. Duckett. DDS&T...Collection of Photo
and ELINT Data on Tallinn Sites Utilizing the OXCART and the U-2... 4 May 1967.
DS&T records (TS Codeword).
 
Sec, el
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
 
Chapter 6
305
raised the issue at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch .. on 16 ~lay.
Helms got the President's approval, and the CIA put the BLACK
SHIELD plan to deploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later
that same day.''0
The airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena began on 17
May 1967, and on 22 May the first A-12 flew nonstop from Area 51
to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. A second aircraft arrived on
24 May. The third A-12 left on 26 May, but the pilot had trouble with
the inertial navigation system and communications near Wake Island.
He made a precautionary landing at Wake. where a pre-positioned
emergency recovery team was located. The problem was corrected
and the aircraft continued its flight to Kadena on the following day.
Before the start of the operation, the CIA briefed a number of
key US and Allied officials on the operation. Included were the US
Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Phillippines. Formosa.
!he High C[:·:· :
inner::_an_d_
:
Thailand, South Vietna~
Chief of Station on Okinawa: the Pnme Ministe
Thailand; the President and Defense Minister of t e _epu 1 c ~
China: and the Air Force chiefs of Thailand and the Republic of
China. All of these officials favored the operation.
 
7
 
By 29 May 1967, 13 days after President Johnson's approval,
BLACK SHIELD was ready to fly an operational mission. On 30
May, the detachment was alerted for a mission on the following day.
As the takeoff time approached, Kadena was being deluged by rain.
but, since weather over the target area was clear, flight preparations
continued. The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain,
taxied to the runway and took off.
This first BLACK SHIELD mission flew one flight path over
North Vietnam and another over the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The
mission was flown at Mach 3.1 and 80.000 feet and lasted three hours
and 39 minutes. While over North Vietnam. the A-12 photographed
70 of the 190 known surface-to-air missile sites and nine other prior­
ity targets. The A- I2's ECM equipment did not detect any radar sig­
nals during the mission, which indicated that the flight had gone
completely unnoticed by both the Chinese and North Vietnamese.
 
"Minnich. "OXCART Story." p. 25 (Sl.
 
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Secret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 6
306
 
During the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK
SHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four de­
tected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD
missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conclude
that no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in North
Vietnam. 61
Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all
operational BLACK SHIELD missions. To ensure secure communica­
tions between Headauarters and KadenaJ
 
I
A typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south
of Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographic pas­
ses, the aircraft withdrew for a second aerial refueling in the Thailand
area before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that it
spent only 12.5 minutes over Vietnam during a "single-pass" mis­
sion, and 21.5 minutes during a "two-pass" mission. Because of its
wide 86-mile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed into
Chinese airspace when getting into position for a second pass.
After the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent
by special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late
summer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan began do­
ing the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands
of US commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of a mission's com­
pletion.
BLACK SHIELD activity continued unabated during the second
half of 1967. From 16 August to 31 December 1967, 26 missions
were alerted and 15 were flown. On I 7 September one SAM site
tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful
with its FAN SONG guidance radar. It was not until 28 October that a
North Vietnamese SAM site launched a missile at the OXCART.
Mission photography documented the event with photographs of mis­
sile smoke above the SAM firing site and pictures of the missile and
its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment aboard the
OXCART performed well, and the missile did not endanger the air­
craft.
 
•• Minnich. '"OXCART Story:· pp. 25-28 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 119-124, ann.:x
152 (TS Cod.:word).
 
ieeret
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
307
The only time the enemy came close to downing an OXCART
was on 30 October 1967. During his first pass over North Vietnam,
pilot Dennis Sullivan detected radar tracking. Two SAM sites pre­
pared to launch missiles but neither did. During Sullivan's second
pass the North Vietnamese fired at least six missiles at the OXCART,
each confirmed by vapor trails on mission photography. The pilot saw
these vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations near but be­
hind the A-12, which was traveling at Mach 3. l at about 84,000 feet.
Postflight inspection of the aircraft revealed that a piece of metal had
penetrated the underside of the right wing, passed through three lay­
ers of titanium, and lodged against a support structure of the wing
tank. The fragment was not a warhead pellet but probably debris from
one of the missile detonations that the pilot observed. 61
BLACK SHIELD missions continued during the first three
months of 1968, with four missions flown over North Vietnam out of
14 alerts. The last OXCART overflight of Vietnam took place on 8
March 1968. During this same three-month period, the OXCART
made its first overflight of North Korea after the USS Pueblo was
seized on 23 January 1968. The goal of this mission was to discover
wh_ether the North Koreans were preparing any large-scale hostile
•move in the wake of this incident. When NPIC photointerpreters ex­
amined OXCART photography taken onf 26 January, they found the
missing USS Pueblo in Wonsan harbor.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was reluctant to endorse a second
mission over North Korea for fear of diplomatic repercussions should
the aircraft come down in hostile territory. The Secretary was assured
that the plane could transit North Korea in seven minutes and was un­
likely to land in either North Korea or China. The 303 Committee
then endorsed a second mission over North Korea, which was flown
on 19 February. A third and final overflight of North Korea on 8 May
1968 proved to be the last operational deployment of the OXCART
aircraft. 6 ·'
 
THE END OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
Almost a decade had elapsed between the time when the concept for
the OXCART aircraft was first examined and the first A-12 was oper­
ationally deployed. Now after only 29 operational missions, the most
'' Minnich. "OXCART Story," p. 28 (S).
'·' Ibid .. pp. 28-29 (S).
 
ioePet
 
Sectet NOF6RN
Chapter 6
308
 
USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor
 
advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban­
donment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the
aircraft; the causes lay in fi scal pn:ssures and competition between
the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the A ir Force.
Throughout the OXCART program. the Air Force had been ex­
ceedingly helpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling
program. provided operational facilities at Kadena, and airl i fted
OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and
Korean operations. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA's A-12the YF- I 2A interceptor and the SR -71 reconnaissance aircraft-had
helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.
Nevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet of recon­
naissance aircraft, budgetary expert:s began to criticize the existence
of two expensive fleets of similar aiircraft.
In November 1965, the very month that the A- 12 had been de­
clared operational, the Bureau of thte Budget circulated a memoran­
dum that expressed concern about 1:he coses of the A-12 and SR-71
programs. It questioned both the total number of planes required for
the combined fleets, and the necessity for a separate CIA fleet. The
memorandum recommended phasiing out the A-12 program by
September 1966 and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71
 
Seere+-
 
Sec, et NOFORM
Chapter 6
309
 
models. The Secretary of Defense rejected this recommendation. pre­
sumably because the SR-7 l would not be operational by September
1966.""'
In July 1966, at the Bureau of the Budget's suggestion, a study
group was established to look for ways to reduce the cost of the
OXCART and SR-7 l programs. The study group consisted of C. W.
Fischer from the Bureau of the Budget, Herbert Bennington from the
Department of Defense, and John Parangosky from CIA. The study
group listed three possible courses of action: maintain both fleets,
mothball the A-12s but share the SR-7ls between CIA and the Air
Force, or mothball the A- l 2s and assign all missions to Air Force
SR-71 s. On 12 December 1966, four high-level officials met to con­
sider these alternatives. Over the objections of DCI Helms, the other
three officials-Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Bureau of
the Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, and Presidential Scientific
Adviser Donald F. Hornig-decided to terminate the OXCART fleet.
Concerned that this recommendation would strip the CIA of its super­
sonic reconnaissance capability, Helms then asked that the SR-71
fleet be shared between CIA and the Air Force.''
Four days later. Schultze handed Helms a draft memorandum for
the President requesting a decision either to share the SR-71 t1cet be­
tween CIA and the Air Force or to terminate the CIA capability en­
tirely. Having just received new information indicating that the
SR-71 ·s performance was inferior to that of the A-12. Helms asked
for another meeting to review this data. His concern was that the
SR-71 could not match the photographic coverage that the A-12 could
provide. Only one of the SR-71 's three camera systems was working
anywhere near the original specifications, and that was its Operational
Objective system which could only photograph a swath 28 miles wide
with a resolution of 28 to 30 inches. The A-12's Type-I P-E camera
could photograph a swath 72 miles wide with a nadir resolution of 12
to 18 inches and oblique resolution of 54 inches. Thus, the A-l2's
camera covered three times as much territory as the SR-71 's camera
and did so with better resolution. In addition. the A-12 could fly
2.000 to 5.000 feet hig:her than the SR-71 and was also faster, with a
maximum speed of M';ch 3.1 compared with the SR-71 's Mach 3.0.""
 
~ OSA Hisron. ch:1p. 20. p.
 
130 (TS Codeword); Minnich. --oXC.-\RT Story:· p. 30 (S).
 
,. OSA Hiswn: ch:1p. 20. pp. 130-133 (TS Cmkword): Minnich... OXCART Swry:· pp.
30-31 (5).
= Minni<:h. '"OXCART Story:· p. 31 (SJ: OS.\ Histon·. pp. 133-13-+ (TS Codeword).
 
Sec,et
 
Secret NOEQBN
 
Chapter 6
310
 
In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the
Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President
Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina­
tion of the OXCART program by I January l 968.
This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an
orderly phaseout of the A- l 2. This activity was known as Project
SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense
Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l 2s would gradually
be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of
January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7ls would as­
sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would
add responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by I December
1967. Until these capabilities were developed, OXCART was to re­
main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast
Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba. 67
All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con­
ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 3 l May
I967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia.
the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities.
Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders
began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue
was reopened.
The CIA contended that the A- l 2 was the better craft because it
flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main­
tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three
different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de­
tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef­
fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each
other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an
A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by
one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River.
The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre­
sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli­
gence organizations.
The results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro­
vided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I
camera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe­
rior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and
., Minnich. "OXCART Story," p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codi:word) .
 
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~eeFet PWFORN
 
Chapter 6
311
 
3,300-foot film supply. On the other hand, the SR-71 's infrared,
side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT/COMINT equipment provided
some unique intelligence not available from the A-12. Air Force plan­
ners admitted, however, that some of this equipment would have to be
sacrificed in order to provide the SR-71 with ECM gear. 68
Although the flyoff had not settled the question of which aircraft
was superior, the OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late
November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep both
fleets for the time being, particularly because the OXCART was actu­
ally flying missions over North Vietnam. With expenditures for the
Vietnam war rising steadily, the question of reducing the costs of
competing reconnaissance programs was bound to surface again. In
the spring of 1968, there was yet another study of the OXCART and
SR-71 programs. On 16 May 1968, the new Secretary of Defense,
Clark Clifford, reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the
OXCART program and store the aircraft. President Johnson con­
firmed this decision on 21 May."9
- - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possi­
ble date for phasing out all OXCART aircraft. Those A-12s already
at the Nevada site were placed in storage, and the aircraft on
Okinawa were scheduled to return by 8 June. Unfortunately, tragedy
struck before this redeployment took place. On 4 June 1968 during a
test flight from Kadena to check out a new engine, an A-12 disap­
peared 520 miles east of Manila. Search and rescue missions found
no trace of the plane or its pilot, Jack W. Weeks. Several days later
the remaining two A- l 2s left Okinawa to join the other eight
OXCART aircraft in storage at Palmdale, California. Because the
A-12s were smaller than either of the Air Force's versions, the only
parts that could be salvaged for Air Force use were the J58 engines.
The OXCART's outstanding Perkin-Elmer camera cannot be used in
the SR-71 because the two-seater Air Force aircraft has a smaller
camera compartment than that of the A-12. Constructed from one of
the most durable metals known to man but unable to fly for want of
engines, the OXCART aircraft are fated to remain inactive at
Palmdale for many, many years.
 
"" Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach.
""Minnich. .. OXCART Story," pp. 32-33 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 143-146 (TS
Codeword).
 
6eeret NOFOAN
 
Chapter 6
312
 
Initial storage arrangements for
A-12s at Palmdale
 
POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO lrHE OXCART
The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro­
duced for the CIA. although the Office of Special Activities did
briefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during
the mid- I960s. The first of these. known as Project ISINGLASS . was
prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its
Convair Division 's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-I I I fighter in
order to create an aircraft capable of Mach ~-5 at I 00,000 feet.
General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of 1964,
and OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would
still be vulnerable to existing Soviet ,countermeasures. In l 965 a more
ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration
as Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the work seems to have
come under the ISINGLASS designation as well). This proposal fea­
tured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52
mother ship and ultimately reach spe:eds as high as Mach 20 and alti­
tudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because building this aircraft would have
involved tremendous technical chall.enges and correspondingly high
costs, the Agency was not willing to embark on such a program at a
time when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted
from aircraft to satellites . As a resuilt. when the OXCART program
ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait­
ing in the wings-only the veteran U-2.
 
5iee,et
 
~asret PJOFORPd
 
Chapter 6
313
 
SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
fntended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was
strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product
contributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission.
By the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had
filled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft
of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever
• 11 y. 70
use d operatwna
The OXCART did not even outlast the U-2. the aircraft it was
supposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa­
bility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight. and
within a week it could deploy abroad. fly sorties. and return to home
base. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel
and emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems
needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers
had to be deployed in advance along an OXCART's flight route and
b_e _p.rovisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the J58 en­
gines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort ·or several
hundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a
third fewer personnel.
Although the OXCART program created a strategic reconnais­
sance aircraft with unprecedented speed, range. and altitude. the pro­
gram's most important contributions lay in other areas: aerodynamic
design, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic
countermeasures, pilot life-support systems, antiradar devices. use of
nonmetallic materials for major aircraft assemblies. and improve­
ments in milling, machining. and shaping titanium. In all of these ar­
eas, the OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology
and helped lay the foundation for future "stealth" research.
 
"'On 26 January 1967 Kelly Johnson noted in his "Archangel log":
I think buck to /959, beji,re we sturred this airplu11e, to disc11ssio11.1· with Dick !Jis.\'ell
where we seriously considered the problem of 11'/zerlzer there would he one more mum! of
aircraji be}<Jrl! the sute/lites took over. We jointly agreed there would be just one round.
and nor rwo. That seems ro huve heerz a 1·ery accurate evaluariim, as it seems rlrcll JO
SR-71 '.I· !(ive us erwugh overflight recormais.1·a11t·e capahi/iry and we dort 't need tlze adcfi­
tional IV Oxcart aircraft.
 
'-ee1el
 
..
.
 
.
.
 
.
 
.
 
See, el N01'0Afl1
 
: ·i· :.,..,., .:, ' .
.
 
Chapter 7
 
.•
 
. .
+
 
.
•
 
•
 
+
 
. .
. .. -: : ,.-··
 
Conclusion
 
U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man­
.agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over
the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very
long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develolP ef­
fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths.
Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers
planned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of
the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program
focused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence.
Once operations began, however, project managers found them­
selves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex­
pectations, the U-2 could not fl y undetected. Its overflights led to
Soviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not
wishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to
harm relations during more favorable intervals. President Eisenhower
placed strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one
and greatly limiting their number. Yet. the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf, he
valued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at
times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was
falling behind the Soviet Union militarily, fi rst in bombers and then in
missiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over­
fl ights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which
no overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity.
 
315
 
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 7
316
 
The low level of overflight activity did not prevent the U-2 from
accomplishing a lot in the four years it flew over the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. Twenty-four U-2 missions made deep penetra­
tion overflights of the Soviet Union: six by Detachment A from
Germany, three by Detachment C from the Far East and Alaska, and
15 by Detachment B from Turkey and Pakistan, including the unsuc­
cessful Powers mission.
The amount of information these missions gathered was impres­
sive. By the summer of 1960, the U-2 project had developed more
than 1, 285,000 feet of film-a strip almost 250 miles long. The U-2s
covered more than 1,300,000 square miles of the Soviet Union, ap­
proximately 15 percent of its total area. [nformation from U-2 photo­
graphs was used to prepare 5,425 separate photoanalytical reports. 1
Numbers alone cannot describe the importance of the U-2 over­
flight project. [n a 28 May 1960 memorandum, after Powers was shot
down, DCI Allen W. Dulles described the program's accomplish­
ments: '"Five years ago, before the beginning of the U-2 program, ...
half knowledge of the Soviet Union and uncertainty of its true power
position posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were
faced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or
of needlessly expending a great deal of money and effort on misdi­
rected military preparations of our own." Dulles went on to describe
the U-2's contribution in gathering information on four critical as­
pects of the Soviet Union's power position: its bomber force, its mis­
sile force, its atomic energy program, and its air defense system. 1
The first major contribution of intelligence collected from U-2
overflights was the exposure of the "bomber gap" as a myth. Contrary
to the US Air Force's claims, the Soviet Union was not building a
large force of long-range bombers. Armed with information from U-2
overflights, President Eisenhower was able to resist pressure to build a
large US bomber fleet to meet a nonexistent Soviet threat.
 
' DCI Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Statistics
Relating to the U-2 Program." 19 August 1960, Operation MUDLARK tiles, OSA re­
cords. job 74-8-605, box 2 (TS Codeword).
'The original draft of this document was probably written by James Q. Reber. It was then
revised by DCI Dulles. "Accomplishments of the U-2 Program," 27 May 1960. Operation
MUDLARK tiles, OSA records, job 74-B-605, box 2 (TS Codeword).
 
SeeFot
 
Secret ~OFORl<J
Chapter 7
 
317
 
The ·'bomber-gap" controversy was soon followed by a "mis­
sile-gap" controversy, provoked by an extensive Soviet propaganda
campaign that claimed a substantial Soviet lead in developing and
deploying ICBMs. U-2 missions searched huge stretches of the Soviet
Union along the rail network, looking for ICBMs deployed outside
the known missile testing facilities. These missions enabled the CIA
to conclude, as Dulles explained to Congress in May 1960, that "the
Soviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a crash program;
instead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at
achieving an early ICBM operational capability." 3 As with the
controversy over Soviet bomber strength, information from U-2
photography enabled President Eisenhower to resist pressure to ac­
celerate the US missile deployment program by building obsolescent
liquid-fueled missiles rather than waiting to complete the develop­
ment of more reliable solid-fueled missiles.
U-2 missions also gathered considerable data on the Soviet
Union's atomic energy program, including the production of fission­
able materials, weapons development and testing activities, and the
location and size of nuclear weapons stockpile sites. Such. U-2 pho­
tography also revealed no evidence that the Soviet Union had violated
the nuclear testing moratorium.
One of the greatest contributions of the U-2 program was to in­
crease the capabilities of the US deterrent force. Before the U-2 over­
flights, most target information was based on obsolete materials
dating back to World War II or shortly thereafter. With the assistance
of U-2 photography, the Defense Department could allocate weapons
and crews more efficiently and identify many new targets. U-2 photos
also proved invaluable in determining the precise location of targets.
One further contribution to the capabilities of the US deterrent force
was the information that U-2s collected on the Soviet air defense sys­
tem. U-2 photography located Soviet fighter airfields and gained in­
telligence on new fighter models. Special electronic intercept and
recording equipment carried on many U-2 missions enabled the CIA
to analyze the technical characteristics, operational techniques, and
radar order of battle of the Soviet Union's electronic defenses. This
information was vital both for planning the routes for US deterrent
forces and for developing electronic countermeasures.
 
' Ibid.. p. 3 (TS Codeword).
 
-Scc,er
 
See. et NOFORN
 
Chapter 7
318
 
The U-2 program not only provided information on individual
Soviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet
intentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in
May 1960:
 
Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of
a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether
the situation might get beyond control-that someone on the
other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war. ...
Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, result­
ing from the overflight program. has given us an ability to dis­
count or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have
been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetori­
cal than threatening and that our courses of action could be
carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet
interference. 4
Dulles closed his report on the U-2's accomplishments by put­
ting the program in perspective as part of the entire national intelli­
gence effort, noting that "in terms of reliability, of precision, of
access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has
been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and
of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been,
to put it simply. invaluable."
The impact of the U-2 overflights on international relations is
harder to measure. On the one hand, the intelligence they gathered
was a major factor in keeping the United States from beginning a
costly and destabilizing arms race in the late 1950s and early 1960s
by showing that the Soviet Union was not engaged in major buildups
of strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the
other hand, violations of Soviet airspace by U-2s strained relations
with Moscow at times and led to the collapse of the 1960 summit
meeting. On balance, however, the impact of the U-2 on superpower
relations was positive. Without the intelligence gathered by the U-2,
the Soviet Cnion's strategic military capabilities would have
remained a mystery, making it very difficult for the President to resist
pressure from the military, the Congress, and the public to carry out
major increases in strategic weapons, which would have poisoned
relations with the Soviet Union far more than the small number of
overflights did.
 
' Ibid.. pp. 9- IO (TS Codeword).
 
Seeret
 
Sec, el NOFORN
Chapter 7
 
319
 
PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM
From the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided
valuable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Pakistan
played a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India,
Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in
Asia. Two Allies-the United Kingdom and Nationalist China-made
an even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots
and conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958
and conducted two important overflights of the Soviet Union in late
1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the
need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew
only training or ferry missions, although their use for operational mis­
sions was considered on several occasions.
The end of overflights of the Soviet Union reduced the impor­
tance of British participation but resulted in the addition of a new
source of pilots when the focus of interest for the U-2 in its strategic­
intelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic of China.
The United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint
r~<;onnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the
mid- l 950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese
with the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12
years, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back
large quantities of information on the development of Communist
China's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such
information was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist
China paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2
program: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on
overflights), and another three were captured.
 
U-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
The low level of mission activity over the project's original target­
the Soviet Union-was initially very frustrating for CIA project man­
agers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned
for the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often
on hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelli­
gence during crisis situations.
Beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with sub­
sequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian
border fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US
 
-ieerct
 
Sec, el NOI-O"N
Chapter 7
320
 
involvement in fndochina, U-2 photography provided accurate and
up-to-date intelligence to US policymakers and tield commanders, as­
sisting them in crisis management and the planning of military opera­
tions. Agency U-2s also assisted in monitoring cease-fire agreements
in the Middle East, with operations occurring after an undeclared war
in 1970 and the 1973 Middle East war.
By the time the OXCART became fully operational, manned
strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union was no longer seriously
considered. The political risks were too high. especially since the
quality of intelligence from reconnaissance satellites was increasing
steadily. Thus, the OXCARTs only operational use was for collecting
tactical intelligence in the Far East. Like the U-2, the OXCART gath­
ered valuable intelligence during crisis situations. Thus. in January
1968. OXCART photography revealed the location of the USS Pueblo
and showed that the North Koreans were not preparing any
large-scale military activity in conjunction with the ship's seizure.
 
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY
One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance
program was the many advances in technology that it generated.
Thanks to simplified covert procurement arrangements and the lack
of detailed and restricting specifications, creative designers such as
Kelly Johnson produced state-of-the-art aircraft in record time. The
U-2, designed to carry out reconnaissance missions for two years at
best, proved so successful that, even after its original area of activity
became too dangerous for overflights at the end of four years, the air­
craft served the CIA well for another 14 years and still is in service
with other government agencies.
The OXCART is an even better example of the technological ad­
vances generated by the CIA's reconnaissance program. Although the
OXCART was designed almost 30 years ago and first flown in 1962.
its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to the use of new materials in aircraft construc­
tion. Unfortunately. the technological breakthroughs that made the
OXCART possible took longer than expected. By the time the aircraft
was ready for operations, the missions originally planned for it were
not practicable. The tremendous technological achievement repre­
sented by the OXCART ultimately led to the aircraft's demise by in­
spiring the Air Force to purchase its own version of the aircraft. The
See1et
 
Seeret NOFORN
 
Chapter 7
321
 
government could not afford to maintain two such similar reconnais­
sance programs. The elimination of the Agency's OXCART program
did not, however, spell the end of the usefulness of the world's most
advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR-71, is still in service.
In addition to the aircraft themselves, many other items associ­
ated with the reconnaissance program have represented important ad­
vances in technology. The flight suits and life-support systems of the
U-2 and OXCART pilots were the forerunners of the equipment used
in the space program. Camera resolution improved dramatically as the
result of cameras and lenses produced for the CIA's reconnaissance
program.
 
COOPERATION WITH THE AIR FORCE
In this history, which concentrates on the CIA's involvement in over­
head reconnaissance, it is easy to overlook the important role that the
US Air Force played in the U-2 and OXCART programs. From the
. v_ery beginnings of the U-2 program in 1954, the Agency and the Air
Force were partners in advancing the state of the art in overhead re­
connaissance. Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon­
naissance program, from project headquarters to the testing site and
field detachments. The Air Force supplied the U-2's engines, at times
diverting them from other high-priority production lines. Perhaps
most important of all, the Air Force provided pilots for the U-2s after
the Agency's original attempt to recruit a sufficient number of skilled
foreign pilots proved unsuccessful. Finally, the day-to-day operations
of the U-2s could not have been conducted without the help of Air
Force mission planners, weather forecasters, and support personnel in
the field detachments. The cooperation between the Agency and the
Air Force that began with the U-2 and continued with Project
OXCART remains a major feature in US reconnaissance programs
today.
 
IMPACT OF THE OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
PROGRAM ON THE CIA
CIA's entry into the world of overhead reconnaissance at the end of
1954 ultimately produced major changes in the Agency. Classical
forms of intelligence-the use of covert agents and clandestine
operations-gradually lost their primacy to the new scientific and
&ec,et
 
Seeret NOFOflN
 
Chapter 7
322
technical means of collection. As soon as the U-2 began flying over
the Soviet Union, its photographs became the most important source
of intelligence available. The flood of information that the U-2
missions gathered led to a major expansion of the Agency's
photointerpretation capabilities, which finally resulted in the creation
of the National Photographic Interpretation Center to serve the entire
intelligence community.
The U-2's tremendous success as an intelligence-gathering sys­
tem led the Agency to search for follow-on systems that could con­
tinue to obtain highly reliable information in large quantities. Thus,
the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced
aircraft-the OXCART-and also pioneered research into photo­
satellites. Less than a decade after the U-2 program began, the
Agency's new emphasis on technical means of collection had brought
about the creation of a new science-oriented directorate, which would
ultimately rival in manpower and budget the Agency's other three
directorates combined.
The negative aspect of this new emphasis on technology is
exploding costs. The Agency's first strategic reconnaissance aircraft,
the U-2, cost less than $1 million apiece. With the U-2's successor,
the OXCART, each aircraft cost more than $20 million, and the cost
explosion has continued with each new generation of reconnaissance
satellites.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the CIA's entry into the
world of overhead reconnaissance in December 1954 was the new na­
tional policy that it signaled. Although US military aircraft had fre­
quently violated Soviet airspace in the decade after World War II,
such shallow-penetration overflights, concentrating primarily on or­
der-of-battle data, had been authorized and controlled by US field
commanders, not by the President. In the autumn of 1954, however,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower-determined to avoid another Pearl
Harbor-authorized the construction of a new aircraft designed solely
to fly over the Soviet Union and gather strategic intelligence.
Peacetime reconnaissance flights over the territory of a potential en­
emy power thus became national policy. Moreover, to reduce the dan­
ger of conflict, the President entrusted this mission not to the armed
forces, but to a civilian agency-the CIA. From that time forward,
overhead reconnaissance has been one of the CIA's most important
missions.
SeePet
 
----
 
:·.,·
 
..
 
.•
 
11,soFet NOFORN
 
Appendix A
 
325
 
APPENDIX A
Acronyms
AEC
AFB
AFDAP
 
AMO
ARC
ARDC
ASPIC
ATIC
BSAP
BUORL
COMINT
COMIREX
COMOR
DB
DCI
DCID
DDCI
DOI
DDP
DDS&T
DPD
 
DPS
ECM
EG&G
ELINT
FCRC
 
HASP
IAC
IAS
IC
ICBM
IR
ISP
JRC
 
MATS
 
Atomic Energy Commission
Air Force Base
Air Force office symbol for the Assistant for
Development Planning under the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Development
Air/Maritime Division
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
Air Research and Development Command
(USAF)
Asian Photographic Interpretation Center
Air Technical Intelligence Center (USAF)
Boston Scientific Advisory Panel
Boston University Optical Research Laboratory
Communications Intelligence
Committee on Imagery Requirements and
Exploitation
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
"Dirty Bird"
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence Directive
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director (or Directorate) for Plans
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Development Projects Division
Development Projects Staff
Electronic Countermeasures
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Incorporated
Electronic Intelligence
Federally Controlled Research Center
High-Altitude Air Sampling Program
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Indicated air speed
Intelligence community
Intercontinental ballistic missile
Infrared
Intelligence Systems Panel (USAF)
Joint Reconnaissance Center
Military Air Transport Service (USAF)
See,et
 
6ee1 et NOFORN
Appendix A
 
326
 
MRBM
NACA
NAS
NASA
NIE
NPIC
NSA
NSC
NSCID
ODM
ORR
OSA
OSI
PBCFIA
P-E
PFIAB
PI
PIC
PID
PSAC
RAF
RFP
SAB
SAC
SAC
SA/PC/DCI
 
SAM
SEI
SENSINT
 
SLAR
TAS
TCP
USIB
 
WADC
WRSP
 
iearet
 
Medium-range ballistic missile
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Naval air station
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
National Intelligence Estimate
National Photographic Interpretation Center
National Security Agency
National Security Council
National Security Council Intelligence
Directive
Office of Defense Mobilization
Office of Research and Reports
Office of Special Activities
Office of Scientific Intelligence
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities
Perkin-Elmer Company
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board
Photointerpreter
Photographic Intelligence Center
Photo-Intelligence Division
President's Science Advisory Committee
Royal Air Force
Request for proposal
Scientific Advisory Board (USAF)
Science Advisory Committee
Strategic Air Command
Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and
Coordination
Surface-to-air missile
Scientific Engineering Institute
Sensitive intelligence (USAF)
Side-looking aerial radar
True air speed
Technological Capabilities Panel
United States Intelligence Board
Wright Air Development Command (USAF)
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional
 
Seeret NOFOAN
Appendix B
 
327
 
APPENDIX B
Key Personnel
 
AYER, Frederick, Jr.
Special assistant to Trevor Gardner in the Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force, Ayer was a strong advocate of overhead reconnaissance
by balloons and an early supporter of Lockheed's CL-282 design.
BAKER, James G.
Harvard astronomer and lens designer, Baker was a leading designer
of high-acuity aerial lenses during World War II and continued this
work after the war. He also headed the Air Force Intelligence Systems
Panel and served on the Technological Capabilities Panel's Project
Three committee that urged the development of the U-2 aircraft.
Baker designed the lenses for the U-2's cameras.
BISSELL, Richard M., Jr.
Head of all CIA overhead reconnaissance programs from 1954 until
1962, a former economics professor at MIT and high official of the
Marshall Plan, Bissell became Allen W. Dulles's Special Assistant for
Planning and Coordination in January 1954 and received responsibil­
ity for the new U-2 project at the end of that year. Later he also
headed the first photosatellite project and oversaw the development of
the OXCART. In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but
kept the reconnaissance projects under his control. He resigned from
the CIA in February 1962.
CABELL, George Pearre
Air Force general and DDCI from 1953 until 1962. Because of
Cabell's many years of experience in aerial reconnaissance, DCI
Dulles delegated most of the responsibility for the reconnaissance
projects to him.
CARTER, Marshall S.
Anny general who served as DDCI from 1962 until 1965. During the
period leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Carter served as Acting
DCI on a number of occasions while DCI McCone was out of town.
In October 1962 he fought unsuccessfully to keep the CIA involved in
flying reconnaissance missions over Cuba. Carter became the
Director of the National Security Agency in 1965.
CHARYK, Joseph R.
An aeronautical engineer who had followed careers first in academia
and then the aerospace industry, Charyk became the Chief Scientist of
-&ec,et
 
Sec,st NOFORPd
 
Appendix B
328
 
the Air Force in January 1959. Five months later he moved up to
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development,
and the following y~ar he became Under Secretary of the Air Force.
In these positions he was involved in coordination with the CIA on
both the U-2 and OXCART projects. In 1963 Charyk left government
to become the first chairman of the Communications Satellite
Corporation.
 
CUNNINGHAM, James A., Jr.
An ex-Marine Corps pilot, he became the administrative officer for
the U-2 project in April 1955. Cunningham handled the day-to-day
management of the U-2 program and brought only the more complex
problems to Richard Bissell's attention. Later he served as the Deputy
Director of the Office of Special Activities and then Special Assistant
to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.
DONOVAN, Allen F.
An aeronautical engineer who had helped to design the P-40 fighter
while working at the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Donovan was one
of the founders of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory after World
War IL He served on several Air Force advisory panels and was a
strong advocate of the proposed Lockheed CL-282 aircraft. Later he
became vice president of the Aerospace Corporation.
DOOLITTLE, James H.
A vice president of Shell Oil Company and an Army Air Force re­
serve general, Doolittle headed General Eisenhower's Air Staff dur­
ing World War II. After the war Doolittle served on many Air Force
advisory panels, and in 1954 he chaired a special panel investigating
the CIA's covert activities. Doolittle also served on the Technological
Capabilities Panel and the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities.
DUCKETT, Carl E.
Headed the Directorate of Science and Technology from September
1966 until May 1976, first as Acting Deputy Director and then as
Deputy Director beginning in April 1967. During his tenure, the em­
phasis in the CIA's overhead reconnaissance program shifted from
aircraft to satellites.
DULLES, Allen W.
DCI from 1953 until 196 l. Although initially reluctant to see the CIA
involved in aerial reconnaissance, which he viewed as the military's
area of responsibility, Dulles became a strong supporter of the U-2
Secret
 
~eeret NOF'ORN
Appendix B
 
329
 
program when he saw how much intelligence it could gather on the
Soviet Union. Because his own interests lay more in the area of hu­
man intelligence, he left the management of the reconnaissance pro­
gram in the hands of DDCI Cabell and project director Richard
Bissell.
 
GARDNER, Trevor
During World War II, Gardner worked on the Manhattan Project, and
later he headed the General Tire and Rubber Company before starting
his own research and development firm, the Hycon Company, which
built aerial cameras. Gardner served as the Secretary of the Air
Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development and then as
the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development during
Eisenhower's first term of office. Gardner's concern about the danger
of a surprise attack helped lead to the establishment of the
Technological Capabilities Panel. Gardner also urged the building of
Lockheed's CL-282 aircraft.
GEARY, Leo P.
Air Force colonel (later brigadier general) who was James
Cunningham's Air Force counterpart in the U-2 program. He was in­
strumental in diverting engines from other Air Force projects for use
in the U-2, and his 10 years with the U-2 project provided a high de­
gree of continuity.
GOODPASTER, Andrew J.
An Army colonel who served as President Eisenhower's Staff
Secretary from 1954 to 196 l. During this period, he was the CIA's
point of contact in the White House for arranging meetings with the
President on the subject of overhead reconnaissance. Goodpaster's
later career included service as the supreme commander of NATO and
then commandant of the US Military Academy at West Point.
HELMS, Richard M.
DCI from 1966 to 1973. During his tenure as DCI, the CIA's manned
reconnaissance program came under heavy pressure because of com­
petition from the Air Force's reconnaissance program.
JOHNSON, Clarence L. (Kelly)
One of the nation's foremost aeronautical designers, Kelly Johnson
graduated from the University of Michigan's School of Aeronautics
in 1933 and began working for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.
During World War U he designed the P-38 fighter, and after the war
his design successes continued with the F-104 jet fighter, the
Constellation airliner, and the CIA's two strategic reconnaissance air­
craft, the U-2 and the OXCART A-12.
Secaer
 
6ee1 et NOFORN
Appendix B
 
330
 
KIEFER, Eugene P.
An Air Force officer with a degree in aeronautical engineering who in
1953 informed a friend at Lockheed of the Air Force's search for a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, thus, leading to the initial de­
sign of the CL-282. After leaving the Air Force, Kiefer became
Richard Bissell's technical adviser for the OXCART and
photosatellite programs.
KILLIAN, James R., Jr.
President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Killian
headed a high-level and very secret study of the nation's ability to
withstand a surprise attack. While this project was still under way, he
and Edwin Land persuaded President Eisenhower to support the de­
velopment of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. Later,
Killian headed Eisenhower's Board of Consultants for Foreign
Intelligence Activities, served as his Cabinet-level science adviser,
and chaired the President's Science Advisory Board. Killian was also
chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board un­
der John F. Kennedy.
LAND, Edwin H.
An extremely talented inventor famous for the development of polar­
izing filters and the instant-film camera. Land also devoted consider­
able time and energy to voluntary government service. During World
War II, Land worked for the Radiation Laboratories, and after the war
he served on numerous Air Force advisory panels. As the head of the
Technological Capabilitites Panel's study group investigating US in­
telligence-gathering capabilities, Land became a strong advocate of
the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (the
CL-282) under civilian rather than Air Force control. Land and James
Killian persuaded President Eisenhower to approve the U-2 project
and later the first photosatellite project. Land also served on the
President's Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities.
 
LEGHORN, Richard S.
An MIT graduate in physics, Leghorn joined the Army Air Force in
I 942 and went to work for reconnaissance expert Col. George
Goddard. By the time of the invasion of Europe, Leghorn was chief of
reconnaissance for the 9th Tactical Air Force. After the war, Leghorn
began preaching the need for "pre-D-day" reconnaissance in order to
gather intelligence on the Soviet Bloc. He returned to the Air Force
during the Korean war and later worked for Harold Stassen 's
Disarmament Office. In 1956 he became the head of the Scientific
 
Secaet
 
~eerct NOFORN
Appendix B
 
331
 
Engineering Institute, an Agency proprietary working on ways to re­
duce the U-2's vulnerability to radar detection. In 1957 he founded
Itek Corporation.
 
LUNDAHL, Arthur E.
A Navy photointerpreter during World War II and afterward. Lundahl
became the chief of the Photo-Intelligence Division in I 953. To sup­
port the U-2 project, he established a separate photointerpretation
center under Project HTAUTOMAT. Under his leadership the Photo­
Intelligence Division grew rapidly and achieved office status as the
Photographic Intelligence Center in 1958. In 1961 Lundahl became
the first head of the National Photograhic Interpretation Center, which
combined the photointerpretation efforts of the CIA and the military
services.
McCONE, John A.
DCI from 1961 to 1965. A strong supporter of the CIA's manned re­
connaissance program, McCone presided over the OXCART's main
period of development and pushed for a greater role for the CIA in its
joint reconnaissance programs with the Department of Defense.
MILLER, Herbert I.
Miller worked in the Office of Scientific Intelligence's nuclear branch
and became Richard Bissell's first deputy for the U-2 project. He later
left the Agency to work for the Scientific Engineering Institute.
NORTON, Garrison
An assistant to Trevor Gardner, Norton became an early supporter of
the Lockheed CL-282 and started the CIA's interest in overhead re­
connaissance by informing Philip Strong about the aircraft. Norton
later became Navy Assistant Secretary for Research and Development
and was involved with the OXCART program.
OVERHAGE, Carl F. J.
After working on the development of Technicolor, Overhage went to
work for Kodak. He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later
became director of Lincoln Laboratories.
PARANGOSKY, John N.
Parangosky worked for Richard Bissell's Development Projects Staff
in the mid- I 950s. He served as deputy chief of the Adana U-2 unit in
1959 and became project manager of the OXCART program from its
inception through the test flight stage.
 
6ec:et
 
Sec,et NOFOAN
Appendix B
 
332
 
PERKIN, Richard S.
President of the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Perkin was a close friend
of James Baker and was also a member of several advisory panels,
including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what
cameras to use in the first U-2 aircraft.
POWERS, Francis Gary
An Air Force Reserve Officer who became a CIA U-2 pilot in 1956,
Powers flew 27 successful missions before being shot down over the
Soviet Union on l May 1960. After his return to the United States in
exchange for Soviet spymaster Rudolf Abel in 1962, Powers was
cleared of all allegations of misconduct in his mission, capture, trial,
and captivity. He became a test pilot for Lockheed and later piloted
light aircraft and helicopters for radio and television stations. He died
in a helicopter crash on l August 1977.
PURCELL, Edward M.
A physicist who won a Nobel prize in 1954 for his work in nuclear
resonance, Purcell served on a number of advisory bodies, including
the USAF Scientific Advisory Committee and Edwin Land's
Technological Capabilities Panel study group. It was Purcell's ideas
for reducing the radar cross section of the U-2 that led to the
OXCART program. Purcell also contributed to the satellite pro­
grams.
RABORN, William F., Jr.
DCI from 1965 to 1966, Raborn pushed for the deployment of
OXCART to the Far East but failed to sway the top officials of the
Johnson administration.
REBER, James Q.
After serving as the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination
in the early 1950s, Reber became the chairman of the Ad Hoc
Requirements Committee in 1955 and continued to chair this commit­
tee after it was taken over by the US Intelligence Board in 1960 and
renamed the Committee on Overhead Requirements. In 1969 he be­
came the chairman of the USIB's SIGINT Committee.
RODGERS, Franklin A.
r
Formerly of MIT, Rodgers was the chief engineer at the Scientific
Engineering Institute who converted the theories of Edward Purcell
into practical systems to reduce the radar image of the U-2 and espe­
cially the OXCART.
Gs&ra1i
 
See1 et NOFOAN
 
Appendix 8
 
333
 
SCHLESINGER, James R.
DCI from February to July 1973, Schlesinger supported the Nixon ad­
ministration's proposal to terminate the Agency's U-2 program.
SCOTT, Roderic M.
An engineer with Perkin-Elmer who worked with James Baker in de­
signing the first cameras for use in the U-2. Scott helped design the
30001 camera for the OXCART.
SCOVILLE, Herbert, Jr.
In February 1962 Scoville became the first Deputy Director for
Research, which took over control of the Agency's reconnaissance
programs from the Deputy Director for Plans. Frustrated by the lack
of support from the DCI and the other directorates, he resigned in
June 1963.
SEABERG, John
An aeronautical engineer who was recalled to active duty with the Air
Force during the Korean war, Seaberg drafted the first specifications
fo~ _a high-flying jet reconnaissance aircraft in 1953.
STEVER, H. Guyford
A professor of aeronautical engineering at MIT, Stever served on nu­
merous Air Force advisory panels and later became the Air Force's
chief scientist.
STRONG, Philip G.
Chief of collection in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Strong kept
himself well informed on developments in overhead reconnaissance
and attended many Air Force advisory panel meetings as an observer.
In 1954 he learned about the Lockheed CL-282 design and passed the
information on to Edwin Land's study group investigating US intelli­
gence-gathering capabilities.
WHEELON, Albert ("Bud") D.
, Wheelon became the Deputy Director for Science and Technology in
August 1963 following the reorganization and renaming of the
Deputy Director for Research. He held this position until September
1966.
 
5ee1et
 
Sec, et NOfiOF\l'fJ
Appendix C
 
335
 
APPENDIX C
Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2
From the beginning the U-2 was envisioned as more than a camera
platform. In fact, the U-2 would ultimately carry only five types of
photographic equipment but more than 20 different types of electronic
devices, some for collecting electronic intelligence (ELINT), others
("ferret" equipment) for gathering intelligence on foreign radars, and
a few for self-protection--electronic countermeasures to defeat en­
emy missile-control radars.
The various electronic, countermeasures and intelligence-gather­
ing systems designed for the U-2 received designations using Roman
numerals-Systems I through XXII. The first seven devices were
built by the Ramo-Wooldridge firm, now part of the TRW
Corporation. System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect
ground-controlled intercept and air defense signals. Weighing only
7. 7 kilograms, this system was aboard all U-2s from I 955 through
1959. System-IL a communications and navigation system. never
worked properly and was canceled. System-III. a 16-kilogram VHF
recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used
and was transferred to the Navy in 1958. System-IV, a ferret device
that recorded electromagnetic energy in the 150- to 4,000-MHz range
was used on 16 missions between 1957 and 1959, when it was given
to the Air Force. System-V was similar to System-I but covered nine
wave bands. The device was so heav·y that U-2s using it could not
carry a camera system. System-V was used on only three missions
and was replaced by the lighter weight System-VI that covered the P-,
L-, S-, and X-band frequencies and could be used with either the A or
B camera. System-VI was used from 1959 through 1966.
The growing need for data on Soviet missile development led to
a contract with the firm of Haller-Raymond-Brown (HRB) to build a
missile-telemetry intercept system as quickly as possible. The result­
ing device (System-VII) could record up to 12 minutes of data from
six simultaneous frequencies. This unit first saw service on 9 June
1959 and was used on another 22 missions during the next year.
Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the
Navy, the designation was changed to System-VIII.
System-IX was an electronic-countermeasures (ECM) device for
generating false-angle information in response to X-band radar pulses
from surface-to-air missile radars. Also known as the Mark-30. the
 
See,et
 
eeeret PmFOAN
Appendix C
336
 
unit was manufactured by the Granger Company. One of these de­
vices was aboard Gary Powers' U-2 when he was shot down.
System-X was a modification of the HRB's System-VII that was
specially built in 1962 for a mission over the Soviet Union that never
took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM devices used by U-2s
overflying China and North Vietnam during the Vietnam war.
System-XVI was a passive ELINT collector.
System-XVII was built by HRB-Singer as a result of an October
l 963 USIB requirement for the collection of antiballistic-missile
(ABM) data from Saryshagan. The system was to be deployed in a
U-2 that would fly over western China, along the Sino-Soviet border,
collecting data on the ABMs being tested at Saryshagan. By the time
the unit was completed in l 965, however, the tipoff time before test
launches had been reduced from almost 24 hours to less than an hour,
making it impossible to stage U-2 missions in time to collect the data.
In the late l 960s, additional ECM systems were needed to coun­
ter the increasing threats posed by more accurate SAMs and higher
flying aircraft. System-XX was specifically designed to counter the
acquisition and guidance radars used by MIG aircraft, and
System-XXII was an infrared jammer to counter air-to-air missiles.
System-XXI, a COMINT package that replaced the much older
System-III, was originally developed for the OXCART program and
was later adapted for use aboard the follow-on U-2, the U-2R.
 
--Seeret
 
See, et NOFORN
 
Appendix D
 
337
 
APPENDIX D
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union,
4 July 1954-1 May 1960
 
Date
 
Mission
 
Pilot
 
Airfield
 
Unit
 
Payload Route
 
4 July 1956
 
2013
 
Stockman
 
Wiesbaden
 
A
 
A-2
 
East Germany, Poland, Minsk,
Leningrad, Estonia, Latvia, Poland
 
5 July 1956
 
2014
 
Vito
 
Wiesbaden
 
A
 
A-2
 
East Germany, Warsaw, Minsk,
Moscow, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland
 
9 July 1956
 
2020
 
Knutson
 
Wiesbaden
 
A
 
A-2
 
East Germany, Poland, Minsk,
Poland
 
9 July 1956
 
2021
 
Overstreet
 
Wiesbaden
 
A
 
A-2
 
Czechoslovakia, Vienna, Hungary,
L'vov, Kiev, Minsk, Poland
 
• 10-July 1956
 
2024
 
Dunaway
 
Wiesbaden
 
A
 
A-2
 
Poland, Kishinev, Kerch•.
Sevastopol', Simferopol'. Odessa.
Romania. Hungary
 
20 November 1956 4016
 
Powers
 
Adana
 
B
 
A-2
 
Iran, Yerevan, Baku. Astara,
Caucasus
 
18 March 1957
 
4020
 
Cherbonneaux
 
Adana
 
B
 
Sys-V
 
Soviet border to Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia
 
20 June 1957
 
6005
 
Rand
 
Eielson
 
C
 
B
 
Khaylyulya. Ust'-Kamchatsk,
Kozyrevsk, Karaganskiy-Ostrov
 
5 August 1957
 
4035
 
Edens
 
Lahore
 
B
 
B
 
Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam,
Kazalinsk, Aral Sea
 
11 August 1957
 
4039
 
McMurray
 
Lahore
 
B
 
B
 
Alma-Ata. Ust' -Kamenogorsk,
Sinkiang
 
21 August 1957
 
4045
 
Snider
 
Lahore
 
B
 
A-2
 
Novokuznetsk, Tomsk
 
21 August 1957
 
4048
 
Jones
 
Lahore
 
B
 
A-2
 
Lake Balkhash, Karaganda, Omsk.
Alma-Ata
 
Saa,et
 
Secret NOFOAN
Appendix D
338
 
APPENDIX D
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union,
4 July 1954-1 May 1960 (continued)
 
Date
 
Mission
 
Pilot
 
Airfield
 
Unit
 
Payload Route
 
22 August l 957
 
4049
 
Birkhead
 
Lahore
 
B
 
A-2
 
Merket Bazar, Kuldja, Abakan,
Krasnoyarsk, Kansk, Sinkiang
 
22 August l 957
 
4050
 
Cherbonneaux:
 
Lahore
 
B
 
A-2
 
Lake Balkhash, Semipalatinsk,
Barnaul, Prokop'yevsk,
Novokuznetsk, Leninogorsk
 
28 August 1957
 
4058
 
Jones
 
Lahore
 
B
 
A-2
 
Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam,
Kazalinsk, Aral Sea
 
10 September 1957 4059
 
Hall
 
Adana
 
B
 
A-2
 
Krasnovodsk, Gur'yev,
Astrakhan', Tbilisi
 
16 September 1957 6008
 
Baker
 
Eielson
 
C
 
A-2
 
Kamchatka Peninsula, Milkovo
 
13 October 1957
 
2040
 
Stockman
 
Giebelstadt
 
A
 
A-2
 
Norway, Finland, Murmansk,
Kandalaksha
 
I March 1958
 
601 l
 
Crull
 
Atsugi
 
C
 
A-2
 
Dal' nerechensk, Khabarovsk,
Blagoveshchensk, Belagorsk,
Komsomolsk, Sovetskaya Gavan'
 
9 July 1959
 
4125
 
Knutson
 
Peshawar
 
B
 
B
 
Tyuratam for suspected Sputnik
launch
 
6 December 1959
 
8005
 
Robinson•
 
Peshawar
 
B
 
B
 
Kuybyshev, Kapustin Yar,
Caucasus
 
5 February l 960
 
8009
 
MacArthur•
 
Peshawar
 
B
 
B
 
Tyuratam, Kazan
 
9 April 1960
 
4155
 
Erickson
 
Peshawar
 
B
 
B
 
Lake Balkhash, Semipalatinsk,
Kyzylespe, Dzhezhkazgan,
Tyuratarn
 
I May 1960
 
4154
 
Powers
 
Peshawar
 
B
 
B
 
Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk;
downed by SAM
 
a RAF pilot
 
Sec1 et
 
Secret NOFORNAppendix E
339
 
APPENDIX E
Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects
 
AQUILINE
In the early l 960s, there were many problems in obtaining coverage
of hostile territory. The U-2 was too vulnerable to Soviet sur­
face-to-air missiles, as had been demonstrated by losses over the
Soviet Union, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China. The
OXCART was still under development and even when completed
might prove vulnerable to Soviet radars and missiles. Although safe
from interception, the newly developed photosatellites could not pro­
vide coverage of a desired target on short notice. Because several of
the intelligence community's primary targets such as Cuba and the
new Soviet radar installation at Tallinn (Estonia) were not located
deep in hostile territory, CIA scientists and engineers began to con­
sider the possibility of using small, unmanned aircraft for aerial
reconnaissance. They believed that recent advances in the minia­
turization of electronic technology would make possible the
development of a reconnaissance vehicle with a very-low-radar cross
section and small visual and acoustical signatures. Such a vehicle
could reconnoiter an area of interest without the hostile country real­
izing that it had been overflown.
In mid-1965, David L. Christ, chief of the Office of Research
and Development's Applied Physics Division, and Frank Briglia of
the same office began working on the concept of a small, inexpensive
aircraft that would be about the size of a large bird and could carry
various payloads for photography, nuclear sensing, and ELINT collec­
tion. ORD soon formed a Special Projects Group to develop the air­
craft with Briglia as the project manager. Only one firm-the Douglas
Aircraft Company-responded favorably to a request for proposal
to study the feasibility of a low-altitude reconnaissance system. On
15 November 1965, Douglas received a study contract. This was
followed by two Agency contracts on 21 November 1966 for the
development of an operational low-altitude intelligence-gathering
system. Further contracts followed in 1968 and 1969.
The AQUILINE prototype developed by Douglas Aircraft
(which became part of McDonnell-Douglas in 1969 as the result of a
merger) was essentially a powered glider with an 8.5-foot wingspan.
The aircraft weighed only 105 pounds. AQUILINE's tail-mounted en­
gine drove a two-bladed propeller. Powered by a small 3.5-horse­
power two-cycle engine originally developed by the McCullough
5-eeret
 
Secret ~OFORl'J
 
Appendix E
340
 
Project AQUILINE
 
Corporation for chainsaws. the aircraft's designed speed was 60 knots
at an altitude of 1.000 feet with a 15-pound payload. The air•::raft
could fly at this speed for up to 30 hours, thanks to the engine's ex­
tremely high fuel efficiency: 480 nautical miles per gallon of fuel.
In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on
the US Navy's Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake,
California, showed that the aircraft was extremely difficult to see:. To
assist pilots of chase aircraft in keeping AQUILINE in sight, its entire
upper surface was painted bright orange: even so. sighting remained
difficult.
The 1esting process was very hard on AQU ILINE because it was
recovered by flying it into a net close to the ground. which almos:t al­
ways caused some damage to the wings or propeller. As a result, one
 
Secret
 
Sectet NOfORN
 
Appendix E
341
 
or more of the aircraft was always being repaired, and eventually
three of the five AQUILINE prototypes were destroyed in testing.
Although AQUILINE's visual and accoustic signatures were
very small, its radar cross section continued to cause problems. The
radar cross section at low frequencies was less than one-tenth of a
square meter, giving it a radar signature smaller than that of an eagle,
but there were flares in the VHF region that increased the likelihood
of detection.
Studies indicated that the radar cross section problems could
eventually be reduced to acceptable levels, but the greatest weakness
of the AQUILINE project was its navigational system. AQUILINE
did not have a programmable autopilot; it had to be flown by remote
control from the ground. Once the aircraft flew over the horizon. all
navigational commands had to be relayed to it by high-flying aircraft.
A DC-6 loitering at 25,000 feet would give AQUILINE a range of
250 nautical miles: use of a U-2 at 70,000 feet could increase this to
350 nautical miles.
- -Such a range was suitable for the targets originally conceived for
AQUILINE, but the need for intelligence on targets located much
dee er in the Soviet Union and the Peo le's Re ublic of China
 
and the development time and costs for
AQUILINE began to soar. By l971 ORD had spent six years and $33
million on AQUILINE but still had many important problems to re­
solve.
 
~~~~~-c---~
 
At this point the project was turned over to the Office of Special
Activities for operational testing at Area 51 in Nevada. Flight tests
showed the aircraft to be successful by the standards originally set for
the project in l 967, as it flew l 30 miles and obtained very high reso­
lution photography of a target before returning successfully to the
original launchsite. However, improving AQUILINE sufficiently to
make it a practical long-range reconnaissance system was estimated
to cost another $35 million and take two to three years. On the recom­
mendation of DDS&T Carl Duckett on I November l 971, Project
AQUILINE was canceled. The project's aircraft and equipment were
eventually transferred to the US Army for use in a battlefield manage­
ment system known as AQUILA, which has yet to be deployed be­
cause of continuing developmental problems.
 
Sec.et
 
Gee,et AIO~ORN
 
Appendix E
342
 
Project AXILLARY
 
AXILLARY
While Project AQU ILINE was still under development, its chief aero­
dynamicist, Charles N. Adkins, left the program because he believed
that its escalating costs wou ld prev,ent it from ever producing a de­
ployable aircraft. He wanted to build a small. inexpensive re­
mote-controlled aircraft to test a low-cost lightweight autopilot
currently being developed by ·oRD. Under a $5,000 time-and-materi­
als contract with Melpar. Incorporatt:d. Adkins hired a local model
aircraft builder to assemble and modify a standard Hawk-750 glider
kit and power it with a rear-mounted engine and pusher propeller.
Following a series of successful test flights. Adkins installed a small
camera and took a number of aerial photographs.
By this time the effort to build a "Miniature Multi-Purpose
Airborne Vehicle" had become known as Project AXILLARY.
Melpar, Inc., received a second contract for $50,000 to install ORD's
autopilot in the aircraft. and the projject managers now began search­
ing for a use for their vehicle. The two main possibilites were ( I) as a
short-range reconnaissance veh icle for use in a peace-monitoring or
intelligence-gathering system and (2) as a short-range warhead deliv­
ery system. In 197 1 the Office of Special Activities evaluated
AXILLARY flight-testing and determined that the small model air­
craft was not suitable for use as a covert reconnaissance vehicle be­
cause of its large radar cross secition and significant accoustical
signature. The aircraft's radar signature made it potentially useful as a
weapons systems, however. ORD suggested that AXILLARY be
equipped with a radar-homing unitE
which would
make it an inexpensive means for .----;---.--..- - -~ - ~ - - -..JJ
surface-to-air missile systems in North Vietnam. T he Director of
 
S98FCt NOfOF\N
 
Appendix E
343
 
Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and
provided DOD funding for ORD to develop two versions of
AXILLARY, one with a radar-homer and one with a television recon­
naissance package. The radar homing system proved successful as
AXILLARY sought out and destroyed a radar during testing at China
Lake Naval Air Station. However, the end of US involvement in
Vietnam in early 1973 led to the cancellation of further DOD funding,
and AXILLARY was placed on the shelf. Melpar, Inc., continued to
work on the radar-homing version and eventually sold some
AXILLARY-type aircraft to [srael, which used them to destroy Syrian
radars in Lebanon in 1982.
 
PINE RIDGE
While work was still in progress on low-altitude, short-range recon­
naissance systems like AQUILINE and AXILLARY, CIA scientists
and engineers were also working on a high-altitude recoverable un­
manned reconnaissance vehicle with an extremely-low-radar cross
section that would enable it to fly undetected over hostile territory.
During the 1960s there had been a study conducted by the Teledyne
Ryan Aeronautical Company of San Diego on the construction of an
.unaetectable drone known as SANDY HOOK. This 44-foot long
drone would operate at 120,000 feet at Mach 0.9, with a range of
5,000 nautical miles. Its radar cross section 07zwould be 0.0 I square
meters. Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop­
ment; projected high costs and substantial technical risks led to its
cancellation in December I 969.
Some of the concepts in SANDY HOOK were carried over into a
new project known as PINE RIDGE, which was a proposal for an un­
manned reconnaissance vehicle with an even lower radar cross sec­
tion (0.001 square meter). Research on SANDY HOOK had indicated
that a radar cross section this low was attainable and would prevent
detection and tracking by existing radar defense systems. The PINE
RIDGE proposal called for a delta-shaped vehicle, approximately
17 feet long with a 21-foot wingspan. Two vertical stabilizers would
give the vehicle an overall height of three to four feet. An existing
Teledyne J- lO0-CA-100 Turbojet engine could have been used to
power the vehicle at Mach 0.9 at the operating altitude of 65,000 to
75,000 feet. Range was estimated at 3,300 nautical miles.
Despite interest within the CIA and the Air Force for an unde­
tectable reconnaissance vehicle, PINE RIDGE was never funded. In
January 1971 high-level representatives from DOD and CIA rejected
a proposal for a feasibility study to be conducted by Ryan Aircraft.
~eeret
 
See, et NOfORN
Appendix E
 
344
 
The following year, the Director of the Office of Special Activities,
Brig. Gen. Harold F. Knowles, wrote a memorandum to the DCI pro­
posing that the ClA develop a clandestine low-radar-cross-section
vehicle like PINE RIDGE. but this proposal also failed to attract sup­
port. With all the improvements in satellite reconnaissance that had
taken place during the previous decade, neither CIA nor the Air Force
was willing to invest substantial funding in a project to send aircraft.
manned or unmanned, over the .Soviiet Union.
 
• 3~~ .
 
.\_· elewL ~ •.
 
SeeFet NOFOAN
 
Bibliography
347
 
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~eeret
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Bibliography
 
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~ - - - -_ ___J
 
"Red Air Force: The World's Biggest." New.rn·eek, 23 August 1954,
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Richelson, Jeffrey. American Espionage and the Soviet Target. New
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ieeFet
 
Seeret PWFQR~
 
Bibliography
 
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Secret PJOFORl:iJ
Bibliography
 
352
Witze, Claude. "Russians Outpacing US in Air Quality, Twining
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-&ec,er
 
iearet NOFORN
Bibliography
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Secret Codeword).
 
&ea,at
 
: . ·.
 
.•.
'
 
..
 
Seeret NOFORN
Index
 
355
 
A
 
Afghanistan
126. 170. 176. 189
afterburner plume
271
ailerons
47, 69
Air Research and
Development Command
 
A-I camera
50
A-2 aircraft
262-263
A-2 camera
53, 77. 100, 104-105. 108
A-3 aircraft
263
A-II
268. 294
A-12
271, 273-274, 277-278. 28 I,
283-286. 289-292. 294-297, 299.
302-305. 307-311, 329
Abel. Rudolf
183, 332
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
81. 114, 188-189, 332
Adana. Turkey
113
Ade11auer. Konrad
101
Adkins. Charles N.
342
Administration (East) Building
42
advanced antiballistic-missile (ABM)
139
aerial cameras
13, 31. 49. 329
aerial lenses
327
aerial photography
3. 13, 33. 49, 96, 119
aerial tankers
313
aerodynamic lift
248. 277
 
aerodynamic structural tests
274
aerodynamicist
342
Aerospace Corporation
328
 
5. 8
Air Staff for Intelligence
154
Air Weather Service
89. 94
air-cooled reactor
239
air-inlet system
291
air-to-air missiles
285,336
air-traffic controllers
72-73. 289
Air/Maritime Division (AMO)
73
aircraft carrier
145, 247, 250
airfields
82, 95-96, 105. 117. 153. 216,
221,226,317
airframe
5, 8. 10. 24, 26. 48. 56, 71,
105. 132-133, 248. 259. 274, 279.
286. 289
airframe contractors
259
airspace
3-4, 19. 127. 134. 142. 144-147.
152-153. 182. 231. 239,241,
303. 306. 318. 322
airspeed
 
I
 
6& 16 I gg
 
?35 .,.,
 
Alaska
133-134. 145. 316
 
Sec,et""
 
iieeret NOFOAN
Index
 
356
Albania
140, 157
Albuquerque, New Mexico
74, 78-79
Allen, Edward L.
21
Almaza Airbase, Egypt
119
altimeters
59-60
altitude
I, 4-6, 7, 8-11, 12, 13-19, 22-26,
33-35, 39, 46-47, 49, 52, 54-55, 59,
61-64, 71-72, 74, 76, 79-80, 84, 87,
89. 93-94, 97, 101, 108, 125, 132,
142, 145, 148-149, 152, 156-157, 168,
175-179, 185,207, 217-219, 229. 235,
240-241, 246-247, 251, 254, 259-260,
262, 263, 267, 268, 273, 277, 278-279,
284,286,288,292,294, 296-297, 304,
312-313, 320, 330, 339, 340, 343
aluminum
271
Ambon Island
214
American Civil War
I
Amory, Robert
114
Anderson, Rudolph
210
Andaya, Norway
172
"Angel",
45, 50, 66,262
Anglo-French bombing campaign
117
Anglo-Soviet relations
94
Ankara, Turkey
135, 178
antiaircraft missile
168
antiaircraft weapons
93, 148
antiballistic missile system
298,303
antiradar studies
267,274
 
Seeret
 
Apollo VII
254
Applied Physics Division
339
AQUATONE
40-43, 59. 62, 66, 74, 77, 82, 88,
93, 96, 100, 108, 113, 115,
122, 134, 155
AQUILA
341
AQUILINE
304, 339-343
Arabs
256
Aral Sea
135
Arbenz, Jacobo
16
"Archangel-I"
262
"Archangel-2"
262
Area 51,
56. 72. 74-75, 77-78, 130-131,
133. 274, 283-284, 286, 291.
303, 305. 341
Arizona
80
Arkansas
78
Armenia
124. 144. 146
arms limitation negotiations
147
arms race
318
Army Air Corps
21. 56
Army Air Force
50,328,330
article 121
286, 288
article 126
296
article 133
296
article 341
66. 71, 131-132
 
See1et NOF8RN
 
Index
 
357
 
article 345A
79
article 346
80
article 347
104
article 349
219
article 354
80
article 357
80
article 360
175,217
article number
59
articles
20, 59, 99,216
Ashford, Douglas E.
30
Asia
135, 190,198,211,216,221,
230,233, 300-301, 310,319
Asian Photographic Interpretation
229
aspheric lens
53
ASPIC
229
Aswan Dam
112
atmosphere
278, 25, 152, 182,215
atmospheric testing
147
atomic bomb
19
Atomic Energy Commission
56, 133, 182, 241-242, 274
atomic energy facilities
233
ATR (Air Transport Rating)
187
Atsugi, Japan
134, 215, 218
autopilot
76, 341-342
Aviation Week
216
 
AXILLARY
342
Ayer, Frederick, Jr.
14-15, 36,327
 
B
B model camera
53
B-17 bomber
222
B-26 bomber
214
B-36 bomber
22, 50
B-47 bomber
72
B-52 bomber
20, 111, 291, 3 12
B-57 bomber
5, 8-9, 13, 15, 24, 35, 72
B-58 bomber
262, 269-270, 273
B-58 "Hustler" bomber
262
B-58A bomber
269
B-588 "Super Hustler"
262
B-58B bomber
263. 269
B-70 bomber
279. 293
BACKFIN
167
"badlands"
71
Baikal, Lake
128
Baird. Walter
56
Baird Associates
56
Baker, James G.
18, 21-25, 29-31. 46, 50-56,
108,253,282.327, 332-333
Balkhash, Lake
138, 139
ballistic missiles
2,201,206,299,318
 
Saeret
 
&ee,et NQFQRN
 
Index
358
 
Baltic Sea
 
3, 303
Baltic states
104
Baltimore; Maryland
6, 9
 
Barents Sea
140, 142, 172
Bamesi~rcv
barrel roll,.._
s_ _ __,
76
Batlin, Alex
66
Bay of Bengal
231
Bay of Pigs
191. 197-199, 205
Baykonur. Soviet Union
137
Beacon Hill
17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.!
BEACON HILL Report
17. 19. 21. 24
BEACON HILL Study Group
18, 21
Beechcraft
56. 187
Beerli. Stanley W.
I 9'.?. 196
Beijing, China (see Peiping. China)
228-229
Bell Aircraft Corporation
9
Bell Laboratories
18
Bell Telephone Laboratories
29
" bends"
 
64
Bennington. Herbert
309
Benton, William
 
299
Berezovskiy. Soviet Union
138
Berlin, Gennany
16. 20. 127, 147, 162. 183. 196
Berlin crisis
147, 196
 
BGMARQUE
222
bhangmeter
240
BIRDWATCHER
235
Bison bomber
20-21. 27, 31, 98. 105. 111
Bissell. Richard M .. Jr.
15- 16. 30. 39-41. -B-44. 56. 59.
61. 66, 69-70. n, 74, 78, 81-82. 89,
93, 95. 100-101. 104-106, 109- 110,
121-122. 124. 127-128. 135. 139. 148..
154-1 57. 162. 168. 170. 172. 174, 178-179.
187. 19 1- 192. 196. 214. 216. 224, 259-260,
262-263. 267. 277-278. 283. 285, 286-287.
289, 295. 327. 328-329, 330-331
Bissell's Narrow-Gauge Airline
72
"black books"
188
"black" contracts
285
BL ACK KNIGHT
126. 134
Black Sea
85. 126. 133. 1-1-l. 153
BLACK SHIELD
301
Blip/Scan Racio
267-268
BLUE BOOK
72-73
Board of Inquiry
184
Bodo AFB. Norway
142. 172. 176- 177
Boeing RB-47
3
Boeing KC-1 35
71
bomb damage
49
bomber
2-3. 5. 20-23. 26. 31. so, 66, 98, 105.
109. 111. 140. 167, 214. 262-263.
269. 279, 293. 316-317
Bomber Gap
31.111.316
 
&eeret NOFe"N
 
Index
 
359
borax
121
Boston, M assachusetts
 
13. IS. 22. 24, 27. 52. 56.
110. 260
Boston camera
 
Burke. William
168 120 114
 
Byeloruss1a
 
104. 106
 
13
Boston University
 
22. 24. 52
Bowles. Chester
 
225
Brahmaputra Valky
 
231
bridges
 
82
Briggs School
 
42
Briglia. FrJnk
 
339
British and French fleets
 
116
British Guiana
 
211
British Guiana-Venezuela border
 
211
Bri tish overflight of the Soviet Union
 
. . . • 23-24. I€H
British Parliament
 
94. 232
British radar network
 
9-1
Brugioni. Dino
 
135. 137
Budapest. Hungary
 
123
Budget. Bureau of the
 
267. 308-310
Budget. Direcwr of the
 
40
Buffalo. New York
 
9. 63
Bulganin. Nikolai
94, 120
Bulgaria
 
10 1. 124- 125. 1-W
Bundy. McGeorge
 
188. 201. 205. 209. 236. 293
BUORL
 
22
Burbank. California
 
45
 
c _ _ _________
C model camera
 
54
C- 118 aircra ft
 
144
C-1 24 cargo planes
 
66. 135. 181. 219
Cabell. Charles P.
 
30. 36. 43. ,88. IOI. 122-123. 127.
139. 183. 223. 295. 327, 329
Cairo. Egypt
117. 119
Calcutta. India
 
232
California
 
9. 13, 24. 26. 36, 45. 50. 54. 56.
• 133. 182. 198. 200. 208. 22 1. 247.
251-252. 254-256. 295. 311. 3-10
California Institute of Technology
 
26
Cambodia
 
216. 230. 243
camera len scs
 
93
camera technicians
 
78
camera-carrying balloons
 
14. 18. 23. 84, 145
cameras
 
I. 3-4, 12-13. 21 -22. 3 I. 44, 49-5 1.
S3-55. 60. 77. 87. 196. 244. 281-282.
3 10,313.321. 327. 329. 332. 333
Canberra
 
5. 9. 23-24. 67. 109. 117, 162
Cannon. Clarence
 
88
Capp, A l
 
45
cardiovascular system
 
62
 
liaewet
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Index
360
 
Carey, Howard
80, 140
Carter, John H. (Jack)
9-10
Carter, Marshall S.
186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327
Caspian Sea
126
catheterized
64
cathode-ray tube
267
Caucasus Mountains
179
celestial "fixes"
76
Central Asia
135
Central Asian republics
176
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
29, 32, 59
Air Force competition
308
air operations
157, 191
General Counsel
44
Inspector General
190
proprietary
260, 129
proprietary firm
110, 129, 222, 260
U-2 program
257, 181
centrifugal force
177
CHALICE
155, 170, 182
Chamoun. Camille
152
Chance Vought Corporation
8
Ch'ang-sha, China
228
Chapman, Robert
238
Charbatia. India
232-233, 237, 239
 
Charyk, Joseph V.
260, 327-328
 
Secact
 
Chekiang Province
235
Chelyabinsk, Soviet Union
176
Cherbonneaux, James
127, 138, 214
Chiang Ching-kuo
224
Chiang Kai-shek
224
Chiang-yu. China
228
Chicago Daily Tribune
132
Chief of Station for Germany
IOI
Chief of Station in Taipei
224
Chief of the German General Staff
 
I
"chimney"
71
China
5, 85, 135, 148, 157, 174, 190, 201,
211, 215-217, 219. 221-222. 224-226.
228-233. 235-237, 239-240, 242-243,
245, 247, 253. 282. 301. 305, 307, 319.
336. 339-341. 343.
See also Nationalist China and
People's Republic of China (PRC)
China Lake, California
340
chine
277
Chinese Communist nuclear tests
240
Chinese mainland
319. 215,222.226
Chinese nuclear reactors
238
Chinese nuclear test
237
Christ, David L.
339
Christian Science Monitor
18
Civil Air Transport
214, 222
civilian supersonic transport (SST)
293
 
Secret NOFORN
 
Index
 
361
CL-282 Project
10-17, 24-27, 29-37, 66. 327-331. 333
CL-400 aircraft
 
263
clandestine operations
16,321
Clandestine Services
192
Clark Airfield. Philippines
 
212
Clifford, Clark
311
Cline, Ray
209. 224
"coffin comer"
76
Cold War
17
collection requirements
80-81, 189. 253, 300
Columbia Broadcasting System
18
combat aircraft
6. 26. 45
Combined Shipping Adjustmenc Board
15
Commerce. Depanment of
254
commercial airliners
72
communications intelligence (COMINT)
189. 311. 335-336
Communications Satellite Corporation
328
COMPASS TRIP
254
competitive bidding
44
 
compressor vanes
 
291
computer-controlled radar
294
computers
52
Congress, United States
44, 88, 98, 111. 159-160. 170, 293,
315, 317-3 18
constant-velocity film transport
 
281
Constellation airliner
IO. 329
Contingency Reserve Fund
40,44
 
contractors
42, 72. 259. 288
contrails
152
Convair
262-263. 267-271. 273. 284. 312
Convair F- 106
284
convective clouds
94
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory
18. 24-25. 328
Corning Glass Works
282
cosmic-ray effects
94
cover officer
89
coven activities
2. 6, 40. 43-44. 73. 80. 88. 134.
157, 189. 191 -192. 212. 214.
222. 320-321. 328. 342
Covert Action Staff (CAS)
214
covert funding
43
Crabb. Lionel
,94
Crete
116
Crick. Alan
154
Crick Commiuee
154
Crimean Peninsula
108
Cuba
188. 197-201. 205-211. 299-300.
302. 310. 327. 339
Cuban air and ground order of battle
198
Cuban Missile Crisis
55. 199. 209-210. 299. 327
Cubi Point Naval Air Station. Philippines
212. 216. 221
Culbertson. Allma.n T.
66
Cunningham. James A.. Jr.
40. 66. 69. 72. 78-i9. 125. 247.
288-289. 328-329
Current Intelligence. Office of
81
 
~eoret
 
Secret rllOFOAN
Index
362
 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation
328
Czechoslovakia
IOI
 
D _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D-21 aircraft
291
Dalai Lama
216
Dallas. Texas
293
Damage Assessment Team
183
David Clark Company
62
Davis, Saville
18
Dayton. Ohio
4. 8
DC-6 aircraft
341
deep penetration overflights
316. 123
Defector Reception Center (DRC)
")
 
defectors
Defense. Department of
33. 61. 122. 145, 154, 161. 234,
236-237, 239, 267, 292-293. 301-302.
304. 310. 317
Defense. Deputy Secretary of
81, 127, 144. 161, 188, 207. 300. 309
Defense. Secretary of
161. 298
Defense Mobilization, Office of
17, 26
Science Advisory Committee
37
Del Rio, Texas
256, 198
Delta-rI camera
250
denied territory
174, 188. 190
 
8ecaet
 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)
30. 36. 43. 327,329.88. 101, 122-123.
127, 139, 186-187, 201, 208-209, 223
Detachment A
94-95, !00-101, 106. 114, 116, 124-125,
139-140, 142-143, 181,316
Detachment B
113, 116, 120-121, 124-126, 133,
135, 139, 142-143. 152-153, 155-157.
164, 167, 181-182. 187. 316
Detachment C
133-134, 139, 143-144, 152, 157,
182, 211-212. 214-220. 224. 316
Detachment G
133. 181-182. 198-199. 211. 221-222.
230-233. 243. 248, 250-251, 254-257
Detachment H
225-226, 228-230. 232-237. 239-241,
243-246, 250-251, 255
Development. Deputy Chief of Staff for
7. 11. 17. 35
Development Planning. Office of
12
Development Projects Division (DPD)
157. 191
Development Projects Staff
40. 55-56, 132. 157, 191. 212,331
Dirty-Birds
128. 130. 135
Donovan. Allen F.
18. 21. 24-26. 29-31, 35. 260. 328
Donovan. James
183
Doolittle, James H.
61. 167. 328
Douglas Aircraft
339
DRAGON
2
DRAGON LADY
77
drivers
59
drone
291. 343
Dryden. Hugh
89, 182
DuBridge, Lee
26-27
 
Seeret PdOF6PU'<J
 
Index
363
 
Dulles. Allen
16-17, 30, 32-37, 39-40, 43-44, 56,
60, 73, 76, 80, 82, 86, 88, 93, 95, 97.
105-106, 109-111, 117. 120, 124, 127,
154, 161-162, 164-165, 167, 170, 180,
184, 189, 191,214, 223-224, 260, 263,
295. 316-318. 327-328
Dulles, John Foster
20, 86, 109, 117, 122-123, 126
dummy corporations
44
Dunaway, Glendon
65
 
E
Earman, J. S.
206
earth's atmosphere
278
East Berlin riots of June 1953
16
East Germany
100-101, 142, 147,183,303
Eastern Europe
- 2, 84. 88-89. 100-101, 106. I IO.
123-124, 126-127, 139-140. 142,
144. 304. 316
Eastman Kodak
4, 31-32
eavesdropping
2
EBONY
222
Eden. Anthony
93-95
Edens, Buster
135
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G)
130, 274
Edwards AFB. California
133, 149, 181. 198. 200,211,230
Eielson AFB. Alaska
133-134
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
I9, 26-27, 33-37, 39, 44, 56. 60. 73,
85-86. 88. 94-101, 104-106, 109-110,
112. 114, 116-117, l19-120.122-124,
126-129, 135, 139, 143-147, 152-156,
 
159-164. 167-168, 170-172, 180-181,
187, 191-192, 195. 211-212, 214. 221,
224, 263, 267, 270. 277, 297, 315-317,
322. 328-330
electromagnetic energy
335
electromagnetic pulse indicator
240
electronic countermeasures (ECM)
207. 239,304.313, 317, 335-336
electronic intelligence (ELINT)
I 14. 126, 144. 146, 153, 162-163.
175. 182, 215, 242. 244, 303, 335
electronic intercept
126,317
electronic sensors
292
electronic warfare
300
ELINT collection
142, 339
ELINT emanations
304
ELINT-collection gear
310
ELINT-collection unit (System VI)
170
Emergency Preparedness, Office of
254
engine nacelles
291
engineers
9-10. 12. 17. 25. 43. 45. 55. 61.
71. 255,260,269.286. 339,343
English Electric Company
5, 23
epoxy resin
277. 289
EQUINE
82
Ericson, Robert J.
80
espionage
I
Estonia
303. 339
 
Eurasian landmass
145
Europe
2, 4, 20. 23, 84-85. 88-89, 93. 100-101.
106, 110. 115, 123-124, 126-127, 139-140.
142. 144, 148, 178,255,304,316.330
 
Seeret
 
6ec1 el NOFORN
 
Index
 
364
 
Evang, Vilhelm
142
EVEN STEVEN
256
Executive Branch
109
exotic fuels
263
 
F
F-100 fighter
71
F- I02 fighter
270
F- I04 fighter
10-1 I, 45, 329
F- I06 fighter
270, 284
F- I08A Rapier
285
F-111 tighter
312
Fairbanks. Alaska
134
- Fairchild K-19 aircraft
49
FAN SONG acquisition radar
234
Far East
3, 110, 133-134. 140, 144. 190,
197. 201. 216. 224, 233-234. 242-243.
301,305.316. 320, 332.
"Fast Move" operations
216
Federal Aviation Administrator
289
Federal procurement cycle
44
"ferret" equipment
3, 335
ferret flights
123
FFD-1
238
FFD-2
238-239
FFD-4,
282. 238
 
Seeret
 
FICON
22
Field Activities, Deputy for
192
5412 Committee
188, 226
fighter
4, I0, 14, 22. 66, 74-75. I08, I 24,
146, 177. 182. 201. 214,312,317,
328-329
fighter conversion
22
Fili airframe plant
105
fillets
277, 288-289
film
I. 31-32, 49. 51-53, 55. 60, 100.
108, 114-115. 119-121. 145,153,179,
209, 215, 218. 221-222, 226. 235-236,
239,241,247, 249-250. 254, 281-282.
306, 310-311. 316. 330
film processing
60, 121. 247
film-transport system
55
Firewel Company
63
First Weather Reconnaissance Squadron,
Provisional (WRSP-1)
94
Fischer, C. W.
309
FISH
250. 263. 268-269, 312
FISH HAWK
249-250
Flickinger, Donald D.
62
FLIPTOP
198
"Flit"
62
Florida
198
flying boat
270
focal-length cameras
13
focal-length lenses
51
 
Sec,et NOFOAN
 
Index
365
Follow-On Group (FOG)
77
Ford Foundation
15
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
192,226,292,302,330
forest fire detectors
238
Formosa
305 (See also Taiwan)
Fort Worth, Texas
50
40 Committee
188, 257
forward processing center
212
Foster, John
343
France
113, 116-117, 120,201,249
Franco-Prussian War
 
I
Frankfurt, Germany
2
Free Europe Committee
88
French atomic test area
250
French Indochina
222
French Mediterranean
116
French Mystere
116
 
French nuclear developments
249
French Polynesia
249
Frogman Incident
94
Fujisawa, Japan
218
Fukien Province
226, 229
 
G2A aircraft
263
Galbraith, John Kenneth
231-232
Gardner, Trevor N.
11, 13-15, 26-27, 32, 36, 40,
66, 81, 99,327,329,331
Gates, Thomas
164
Gaza Strip
114
Geary, Leo P.
61, 66, 71, 73-74. 78, 152,
186, 196, 288, 329
General Dynamics
312
General Electric 173/GE-3
11
General Tire and Rubber Company
329
GENETRIX
84-85, 87-88
Geneva, Switzerland
96, 147, 159
Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack
159
Geneva summit conference
96
geological survey
254-255
German Luftwaffe
22
German scientists
2
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
120
Gibbs. Jack A.
61, 259-260
Giebelstadt Airbase, West Germany
95, 124, 140
Gilpatric, Roswell
207-208
Glennan. Keith
182
gliders
 
II
 
G
G-forces
79
 
Glienecke Bridge
183
Globke. Hans
101
Goddard, George
330
 
ieeret
 
Sec, el "10FOAl\i
 
Index
366
 
Goering, Hermann
66
Goldmark, Peter C.
18
golf balls
50
Goodpaster. Andrew J.
89. 97. 100. 105-106. 109, 120. 126
128, 144. 146. 167. 172,187,329
Grace. Frank G.
80
GRANDSLAM
170. 172. 174-175
Granger Company
336
GRC- 127
205
Great Britain
3. 7, 23. 93-95. 112-113. 115. 117.
120. 153-156. 181. 303. 319
Air Ministry
94. 155
counterintelligence operative
94
-
 
Greyhoun<I bus
289
Groom Lake
56. 66. 133
Groton
15
!!round resolution
281-282. 250
Guatemala
. 157
"guided democracy"
212
Gulf Coast
254
Gulf of Finland
142
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
231
2ust control
47
GUSTO
274
 
..Seecet
 
H
H camera
244. 247. 253. 256. 282
Hagerstown, Maryland
9
Haiphong Harbor
247
H:ilaby. Najeeb E.
289
Hall. Wiliam
117. 119. 143
Haller-Raymond-Brown (HRS)
335
"handing off'
87
 
[_ _
"hanger queen"
175
Harvard University
18. 2 1-22. 29, 50-51. 327. 129
!Harvard College Observatory
21
IHawk-750 glider kit
342
haze filters
105
IHBJARGON
175-176
IHBJGO
176
heavy water
19
Helms. Richard M.
253. 256. 304-305, 309-310. 329
HEN HOUSE
168
HEN ROOST installations
168
Hener. Christian
127. 163
" hiding in the open"
55
high-acuity cameras
2 1, 50-51. 327
high-altitude air sampling (H ASP)
219
hi!!h-altitude aircraft
4. 8. 16. 24. 59. 148. 304
 
Sec, et NOFORN
 
Index
 
367
 
high-altitude balloon program
22
high-altitude photography
I, 55, 84
high-altitude photoreconnaissance
7
high-altitude reconnaissance
I, 4-5, 8-9, 13-14, 17, 19, 22-25,
33-34, 39, 49, 52, 55, 254, 262,
292, 312, 330
high-altitude weather plane
178
high-impact plastics
313
high-resolution cameras
4
high-resolution infrared scanner
238
high-speed buffet
76
high-speed reconnaissance aircraft
262-263, 270
HIGH WIRE
164
Hitsman, Roger
209
Hitchcock, Alfred
29
Hokkaido, Japan
4
Holcomb. William
285
Hollywood, California
29
Hong Kong
217
Hoover, Herbert, Jr.
123-124
horizontal stabilizers
47
Horner, Richard
70
Hornig, Donald F.
309
 
HRB-Singer Corporation
336
HTAUTOMAT
83,115,331
HTNAMABLE
l l0-111
human intelligence sources
2
Hungarian uprising
123
Hungary
101, 123
Hurricane Baseline Survey
254
Hycon Manufacturing Company
13, 50. 252
hydraulic fluid
279
hydraulic pump
279
hydrogen bomb
19-20, 242
hydrogen weapons
164
hydrogen-powered aircraft
263
hydrologists
254
 
I
IBM CPC (card-programmed calculator)
52
IDEALIST
182. 210. 234, 303
IDEALIST U-2
303
lgarka, Soviet Union
 
3
ileitis
96
imagery
116, 179. 252-253, 255-256, 282,
298. 303,310
 
HOT SHOP
 
impeller
 
162
Houston, Lawrence R.
44
HR-333 camera
253
 
291
"in-and-out" operations
205
in-flight refueling
198-200, 237, 302
 
.$eeret=
 
Sec1 et NOFORN
 
Index
 
368
 
lncirlik Airbase, Turkey
 
intercept
 
87. 108, 124, 126-127, 142, 148,
162. 168, 170. 174, 176-177. 259,
285,317.335
 
113, 181
India
 
148, 231-232, 237, 247, 319
Indian Parliament
 
interceptor aircraft
 
93. 109, 124, 148, 176
 
232
Indian Springs, Nevada
 
intercontinental ballistic missile
 
274. 130, 132
Indonesia
 
137. 159
Interior, Department of the
 
211-212, 214,319
Indonesian Air Force
 
254
international date line
 
212
inertial guidance systems
 
134
International Geophysical Year
 
313
 
85
 
inflatable aircraft
 
international law
 
262
infrared camera
 
110
interrogation
 
2-3. 183, 241
 
282
infrared jammer
 
intruder
 
336
 
109
 
infrared scanner
 
"invisible" dirigible
 
238-239
inland waterways
 
18
ion cloud
 
82
instant-film camera
 
300
ionosphere
 
175
 
330
intelligence. collection of
 
16, 31-32. 80-81, 142. 146. 153.
162. 170, I 82. 189. 211, 245. 253,
256. 282. 300,303.310. 315. 319.
322. 333. 336, 339
 
Iran
 
124. 133. 189
Iraq
 
133. 153
Iron Curtain
 
I. 17. 93. 95. Ill. 126. 146
 
Intelligence and Research. Bureau of
 
209
 
ISINGLASS
 
312
 
intelligence community
 
2. 20. 33, 81. 138, 153, 160. 164-165.
170-171, 190. 196, 232-233, 254, 298.
303-304, 322. 339
Intelligence Coordination, Office of
 
81
intelligence requirements
 
25-26, 80-82, 114, 122, 154, 188-190,
226. 230,233.250, 253,300,332
Intelligence Requirements Officer
 
Isle of Pines
 
205
Israel
 
113-114. 116-117, 120, 343
Israeli paratroop
 
117
Israeli-Egyptian conflict
 
257. 117
Israeli-Syrian disengagement
 
81
 
257
 
Intelligence Star
 
Itek Corporation
 
186
Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP)
 
21-22, 24-26, 30-32. 35, 327
 
Secaet
 
331. 250
IX spaceflights
 
254
 
6eeret NOFOAN
Index
 
369
 
J
 
K
 
J-3 (Operations)
189
175 power plant
152
jamming devices
300
Jammu and Kashmir
231
Japanese airspace
4
Japanese Government
134, 182, 221
jet stream
94, 145
jet-propelled glider
II, 25
Johnson, Clarence L. (Kelly)
10-12, 13-14, 17, 24-26, 29-31,
34-36, 43-48, 50, 54, 56-57, 59,
64, 66-70, 76, 108, 130, 132. 149.
179. 185, 196, 247-248. 251, 262-263.
268,271,274, 277-279, 281, 284. 289,
293-297, 320, 329
Johnson. Lyndon B.
195. 236-237, 243, 293-295. 302.
304-305, 310-311, 332
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
122, 124, 126, 161, 187-190, 223,
234,302
Joint Intelligence Committee
154
Joint Priorities Committee
154
Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC)
189
Jones,· Edwin K.
138
 
K-21 framing cameras
49
K-38 camera
50-5 I, 53
Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, Japan
301
Kaliningrad missile plant
105
Kamchatka Peninsula
128, 134, 197
Kandalaksha, Soviet Union
176
Kapustin Yar, Soviet Union
16, 23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164
Kara Sea
142
Kazakh language
135
Kazakhstan
135
Kazan', Soviet Union
167
KC- I 35 tankers
71, 199
KEDLOCK
285
"Kelly's Angel"
66
KEMPSTER
300
Kennedy, John F.
186, 191-192, 195-196, 198. 207-208,
2 I0. 225, 229, 232, 235. 292-293,
297-298, 330
Kennedy, Joseph W.
29
Kennedy, Robert
215
Kennedy administration
191, 195, 225
kerosene fuel
62
Khan, Ayub
135
 
Jordan
117, 153
JP-7 fuel
62
 
Secret
 
Sec, et NOFOAN
Index
 
370
 
Khimki rocket-engine plant
 
105
Khrushchev, Nikita
94, 96, I00-101, 147, 160, 163-164,
168, 179-180, 299
Kiangsi Province
235
Kiangsu Province
229
KICK OFF
198
Kickapoo Joy Juice
45
Kiefer, Eugene P.
7, 9, II, 260, 330
Killian, James R.
27, 29-30, 33-34, 89, 100, 191-192,
263, 292, 330
KINGFISH
270, 273
 
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B.
190
Kirov, Soviet Union
172,- T76
Kirtland AFB
79
Kissinger, Henry
256
Kistiakowsky, George
171
Klein, Burton
11
Klyuchi, Soviet Union
134 143
 
KNIFE E~E
167
Knowles, Harold F.
344
Kohler, Foy D.
112
Koko Nor
233
Kola Peninsula
182
 
ieeret
 
Kollman Instrument Company
59
Koon, Ralph E.
79
Korea, demilitarized zone (DMZ)
305 (See also North Korea)
Kotlas, Soviet Union
172
Krag, Jens Otto
299
Kratt, Jacob
65, 79, I 16
Kremlin
123
 
Kunming, China
2"6
 
Kuybyshev, Soviet Union
164
KWCORK
113
KWEXTRA-00
59
KWGLITTER-00
59
Kyshtym, Soviet Union
176
 
L
L'il Abner
47
L-pills
66, 125
Lahore, Pakistan
135
Lakenheath AFB, England
93
 
Sec, et NOFOftN
 
Index
 
37 1
Land. Edwin H. (Din)
18, 21, 25, 29-34, 36, 80-81, 89, 96,
100. 110, 19 1-192, 260, 262-263, 269-27 1,
292,307,330, 332-333
Land Panel
37
Langley, Virginia
43, 192, 306,
Langley AFB. Virginia
23
Laos
2 I6, 22.1. 231. 233
Las Vegas. Nevada
284
Latham, Allen. Jr.
29
Latvia
303
Laughlin AFB, Texas
198,200
Lebanon
114, 117, 152-153, 343
Ledford, Jack C.
207, 288. 297
Leghorn, Richard S.
• - • 4-8. 18, 23. 110, 330
LeMay, Curtis E.
11 -12. 14. 60
"Lemon-Drop l(jd"
124
Lend-Lease
7
Leningrad, Soviet Union
104-106. 109, 142, 298. 303
lens
I. 18. 2 1-22, 30. 49-55, 93.
I 08. 250. 247. 253, 28 1-282.
321, 327
lens curvatures
52
lens designs
52, 55
LeVier. Tony
56, 68-7 1, 75
LF-lA fuel
62
Libya
121
 
lightweight film
32
LINCOLN
18
Lindsey Air Force Base. Wiesbaden. West Gennany
80
liquid-fueled missiles
161,317
lithium deut,eride
19
Lithuania
303
Little, Arthur D., Inc.
29
Liule Quem1:ly
215
Lloyd, Selwyn
93
Lockheed A:ircraft Corporation
9, 24, 329
Lockheed D:ay Fighter
14
Lockheed m,echanics
66, 13,0, 225
London School of Economics
. 15
LONG GREEN
198
long-range bombers
20, 81. 98-99, 316
LONG SHAFT
245
Lop Nor test site
237
Los Ange les., California
186, 254
Lovelace, W. Randolph, III
62, 74
Lovelace Foundation for Medical
Education antd Research
74
low-radar-cross-section vehicle
344
low-level phmography
209
low-vapor-pressure fuel
278
Luke AFB. Arizona
74
 
Seeret ~QlzOR~
 
Index
 
372
 
Luna 2 rocket
163
Lundahl, Arthur C.
82, 114-115. 117,119,121,135,
142, 154, 191,209,241, 331
 
M
M Building
83
M-12 aircraft
291
M-195 aircraft
9
MacArthur, John
167
Macdonald. Duncan E.
22, 154-155
Macmillan, Harold
155-156, 164. 167, 187
Malaya Sazanka, Soviet Union
144
Malinovsky, Rodion
160
Malta
114, -116
Manchuria
229. 233. 237
Mandrake
148
Manhattan Project
329
Manila, Philippines
311
manned space program
62
March AFB, California
75
Mark-30
335
Marquardt ramjets
268
Marr, William H.
72
Mars
7:
Marsna1 Plan
15,327
 
SHret
 
Martin. Glenn L., Aircraft Corporation
5, 8-9. 24, 270
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
4, 15, 18, 27, 30, 110, 129-130, 327,
330, 332-333
Matomic Building
42, 104
MATS
72
Matsu Islands
229
May Day
20. 176, 191. 195
MC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits
64
McConaughy, Walter P.
257
McCone. John A.
184-186, 192, 195, 197, 201, 206-207,
209, 232-234, 236-238, 240, 292-294,
296,298,300,327,331
McCoy, Frederick
95
McCullough Corporation
339
McDonnell Aircraft
312
McElroy, Neil
146, 161-162
McFadden. William
54
McMahon, John N.
186
McNamara, Robert
229, 234, 236, 238, 253, 285, 292-293,
298, 300-301
mechanical fuel totalizer/counters
68
Mediterranean Sea
114, 116. 121, 140, 142, 153
medium-range ballistic missiles
201,206
Melpar. Incorporated
342
Menderes. Adnan
112, 181
mercenary pilots
214
metal fatigue
242
 
~eeret NOFORN
Index
373
 
meteorologists
42, 87
MI-6
93, 154
Michigan, University of, School of Aeronautics
329
microwave reconnaissance
19
Middle East overflights
114, 116
MiG aircraft
336
MiG-15
108, 148
MiG-17
5, 108, 148
MiG-19
148
MiG-21
148, 237, 244
Military Adviser to the President
188
Military Air Transport Service
72
MILL TOWN
216
. Miller, Stewart E.
18. 21. 39-40, 55-56, 331
 
I
 
"million-dollar" photography
Ill
miniaturization
339
mirrors
54-55
Mirza
135
"missile gap"
157, 159,317
missiles
2, 22, 81, 98-99, 137, 139, 149,
160-161, 165, 167,171,201, 205-206,
209, 226, 239, 243, 257, 285, 299, 301,
303-304, 306-307, 315, 317-318, 336,339
Mississippi River
78,310
MKNAOMI
66
Monthly Activities Book
189
 
moon
163
Morotai
214
Moscow, Soviet Union
3, 20. 85, 94, IOI, 105-106, 109,
124, 143, 145, 160, 167, 177, 179,318
MUDLARK
178
multiengine aircraft
12, 24-25
multiple sensors
22
Murmansk, Soviet Union
_140, 142, 172, 174, 176
Mururoa Atoll
250
Myasishchev-4 (see Bison bomber)
 
N
Nagy, lmre
123
Nank.ing. China
228
Narcotics. Bureau of
254-255
Nasser, Gama! Abdel
112. 153
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
89, 94
National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA)
178-179, 254
National Air & Space Museum
64
National Intelligence Estimates
19. 235
national intelligence objectives
81
National Security Agency
81,114,134,185,327
National Security Bureau
224
National Security Council
27, 294, 161, 167, 187-188, 191, 197, 212
 
Seeret
 
SeoFet NOF6ftrq
 
Index
374
 
National Security Council Intelligence
Directive (NSCID)
 
191
Nationalist China
 
319,215,224,226,229,236
Nationalist Chinese
 
201, 205, 222-226,
229-230, 234-237, 239-240,
243, 245-246, 253,257,319
Air Force
 
223,225
 
9th Tactical Air Force
 
330
nitrogen
 
64
Nixon, Richard M.
 
245-246, 256-257, 333
Nobel Prize
 
332
North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD)
 
289
 
insignia
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 
225
 
(NATO)
 
pilots
 
20, 329, 87, 148, 172
 
319,223,230,235,243,246,253
 
radars
 
U-2
 
87
 
205, 223-224, 229, 246
Navajo missile
22
Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan
 
134
naval quarantine
210
Nehru, Jawaharlal
 
231~233
Nelson, Nonnan
 
68
Nevada
 
56-57, 341, 113, 130-131, 133, 149,
182, 241, 274, 283, 286, 290, 295,
297, 302-303, 31 I
Nevada Proving Ground
 
56,241
New Delhi, India
 
232
Ngo Dinh Diem
 
230
NICE GIRL
310
nickel-cadmium batteries
 
240
Nile River
 
119
NIMBUS
 
200
1973 Middle East war
256,320
 
-seOfeL
 
North Island Naval Base, California
 
248
North Korea
 
4,233,237,242,307
North Vietnam
 
190, 221-222, 230-231, 233, 243,
246-247, 301, 304-307, 311,336,342
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
 
231
Northrop Aviation
 
259
Norton, Garrison
 
14-15, 31, 70,260,331
Norwalk, Connecticut
 
50
Norway
 
140, 142, 172, 176-177, 303,319
Norwegian Defense Staff
 
142
Norwegian Intelligence Service
 
142
Notre Dame University
7
Novaya Zemlya
 
172
Novokuznetsk, Soviet Union
138
nuclear energy
39, 81, 225
Nuclear Energy Division
 
39
 
~&Gret NQFQRN
 
Index
 
375
nuclear fireball
240
nuclear resonance
332
nuclear strike
292
nuclear testing moratorium
317
nuclear tests
133, 147, 240
nuclear weapons
2, 19-20, 99, 147, 226,
238,240,317
 
0
GARFISH
44
O'Donnell, Emmett (Rosy)
7J.
 
oblique photography
__ -- 135. 189,244
Offshore Islands Crisis
215-216
OILSTONE
60-61
Okinawa
301-302, 305-306, 308. 311
Old Executive Office Building
27
OLIVE HARVEST
257
Omaha, Nebraska
60
112A camera
250
112B camera
250, 252
 
"Open-Skies"
96
Operation Overflight
186
optical distortion
282
 
Optical Research Laboratory
21-22
optical systems
52
order-of-battle
82, 134, 322
"Oscar-Sierra" unit
234
 
over-the-horizon radar
241
Overhage, Carl F. P.
18, 21, 331
overhead photography
82, 87. 172, 237-238
overhead reconnaissance missions
188
Overstreet, Carl K.
100
OXCART
61, 73, 157, 191,236.238, 252-253,
259,274, 277-313. 320-322, 327-333,
336, 339
oxygenation
62
 
p
P-38 fighter
IO, 329
P-40 fighter
328
P-51 Mustang
214
P-80 fighter
10, 45
P-80 Shooting Star
45
P2V7
222
P3A
222
Pacific Ocean
247
Padang. West Sumatra
212
 
6ee,et
 
6eeret NOFORN
Index
376
 
Pakistan
128, 135. 139, 148, 163, 167-168.
170, 172, 174, 178. 189,247,316,319
Paksane, Laos
231
Palmdale, California
31 I
panoramic-type framing camera
53
Paradise Ranch
57, 66
PARAMOUNT Committee
114, 116, 120
Parangosky. John
274,288.296, 309. 331
"parasite" aircraft
263
Paris Summit
172. 181-182
Pasadena, California
13. 50,252
Pathet Lao
221
PB-4Y aircraft
222
Pearl Harbor
322 _
Pearson. Drew
299
Peenemunde rocket project
2
Peiping. China
228-229
Pellegrini. Joseph J.
6
Pennsylvania State Police
222
Pentagon
5, 7, 9, ll. 13-14, 39, 78-79, 238
People ·s Liberation Anny (PLA)
215
People's Republic of China (PRC}
85, 135. 201, 215, 222, 225-226,
228-247, 253. 282, 301, 319. 339. 341
(See also China)
radars
215
troop movements
215
nuclear plants
238
 
nuclear weapons establishment
226
Shuangchengzi missile-test range
235
periscope
56. 76
Perkin. Richard S.
18, 31. 50-52. 281-282, 31 I. 332-333
Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company
18. 31. 50. 281
Perkin-Elmer tracking camera
52
Perkins. Courtland D.
260
Personnel (USAF). Deputy Chief of Staff for
74
Peshawar. Pakistan
135. 163-164. 167-168, 172, 174-!76
Philippines
305
Photo-Intelligence Division (PID)
82. 100. 135
photographic chemicals
121
Photographic Evaluation of /n/onniltion on Cuba
200
photographic resolution
281
photo interpreters
83. 108. Ill. 114-116. 120-121. 135,
138. 153. 172. 191, 198. 209. 2! l.
2 I6. 221. 236. 303, 307
photomapping
I. 232
photoreconnaissance
I. 4-5. 7. 22
photosatellite
270, 3 I 3. 327. 330, 157
Phouma. Souvanna
221
PID's Special Projects Branch
ll5
PINE RIDGE
343-344
"pioneer" photography
87
pitot-static tube
295
Pittsburgh-Corning Glass Company
55
Plans, Deputy Director for
157, 191-192, 327. 333
 
Sec, et NOfOAl'I
 
Index
377
 
Plans, Directorate of
73, 81, 157,197,211,287
Plesetsk, Soviet Union
176
Poland
I00-101, l04, I 10, 123, 145,303
polarizing filters
330
Polaroid Corporation
18, 24, 29
POLECAT
221
Polish Ambassador to the US
109
Polyarny Ural
172
polygraph examination
185
Pope, Allen L.
214-215
poppy fields
254
Port Said, Egypt
120
Portsmouth Harbor
94
. P9tassium cyanide
66. 125
powered glider
14, 25. 339
Powers. Francis Gary
88,117,124, 174-178, 181-187,
190-191, 195, 197,201.219, 221.
224,252,316,322.332, 336
Poznan, Poland
104
PR3 aircraft
5
Pratt, Perry W.
31
Pratt & Whitney
12, 31. 35, 40, 48, 67, 71. 152,217,
251,268,270, 284-285, 290
Pratt & Whitney J58 power plant
270
Pratt & Whitney J75-Pl3 jet engine
152
Pratt & Whitney J75/19W engines
284
Pratt and Whitney J57
12
 
President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities
37, 127, 167, 170, 190, 192,328,
330
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
37
President's Intelligence Checklist
201
President's Science Advisory Committee
37
pressure suits
64, 247
pressurized "spacesuit"
63
Prettyman. E. Barrett
184-185
Prettyman Board
185
Princeton University
29
processing and interpretation centers
115
Project Director
61. 82. 329
Project Officer. AFCIG-5
61
Project Staff
40-43. 56, 72-73. 82, 89,
170. 299
Project Three
27, 29-34. 327
propaganda
88, 160, 162. 183. 186. 317
Pryor. Frederick
183
psychological warfare
186. 222
Pueblo
242. 307,320
Puerto Rico
207,211
Pulse-Position Indicator display
267
Purcell. Edward M.
 
18, 29, 110-111. 129,260,263.
271, 274. 332
Putt, Donald L.
• 11. 35-36. 40
PYO [Soviet Air Defense]
174
 
Secret
 
Seu et NOfOfUd
Index
 
378
Pyroceram
268, 271
 
Q
Quarles, Donald
81, 127, 144-145, 161-162, 263, 267
Quarters Eye
42
quartz glass window
282
Que Building
83, 111
Quemoy
215, 229
QUICK KICK
216
quick-reaction capability
301,313
 
R
Raborn, William F., Jr.
240, 301, 332
radar
3, 7, 15, 19, 23,, 82, 87, 94, 97, 101.
104- 106, 110-111, 123, 128-130, 132-134,
139, 142, 144, 148, 168, 175-176, 178,
197, 211,215,230, 234-237, 239, 241-243,
247,257, 259-260, 263, 267-271, 273-274,
277,289,294,300, 303-307, 310-311, 317,
331-332, 335-336, 339, 341-342
radar camouflage
128
radar cross section
15,260,263, 267-270, 271, 273-274,
277, 300, 332, 339, 341-343, 110
radar deception
130
radar defense systems
343
radar image
259,332
radar pulses
87, 110, 130, 175, 268, 335
 
Seeret
 
radar signature
341-342
radar technology
7
radar-absorbing
111, 260
radar-deflecting
260
radar-homing unit
342
Radford, Arthur W.
122-124, 126
Radhakrishnan, Savepalli
232
Radiation Laboratories
330
RADINT
189
radio
2, 7, 19, 75, 87, 175-176, 186,
268, 289, 332
RAINBOW
111. 129-130, 259
Ramenskoye, Soviet Union
20. 105
Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico
211
ramjet-powered
262-263. 268. 291
Ramo-Wooldridge firm
335
RAND Corporation
20, 26, 85
Randolph AFB, Tex.as
73
Randsburg Wash
340
Ray, Walter
302
"ray-tracing" programs
52, 55
RB-29 aircraft
3-4
RB-47 aircraft
3, 22. 182. 186
RB-52 aircraft
22
RB-57 aircraft
26, 35, 40, 134. 223
RB-57D aircraft
6, 126. 162
 
-Secret NOFORN
Index
379
 
RB-58 aircraft
22
Reber. James
81. 114-115. 154,332
reconnaissance
1-9. 12- 19. 21-25, 27, 30-37,
39, 41. 43. 46, 49, 52. 55. 59,
61-62, 66, 80, 84, 94, 96, 98, 109.
113, 115- 116, 119, 122, 126- 127.
133. 153-154. 161-162. 188-193.
196-197, 201, 205-206, 208, 2!0-212.
216. 222-223, 226, 228, 230-233. 240,
249, 253-254, 260. 262-263, 267-268.
270. 287. 291 -292, 295. 297-299, 301.
303-304. 308-309. 311-313. 319-322.
327-331, 333,339, 341-344
reconnaissance aircraft competition
9
reconnaissance drones
301
reconnaissance satellite project
16 1
"reconnaissance strike"
295
Reconnaissance Systems Branch
 
4
records. altitude
302
records. speed
302
RED DOT
254
reflecting cube
281
reflective system
 
Rhodes
116-117
Ridenour, Louis N.
18
Ridenour Associates. Inc.
18
Rieland, Osmond
56, 61, 70, 78
ROBIN
23
ROBI N HOOD
21 I
Robinson. Robe1t
164
rocket planes
60
rocket-powered ai1rcraft
312
Rodgers. Franklin A.
129, 267-268, 274, 332
Rodgers· Effect
267
Rolls-Royce Avon -109 engines
5, 23
Romania
 
IOI .
RoO!, L. Eugene
9. 24
Rose, Wilburn S.
Ml '70.l!Qj_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _7
 
55
refueling
114. 198-200. 231. 237, 241.
302. 306. 308
refugees
2
Republic RF-84F Thunderflash
22
Research, Directorate of
192. 287
Research and Development, Director of
66
Research and Reports (ORR). Office of
21. 81. 237
Returnee Exploi tation Group (REG)
 
2
Revolutionary Council
212
 
runway
57, 68-69, 79-80. 108. 140, 176.
283-284, 29•1. 302, 305
 
RS-71
295
Ruseckas, Joseph
63
Rusk, Dean
183. 201. 209. 236. 293. 304. 307
 
Sec.et
 
Secret NOFORN
Index
380
 
Russell, Richard B.
88
Ryan Aircraft
343
 
s
S-band radar
87
sailplane
10-11. 24-26. 47
Sakhalin Island
201
Saltonstall. Leverett
88
SAM site
177. 205. 306
San Cristobal. Cuba
206-207. 209
San Diego, California
2-P, 343
SANDY HOOK
343
Santa Barbara Channel
254 _ Santa Clara Airfield. Cuba
201
Saratov Engels Airfield. Soviet Union
IM
Saryshagan. Soviet Union
139. 168, 232. 336
satellite imagery
298, 255
satellite navigation systems
341
satellite photography
87. 195-197, 22~ 233. 237. 241
satellites
22. 100. 104. 159. 162,211.299,
303. 312. 320. 322. 328
Saville. Gordon P.
17-18
Schalk. Louis
288-289
Schlesinger. James R.
257. 333
Schoech. William A.
285
 
Seeret
 
Schriever, Bernard A.
7, II
Schultze, Charles L.
309
Science and Technology. Directorate of
I 93, 287, 328
Science and Technology, Special Assistant
to the President for
37
Scientific Advisory Board
17. 23
Scientific Advisory Committee
17, 89, 332
Scientific Engineering Institute (SE!)
110- l I l, 129. 260. 267, 27-+. 331-332
Scientific Intelligence (OSI). Office of
14, 21, 39, 81, 97,331,333
SCOPE COTTON
310
SCOPE CRANE
242
SCOPE LOGIC
303
SCOPE SAINT
255
SCOPE SAINT-I
255
SCOPE SAINT-11
255
SCOPE SHIELD
246-247
Scott. Roderick M.
51, 53. 281. 333
Scoville. Herbert
207,287,289.333
SCR-270 radar
7
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre Airport. Pennsylvania
222
Sea of Japan
 
3
Seaberg, John
8-9. 12. 35-36. 333
SEAFOAM
211
sealant
286. 288
secrecy agreements
295
 
Index
381
 
security
 
2, 27, 40-41, 43, 55, 59-60, 72, 8 1,
94, 112, 125, 127, 140, 161. 167,
185. 187-188. 191. 197,201,209,
212, 218, 221-222, 224, 236, 256,
273, 283-284, 294, 318, 327
Security, Office of
 
59, 112, 222
Semipalatinsk, Soviet Union
 
128, 138-139, 147, 168
SENSINT--Sensitive I ntelligence
 
3
sensors
 
11, 22. 241, 292, 3 I0
Seventh Air Division
 
89
Severodvinsk. Soviet Union
 
172, 176
Shanghai. China
 
222, 228, 242
sheep-dipping
 
74
Shell Oil Company
 
62. 328
shellfi sh toxin
 
125
Shelton, William
 
- - - 125, 176
shock wave
 
290-291
short-range reconnaissance vehicle
342
show 1rial
 
183
Shuangchengzi, China
 
226, 228. 235
shutter assemblies
 
53
Siberia
 
3
Sichuan, China
 
230
Sicily
 
116
Sieker, Robert
131
Sierra snowfield
254
 
Sinai penins1ula
 
117
"single-pass'" mission
 
306
Sino-Indian border
 
231-2:33. 319
Sino-Soviet lborder
 
336
"Skonk Works"
 
45
Skunk Work:s
 
45, 71, 132. 251. 262, 273-274
SKYLARK
 
299
Smithsonian Institution
 
55
"snap-up"
 
148
Snark missil,:s
 
22
Snider, Sammy V. C.
 
138
snowmelt
 
254
SOFT TOUCH
 
135, 139, 143
software algorithms
 
52
solar cells
 
240
solid-fueled imissiles
 
161.3 17
sound barrier
 
289
SOUTH GATE
 
2 16
South Vietnam
 
230-231, 243, 301. 305
Southeast Asia
 
190,198,216, 221.301, 310
Sovetskaya Gavan'. Soviet Union
144
Soviet B loc
 
1-2. 4, 6. 16-20. 87. 93. 112. 123.
147. 152,159. 19~ 197,211.330
Soviet Communist Party Congress
 
SIGINT Committee
 
160
 
332
 
Soviet Far East
 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
 
222
 
134,144
 
Sec, el l'(IOFORl'.J
 
Index
 
382
Soviet Union
1-3, 4-7. 14-27. 31, 39, 65, 81-89,
93-101. 104-106. 108-112. 120,
122-124, 126-130, 133-135, 137140, 142-149. 152-157, 159-165,
167-168. 170-172. 174-183. 186-187,
189, 195-197. 200-201, 205-206,
209-211, 215. 219,221,225,232,237,
247, 254, 259. 294, 297-299, 301,
303-304, 312. 315-320, 322. 329-330,
332. 335-336. 339,341,344
activity in Cuba
200,201
air defense system
2. 3. I08. I68. I 70, 317
air power of the
20
air show
98
atomic energy program
317
bomber
21. 11 I. 167. 317
borders
123, 127, 143
diplomatic protests
315- electronic defenses
317
fighters
3. 5. 23, 26. I 27. 144
G-class ballistic-missile submarine
237
guided missile and nuclear programs
135
guided missile research
99
guided missiles
81. 99
guided-missile test range
16
intentions
4. 318
intercept attempts
142
interception of U-2
19, 24-25. 47. 87. 106, 108. 110. 122.
127, 134. 144. I70, 244. 270. 3 I5, 339
medium-range ballistic missiles
201, 206
 
Sec,et
 
missile program
128. I59- I61. 163-164
missile test range
16. 23, 143, 164. 167, 176
overflight operation
110
propaganda campaign
317
Protest Note
109
radar coverage
106
radars
3. 7. 15, 97. 130, 134, 168. 176.
259. 339
rail network
167
strategic capabilities
2. 19
Supreme Soviet
179
surface-to-air missile (SAM)
177, 168, 304
surprise attack
19. 26-27, 89. 147, 159, 329-330
Soviet-Finnish border
303. 142
Soviet-Iranian border
124. 162-163. 168
Special Activities. Director of
193
Special Activities (OSA). Office of
43. 192-193, 207. 234-235. 242. 247.
252. 257,288. 296-297, 299. 303. 312.
328. 341-342. 344
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
188
Special Assistant to the DCI
40
"special" missions
116
Special Operations Division
192
Spica. Incorporated
51
spotting camera
282
Sputnik
159
SQUARE DEAL
168. 170
 
Seeret NOFORN
Index
 
383
SR-71
295, 302, 308-31 I, 321
SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM
206
SS-6 ICBM
[
160, 165, 171-171
stainless steel
277, 280
Stassen, Harold
330
State Department
81, 95, IOI, 146, 154, 163, 179, 186,
196-197, 212, 224-225, 229,243,249
"stealth" research
313
stereo camera
281, 252
stereoscopic lenses
250
Steuart Building
83, Ill, 114
STEVER
260. 333
Stockman, Hervey
65. J-04-105
STPOLLY
222,224,240
Strategic Air Command (SAC)
11, 14, 17, 20, 26, 42, 60, 74-76, 78,
89, 93, 95, 198, 201, 207-210, 299, 230
meteorologists
42
strategic bombing
49
"strategic hamlet"
230
strategic intelligence
82,115,152,302,304,313,315,
319,322
strategic reconnaissance
9, 122,230,295, 297, 299, 313,
320,322,329
Strauss, Lewis
56
Strong, Philip G.
14-17, 21-22, 24-25, 29-30, 333
subsonic
8, 14, 260, 263
 
Suez Canal
112-114, 117,120,256
Suez Canal, Israeli-British-French attack on
116
Suez Canal Company
I 12-113
Suez Crisis
152
Suhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed
135
suicide pill
65
Sukarno, Achmed
212,215
Sulawesi (Celebes)
212
Sullivan, Dennis
307
Sumatra
212
SUN SPOT
171
Super Snooper
132
supersonic designs
260 supersonic interceptor
285
supersonic technology
292-293
Support. Directorate of
40, 83
surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites
201
surface-to-air missiles
257,299,301,303,339
surface-to-surface missiles
205-206, 209. 304. 306
Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union
172, 176-179, 185
Symington, Stuart
99, 161
synthetic lubricants
279
Syria
114, 120, 133, 153
Syrian radars
343
System-I
335
 
&ee,er
 
See1 et NOFORN
 
Index
 
384
System-II
335
System-III
335-336
System-IV
335
System-Y
126. 215, 335
System-YI
335. 175
System-VII
335-336
System-VIII
335
System-IX
335
System-IXB device
175
System-X
256. 336
System-XII units
23-4
System-XIII
234. 236-237. 239
System-XVI
336
System-XVH
336
System-XX
336
System-XX!
336
System-XXII
336
System-XXIV
256
 
T
Taber. John
88
TACKLE
224. 226. 228-230. 234-239. 241-246.
2 53. 257, 282
tactical intelligence
304
 
tactical reconnaissance
9. 25, 115, 153
TAGBOARD
291
Tahiti
250
tailless subsonic aircraft
263
Taiwan
215-216, 222. 224-225. 229,
233, 236-237. 239, 241-243.
2-46. 251
Taiwan Strait
229
Ta Khli. AFB. Thailand
230
 
lalbott. Harold E.
13-14, 36
TALL KING
294
Tallinn. Estonia
303
 
~
 
Tashkent. Soviet Union
176
TASS
137
Tatar Strait
144
Taylor. Maxwell
188
TCP
27
Technical Services Division (TSO)
66. 125
Technicolor
331
Technological Capabilities Panel
26-27, 29-30. 35, 62, 80, 327329. 332
Technology. Deputy for
192
Teheran, Iran
144
Teledyne J-100-CA-IOO Turbojet engine
343
Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Company
343
 
SeoFet NOFORN
 
Index
 
385
television reconnaissance package
343
Tennessee
78,238
tent-ology
116
test ban
147
Tet offensive
243
Texas Instruments Corporation
238, 282
 
Third World
211
three-camera trimetrogon unit
52
three-dimensional movies
29
3000 I camera
333
303 Committee
243, 257, 301-302, 304, 307
Thule, Greenland
172
Tibet
157, 216, 219, 232
99
TIME STEP
172, 174
 
Titan ICBM
160
titanium alloy
271
Titanium Metals Corporation
280
 
TOKEN
87
Tomsk, Soviet Union
138
 
TOPPER
219
 
TOUCHDOWN
163
Toulon, France
116
tracker camera
241
 
tracking
3, 7, 52-53, 87, 97, 106, 128-129,
144, 170, I76, 178, 234, 259, 263,
267-268, 303,307,343
tracking radars
7,267
Trans-Siberian Railroad
144
transport aircraft
25, 45, 66
traveling-wave tube (TWT)
236
trimetrogon K-17 mapping-camera system
49
Tripartite Declaration, 1950
117
tropopause
152
Truman administration
17
TRW Corporation
335
Tuamotu Archipelago
249
"Tuesday lunch"
305
Tukey, John W.
29
turbojet engine
8, 11, 262, 268, 343
Turkey
3, 112-114, 116, 121,135,146,
152-153, 178, 181, 189,247,
316,319
Tuslog Detachment I0-10
113
Twining, Nathan
60-61, 86, 88, 96, 99, 101, 127,
134, 139, 161, 165
Tyler Building
43
Type-I camera
281, 304, 310
Type-II camera
281
Type-IV camera
282
Typhoon Winnie
216
 
Tysons Comer, Virginia
43
 
Sec.et N6f'OPIN
Index
386
 
Tyuratam, Soviet Union
 
135, 137-138, 160, 163-165, 167-168.
171- 172, 176
 
emergency landing
 
78. 188. 222,313
film exploitation
 
115
flameout
 
u
 
71, 78-79, 131, 198. 229
flight plans
 
82. 177
flights approval process
 
U- 1
 
66
U-2
accomplishments
 
316
assembly
 
45, 47, 66. 75. 164. 280, 284, 291
bailout experiments
 
64
bases
 
93
bicycle-type landing gear
 
47
blue-black color
 
149
brakes
 
69
canopy
 
80. 149. 177
cockpit
 
11. 63-64. 79, 125. 283. 292. 296
 
187-188, 226. 30 I
foreign pilots
 
73-74, 32 1
fuel
 
5. 23. 47. 61-62. 68. 76. 133. 161. 175.
199. 218-219. 231. 235. 241 , 247-248.
271. 274. 277-278. 283-284. 286. 288.
302. 313. 340
fuel consumption
 
68. 219
fuel <>auae
 
68, z"19.~302
fuselage
 
10. 24. 47. 130,248.251, 270,277,286
inspection procedures
 
297
landing gear
 
10-12. IS. 47-48. 69. 89. 248
low-speed stall
 
76
 
cost
 
maiden flight
 
34. 124. 149. 250-252. 263. 269. 273.
280. 285-286, 309, 322. 341-342
 
66. 288
mission 1104
 
cover story
 
I 14
 
60. 85. 89-90, 94, 99, 132, 156, 178-180.
182, 207-208, 216,224,295
coverage
316
 
mission 1105
114
mission 1314
 
deadstick landing
 
mission 2003
 
117
 
79
 
100
 
deployment
 
mission 2009
 
2, 74. 76. 78. 88-89. 93-94. 134. 161.
165, 167, 247, 250. 255-257, 297.
301-302. 304. 307,3 13,3 17.332
 
mission 2010
 
design
 
mission 2013
 
IO I
101
 
47
 
104-105
 
destruction device
 
mission 2014
 
177
 
105
 
detachable pogos
 
mission 2020
106
mission 2021
106
 
47
ejection seat
 
64. 177, 302
 
ioe,at
 
Sec1 et NOFORN
 
Index
 
387
mission 2023
108
mission 2029
124
mission 3086
200
mission 3088
200
mission 3089
201
mission 3091
205
mission 3093
205
mission 3095
205
mission 3098
206
mission 3 100
206
mission 4016
124
mission 40 18
124
mission 4019
126
mission 4030
133
- mission 4154
175
mission 4 I55
168
mission 6011
144
mission length
199
~
mission plotting
60
mission programmers
78
missions
59, 75, 82, 87, 106, I 14, 124, 127,
129, 154, 164, 167, 179, 187, 196, 207,
210,224,237,245,254,263, 316-317,
322,336
Nationalist Chinese crews
222
 
oleostrut
47, 69
operational altitude
76, 79, 108, 152
Operational Objective system
309
 
Operational Readiness Inspection
77
outrigger wheels
79
overflights
6, 32, 62, 74, 76-77. 84-86, 88-89,
94-98, I00-10 I, I04-106, 108-111,
114, l 16, 122-128, 135, 138-140,
142-143, 146, 148, 152, 154-157,
159, 161-165, 167-168, 170, 172,
180-181, 195-198, 200-20 I, 205-206,
208, 210-21 l, 219, 222-226, 228-237,
239-240, 242-244, 249, 253, 257, 259,
294, 297-301, 310, 315-317, 318-320,
322
paint penalty
149
payload
262, 8, 11. 50, 54, 340, 87, 145, 152
peripheral missions
I 89, 206, 244, 246
phaseout
257, 310
pilot fatigue
199
pilot hypoxia
80
pilot life-support system
64
pilot selection
60,283
pilot-survival gear
62
pilot training program
75
pilot urination
64
pilots
42, 299, 47, 56, 59-60,62-66, 68-69,
71-77, 79-80, 94, 109, 113-114, 116,
125, 127. 132-135. 140, 148-149, 153156, 164. 175-176, 179. 181-183, 186-187,
198-199, 207-212, 214, 221, 223-226,
229-230, 233-236, 238-240, 243, 246-248.
250-253, 256,283,319,321,332,340
pilots dessicated
65
pitch-control servo device
296
pogos
47, 79, 108
 
ieeFet
 
Sec, et NOFORN
Index
 
388
prebreathing
 
117, 121, 124. 140, 142. 147-148. 153-156.
159, 161. 163-164, 179. 181-183. 187,201.
205,215. 221-222, 224-226. 229-232, 245247. 254. 256. 285, 294. 297, 299. 301-302.
306. 315. 60. 316, 318-319. 332
 
64, 125
projects
 
39-40. 42-44. 56, 59, 61-62. 71, 73.
74, 81-82, 88-89, 97, 153-155, 157.
186,257,316, 327-331
rocking mount
 
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft
'1QJ 304
 
51, 53
stall envelope
 
71
stalls
 
80
tail section
 
47, 76
taxi trials
 
68-69
training
 
302
vertical stabilizers
 
277,343
vulnerability study
 
97, 207
U-28
 
95
U-2Cs
 
152, 196, 208, 210, 217
U-2F
 
198
U-2G
 
UPWIND
 
303
Urals
 
22. 163
uranium gaseous-diffusion plant
 
239
uranium-processing facility
 
138
US Air Attache in Moscow
 
177
US Air Force. Secretary of the
I I. 32, 78, 81. 327-329
US Air Force
Air Weather Service
 
94
Chief of Air Scaff
 
78
EC-130. 146
Inspector General
 
248. 250, 252. 255
 
61
 
251-253, 257, 282, 336
 
62
 
U-2R
 
U-3
66
Ukraine
 
106
Under Secretary of State
 
188, 225
Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs)
 
72
United Arab Republic
 
153
United Kingdom (See Great Britain)
United Kingdom Requirements Committee
154
United Nations
 
20
United Press International (UPI)
 
232
United States
 
2-4, 7-8. 19-21. 26-27. 73. 77-78.
85, 89-90. 96. 98- I00. I08-110. 112.
 
Secret
 
oxygen mask
RB-57D Canberra
 
162
Third Air Force
 
89
US deterrent force
 
317
US Geological Survey
254
US House of Representatives
Appropriations Committee
 
88
US Marine Corps
 
40. 153. 247, 328
US Marine Corps Reserve
 
14
US Military Academy at West Point
 
329
US Navy
Chief of Naval Materiel
 
285
 
Sec. et N6f6RN
Index
 
389
Neptune bomber
 
Vladivostok, Soviet Union
 
3
Privateer patrol aircraft
 
3. 126
Vogt, Richard
 
3
Naval Ordnance Test Station
 
8
Voigt. Woldemar
 
340
U.S. News and World Report
 
8
Vol ga River
 
99
US nuclear test monitoring system
 
139
 
22
von Fritsche, Wc:mer
 
I
 
US nuclear tests
 
147
US Senate, Anned Services Commiuee
 
88. 99, 185
US Senate. Foreign Relations Committee
 
w
 
165, 185
US 6th Fleet
 
153
US 7th Fleet
 
215
US lmelligence Board (USIB)
 
196-197. 225,228,249, 332,336
USS Kitty Hawk
 
247
USS Ranger
 
250
utility aircraft
66
 
WADC's Bombardment Branch
 
8
Wake Island
 
305
Walker, Christopher H.
 
155
wallpaper
 
130
Walter Reed Hospital
 
96
Warsaw Pact
 
87·
Washington University. St. Louis
 
29
Watertown Strip
 
V
 
57
Watton RAF Base. England
 
Vance. Cyrus
 
238. 300. 309-310
Venezue la
 
211
vernier adjustment
76
very-high-acuity lenses
 
50
Viet Cong
 
230, 243
Vietnam
 
190. 216, 22 1-222, 230-231 , 233-234.
242-243, 246, 30 I , 304-308, 311. 336.
342-343
Vito. Carmine
 
65. 105, 124-125, 214
Vladimirovka. Soviet Union
 
17 1
 
156
"weather plane" cover story
 
179
weather research
 
85-86, 89-'90. I 32, 182
Wearherwise
 
2 16
Wendover, Utah
 
295
West Potomac P~irk
 
42
Western Europe
 
20, 85, 140
Western Hemisphere
 
21 1
"wet-wing" design
 
68
 
iuret:
 
ieeret NOFORN
Index
 
390
WHALE TALE
247,249
Wheelon, Albert (Bud)
240, 287, 333
Wheelus AFB
121
White House
33, 43, 97, 109, ll 1-112, 120, 122.
128, 154, 172, 186, 189
Wienberg, Charles F. {Bud)
7, 11-12
Wiesbaden, Gennany
80, 95, 104-105, 108. l 14-ll5,
120-121
Wiesner, Jerome B.
37
Williams, John J.
185
Williamsport, Pennsylvania
222
Wilson. Charles
126
wind currents
87
wind tunnels
269
wing teeth
277
wings
5, 8. 1I. 23-25, 42, 45, 47, 66. 68.
72. 75-76, 80. 89, 95. 129, 148-149,
199. 242,248, 25!, 271. 274,277,
286, 312, 340
wiretaps
2
Wonsan Harbor
307
Worcester, Massachusetts
62
world press
85, 122
World Warr
l
World War II
1-2. 4, 7-8. 13, 15. 17. 22. 42,
49, 56, 62. 87, 95. 97, !24. 135,
214, 222, 232. 317, 322. 327-33!
 
Sec1et
 
Wright Air Development Command
4-5, 8, 12, 14, 18, 35, 73
Wright-Patterson
73
WRINGER
2
WS-461L
144-145
Wu-ch'ang. China
228
 
X
XF-104
(See Lockheed Day Fighter)
X-16
9. 13, 15. 26, 34-35
X-band radar pulses
335
X-rays
291
 
y
YAK-25RM
(See Mandrake)
YAK-26
(See Mandrake)
Yakov!ev
148
Yakovlev-25
148
Yale University
15
Yancey, William f.
75, 77-78
YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser
13
Yerevan, Soviet Union
124
YF-!2A
285, 291, 294, 308
50z(See also AF-12)
Yokota AFB. Japan
134
 
Sec, el NOFOAN
Index
 
391
 
Yur'ya, Soviet Union
176
 
Yutzy, Henry
31
 
..Seeret
 
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