UAP Gerb — “Special Access Required: the Secrecy of UFO Crash Retrieval Programs” [VOL.2]

Source: UAP Gerb (YouTube channel @UAPGerb). Long-form documentary, Volume 2 of his crash-retrieval-secrecy series. URL: https://youtu.be/6MsmPrpQqa8 Published: 2026-06-19. Duration: 3:22:45. Captured: 2026-06-19 via OpenAI Whisper (scripts/speech_to_text_remote.py, —timestamps; auto-chunked at 25MB, timestamps continuous across chunks). Single narrator (Gerb). Verbatim machine transcription — proper nouns, acronyms, statute citations, and names may be mis-rendered; verify any specific citation against the video. What this is: Volume 2 — the legal and administrative mechanics of the alleged program: rotating “cognizance” across time epochs (Truman/Eisenhower NSC, CIA Office of Policy Coordination, the Atomic Energy Commission), the randomized personnel/custodianship schema, and the claimed White House non-covert-action special-access-program loophole (50 U.S.C. 3093 reporting carve-outs) plus DOE custodianship as the mechanisms that keep the program outside Gang-of-Eight reporting and FOIA. Primary source for gerb-uap-open-source-researcher.

[0.0s → 12.5s] The cognizance of who was kind of leading the program changed over time epochs. The genesis was in the Truman and Eisenhower National Security Council and the CIA Office of Policy Strategy. [12.5s → 22.7s] But the Atomic Energy Commission was involved, the Department of Defense at the time. With how they hide this program based on time epochs and who they trust, career civil servants, [22.7s → 33.2s] career senior executives in industry, they rotate it and they randomize the schema too. It’s not like this one guy in this one DOD office always gets it. [33.2s → 44.2s] They spread it across and it’s just like rule by committee, flat hierarchy. What we’ve seen in previous administrations, like Clint, people, the program thought Clint [44.2s → 66.4s] was going to disclose in the 90s. Well, there was a burn bag and shred party at a particular agency in the mid-90s, I’m aware of. You have to remember, so here’s one of the loopholes they use, right? So there’s White House special access programs. There was something called covert access programs, 50 U.S. Code 3093. Those are the programs reported to Gang of Eight, Gang of Four. [66.4s → 77.8s] That’s like assassination stuff, et cetera, other things the government doesn’t acknowledge. But there’s a way to develop a White House app that is non-covert action, White House [77.8s → 101.6s] special access program. If you look in the law, there are no reporting carve outs. That was one of the tricks of the trade, bearing it over in the Department of Energy, but also keeping it in these non-covert action programs that like, you know, five people on the NSC know about, and the president at one time. And then, you know, it has custodianship over across the Potomac and McLean. [101.6s → 132.1s] The singular purpose of my channel is to uncover the UFO legacy program architecture. Special access, unacknowledged special access, controlled access, and non-covert action White House programs that are housed within elements of the United States executive branch, armed forces, intelligence community, national laboratories, and defense industrial base infrastructure that is tasked with the retrieval, collection, storage, exploitation, and derivation of non-human [132.1s → 168.2s] technical vehicles and technologies of unknown origin. This once mighty and stalwart national effort that I call the Manhattan Project 2.0, spearheaded by the U.S.’s greatest presidents, military leaders, senior statesmen, and seasoned politicians under the auspice of the National Security Council, devolved and degraded during the Cold War, breaking off pieces of itself and siloing itself into cover offices and programs to morph and adapt to special access program oversight reforms and expansions during the [168.2s → 181.8s] 1970s and 1980s, ultimately relegating program control to a quasi-government and industry control group of just over two dozen in 1994 in order to flee from the disclosure disposition [181.8s → 216.4s] of President Bill Clinton. Further disfiguring was done to this once mighty effort when in the early days of the Global War on Terror, 2005 to be specific, certain defense contractors like Northrop Grumman harnessed company-funded independent research and development funds, IRAD, to ostensibly conduct their own breakaway UFO retrieval and exploitation activities, as well as 2009 when the last quote-unquote mob boss who reigned control of the entire legacy program portfolio [216.4s → 229.7s] across the scattered silos and grains of rice in a rice bowl, Dick Cheney, left office as VP. Indeed, the immense UFO crash retrieval and reverse engineering activities of Truman, [229.7s → 251.8s] Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, etc. are unrecognizable to the fractured ecosystem of today. A long past its prime portfolio of siloed program fiefdoms subject to severe redundancies and brain drain, seriously at risk of losing a sub-Rosa Cold War with our peer adversaries [251.8s → 270.6s] to harness control over these quote-unquote otherworldly technologies. To visualize such a tangled and scattered web of programs that have seen nearly 80 years of morphing and mangling, I visualized the modern day UFO legacy program structure as [270.6s → 278.1s] a pyramid. For further down the pyramid one travels, sees far less access to program institutional [278.1s → 297.2s] knowledge and exponentially decreasing ability to peer across program silos. To keep a hyper-complex story short that I discuss in the introduction of nearly every single one of my videos, this pyramid was once governed by a now amorphous centralized [297.2s → 317.1s] control group. Truman, Eisenhower, the National Security Council and its 54-12 committee special group, and that special group’s MAJ-12 or Majestic-12, ultimately degrading into the quasi-industry and government control group of today that features a flat hierarchy where nobody after [317.1s → 324.3s] Dick Cheney operates full control and oversight of all siloed program directives. [324.3s → 334.4s] Below the control group sits program administration. Once thought of by me as silo containers, housing specific programs and directives under [334.4s → 344.9s] specific elements of the armed forces and intelligence community. Below the administrators sits federally-funded research and development centers, FFRDCs and [344.9s → 363.9s] GOCOs, government-owned contractor-operated institutions. FFRDCs and GOCO structures allow the US government to attract the brightest of industry and subject matter experts, while still retaining strict control over programs, materials, breakthroughs, [363.9s → 370.5s] etc. At the bottom layer of the pyramid sits the most security-vulnerable aspect of the legacy [370.5s → 382.0s] structure, defense-industrial base-prime contractors and their subcontractors. Only specific personnel within these companies are read into the legacy effort at a functional [382.0s → 409.6s] level, including executive-level positions, C-suite executives, or special program directors. The mortar that binds this structure together, well of course, this is the US defense-industrial base, whose authoritative channels are often bypassed to allow UFO legacy programs to harness any US military and intelligence asset that may be needed to accomplish these covert mission [409.8s → 425.8s] directives. But one aspect of this pyramid has not degraded and broken itself over time. Instead, this core element to the legacy pyramid has, in a way, increased exponentially alongside [425.8s → 440.2s] the morphing of the legacy program structure. Indeed, I am speaking about the equivalent to the limestone casing that once encapsulated the Great Pyramids of Giza to protect the structures from the elements. [440.2s → 451.7s] The UFO Legacy Program Security Apparatus. The security architecture of UFO crash retrieval and reverse engineering programs is so incredibly [451.7s → 464.4s] robust. Not only have I had to break this topic into two separate parts to cover the changing security blanket obfuscating UFO covert activities from 1947 to present, but I have also had [464.4s → 482.8s] to convey such a security apparatus analogous to an onion. Where akin to an onion center surrounded by many layers, the core secrets and extant presence of the UFO crash retrieval and exploitation portfolio is always hidden and obscured by [482.8s → 494.1s] another layer of protection and secrecy. So today, I warmly welcome you to join me for Part 2 of our investigation into UFO Legacy [494.1s → 509.8s] Program Secrecy. After all, one of the most appropriate and poignant questions asked about the existence of UFO Legacy Programs is how can such technology, biologics, crash retrievals, and programs [509.8s → 522.4s] be kept secret and kept secret for 80 years at that? Here’s the thing. For those of you who still think that, you know, we’ve got little green men underground [522.4s → 532.0s] somewhere. One of the things you learn as president is government is terrible at keeping secrets. [532.0s → 554.2s] This idea of conspiracy theories. If there were aliens or alien spaceships or anything under the control of the United States government that we knew about, seen, photographs, what have you, I promise you some guy guarding the installation would have taken a selfie with one of the aliens and sent it to his [554.2s → 563.8s] girlfriend and present. It would leak. Today’s project seeks to pick up right where we left off, correcting the record on similar [563.8s → 603.0s] obscene comments like that from Obama. We will be leaving the epoch of 1947 to 1994, where we explored the Manhattan Project 2.0’s security apparatus, ripped straight from the Manhattan Project, investigated key individuals instrumental to establishing covert UFO recovery and study infrastructure, distilled how statutory secrets derived from the 1954 Atomic Energy Act not only evade presidential declassification, but also serve as the perfect vessels to hide UFO activities with an iron grip, identified [603.0s → 620.9s] the National Security Council as the top secret early legacy control group, narrowed in on the great schism that led to the Manhattan Project 2.0 taking drastic security measures during the 1980s to maintain secrecy, leading directly to the fractured program ecosystem [620.9s → 637.3s] of today and so much more. As we depart the Manhattan Project 2.0, and quite frankly, its depressing devolution behind, we move on into the modern era, to shift our lens on how UFO legacy activities today [637.3s → 645.8s] maintain secrecy. We will reorient our lens to study layers of the UFO legacy onion, critical individual [645.8s → 679.7s] layers and concepts paramount to obfuscating the core of the 21st century legacy apparatus. After all here, a cadre of covert, compartmented, and beyond top secret programs, facilitating knowledge and need-to-know access to the greatest secret in the history of mankind, the presence and procurement of non-human technology and their biological operators, existing as a hidden shadow symbiotically attached to the United States government, armed forces, intelligence [679.7s → 693.3s] community, would require an ever-evolving, impenetrable, and stalwart architecture to stay hidden from even presidents and other elected quote-unquote temporary employees, [693.3s → 700.2s] would it not? So let’s peel back some layers of embedded secrecy, where layers protect layers that [700.2s → 734.6s] obscure core secrets. From conceptualizing special access programs, or SAPs, to uncovering some of the loopholes for managed need-to-know compartmented programs legacy operations have used with quote-unquote non-covert White House programs, to program protection agencies deputized to enforce insider and outsider threat protection to maintain total program secrecy, to the antibodies David Grush awoke when investigating the topic in a legal and empowered manner, to the disgraced [734.6s → 764.7s] Sean Kirkpatrick and his ineffective All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office arrow, to the ATIP Program Protection Management Campaign and attempts to talk about the subject outside of the proverbial onion, to the myriad, and I mean myriad, criminal actions taken that aid the all-encompassing subject of quote-unquote unrivaled secrecy, this project will not hold back and aims to conduct a hyper-specific investigation into the modern-day legacy [764.7s → 786.6s] onion. So as I said in Part 1, sit back, mark your notes, special access required, and let us deep dive into the secrecy and security mechanisms that embolden UFO legacy programs to operate in the shadows with unrivaled secrecy, power, and reach. [797.0s → 846.5s] Before jumping off into our investigation today, let us quickly define our onion analogy, recap Part 1 of our investigation, and lay out today’s discussion points in an executive summary format. Part 1 focused predominantly on the rise of the Manhattan Project 2.0 security infrastructure and fall from grace during the Cold War into the fragmented and siloed program infrastructure of today. Within the Manhattan Project 2.0 volume, we listened closely to the sage words of David Grush, who directly stated the Manhattan Project [846.5s → 883.6s] secrecy apparatus was translated directly onto early UFO retrieval and exploitation efforts. First of it, obviously, it’s understanding the situation, right? What do we have our hands on? And like I’ve said in some other videos and stuff, we took the Manhattan Project secrecy and overlaid it on this issue because that secrecy worked well for atomic bomb developments and whatnots. And certainly, this whole program in a nutshell, if I were to like summarize the 90 plus years of history, it is a reverse engineering program to garner some kind of [883.6s → 899.4s] insight. Indeed, we then explored five critical concepts of secrecy translated from the Manhattan Project directly onto the Manhattan Project 2.0. Compartmentalization, organizational architecture, physical security, [899.4s → 911.5s] classification, and information control, and finally, political shield slash cover. To summarize an hour plus section in just a few sentences, let’s quickly recap and [911.5s → 921.2s] break down each of these points. Compartmenting or compartmentalizing programs or information operates as a defensive security [921.2s → 958.8s] mechanism, reducing attack vectors for espionage, leaks, and intrusions. The practice of compartmentalization sees program personnel granted access only to the specific information they need to perform their duties, even if they hold the necessary clearance level. The Manhattan Project served as a period of tremendous innovation of compartmented programs, leading to the modern-day basis for special access programs. We also discussed organizational architecture being weaponized and leveraged for secrecy. The Manhattan Project [958.8s → 995.1s] was conducted out of the Manhattan Engineer District, MED, which served as the legal and administrative entity through which the Manhattan Project operated. The MED was chosen to be inconspicuous and essentially a container within the US Army Corps of Engineers to house the top-secret atomic project. We compared this secrecy practice with the early days of the quote-unquote hidden wing, an Air Force series of UFO tests and evaluation programs I’ve published extensively on that are housed as a shadow hidden in plain sight within the [995.1s → 1030.3s] Department of the Air Force. Moving on to physical security, saw a translation of the Manhattan Project’s most secret and heavily guarded sites, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and soon-to-be Los Alamos Z Division at Sandia Base, aka Sandia National Lab, onto the Manhattan Project 2.0. Indeed, within that section, we discussed alleged classified executive orders signed by Truman in 1948, which relegated custody of recovered disks to Atomic Energy Commission National Laboratories to be studied [1030.3s → 1038.6s] by the prestigious Dr. Vannevar Bush. And here we arrive to our final two Manhattan Project security blankets that are crucial [1038.6s → 1057.1s] to conceptualize as we move on to Part 2 today. Classification and Information Control saw discussion of self-imposed and mandatory self-classification protocols for atomic scientists, as well as a deep investigation into the 1946 and 1954 [1057.1s → 1071.3s] Atomic Energy Acts. One of the most critical discussions of the entirety of Part 1 was highlighting the introduction of two separate tracts of classification within the United States upon establishment of the [1071.3s → 1079.0s] Atomic Energy Commission. Tract 1, of course, being the standard executive order-based system. Think of the standard [1079.0s → 1090.5s] confidential, secret, and top-secret levels of classification. Tract 2 being the statutory Atomic Energy Commission, DOE, and NNSA system, whose authority [1090.5s → 1107.8s] is derived from the 1954 Atomic Energy Agreements. The second tract of U.S. classification here sees equivalence to secret and top-secret classifications with L and Q clearance, respectively, but also restricted data, formally restricted [1107.8s → 1120.5s] data, special nuclear materials, all information quote-unquote born classified. Such a second system is not subject to executive order and will likely prove to be a real can [1120.5s → 1135.3s] of worms for any president to take full steps to disclose. Thanks to the SAGE Council and discussion of GRUSH, we know both systems of classification are used by legacy programs to maintain secrecy. [1135.3s → 1156.5s] They’re basically treating this as nuclear secrets, because it gives off nuclear radiation. Because if you look at the ultra-vague definition of special nuclear material, which is section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it says, anything that gives off a sizable amount of [1156.5s → 1172.3s] atomic energy, literally that’s what it says. With sizable, in what legal gymnastics are you saying this stuff, which is obviously not a, well, who knows, maybe a nuclear weapon, and you’re saying this is a U.S. nuclear secret, [1172.3s → 1182.3s] you’re trans-classifying it into a nuclear secret. Finally here, we have the political shield slash cover, which existed as the quote-unquote [1182.3s → 1209.4s] top policy group at the apex of the Manhattan Project. The top policy group was the narrow and stripped chain of command to which General Leslie Groves reported, consisting of a handful of powerful figures like FDR slash Truman, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and of course, don’t forget, head of the OSRD, or Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush, and [1209.4s → 1215.5s] his assistant. And the purpose of this group, well, this was to keep Redden personnel and the existing [1215.6s → 1226.3s] control group small, minimize the paper trail, and maintain presidential control. Funny enough here, Truman wasn’t briefed on the Manhattan Project as a senator or even [1226.3s → 1239.0s] vice president. Only when he was sworn in as president after FDR’s death was he actually read in. Indeed, we discussed how Truman relegated control over the UFO portfolio to the National [1239.0s → 1263.8s] Security Council after the establishment of the 1947 National Security Act. But of significantly greater consequence, we discussed how in 1954 and 1955, President Eisenhower created the NSC 5412 Committee Special Group, and designated such a body focused on covert action as the Manhattan Project 2.0’s control group. [1263.8s → 1281.5s] This is the Majestic 12, appropriately called at this time, Madge 12. Ultimately within Part 1, we discussed the Cold War and the concept of changing tides, where the wild, wild west days of the Legacy Program ran from the 1950s up until the early [1281.5s → 1289.0s] 1980s. This epoch saw several executive orders expand and contract oversight over Special Access [1289.0s → 1301.1s] Program precursors, aka Black Projects. Indeed, Nixon’s Executive Order 11652 saw tremendous concern over ad-hoc security protocols, [1301.1s → 1330.1s] including top-secret codeword access. We concluded the great schism that ended the Manhattan Project 2.0 was actually Ronald Reagan’s 1982 Executive Order 12356, which ended the wild, wild west days of Legacy activities by effectively concluding top-secret codeword read-on access and other ad-hoc security protocols, as well as the 1983 revelation of Yellow Fruit, an Army SOD or Special Operations Division [1330.1s → 1344.1s] unacknowledged Special Access Program USAP. This USAP, a term we will use often today, was discovered through a series of normal audits, and revealed a shady world of data masking, cover offices, staged retirements, [1345.1s → 1353.6s] illegal covert activities, and so on. Yellow Fruit partially led to the uncovering of the Iran Contras, and directly led to massive [1353.6s → 1361.5s] SAP reforms. Such reforms forced Legacy activities to sever off their own limbs to hide and silo themselves [1361.5s → 1381.0s] within cover offices and programs. As a finishing bow on Part 1, we discussed how Legacy Operations, fearful of Clinton’s disclosure appetite, permanently vested the UFO Legacy Program Control Group in 1994 into a quasi-industry and government control group of just over two dozen. [1381.0s → 1390.1s] And again, it appears Dave Grush agrees with this statement. What we’ve seen in previous administrations, the program thought Clinton was going to disclose [1390.1s → 1396.3s] in the 90s. Well, there was a burn bag and shred party at a particular agency in the mid-90s, I’m [1396.3s → 1431.2s] aware of. The Manhattan Project formed our proverbial onion. However, unlike the great schism of the Manhattan Project 2.0, which led to tremendous fracturing and weakening of the overall national effort to retrieve and exploit non-human technical vehicles, every single special access reform period, whether it be expansion or retraction of oversight, every time Legacy was forced to silo one of its limbs within a cover office like the SAF AA, even when the Legacy Program vested control into a quasi-government and [1431.2s → 1438.3s] industry control group, this all saw amplification, strengthening, and new layers added to the [1438.3s → 1445.3s] onion. The Manhattan Project’s secrecy apparatus itself can also be represented by a proverbial [1445.3s → 1462.8s] onion, sure. If you were a low-level physicist, you were subject to Vannevar Bush’s system of self-censorship, Groves’ compartmentalization, need-to-know access, the Manhattan Engineered District, the top policy group, numerous layers that kept ordinary people on the project always [1462.8s → 1472.4s] a step away from the core of the atomic project. Now recontextualize that Atomic Project onion model for the Manhattan Project 2.0 in the [1472.4s → 1502.9s] 50s. With the addition of restricted data in special nuclear materials under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, custody of non-human materials being delegated via classified presidential executive order, a special group focused on covert activities being established within the National Security Council, top-secret codeword program access similar to NRO by man, and a litany of security protocols even more strict and expansive than the Atomic Project overlaying this project [1502.9s → 1533.3s] portfolio. Now imagine that same security system in the 1980s, but with a fractured centralized leadership group to direct and establish security baselines for this once-mighty national effort, where program elements were forced to burrow even deeper into the shadows to hide from Pentagon audits, and throw in the Air Force and NRO program involvement being broken off and hidden within the Air Force SAF AA, and understand that naval involvement is hidden within programs, [1533.3s → 1537.5s] hidden within other programs, themselves hidden within even further programs like the [1537.5s → 1545.5s] Polaris program and Sand Dollar. Observe instances of projects within the armed forces and intelligence community being siloed [1545.5s → 1555.2s] into their own containers with a flat hierarchy. This leaves you with an onion model that quite literally doubles, triples, or even exponentially [1555.2s → 1575.9s] grows in size. Add to that concentrated efforts in the early 2010s by specific FFRDCs and elements of the US government to quite literally restrict program history briefings on legacy incumbents, to purposefully keep new program personnel ignorant to the scope and history of the legacy [1575.9s → 1604.5s] program portfolio and their specific siloed project. And no, I’m not joking there. Because today, we are left with an onion model of secrecy that is so vast, convoluted, and severe, I am willing to wager any amount of money the following statement is true as I say this with the utmost confidence, today, only 40 to 50 people alive at any given time [1604.5s → 1638.0s] know the full breadth and history of the programs. Former Chief Scientist of the Navy Special Programs Office, Dr. John Peña Craven, said it best when speaking about the Sand Dollar Compartmented Program, a program I highly wager was involved in undersea UFO recoveries, with his quote-unquote seventh fail analogy, where even highly cleared individuals within top-secret, unacknowledged classified projects could never truly know if they’d reached the innermost layer of compartmentation or [1638.0s → 1643.5s] were in fact just working on a cover program in service of another cover program going [1643.5s → 1663.1s] on for an unknown length of time. So as we investigate today, we cannot reconstruct the onion, but we can identify several of the layers that majorly factor into the modern day security structure behind the mess that is the UFO legacy program portfolio. [1663.1s → 1682.3s] These include possibly one of the most robust and imperative outer-ish layers of the onion. The very vessels under which UFO legacy activities operate, receive funding and appropriations, maintain a baseline level of security, classification, and need-to-know access, and a vessel legacy [1682.3s → 1694.8s] activities often mold and stretch to suit the needs of these covert operations. I am talking of course of Special Access Programs, SAPs, out of the DoD and DoE, and their intelligence [1694.8s → 1728.8s] community equivalents, Controlled Access Programs, or CAPs. As the very structure of SAPs, which we will focus on significantly more than CAPs, is so fundamental to understanding UFO legacy programs, we will spend an exorbitant amount of time studying the ultra-strict definitions, history, authority, limitations, etc. of SAPs and explain why exactly covert UFO activities have been for years hidden within Special Access Programs and their precursor Black Programs under the authorities of Executive [1728.8s → 1754.6s] Order 10502, Executive Order 11652, and Executive Order 12356, as we outlined in Part 1. Most critical to understand about SAPs actually goes far beyond the standard definition and application of SAPs, where SAPs are, quote, established to control access, distribution, and provide protection for sensitive classified information beyond that normally required, [1754.6s → 1763.1s] end quote. Indeed, for us, it is crucial to understand the three types of SAPs, acquisition, intelligence, [1763.1s → 1779.5s] and operations and support programs. How such SAPs report to relevant OSD or Office of the Secretary of Defense offices that are culpable in legacy operations, including USD-INS or Intelligence and Security, USD-R&E [1779.5s → 1797.4s] or Research and Engineering, and USD-ANS or Acquisition and Sustainment. Give examples of how each type of SAP can be implicated in UFO legacy activities, as well as really digest the consequence behind the categories of SAPs, acknowledged, unacknowledged, [1797.4s → 1809.6s] and waived. It is in fact the ability to waive unacknowledged SAPs with additional security protocols legacy programs have enjoyed to hide from traditional oversight channels. [1809.6s → 1818.2s] Of course, guys, it’s me, so we will go much deeper here. We will not stop at a standard SAP analysis and thorough investigation of the skeleton [1818.2s → 1823.7s] of the gatekeeping and governance structure of SAPs, including the SAPOC and SAPCO. [1823.7s → 1827.7s] And if you don’t know those definitions yet, don’t worry, because we will get to them. [1827.9s → 1838.4s] We will also introduce the subject of quote-unquote content-only SAPs. Content-only SAPs are quite the ingenious loophole legacy programs, specifically the [1838.4s → 1861.2s] White House and National Security-run UFO crash retrieval activities have employed. As we will discuss, content-only SAPs are not a type of SAP, but a descriptive funding slash administrative designation, whereas a SAP holds or protects classified information aka content without dedicated program-specific funding lines, major resource allocation, [1861.2s → 1868.3s] or separate budgetary authority. Such a system has been enjoyed to completely waive reporting requirements as indeed the [1868.3s → 1876.3s] SAP contains just information. I strongly recommend if you take one thing away from this project, it is the topic of [1876.3s → 1885.7s] content-only SAPs and what we summarize next. In addition to content-only SAPs, we will distill what David Grush stated on his incredible [1885.7s → 1898.5s] Judicial Watch interview, the topic of covert action programs born out of 50 U.S. Code 3093. As David Grush stated, all eyes on the White House here and specific importance on the [1898.5s → 1911.3s] National Security Council. And I love how when David Grush spoke on this topic, he mentioned alongside Eisenhower and Truman being the genesis for legacy activities, specifically five people in the National Security [1911.3s → 1921.6s] Council were involved at one time in the programs. Of course, part one focused heavily on Eisenhower’s NSC 5412 Committee Special Group, which was [1921.6s → 1930.8s] founded specifically to address covert actions. Indeed, as I stated, Eisenhower relegated the NSC 5412 Committee Special Group as the [1930.8s → 1937.7s] UFO Legacy Program Administrator. And guess how many people were in the 5412 Committee? [1937.7s → 1952.7s] That’s right, five. So thanks again, David Grush. That was one of the tricks of the trade, bearing it over in the Department of Energy, but also keeping it these non-covert action programs that like, you know, five people in the NSC know about the president at one time. [1952.7s → 1970.5s] And then, you know, it has custodianship over across the Potomac and McLean. Anyways, as we will discuss, the White House and NSC have taken covert action programs, designated them as non-covert action programs by utilizing content-only SAPs and compartments, [1970.5s → 1977.0s] completely waiving reporting requirements, and use such vessels for legacy activities. [1977.0s → 1990.9s] So again, I can’t stress this enough. If you recall just two things from this video, non-covert action programs and content-only SAPs are what I ask you to recall, ingenious loopholes that have been historically utilized [1990.9s → 2014.3s] by the National Security Council’s UFO Legacy Program portfolio. Let us also, of course, address some of the more nefarious and disturbing inner-ish layers of the onion, Program Protection Offices, U.S. agencies and services who see specific personnel and elements deputized to enforce UFO legacy activity security protocols, akin [2014.3s → 2031.5s] to the antibodies David Grush stirred when he heroically pursued the UFO issue. These offices are inherently tasked with safeguarding some of the United States’ most intimate national security secrets, operate deep within unacknowledged SAP channels, and often feature [2031.5s → 2043.6s] career spooks with, let’s just say, interesting careers in and out of government service. Effectively making a perfect gatekeeping structure to mitigate program exposure and neutralize [2043.6s → 2058.9s] outsider and insider threats. One of the most prolific examples here, which we will actually not spend too much time on as I covered this office and individual extensively in my Air Force project, is the AFOSI PJ, [2058.9s → 2069.2s] or Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Special Projects. PJ is OSI’s office, tasked with safeguarding the Air Force’s most sensitive and national [2069.2s → 2100.8s] security imperative top-secret research, development, and acquisition programs. And I am aware of specific instances in which former PJ Executive Director and former Director of the entire Air Force SAP Security Enterprise, and now Vice President for Security at Northrop Grumman, Terry Phillips, and current PJ Executive Director and Director of the entire Air Force SAP Security Enterprise, Mr. Lee M. Russ, have acted as attack dogs for the UFO legacy architecture. [2100.8s → 2113.6s] I would go so far as to say, Terry and Lee are quite integral figures to legacy operations. Indeed, today, we will mainly focus on three such program protection offices deputized [2113.6s → 2124.0s] to operate as legacy program Gestapo. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Security and Intelligence Directorate, or DARPA SID. [2124.0s → 2130.5s] Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Information Protection Directorate, or AFL-CMC-IP. [2130.5s → 2142.0s] And the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, or OICI. On the subject of DARPA, I am going to introduce a legacy program senior who operates a very [2142.0s → 2149.2s] senior role within the program currently. As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Critical Technologies, out of [2149.2s → 2157.2s] the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, USDR&E. Former Director of Research at the NGA. [2157.2s → 2161.7s] Former Director of IARPA, or the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency. [2161.7s → 2172.5s] And former Deputy Director and Director of DARPA, Dr. Peter Heinem. People want names, and here is a name of an individual at the highest echelons of UFO [2172.5s → 2188.1s] legacy program science and technology currently. We will investigate each of these offices’ missions, their cognizant authority, intriguing personnel, and outline my argument why these three offices in particular, plus AFOS-IPJ, [2188.1s → 2198.7s] are some of the most critical legacy program protection features. I would also be remiss to not speak a bit on the surface of the onion, disinformation [2198.7s → 2205.4s] and narrative control. The UFO topic is rife with disinformation, information control, narrative campaigns, [2205.4s → 2212.8s] etc. and has been for decades. So I would like to quickly revisit the stigma that was carefully manufactured to make this [2212.8s → 2227.5s] topic obscure and appear nonsensical. I would also like to revisit the legacy apparatus’ most recent narrative management tool, ARO, and speak more on former disgraced ARO Director Sean Kirkpatrick and his many half-truths [2227.5s → 2239.7s] and lies. Most consequently to the topic of narrative control and information ops will be to touch on the ATIP cover program, Luis Elizondo, to the Stars Academy, and the coordinated [2239.7s → 2256.9s] attempt to prop up Hillary Clinton as the disclosure president. In summary, the ATIP cover program for all intents and purposes operated as a cover for several National Security Council activities under DNI and former USDINS Lt. Gen. James [2256.9s → 2274.1s] Clapper as a way to talk about the onion outside of the onion. The front man for this operation was indeed Luis Elizondo, who has far more of an intimate history with quote-unquote national programs, USDINS, and the National Security Council [2274.1s → 2293.2s] than he has ever led on. We will extend coverage of this bizarre partial disclosure campaign and touch on the fallacies and partial truths outlined by Elizondo and others within the Age of Disclosure documentary that attempted a revisionist structure of the legacy programs, plural, likely to delegate [2293.2s → 2305.6s] who gets to catch the live hand grenade when disclosure finally comes. And lastly, we will touch on the topic of unrivaled secrecy, numerous small or sub-layers [2305.6s → 2340.4s] the legacy apparatus harnesses and have harnessed to maintain total secrecy. We will discuss cover offices and programs, gatekeeping structures, administrative terrorism, the subject of wetworks and prospective whistleblowers possibly permanently being silenced, the practice of hiding in plain sight, frankly ingenious misappropriation of funds and funding schemes, information siloing through GOCO and FFRDCs, program siloing leading to egregious redundancies, and so much more. So let’s waste no more time and dive right in. [2367.2s → 2390.1s] The 2023 revelations of David Grush strongly cemented the reality of the UFO legacy program [2390.1s → 2403.1s] modus operandi. The retrieval, storage, exploitation, and possibly a host of weirder activities such as communication being housed within national programs, specifically special access programs [2403.1s → 2413.5s] or SAPs as I have called and will call them from here on out. Indeed, in every single project of mine, you will hear me speak ad nauseum about elements [2413.5s → 2436.6s] of legacy activities being housed within SAPs. So I think it necessary and quite frankly mandatory we finally step back and get ultra-specific on why such covert UFO activities have been hidden within SAPs for decades, identify how the structure of SAPs is perfect for this need-to-know ecosystem, and get real specific [2436.6s → 2465.2s] on loopholes harnessed to keep such activities free from traditional oversight channels. Sure, this section may be a little academic at first, but I absolutely implore you to pay close attention and keep notes, because special access programs plus additional access protocols as well as some creative loopholes are the vehicles through which UFO legacy programs operate, get funded, and stay hidden from congressional oversight and those they [2465.2s → 2489.3s] consider quote-unquote temporary employees. And if you’re like me and want some physical materials to follow along, two documents I would strongly recommend keeping handy are DoD Instruction 5205.11, Management, Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs, as well as DoD Instruction 5205.07, Special [2489.3s → 2498.9s] Access Program Security Manual. The term Special Access Program was first acknowledged in the 1980s, and prior to the [2498.9s → 2512.3s] 80s, precursors to SAPs did indeed exist, but as what one might call Black Programs. This era of Black Programs consisted of the early days of the NRO, stealth aircraft programs [2512.3s → 2533.0s] out of the Lockheed Skunk Works, etc. As we’ve discussed so far in Part 1 and here in Part 2 at length, national programs critical to national security, U.S. classification standards, and oversight of compartmented need-to-know programs have fluctuated greatly from the 1947 National Security Act until [2533.0s → 2552.9s] present. Specifically, in Part 1, we referenced Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10-501, which removed the restricted classification designation and introduced the era of ad hoc security protocols on sensitive programs, such as top-secret codeword access, really introducing the concept [2552.9s → 2588.0s] of quote-unquote special access. In Part 1, we also referenced Nixon’s 1972 Executive Order 11-652, which saw the formal framework for special access programs established, resulting in widespread concern of uncontrolled and rampant growth of unauthorized applications of special access labels across DoD compartments, with the House Committee on Government Operations report discussing quote, widespread use of dozens of special access, distribution, or control labels, stamps, or markings on both [2588.0s → 2597.3s] classified and unclassified documents, end quote. These access controls were harnessed by quote, many executive agencies having classification [2597.3s → 2621.2s] authority and dozens of other agencies who do not possess such authority, end quote. Finally, we discussed Reagan’s 1982 Executive Order 12-356, which expanded the categories of classifiable information and lowered the threshold for classification, essentially tightening the grip of government secrecy from Carter’s previous administration’s attempts of government [2621.2s → 2632.1s] secrecy shifting towards declassification and transparency. However, as we discussed in Part 1, EO 12-356 essentially ended the Wild Wild West days [2632.1s → 2643.1s] of the Golden Age of Legacy with the removal of top-secret codeword access. This plus the revelations of the Yellow Fruit USAP led to the great program schism we spoke [2643.1s → 2658.8s] on so much. But I digress here. Today, the framework of special access programs are primarily managed, authorized, and run out of the Department of Defense, and governed by Executive Order 13-526, titled quote, Classified [2658.8s → 2667.5s] National Security Information, end quote. Because remember here, the intelligence community has their own special programs CAPS, Controlled [2667.5s → 2673.7s] Access Programs. And the Atomic Energy Commission, now the Department of Energy, has their own special [2673.7s → 2693.1s] access programs governed by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. But put a pin in that for later. Executive Order 13-526 defines a SAP as a quote, program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements exceeding [2693.1s → 2699.0s] those normally required for information at the same classification level, end quote. [2699.0s → 2719.1s] SAPs are established when a program is required by statute. According to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s SAP training course, which we will be referencing quite often, quote, upon the finding of exceptional vulnerability of or threat to specific information, and if the normal criteria for determining access [2719.1s → 2729.1s] to information classified at the same levels are insufficient, end quote. The existence of special access programs are imperative to U.S. national security for several [2729.1s → 2735.5s] reasons. Some SAPs protect technology breakthroughs and ensure the U.S. maintains its leading [2735.5s → 2758.9s] technological edge. Some SAPs, according to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, quote, ensure once we discover and exploit an adversary’s vulnerabilities, the knowledge of the exploitation remains secure and the adversary does not develop a countermeasure, end quote. Some SAPs ensure sensitive operation plans are completed without disclosure. [2758.9s → 2787.7s] And some SAPs protect sensitive intelligence information. I am willing to bet I do not need to explain why such a system is perfect for a portfolio of programs founded off exceptionally higher security than that of the atomic bomb project, tasked with top secret retrieval, exploitation, and storage of non-human technical vehicles, mandated to be hidden from both U.S. adversaries and any USG element not deemed, quote, unquote, [2787.7s → 2795.2s] need to know. And before we move any further, let’s clear up just a few misconceptions about SAPs. [2795.2s → 2805.0s] SAPs are not a method to hide money spent on certain programs. SAPs are used to ensure the security and accountability of a specific project is maintained to the [2805.0s → 2818.5s] highest level. Of course, as we have prior and will discuss further, legacy programs have used several loopholes to misappropriate illegal and inappropriate funding streams for their portfolio of UFO [2818.5s → 2825.4s] SAPs. Additionally, SAPs are not a classification designation, like confidential, secret, and [2825.4s → 2836.4s] top secret. No, SAPs use the standard level of classification. So in simplest terms, a SAP is a classified and compartmented sensitive research acquisition [2836.4s → 2843.3s] intelligence or operational activities program with enhanced safeguarding and access requirements. [2843.3s → 2851.9s] There’s nothing that you’re aware of that’s above special access program classification. It’s a misnomer that there’s anything actually above top secret. [2851.9s → 2868.6s] Executive order 13-526 delineates the classification levels. If you are with me so far, just to contextualize here, some infamous examples of SAPs in the past include the F-117A Nighthawk, B-21 Raider, RQ-180, and Yellow Fruit we spoke on in part [2868.6s → 2881.6s] one. SAPs are inherently designed to compartment information and employ need-to-know access. Indeed, in part one, we discussed how the Manhattan Project inspired and influenced [2881.6s → 2889.3s] such controls. For one to access a SAP, they must possess an appropriate need-to-know assessed and determined [2889.3s → 2898.1s] by a designated access approval authority. SAPs are so securely safeguarded that access to a SAP is limited to the minimum number [2898.1s → 2910.2s] of individuals essential for program success, irrespective of rank, title, or position. Shifting over for a moment to legacy activities here, I am aware of read-ins to a specific [2910.2s → 2919.3s] legacy activity SAP being kept so small and minimal. Program personnel were often given additional work tasks below their pay grade to avoid [2919.3s → 2932.7s] reading in additional personnel. An example there would include a senior scientist also performing account management or an industrial security professional also performing janitorial work. [2932.7s → 2938.2s] And just so we can be clear here, we discussed this at length in part one, but real fast. [2938.2s → 2947.9s] What exactly is and determines need-to-know? To quote again, the DCSA SAP training course, need-to-know is defined as a quote, fundamental [2947.9s → 2952.6s] principle in the protection of classified information and the protection of SAPs. [2952.6s → 2957.6s] It is not enough just to have the appropriate clearance and formal approval to access a SAP. [2957.6s → 2973.6s] In addition, a person must have a need-to-know that pertains to the specific information, end quote. A SAP operates with an intriguing hierarchy, a system of further compartmentalization within the program to further isolate programs. [2973.6s → 2985.7s] Thus, SAPs are structured into hierarchical tiers called, quote unquote, umbrellas. Beneath a SAP umbrella sits several SAP compartments, and below these compartments sit several SAP [2985.7s → 2997.7s] sub-compartments housing several operational projects. This framework is organized to group similar capabilities or information into a single sub-compartment or compartment. [2997.7s → 3013.9s] Similar critical program information, CPI here, is grouped into a single SAP. We covered several such examples in Part 1, such as the Polaris Submarine Special Program housing numerous hidden programs, which in turn held the Sand Dollar Covert Program, [3013.9s → 3029.5s] that I am highly confident was involved in undersea UFO retrieval operations. We additionally discussed the Army Special Operations Division’s SODS Yellow Fruit USAP, which contained several classified operations as well as the Army CIA support for Latin [3029.5s → 3036.7s] American operations. This umbrella structure makes it shockingly easy to take an already classified program [3036.7s → 3044.7s] and further compartment and hide both projects and information within. Even the naming of special access programs [3044.7s → 3053.3s] are meant to compartment and hide information. SAPs commonly use an unclassified nickname comprised of two unrelated words [3053.3s → 3070.5s] that represent what’s known as a program identifier or PID. Think here of Yellow Fruit or the 2010 Department of Homeland Security prospective special access program Kona Blue, which was meant to serve as a vehicle for Lockheed Martin to pass UFO materials to the AUSEP program [3070.5s → 3083.6s] as examples here. In addition to the two word unclassified nickname representing the program identifier PID, sometimes the special access program central office SAPCO might add an additional singular classified code word [3083.6s → 3098.1s] onto a program for enhanced compartmentation. So here’s an example for a naming convention for a SAP, TS SAR Hanger Bully Waved, where TS means top secret classification, [3098.1s → 3110.6s] SAR means special access required. Hanger Bully is the unclassified nickname representing the program identifier and Waved is an additional control marking slash secondary layer of security [3110.6s → 3119.7s] we will expand on momentarily. Another example is the Kona Blue marking on screen now with the additional control marker of no foreign, [3119.7s → 3129.6s] short for not releasable to foreign nationals. Indeed, I am aware of specific UFO related SAPs in the early 2000s that extensively featured Waved [3129.6s → 3146.3s] and no foreign controls. To make this even more complicated here, I’m aware of testimony from whistleblowers who have sworn statements before Congress that SAPs housing UFO legacy activities routinely rotate names, possibly even as frequently as monthly [3146.3s → 3157.3s] for the purpose of more easily identifying security leaks. But before we get too ahead of our skis here, let’s rewind and start to break down [3157.3s → 3169.1s] the tangible functions and delineations of SAPs. SAPs are divided into three principal categories, acquisition programs, intelligence programs and operational programs [3169.1s → 3179.0s] involving active missions or activities. These three principal categories are further distinguished by three classification categories or protection levels, [3179.0s → 3188.4s] acknowledged, unacknowledged and waved. Acquisition SAPs comprise the vast majority of Department of Defense special programs, [3188.4s → 3207.5s] constituting 75 to 80% of all SAPs. Acquisition programs focus on protecting sensitive RDT&E or research development, test and evaluation, modification and procurement efforts that if compromised would reveal critical asymmetric technological capabilities [3207.5s → 3213.6s] or vulnerabilities. Oversight for acquisition SAPs fall under the Undersecretary of Defense [3213.6s → 3224.5s] for Acquisition and Sustainment, USD ANS. USD ANS manages the SAP corporate portfolio to integrate corporate work on carve out contracts [3224.5s → 3241.2s] within broader defense acquisition strategies. If you have watched a single one of my projects, you will immediately recall the consequences of the USD ANS whose office has been previously known as the OUSTAT or USD AT&L. [3242.4s → 3250.9s] The Wilson Davis notes, I said this in part one and I mean it again. I talk about these allegedly leaked notes so often, [3250.9s → 3257.3s] I will not give a summary past one to two sentences. As always, I do question the credibility [3257.3s → 3263.5s] of the man who generated this document, Dr. Eric Davis. But I do believe the fundamental facts of this document [3263.5s → 3283.1s] to be indeed true. That in the late 1990s, as Deputy Director of the DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson attempted to brute force a read-in into the legacy program portfolio, but was ultimately stonewalled even with appropriate access credentials. Indeed, I additionally believe [3283.1s → 3307.6s] Wilson shared his misadventures with Davis. Within these notes, Admiral Wilson allegedly stated that in 1994 under sweeping SAP changes under then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, the UFO legacy program portfolio was reorganized into a separate special records group, quote, a special subset of the unacknowledged carve-outs waived programs [3307.6s → 3326.3s] not belonging to usual SAP divisions, end quote. The document then states the SAPOC or Special Access Program Oversight Committees newly established in 1994 Senior Review Group, SRG served as a stalwart gatekeeping structure for legacy activities [3326.3s → 3354.1s] from even appropriately cleared agency directors. In short, the document is stating Bill Perry’s 1994 actions to significantly strengthen and enhance DoD SAP management and control structures, saw introduction of a Goliath gatekeeping structure within DoD’s internal SAP channels, specifically within SAPCO and SAPOC SRG, and don’t worry, we will spend time distilling these terms. [3354.1s → 3372.3s] And to my understanding, this is absolutely true. I understand that in 1994 to hide from Clinton’s disclosure appetite, legacy programs under Bill Perry’s SAP management and control structure expansion saw both gatekeeping duties largely tasked [3372.3s → 3388.2s] to the SAPOC SRG, but infinitely more important here. This also saw the legacy structure permanently vest top-down program control out of exclusively the USG, shifting the control structure to a quasi-government and industry control group [3388.2s → 3403.4s] of a handful over two dozen individuals. We will of course talk about this much more, but let’s rein it in here and get back to Acquisition SAPs whose oversight authoritative body is the USD ANS, again, the Undersecretary of Defense [3403.4s → 3413.9s] for Acquisition and Sustainment. And for more context, I do highly recommend viewing my NRO project, which talks much more about this 1994 reorganization [3413.9s → 3430.5s] and Bill Perry. Well, within the Wilson Davis notes, the USD ANS’s former title, the AUSDAT or USDAT, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology is cited as one of the critical offices housing UFO legacy activity information [3430.5s → 3463.6s] post-1994 Bill Perry SAP reorganization. Indeed, allegedly, it was Air Force General H. Marshall Ward who served as former director of SAPCO or the Special Access Program Central Office in the DoD, former executive secretary of the Special Access Program Oversight Committee or SAPOC and former director of special programs within the modern day term USD ANS that outright told Admiral Wilson, this special subset of the unacknowledged carve-outs, waived programs containing information on the legacy programs, [3463.6s → 3475.9s] was housed within then AUSDAT, now USD ANS. The important thing here is Wilson allegedly found this unusual records group within the AUSDAT, [3475.9s → 3487.3s] now USD ANS and read the index abstracts. The program record contained zero budget info. Such information was kept in separate records [3487.3s → 3503.9s] for audit purposes. And please, please remember this. The fact that there was no budget info here is probably the most critical piece of the entire Wilson Davis notes and one of the most consequential pieces to this document [3503.9s → 3512.9s] that gives the document authenticity to me. Please remember that in 1997, Wilson found the UFO legacy program portfolio record [3512.9s → 3525.8s] had zero budget info. The AUSDAT at the time of Wilson’s conquest was one Mr. Paul Kaminsky, a man whom I have direct knowledge was indeed a very senior individual [3525.8s → 3531.2s] within the UFO legacy program portfolio. Kaminsky additionally served as a senior member [3531.2s → 3566.0s] of the SAPOC and more present day on the board of MITRE. Indeed, I wager the modern day USD ANS who maintains oversight of acquisition SAPs and according to Wilson’s alleged disclosures, has in the past housed records for the UFO legacy program portfolio is absolutely critical to covert UFO operations alongside the USD R&E, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, which is the evolution of Vannevar Bush’s Research and Development Board, RDB, as well as USD INS, [3566.0s → 3578.9s] Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. Lieutenant General James Clapper’s previous role, high level acquisition directors, offices and functions have been highlighted again and again in my work [3578.9s → 3606.7s] as being imperative to the UFO legacy program structure. Indeed, I spent hours discussing SAFAQ, or Air Force Acquisition Managed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Technology and Logistics and three components within SAFAQ, SAFAQR, Science Technology and Engineering, SAFAQX, Acquisition Integration and SAFAQL, Special Programs, as being a critical elements [3606.7s → 3615.2s] to the Air Force’s Hidden Wing Program. The Hidden Wing centers on T&E, or tests and evaluation of alien reproduction vehicles, [3615.2s → 3621.6s] derivative airframes and the occasional NHI craft. I’ve additionally spoken on the importance [3621.6s → 3636.5s] of NRO acquisitions in the context of covert UFO activities. NRO acquisitions are joint run by the DDNI-ATNF, or Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition Technology and Facilities, [3636.5s → 3649.7s] and you guessed it, the USD-ANS. We’ve already talked plenty about USD-ANS, but I am shocked at just how many agency spook legacy gatekeepers have also served [3649.7s → 3658.7s] within the DDNI-ATNF. These include Doug Wolf and Don Myricks, both of whom also served as Deputy Director [3658.7s → 3670.9s] for the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology. Doug Wolf is a very bad man. Okay, let’s finally loop back to the three types of SAPs, [3670.9s → 3679.8s] Acquisition, Intelligence and Operations and Support SAPs. Intelligence SAPs safeguard the execution and planning of sensitive intelligence [3679.8s → 3685.2s] and counterintelligence operations. Intelligence SAPs, as you can probably guess, [3685.2s → 3703.8s] are overseen by the USD-ANS, Intelligence and Security. Again, former USD-ANS Lieutenant General James Clapper served as the closest thing to a Dick Cheney level UFO legacy program mob boss, whilst he was DNI from 2010 to 2017, [3703.8s → 3735.8s] where he previously served as USD-ANS from 2007 to 2010. I am going to say something rather controversial here, which we will expand on later, but with extreme confidence, I will go out on a limb here and state that the AATIP, the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, a cover project for several National Security Council activities, operated as a Clapper-given cover when he was USD-ANS onto DNI as a system to, quote unquote, [3735.8s → 3748.9s] talk about the onion outside of the onion. The motives for Clapper pushing for partial transparency on UFOs are unknown, but I highly wager the fake AATIP program was partially a cover [3748.9s → 3760.9s] for National Security Council Intelligence SAPS. And who better to spearhead this job than Luis Elizondo, who from 2013 to 2017 served as director [3760.9s → 3778.4s] for the National Programs Special Management Staff, or NPMS. The USD-ANS NPMS, or again, National Program Special Management Staff Director, runs coordination between National Security Council SAPS and the U.S. Department of Defense [3778.4s → 3787.1s] slash Intelligence Community. The director of NPMS is one of the most critical jobs in the entirety of the United States [3787.1s → 3801.4s] that most people have never even heard of. The director of NPMS is usually the most cleared person in the entire DoD, besides the Secretary of Defense themselves. Indeed, more cleared [3801.4s → 3821.2s] than the DoD Special Access Program Central Office Director. So, when I say Lou tangoed with the legacy architecture far more than he has ever let on, understand the extreme consequences and importance of his former position as director of the National Programs Special Management Staff. [3822.4s → 3826.9s] Now, throughout this project, we’ve been talking a lot about elements and offices [3826.9s → 3837.9s] within the Secretary of Defense. Just recall here that all three elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I frequently accuse of being imperative to the UFO Legacy Program effort, [3837.9s → 3846.7s] are also paramount to SAP structure. USD-ANS, which spearheads oversight for DoD acquisition SAPS. [3846.7s → 3875.3s] USD-INS, which spearheads oversight of intelligence SAPS. And USD-R&E, the evolution of Vannevar Bush’s Research and Development Board, RDB, which according to DoD I-5205.11, quotes, identifies and cultivates cutting edge technology development, technology transition, developmental prototyping, experimentation, and developmental testing activities and programs requiring SAP protection [3875.3s → 3882.1s] to ensure continued US warfighter advantage, end quotes. I highlight this here to once again say [3882.1s → 3904.2s] the US government really isn’t that smart. The infrastructure that has the cognizant authority, operational capacity, expressed mission, et cetera, to operate within UFO RDT&E programs are more often than not the exact offices you’d expect, albeit in a shadow dual-hatted capacity. [3905.8s → 3928.5s] Lastly here, operations and support SAPs or OS SAPs, quotes, protect the planning, execution, and logistical support of sensitive military operations, often involving tactical or strategic activities where operational details must remain obscured to preserve, surprise, or deny adversaries insight into US force capabilities, end quote. [3930.0s → 3945.6s] So let’s give an example on how all three SAP types would fit into a UFO legacy program activity. Let’s say we are out on the Western Ranges, Edwards 412th Test Wing specifically within the Air Force Test Center, AFTC, [3945.6s → 3958.0s] to operate on the Hidden Wing program. We have a triangular airframe whose electro-gravitic propulsion system and cloaking capabilities were derived from a non-human technical vehicle [3958.0s → 3966.6s] that was recovered in the American Southwest. The development of such a craft, likely down at GOKO Air Force Plant 42, [3966.6s → 3977.8s] would be protected under an acquisition SAP. Once this triangle is operational and fielded for covert ISR missions, protection of these missions would be protected [3977.8s → 3988.9s] by an operations and support SAP. The sources and methods that justified the craft in the first place, recovered non-human technology that was deemed to be exploitable [3988.9s → 3994.8s] would be protected by an intelligence SAP. For our Hidden Wing electro-gravitic triangle, [3994.8s → 4001.8s] intelligence SAPs protect how the craft is built. OS SAPs protect how and where it’s used. [4001.8s → 4013.3s] And intelligence SAPs protect how we know what we know. Okay, now is where we must get ultra-specific to speak on the protection levels of SAPs, [4013.3s → 4025.4s] acknowledged, unacknowledged, and waived. You will hear me often speak on WU SAPs or waived unacknowledged special access programs as the container for UFO legacy activities, [4025.4s → 4038.4s] as these are the apex of secrecy for SAPs. Although all SAPs are closely guarded national programs, there are SAPs whose very existence is a core secret and thus more closely guarded [4038.4s → 4052.7s] with enhanced protection levels. An acknowledged SAPs existence can be openly recognized. Although details of the program, such as materials and techniques remain classified, the funding for such acknowledged SAPs [4052.7s → 4065.5s] is often unclassified. Acknowledged SAPs undergo full reporting to congressional defense and intelligence committees, essentially broad SAP oversight while still retaining need to know access [4065.5s → 4076.1s] for cleared program personnel. On the other hand, unacknowledged SAPs or USAPs are even more closely guarded secrets with the mere existence and purpose [4076.1s → 4085.0s] of the USAP being protected. Indeed, USAP program funding is often classified, unacknowledged, hidden within the federal budget [4085.0s → 4095.3s] or not directly linked to the program. USAPs are built to conceal program existence from all unauthorized individuals, including most US government officials [4095.3s → 4108.0s] and congressional committees. For USAPs need to know access far transcends traditional SAPs. With cleared personnel often requiring additional indoctrination beyond top secret clearance [4108.0s → 4115.4s] with sensitive compartmented information or TSSCI. Yellow Fruit, as we discussed in part one of this project [4115.4s → 4126.1s] was indeed a USAP with a possible waived status. Recall how Army Chief of Staff John Wickham at the time claimed he was never briefed about the black operations [4126.1s → 4140.1s] run by the Army Special Operations Division, SOD. According to the Joint Security Commission’s 1994 report titled, Redefining Security, unacknowledged SAPs run roughly three to 10 times [4140.2s → 4149.8s] the security costs of acknowledged SAPs. Indeed, the report states that estimated security costs for USAPs can be as high as 40% [4149.8s → 4174.7s] of total operational costs for unacknowledged programs. This may initially seem at odds with what’s presented in the Wilson Davis Notes, where Wilson states that General Mike Kostelnik stated the security budget for the legacy activities hidden within a special subset of unacknowledged carve out waived national programs was two to three times the actual program budget, but in the past reached as high [4174.7s → 4183.9s] as six to seven times the program budget. But coming up soon, I’m actually going to make a counter argument that we will expand on and state that this comment [4183.9s → 4191.1s] allegedly by Kostelnik makes perfect sense. Recall how the legacy program records within the OUSTAT, [4191.1s → 4210.1s] now USD ANS, contained zero budget info. There is a very specific loophole that National Security Council spearheaded programs have enjoyed to waive budgetary and further reporting requirements in conjunction with myriad funding schemes, including misappropriation of funds, [4210.1s → 4219.3s] haircuts across multiple programs and self-fund. Put a pin in this budget topic once more, we will return to this most crucial topic soon. [4220.8s → 4228.4s] A secrecy layer even deeper is the final protection level of SAPs, waived. Waived unacknowledged programs [4228.4s → 4235.2s] are created under extremely limited circumstances. Waived programs have significantly [4235.2s → 4242.7s] more restrictive reporting requirements and access controls. Literally waiving or getting rid of SAP reporting requirements [4242.7s → 4250.6s] detailed in section 119 title 10 US code. WSAPs as we call them, have far more strict carve out [4250.6s → 4268.9s] and reporting requirements than even USAPs. According to the war zone and DODI 5205.05, the access approval authority for WSAPs consists solely of the deputy secretary of defense, special undersecretaries of defense or an amorphous component head [4268.9s → 4282.4s] with quote unquote, cognizant authority. Waived programs here are still supposed to be reported to the congressional gang of eight, which includes the majority and minority leaders of the house and Senate and chairs and ranking members [4282.4s → 4292.1s] of the intelligence committees. But alas, we will discuss loopholes that waives even this reporting requirement as the gang of eight have clearly not been briefed [4292.1s → 4313.2s] on the legacy portfolio. And I met with Senator Harry Reid about nine months before he died. And of course he’s a private citizen now and I wanted to brief him on the topic and I wanted to get his kind of thought leadership on it cause you know, he was a gang of eight member, right? Which is the top most cleared senators and congressmen. [4313.2s → 4323.9s] He was the majority leader for God’s sakes of the Senate. And I knew, you know, he helped sponsor the OSAP program that I mentioned and where they looked at Skinwalker Ranch [4323.9s → 4332.5s] and some other things. And I wanted to understand like, what does Harry Reid actually know? Like why did he, you know, give $21 million [4332.5s → 4345.6s] to DIA and Bigelow Aerospace for this? So I’m sitting there in Harry Reid’s living room, you know, right next to him with some other witnesses that were there with me and he straight up says, [4345.6s → 4365.2s] he’s like, yeah, I knew we had UFO material. I was denied access for decades. And just like the no foreign or not releasable to foreign national control marker, a waived unacknowledged SAP can also feature the informal control marker of bigoted. And I cannot think of anyone [4365.2s → 4377.5s] to explain this better than David Grush. So let’s expand on what he said in the intro. One of the most serious SAPs you can ask for, what they call a bigoted waived special access program. [4377.5s → 4387.8s] So waived means it’s limited congressional reporting. That is a class of special access programs. And bigoted means it’s like by name. You have to remember. [4387.8s → 4396.1s] So here’s one of the loopholes they use, right? So there’s White House special access programs. There was something called covert access programs, [4396.1s → 4403.4s] 50 US code 3093. Those are the programs reported to gang of eight, gang of four, that’s like assassination stuff, et cetera, [4403.4s → 4412.4s] other things the government doesn’t acknowledge. But there’s a way to develop a White House SAP that is non covert action, [4412.4s → 4421.9s] White House special access program. If you look in the law, there are no reporting carve outs or requirements to tell like the speaker [4421.9s → 4428.2s] or the majority leader or anything like that. Okay, we have really started to dive into oversight [4428.2s → 4435.3s] and authority of SAPs. And like David Grush has stated, UFO legacy activity national programs are structured in such a way [4435.3s → 4444.9s] to even avoid waived bigoted reporting. So before we discuss those loopholes I mentioned earlier, let’s first briefly discuss the SAP oversight [4444.9s → 4464.7s] and governance structure in more detail. Because indeed, if elements of covert UFO programs operate within SAPs, which I will put any amount of money on that they do, surely special access programs must have an internal system of governance and gatekeeping to maintain total secrecy and make unauthorized access [4464.7s → 4478.4s] to the program portfolio impossible. Title 10 US code 119 outlines reporting requirements for SAPs. And funny enough, such strict oversight actually arose from the yellow fruit fiasco in 1983 [4478.4s → 4490.8s] as we discussed in part one. But such discussion is trivial at best, because as we know, UFO legacy programs are not reported to congressional elements, bar a few Congress people here and there [4490.8s → 4512.4s] on the payroll of legacy programs. Mike Turner is likely one of these thug enforcers. Internal SAP governance is broken up into several clearly defined roles and layers to ensure the SAP enterprise runs smoothly, maintains appropriate access and enforces security protocols. The SAP governance structure [4512.4s → 4522.1s] is top-down comprised of the SAPOC, SRG and SAPCO. And the SAP governance process relies upon personnel making the determination [4522.1s → 4530.1s] that the need for a SAP exists. The lowest rung of the totem pole here is component level special access program [4530.1s → 4540.9s] central offices or SAPCOs. Each branch of the armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DARPA and the Missile Defense Agency possess a component level SAPCO, [4540.9s → 4563.8s] which is responsible for all SAPs under their purview. This here is a bit of a quandary. I am aware of individuals within component level SAPCOs like William E. McClure of the Air Forces SAF AAZ or the Directorate of Security, Special Programs Oversight and Information Protection, who they and their offices operate key positions [4563.8s → 4570.3s] in legacy activity architecture. But I am also aware of instances in which component level SAPCOs [4570.3s → 4580.9s] are bypassed by the legacy programs. Like when Edward C. Aldrich stuffed likely joint Air Force and NRO activities called quote unquote outside activities [4580.9s → 4595.9s] under SAF AA bypassing the AAZ I just mentioned. I believe the determination on if a component level SAPCO is read into legacy activities depends completely on the director and their history in the programs. [4597.2s → 4614.2s] Above component level SAPCOs sit OSD or Office of the Secretary of Defense level SAPCOs. We discussed this in relation to USD INS, USD ANS and USD RNE earlier. Above OSD SAPCO sits DoD SAPCO, [4614.2s → 4624.4s] whose director has often historically been the USD ANS. Former directors of DoD SAPCO that have almost certainly been legacy program personnel [4624.4s → 4632.7s] include General Don Dunlop and General H. Marshall Ward. DoD SAPCO serves as the primary staff support [4632.7s → 4642.5s] to something called the SAPOC. The SAP central office also serves as the primary point of contact with Congress, the National Security Council [4642.5s → 4661.6s] and other government agencies slash services. So yeah, I bet I know what you’re thinking here. The SAPCO and SAPOC above it, which we will speak on momentarily here, are two of the critical gatekeeping fixtures within the SAP enterprise that get to decide who and what services access [4661.6s → 4672.0s] the legacy program portfolio. The DoD SAPCO is supposed to complete PAR or program access requests and facilitate general access for Congress [4672.0s → 4687.3s] requiring access to a SAP. However, just as we discussed the amorphous access approval authority behind waived SAPs, the DoD SAPCO makes a staunch exemption to this congressional access for waived SAPs and waived subcomponents. [4688.5s → 4701.2s] But moving up the totem pole, let’s now focus on the real mean potatoes. The established in 1994 Special Access Program Oversight Committee or SAPOC chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense [4701.2s → 4718.9s] like John M. Deutsch and Bill Perry. SAPOC has access to all DoD SAPs to provide DoD wide departmental oversight and management and was built to, quote, ensure compliance with law, regulations, policies and procedures and ensure required information [4718.9s → 4725.9s] is provided to the Congress, end quote. SAPOC has oversight over all waived DoD SAPs [4725.9s → 4734.1s] to determine if there is a continued need for waived status. SAPOC is supported by the SRG or Senior Review Group, [4734.1s → 4748.3s] which is really the apex of our totem pole here. To learn more about many individuals within SAPOC and SRG like Mike Kostelnik, Lynn Wells, Paul Kaminski, et cetera, I do highly recommend referencing my NRO project, [4748.3s → 4762.8s] but I wanna focus more on the structure here. SRG, again, Senior Review Group, is comprised of a cadre of senior executive service level individuals to operate as the principal support to the SAPOC and ensure SAPs aren’t duplicated [4762.8s → 4778.5s] across various SAP categories. Hmm, senior executive officials. I wonder what kind of people Dave Grushet serve as gatekeepers for the legacy apparatus. So who gets to decide this, in your opinion, in the past? [4780.4s → 4786.8s] It’s a group of career senior executive officials. Okay, are they government officials? [4787.9s → 4794.6s] Both in and out. Do what? Both in and out of government, and that’s about as far as I can go there. I got you, all right, well, that’s, [4794.6s → 4805.7s] that leads to my next question. Within the Wilson Davis Notes, the senior review group is labeled as the gatekeeping structure for the UFO portfolio, with SRG members blocking Wilson [4805.7s → 4812.4s] from accessing the programs. Quote, I was to immediately drop the matter and let it go. Forget about it, [4812.4s → 4818.0s] as I do not have purview over their project. It didn’t fall within my oversight, et cetera. [4818.0s → 4840.4s] End quote. I vehemently agree with these statements allegedly made by Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson. Indeed, I am aware of the SAPOC SRG established in 1994 by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Perry was tasked alongside its many oversight duties to gatekeep authoritative access to the legacy program portfolio. [4841.8s → 4866.2s] Short and narrow chains of command, as I always say. You see, as I understand, after the entire Manhattan Project 2.0 schism that occurred in the 1980s with NSDD-159, EO-12356, and Yellow Fruit as we spoke on in part one, the disclosure appetite of Clinton was the final straw for the ever crumbling legacy structure to permanently vest itself [4866.2s → 4888.4s] outside of fully contained executive branch oversight. So again, as I’ve stated so many times throughout this project, because this is so critical to remember, as I understand, in 1994, legacy programs permanently transformed full oversight of the many legacy program silos to a quasi-industry and government body [4888.4s → 4902.8s] of slightly over two dozen people. And the SAPOC SRG was deputized as the access approval authority to gatekeep even directors of intelligence agencies and general and FLAC officers who did not possess relevant need to know [4902.8s → 4913.1s] from accessing the programs. So just to be clear here, SAPOC and its SRG are the skeleton gatekeeping structure and access approval authority [4913.1s → 4934.2s] for USG access into the legacy programs. SAPOC SRG is not the boogeyman remnants of the Madge-12 or Majestic-12 entity that existed in Eisenhower’s 5412 Committee Special Group or Nixon’s 303 Committee, nor is it the stalwart titan that protects inside access to an insidious and amorphous control group [4934.2s → 4945.6s] that exists as a pitiful shell of a once mighty efforts. I additionally understand whilst SRG is tasked to ensure there is no duplication of SAPs across the entire DoD, [4945.6s → 4963.5s] these actions are not taken with legacy operations. The UFO portfolio is so fractured and siloed, there is no way SRG can enforce program redundancies across the wider USG, like similar exploitation efforts across the Army and Navy, for example. [4965.9s → 4974.5s] The loopholes of SAPs enjoy to further obfuscate legacy activities. This is both my favorite part of the entire video [4974.5s → 4980.6s] and in my opinion, the most important. David Grush’s recent Judicial Watch interview [4980.6s → 4996.8s] was absolutely brilliant. Like any Grush interview, if you really listen closely and distill what Grush is saying, there are veins of gold to mine. Let’s listen in on Grush speaking about some of the tricks of the trade, if so to speak. You have to remember, [4996.8s → 5005.2s] so here’s one of the loopholes they use, right? So there’s White House special access programs. There was something called covert access programs, [5005.2s → 5012.3s] 50 U.S. Code 3093. Those are the programs reported to Gang of Eight, Gang of Four. You know, that’s like assassination stuff, et cetera. [5012.3s → 5018.2s] You know, other things the government doesn’t acknowledge. But there’s a way to develop a White House SAP [5018.2s → 5031.0s] that is non-covert action. You know, White House special access program. If you look in the law, there are no reporting carve-outs or requirements to tell like the speaker [5031.0s → 5048.2s] or the majority leader or anything like that. And so that was one of the tricks of the trade, bearing it over in the Department of Energy, but also keeping it these non-covert action programs that like, you know, five people on the NSC know about and the president at one time. And then, you know, it has custodianship [5048.2s → 5072.8s] over across the Potomac and McLean. Wow, guys, this is incredibly valuable. Basically what David Grush is saying here is that historically a loophole White House, so National Security Council derived legacy operations have utilized, was creating a White House controlled special access program specifically a non-covert action program, which completely removes any reporting [5072.8s → 5094.4s] and carve-out requirements. Let’s really break this down and see how this can be done. As Grush stated, covert action programs are defined by 50 U.S. Code 3093 and detail programs or activities of the U.S. government pertaining to assassination, clandestine operations and covert activities of which the U.S. government [5094.4s → 5105.0s] does not want to acknowledge their involvement. Covert action programs feature several similarities and differences to SAPs. Both systems harness compartmentalization [5105.0s → 5111.8s] and security controls beyond top secret. Both systems are supposed to have congressional briefing channels [5111.8s → 5117.8s] and both operate with third party and cover mechanisms. However, covert action programs and SAPs [5117.8s → 5135.6s] differ greatly on purpose and authority. Of course, covert action programs operate under 50 U.S. Code 3093 and SAPs operate under Executive Order 13526 and 10 U.S. Code 119. As we stated, SAPs operate under three categories, [5135.6s → 5144.2s] acquisition, intelligence and operations and support. While covert action programs are almost always a specific category of activity [5144.2s → 5151.2s] authorized under Title 50. Although a covert action program will almost always be protected as a SAP [5151.2s → 5166.4s] or under SAP-like components. Perhaps it should really come as no shock, but I argued incessantly in part one that Eisenhower relegated the UFO control group, literally once called the MATCH 12 within the 5412 Committee Special Group, [5166.4s → 5175.8s] which operated from 1954 to 1964. This control group then translated onto Nixon’s 303 Committee from 1964 to 1970, [5175.8s → 5185.9s] then 1970 onward, a bit of an unknown until about 1994. But yes, I am literally stating the MATCH 12 existed within the National Security Council’s [5185.9s → 5198.8s] 5412 Committee Special Group. So perhaps it should come as no surprise, covert action approval was housed within the National Security Council’s Subcommittee on Covert Action, the 5412 Special Group, 303 Committee [5198.8s → 5209.2s] and further iterations. Because at this time, up until the mid 1970s, covert action approval was an entirely executive branch process [5209.2s → 5217.2s] governed by NSC activities. So covert action programs are still supposed to be reported to Congress, [5217.2s → 5235.7s] at least the Gang of Eight or Gang of Four. But David Grush states these programs can be made non-covert, essentially becoming a White House controlled special access program with no reporting requirements. And before we unpack this, I get it. Why so much discussion of the White House, [5235.7s → 5243.1s] National Security Council, et cetera? Aren’t programs held from presidents and administrations? [5243.1s → 5250.7s] Yes, they are indeed. But the framework and very skeleton for the legacy architecture, as we discussed in part one, [5250.7s → 5273.4s] was formed by Truman and more consequentially Eisenhower. Indeed, through a series of classified presidential executive orders, Truman and Eisenhower vested legacy program management within the National Security Council with support from major elements of the US intelligence community and armed forces, premier scientific institutions like Vannevar Bush’s Research and Development Board, RDB, [5273.4s → 5292.2s] and Atomic Energy Commission National Laboratories. Over the epochs, climaxing and ending in 1994, when the programs completely wrestled the control group out of the US government into a quasi-government and industry control group, the legacy program portfolio was primarily always a White House, [5292.2s → 5300.8s] specifically National Security Council-run activity. So power for the legacy programs has almost always been vested in the White House [5300.8s → 5307.0s] and at one time under presidential control. And that is one of the most major concerns [5307.0s → 5329.4s] with the legacy programs. Sure, these activities conduct white and blue collar crimes extensively, but perhaps the very existence of these programs are not illegal, but protected by ironclad statutes. Anyways, rant here over. How are covert action programs transformed [5329.4s → 5344.9s] into White House-controlled SAP non-covert action programs? White House SAPs are not unheard of. A well-known example here is Yankee White, a single-scope background investigation required for direct support for the White House, [5344.9s → 5359.2s] but Yankee White was indeed properly reported to Congress. So let’s say you have a White House SAP similar to Yankee White, but is handled by the National Security Council and deals with what 50 U.S. Code 3093 [5359.2s → 5374.3s] might consider quote-unquote covert action. If the SAP is given the non-covert action designation as defined by 50 U.S. Code 3093, this completely removes any presidential findings slash reporting requirements to Congress [5374.3s → 5382.5s] and intelligence committees. The activity is then treated as a sensitive, but non-covert acquisition, intelligence, [5382.5s → 5393.1s] research or operation activity. Because the activity is not generated as a DOD SAP, it falls outside of 10 U.S. Code 119 [5393.1s → 5415.8s] and thus is not subject to Title 10 requirements. The White House SAP then exists in a gray area between 50 U.S. Code 3093 and 10 U.S. Code 119 with, and write this down because this is critical, no statutory reporting obligations, yet still answers directly to the National Security Council [5415.8s → 5432.0s] or cognizant executive authority. One of the concerns of how this has been historically accomplished is the wielding of unitary executive theory by presidents Eisenhower and Truman, essentially leveraging and exploiting the executive body’s inherent authority [5432.0s → 5439.4s] over classification and national security operations. But for a more tangible and concrete method here, [5439.4s → 5449.0s] this is really the most important part of the video. The loophole here is to harness content-only special access programs. [5451.6s → 5472.3s] A content-only special access program is defined as a highly restricted security protocol used within the U.S. government to protect extremely sensitive information or intelligence rather than an entire project or acquisition, thus content-only. Unlike acknowledged, unacknowledged and waived, [5472.9s → 5479.6s] content-only is not a protection level. Here’s the kicker. It is a budgetary slash structural tier [5479.6s → 5486.0s] and an administrative designation. Content-only SAPs hold protected information, [5486.0s → 5500.0s] but they are technically unfunded. The SAP either has no funding at all or funding is rolled into normal executive armed forces or intelligence budgets. Because content-only is unfunded, [5500.0s → 5510.6s] these SAPs carry zero reporting requirements. Doesn’t matter if it’s Title 10, Title 50, none. Content-only is an extremely niche designation [5510.6s → 5545.8s] spoken about extremely infrequently. Indeed, two of the only major discussions you will find on content-only SAPs exist within AFI 116-701, which describes the designation as quote, a descriptive term used to describe a SAP or any sub-element that contains information only and either has no funding associated with it or its funding is managed as part of the Air Force corporate budget process, end quote. As well as DODI 5205.11, which describes content SAPs as quote, [5545.8s → 5558.5s] a SAP that protects discrete CPI, end quote. CPI, of course, is critical program information. So let’s think this through here. Early UFO legacy program activities [5558.5s → 5566.8s] are conducted out of the 5412 Committee Special Group. Thus, retrieval, exploitation, and storage of non-human technical vehicles [5566.8s → 5574.8s] are inherently covert action. Bonus points because POTUS at the time, Eisenhower, most certainly did not want national acknowledgement [5574.8s → 5581.2s] of the UFO issue. Various classified presidential executive orders cemented program coordination [5581.2s → 5589.8s] within NSC’s 5412 Committee and successor groups. And up until the Reagan administration, legacy programs did whatever they wanted, [5589.8s → 5598.5s] the Wild Wild West days. Major SAP crackdowns forced the legacy structure to start leveraging cover offices and programs to stay hidden, [5598.5s → 5614.0s] effectively siloing the programs. 1994 saw the program’s best management outside of the US government into a quasi-government and industry control group that still features statutory controls and involvement by the National Security Council, [5614.0s → 5625.0s] and clapper, I’m looking at you. The introduction of 50 US Code 3093 in the early 1990s and 10 US Code 119 in the late 1980s [5625.0s → 5632.6s] forced legacy to get creative again. Historically covert UFO activities have been run out of the White House [5632.6s → 5642.6s] and National Security Council. But with all of these US government-wide oversight mechanisms, how does one make covert action programs and special access programs [5642.6s → 5648.8s] waive Title 10 and Title 50 reporting requirements? You do this by making the covert action [5648.8s → 5659.0s] White House SAP non-covert. So the solution here is to make covert UFO SAPs content only, and thus all carve-out [5659.0s → 5674.7s] and reporting requirements are hidden and waived. The actual SAP program record contains critical program information, CPI only, and actual craft retrieval, storage, and exploitation is not inherently conducted [5674.7s → 5698.4s] under the SAP, akin to standard SAP umbrellas. The program structure can harness dual-hatted roles, something I talk about often, like the night shift guy at NASIC, a parallel tier one element for retrievals, or a hidden wing under the Edwards 412th test wing to harness elements of the defense industrial base for these covert mission directives, [5698.4s → 5725.6s] whilst maintaining a short yet narrow chain of command. Of course, the program structure can use the subject matter experts and R&D aces, FFRDCs, which exist as GOCO, government-owned contractor operated, to keep program materials, activities, deliverables, reports, et cetera, in a quasi-government and industry state. Wink, wink, MITRE. And most importantly here, [5725.6s → 5737.4s] this SAP activity carries zero budget. The budget is rolled into standard USG budgets. Think to when I talked about Witness Ed, a lieutenant colonel within the hidden wing, [5737.4s → 5746.8s] and a senior figure within SAFAQ, or Air Force Acquisition. Ed’s stated money was just pulled off the books of the Air Force budget into black holes [5746.8s → 5753.1s] before any sort of review by SAPFM, or Financial Management. With no dedicated budget [5753.1s → 5762.3s] carries little to no monetary footprint. Now think back to the Wilson Davis notes. Remember what Wilson stated, that the legacy program record [5762.3s → 5768.7s] within the AUSDAT contained zero budget. That budget was kept in separate records [5768.7s → 5790.6s] for quote-unquote audit purposes. This is one of the premier loopholes legacy uses alongside WSAPs to completely hide and obfuscate UFO legacy programs. Content only SAPs. Now of course, similar systems exist with an intelligence community, [5790.6s → 5801.8s] controlled access programs, CAPs, and DOE SAPs. But I really wanted to take an extended top-down overview of how sensitive national programs and how the executive branch specifically [5801.8s → 5813.8s] has manipulated SAP structure to hide the legacy programs. And you have to remember the president has original classification authority over what they call classified national security information [5813.8s → 5823.0s] under executive border 13-526. The issue is some of this is under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the president does not have unilateral [5823.0s → 5830.2s] declassification authority. Of course, I must mention, and we must spend some time discussing a nearly uncrackable system [5830.2s → 5836.2s] similar to White House non-covert action SAPs. These are Department of Energy SAPs. [5836.2s → 5846.4s] DOE SAPs get very spooky, very fast. DOE SAP authority is given from both executive order 13526, same as DOD SAPs, [5846.4s → 5854.0s] but also the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. We discussed at length in part one, the statutory authority born [5854.0s → 5864.9s] from the 1954 Atomic Energy Agreement. In short, the classification system for the Department of Energy and its precursor Atomic Energy Commission system is very different [5864.9s → 5879.4s] to the standard executive order based classification system. Concepts like restricted data, formerly restricted data and broad interpretations of special nuclear materials as we know from David Grush are inappropriately draped over the UFO topic [5879.4s → 5892.6s] to maintain airtight secrecy. Such systems born from the 1954 Atomic Energy Act are covered by statute and thus not responsive to magic executive orders and the standard DOD classification [5892.6s → 5899.4s] and declassification processes. They’re basically treating this as nuclear secrets [5899.4s → 5917.4s] because it gives off nuclear radiation. Because if you look at the ultra vague definition of special nuclear material, which is section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it says anything that gives off a sizable amount of atomic energy, [5917.4s → 5936.7s] literally that’s what it says. Well, what’s sizable and what legal gymnastics are you saying this stuff, which is obviously not a, well, who knows maybe it is a nuclear weapon and you’re saying this is a US nuclear secret, you’re trans classifying it into a nuclear secret, [5936.7s → 5948.6s] which I understand maybe at first why they did that. So DOE SAPs can operate under DOD SAP guidelines or the DOE’s own classification standard [5948.6s → 5968.8s] whose authority is the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. This second option here allows legacy elements within the Department of Energy and its semi-autonomous subordinate agency, the NNSA, National Nuclear Security Administration, to really deep six and hide their SAPs under the guise and liberal interpretations [5968.8s → 5977.6s] of quote unquote nuclear secrets. This is why I have stated on several occasions, the Department of Energy is figuratively baked [5977.6s → 5990.3s] into every single layer of the UFO Legacy Program Pyramid. Relegating program materials, reports, deliverables, et cetera under DOE controls are incredibly airtight. [5990.3s → 6010.7s] An example here is actually the hidden wing again. Witness Ed stated from day-to-day operations with the AFTC or Air Force Test Center on the Edwards 412 Test Wing, all the way up to Air Force acquisition, the Department of Energy was intimately involved with every layer of the program. So no, Lou Elizondo, [6010.7s → 6024.4s] your false legacy program outline is inaccurate. The Department of Energy is not an equal player with the Air Force and Defense Industrial Base Prime contractors. Of course, in the future, I will do a full DOE investigation. [6026.1s → 6038.7s] Lastly, on our SAP section here, we have taken a top-down overview of SAPs, USAPs, WUSAPs, covert and non-covert action programs, CAPs, DOE SAPs and National Special Access Programs [6038.7s → 6046.2s] or NSAPs. But how can we translate these security protocols onto day-to-day operations of UFO Legacy Programs [6046.2s → 6057.7s] at Defense Industrial Base locations? From Dugway Proving Ground to the Naval Surface Warfare Center crane, I have not held back on locations that I am supremely confident engage [6057.7s → 6069.4s] with covert UFO retrieval and RDT&E. Indeed, I often state MRTFBs or Major Range and Test Facility Bases are the paramount critical physical cores [6069.4s → 6083.2s] to such operations. Places like Dugway, the Nevada Test and Training Range, Utah Test and Training Range, China Lake, Edwards 412 Test Wing, Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, et cetera. But to get… [6082.6s → 6097.2s] Let’s get real specific here in reference to SAPs. Day-to-day handling of SAP material and physical access to SAP information must be confined to SCIFs, or Secure Compartmented Information Facilities, or Accredited Special Access Program [6097.2s → 6107.5s] Facilities, SAPFs, which are permanent locations. Alongside permanent accredited SAPFs, SAP activities involving the processing, handling, [6107.5s → 6130.9s] and or storage of classified information can occur within several other facilities. These include Temporary SAPFs, or TSAPFs, which are limited to 12 months of operations, SAP Compartmented Areas, SAPCAs, SAP Working Areas, for processing and discussion without storage of CPI, SAPWAS, and SAP Temporary Security Working Areas, limited to 40 hours [6130.9s → 6145.2s] per month, also called SAP TSWAS. SAPFs can be placed anywhere that meets or exceeds SCIF standards, prominently placed on contractor facilities within defense industrial base infrastructure, and employ extensive [6145.2s → 6152.2s] physical, electronic, visual, etc. safeguards to ensure the sanctity of SAP materials. [6152.2s → 6185.5s] Day-to-day operations of SAPs rely on both government and contractor personnel. Such a roster here includes a Government Program Manager, or GPM, who is a senior government program official responsible for all aspects of the SAP, a Contractor Program Manager, or CPM, who is the industry equivalent to the GPM, and is responsible for the program’s overall management within the contractor facility, and is responsible for executing all contractual obligations, a Program Security Officer, or PSO, who is responsible for full-spectrum [6185.5s → 6192.2s] program security, Government SAP Security Officers, or GSSOs, under the PSO, and a Contractor [6192.2s → 6206.2s] Program Security Officer, or CPSO. This here is a perfect bridge into our next section, Program Protection Agencies, who often live within the program’s security channels, deputized by elements of the legacy [6206.2s → 6235.8s] programs to neutralize program exposure and insider and outsider threats. But I do have knowledge of active planned reprisal activity against myself and other colleagues, and it’s very upsetting to me. Coming from where? Certain senior leadership at previous agencies I was associated with. [6235.8s → 6248.6s] And that’s all I’ll say publicly, but I can provide more details in a closed environment. Yeah, there were certain colleagues of mine that were brutally administratively attacked, and it actually makes me very upset as a leader to see that happen to other co-workers and [6248.6s → 6253.5s] actually superiors of mine over the last three years. How do you account for that response? [6253.5s → 6276.4s] That seems like a bizarre response. I call it administrative terrorism. That’s their quiver, their tool in the toolbox to silence people, especially the career government service cares about their career, cares about their clearance, their reputation to climb the ladder. And when you threaten that career path, a lot of people back off. [6276.4s → 6296.0s] But I’m here to represent those people. Let us now move down the onion and identify program exposure management and protection agencies, elements of specific U.S. agencies slash services that are deputized to enforce insider and outsider threat protection, all to enforce total security surrounding UFO [6296.0s → 6308.1s] legacy programs. If we have the core of our onion protected by layers of exploited special access program protocols, which are in turn protected by the SAPOC SRG, think of program protection [6308.1s → 6318.9s] agencies as the antibodies that swarm to neutralize threats to the core of legacy. Of course, program protection and program exposure management are inherent to the SAP [6318.9s → 6325.8s] structure. And we discussed as such in our SAP section with defining component USD and DoD level [6325.8s → 6332.2s] SAP co’s SAPOC and the SRG. There is nothing nefarious about program protection. [6332.2s → 6349.4s] Indeed, the concept is critical to maintaining a healthy SAP enterprise. I am stating that under or better phrase here within the SAP ecosystem exists several agencies, offices or services that are deputized to protect and neutralize threats towards high [6349.4s → 6378.9s] risk waived national special access programs regarding covert UFO action. Like other program protection elements that exist outside the SAPCO, SAPOC and SRG DoD pyramid, like the ISO or the Information Security and Oversight Office and DCSA, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, the select agencies we will speak on exist within the very same agencies and departments within the armed forces, intelligence community and DoD that [6378.9s → 6393.2s] operate on UFO legacy activities. And I have spoken about one such agency extensively in my video on the Air Force Hidden Wing Program, this being the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Special Projects [6393.2s → 6402.0s] or AFOSI-PJ. Indeed, this office, PJ, is tasked with safeguarding the US Air Force’s most sensitive and secretive [6402.0s → 6408.4s] special access programs. I really don’t want to spend too much time on PJ, but once again, I will bring up two [6408.4s → 6425.9s] names attached to PJ that I am aware are paramount gatekeepers to the UFO topic. And these include former AFOSI-PJ Executive Director and Department-wide Air Force SAP Security Director, now Vice President of Security at Northrop Grumman, former Senior Executive [6425.9s → 6444.3s] Service Mr. Terry Phillips. I am aware that before his retirement from federal service in 2021, Phillips operated as an enforcer for the UFO activity administrative structure, leveraging administrative terrorism and much worse, against prospective whistleblowers. [6444.3s → 6456.3s] Indeed, I understand Phillips continues similar work within Northrop Grumman to this day. Phillips’ successor in AFOSI-PJ and the Air Force SAP Security Enterprise is a man [6456.3s → 6464.0s] named Mr. Lee M. Russ. Similar to Phillips, I understand Mr. Russ picked up right where Phillips left off within [6464.0s → 6470.1s] federal service. Let’s just say I would not be surprised if documents are ever released that directly [6470.1s → 6479.5s] state Russ has been involved in UFO narrative shaping. Phillips and Russ are critical names, but alas, I have covered these two in great detail [6479.5s → 6492.6s] before, so let’s move on to new things here. I would like to now move on to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA’s Security and Intelligence Directorate, SID. [6492.6s → 6511.7s] Coming to DARPA is like grabbing the nose cone of a rocket and holding on for dear life. DARPA is a place where if you don’t invent the internet, you only get a B. A DARPA program manager quite literally invents tomorrow. We are thinking about innovation unconstrained. Where can we go? [6511.7s → 6522.1s] Predict what is emerging as threats. We’re looking for the applications that seem impossible. That passion will be saving lives 5, 10, 15 years from now. [6522.1s → 6537.1s] Getting to work every day and being humbled by that. Real fast, what exactly is DARPA? DARPA is the DoD R&D Research and Development Agency reporting to the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering that is tasked with development of emerging and [6537.1s → 6545.7s] advanced technologies for military use. As the agency that quote unquote shaped the modern world, DARPA is the tip of the spear [6545.7s → 6558.4s] for advanced asymmetrical advantages in national security related technology. DARPA is well worth an enormous exploration into possible involvement with recovered non-human materials, craft, and bodies. [6558.4s → 6564.9s] As DARPA is strangely and largely missing from most UFO legacy program conversations. [6564.9s → 6575.4s] And do not fret, one day I will undertake this effort. The DARPA SID or again Security and Intelligence Directorate is a critical support component [6575.4s → 6582.0s] within DARPA. SID works to ensure protection of DARPA’s high-risk R&D programs that involve highly [6582.0s → 6592.3s] sensitive technologies critical to U.S. national security. SID safeguards against insider threats, foreign influence, espionage, and a wide swath of [6592.3s → 6614.3s] protection protocols to ensure U.S. technological dominance. DARPA SID is the premier program protection element for DARPA agency-wide and interagency SAP activity, quote, planning, executing, and directing the information, personnel, industrial information assurance, and physical security programs at DARPA and at specific [6614.3s → 6623.3s] contractor sites, end quote. Indeed, SID’s expressed mission is to quote, develop, manage, and implement programs that [6623.3s → 6632.8s] facilitate the secure and successful accomplishments of DARPA’s mission. While protecting DARPA technical and administrative personnel, information, property, and ensuring [6632.8s → 6648.2s] business continuity, end quote. In an almost comical statement, DARPA SID’s PSRs or Program Security Representatives, quote, analyze and create protection strategies and tactics, frequently for technologies that [6648.2s → 6663.8s] exist nowhere else, end quote. DARPA SID is incredibly unique as an office because its security representatives are not stove-piped into specific types of program security support, example being just collateral, [6663.8s → 6678.9s] just SAP or SEI, or just CUI. Instead, SID’s PSRs are, quote, responsible for providing expert security support to a program portfolio that may include fundamental research, controlled unclassified collateral [6678.9s → 6690.0s] SAP, SEI, and other compartmented information activities, end quote. In another quote, quote, they are the tip of the spear for execution of SID’s primary [6690.0s → 6701.2s] function, enabling the secure development of DARPA technologies, end quote. Now apply this hands-on SID approach to some of the day-to-day SAP operations we just spoke [6701.2s → 6707.6s] of. As best as I can tell, the SID was founded by at least 2003, when the first mention of [6707.6s → 6719.6s] SID I can find is a routing line for a DARPA Information Processing Techniques office document. I wonder what office would ostensibly function as, quote unquote, antibodies if someone posed [6719.6s → 6738.9s] a security risk to the most covert, deep-sixed, interagency-waved USAP portfolio in existence. I will go so far as to say I’m aware of former directors within DARPA SID that have engaged in serious crimes to silence whistleblowers and prevent program exposure. [6738.9s → 6748.7s] These include, but are not limited to, wetworks operations. I would encourage Congress to immediately construct interrogatories leveraged at DARPA [6748.7s → 6757.4s] SID and its SSO, Support Services Office. I would leverage questions towards former SID directors under penalty of prosecution [6757.4s → 6770.1s] if questions are not answered truthfully. I genuinely hope this does happen. Now believe it or not, I do have some sense of self-preservation, so I will not be naming [6770.1s → 6781.1s] this individual, but it would not be a GERB video without names. DARPA reports through the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering directly [6781.1s → 6808.2s] to the USDR&E. Recall from earlier, USDR&E is the evolution of Vannevar Bush’s Research and Development Board, RDB, and according to DODI 5205.11, USDR&E, quote, identifies and cultivates cutting-edge technology developments, technology transition, developmental prototyping, experimentation, and developmental testing activities and programs requiring SAP protection to ensure continued [6808.2s → 6821.8s] U.S. warfighting advantage, end quote. Since SID is a support directorate directly under the DARPA director, SID’s direct administrative line of accountability traces directly to the Undersecretary of Defense for Research [6821.8s → 6829.6s] and Engineering. So let’s name a man within this chain of command that I know to be legacy program, Dr. Peter [6829.6s → 6837.2s] Hynum. So DARPA works at the intersection of national security and science and technology. [6837.2s → 6848.4s] Our job is to avoid and to impose technological surprise, and we focus on the hardest problems. Dr. Hynum currently serves as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for [6848.4s → 6859.5s] Critical Technologies within the USDR&E. And by the way, critical technologies in high-level DoD positions is often an indicator of legacy [6859.5s → 6886.0s] exposure. Prior to work within the OSD, Hynum operated as a DARPA program manager focused on electronic warfare and airborne communications, served as director of ODNI’s Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, IARPA, director of research at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, NGA, then from 2018 to 2022 served as Deputy Director and Acting Director of [6886.0s → 6898.3s] DARPA. If there is indeed an individual who has been integral to coordinating legacy efforts between DARPA and USDR&E, and then don’t forget DARPA SID for program protection within the last [6898.3s → 6906.4s] 8 plus years as I am directly alleging, it has been and continues to be Dr. Peter Hynum. [6906.4s → 6918.0s] Since 2012, SID has maintained an intimate partnership with a company called System-Hi. Indeed since 2012, the two’s partnership has quote, produced several novel advancements [6918.0s → 6941.8s] in security policies, enhanced methodologies and tools, end quote. Indeed in 2022, SID awarded a 5-year contract to System-Hi to quote, provide multi-security services to our nation’s premier innovation engine, responsible for developing and delivering breakthrough technologies critical to assuring U.S. technical dominance and overmatch, end [6941.8s → 6960.8s] quote. This 2022 contract was the third consecutive awarded to System-Hi by SID. Established in 2005, important year to contractor breakaway legacy programs, System-Hi quote, delivers the most advanced protection and security solutions to secure and strengthen [6960.8s → 6977.8s] critical missions, programs, operations and intelligence activities, end quote. The mission of System-Hi is to be the only choice when the mission must be protected, to set the bar high and exceed it by working together to continuously improve and strengthen [6977.8s → 6996.9s] the protection landscape and deliver for our customers at a level no one else is capable of. Outside of DARPA SID here, System-Hi currently has numerous contract vehicles including IDIQ, Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity contracts, with the Navy, Missile Defense Agency, MDA [6996.9s → 7027.3s] and other agencies slash services. System-Hi has some rather intriguing individuals on its board, including former C-suite executive and president during our epoch of interest from 2019 to 2025 Rob Howe, who prior to System-Hi was a manager for quote, unquote special activities at Northrop Grumman, a PSO or Program Security Officer for SAFEQ, again Air Force Acquisition, and of course served in the Air Force at the [7027.3s → 7045.3s] AFTC, all major elements within UFO legacy programs. DARPA SID is a very little known element that safeguards the U.S. most innovative and secretive science and technology programs and an office that engages in UFO legacy program [7045.3s → 7059.9s] exposure management and protection. To the uniformed and civilian airmen of the Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, our contractors and the Defense Industrial Base, thank you for being here and thank you for [7059.9s → 7100.5s] all that you do to support our great nation during this time of consequence. Now on to a mouthful here, AFL-CMC-IP or the Air Force Lifecycle Management Center’s Information Protection Directorate, AFL-CMC is currently directed by Lieutenant General Donna D. Shipton, a senior individual within Air Force UFO legacy activities that also formerly served a senior position within SAFEQ, where Shipton was, quote, responsible for research and development, test, production, product support, and modernization of Air Force programs worth more than $60 [7100.5s → 7117.5s] billion annually, end quote. AFL-CMC is one of six major operational centers under Air Force Major Command, Air Force Materiel Command, AFMC, alongside AFTC we spoke about earlier, as well as AFRL, Air Force Research [7117.6s → 7131.9s] Lab. My Hidden Wing project painstakingly details the history and evolution of AFMC and why this major command is one of the most critical to all of Air Force UFO activities, so I do [7131.9s → 7141.5s] strongly recommend viewing that if you haven’t already for some background. Centered out of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the AFL-CMC mission is to deliver affordable [7141.5s → 7160.2s] and sustainable war-winning capabilities to U.S. and international partners. On time, on cost, anywhere, anytime from cradle to grave, AFL-CMC is the single center responsible for total life-cycle management of all aircraft, engines, munitions, and electronic [7160.2s → 7184.2s] systems. AFL-CMC’s portfolio includes Information Technology Systems and Networks, Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, C4ISR, Armaments, Strategic Systems, Aerial Platforms, plus Installation and Infrastructure Management, Advanced Training Capabilities, as well as Combat Readiness Programs that focus on equipping [7184.2s → 7195.2s] the warfighter with the tools needed for protection in all environments. AFL-CMC IP, or again, Information Protection Directorate, is the premier program protection [7195.2s → 7209.4s] element for Air Force acquisition and sustainment. You can recall my Hidden Wing Project, where SAFA-Q, under the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is a major administrative element [7209.4s → 7231.3s] within the Air Force’s work on UFO RDT&E. The AFL-CMC IP, quote, enhances the ability to acquire and support war-winning capabilities by providing a professional security workforce and risk-based processes, to protect technology and information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise throughout a program’s life [7231.3s → 7259.7s] cycle, end quote. This protection of information and technology extends across the entire Air Force acquisition umbrella, involving work within AFMC’s other major operating areas, including AFTC and AFRL, Air Force Test and Evaluation, or AFTE, specifically AFTEZ Special Programs Division, and across all Air Force Major Range and Test Facility Bases, MRTFB. [7259.7s → 7272.7s] AFL-CMC IP also interfaces with the Air Force Component Level SAPCO, SAF-AAZ. We know from Part 1, SAF-AAZ has been bypassed for activities that I am highly confident [7272.7s → 7284.0s] are legacy operations, quote, unquote, outside activities under Edward C. Aldrich. But specific SAF-AAZ heads have been senior legacy officials before, including William [7284.0s → 7297.5s] E. McClure. From studying the CV of the current Director of IP, Mr. Terrence L. Reynolds, we can learn a little more about how extensive IP’s program protection strategies reach across the entire [7297.5s → 7311.6s] Department of the Air Force. Mr. Reynolds guides the IP on, quote, information security, personnel security, industrial security, operation security, international program security, operation security, scientific and [7311.6s → 7333.2s] technical information program and program protection planning, end quote. I don’t want to spend too much time on IP here, but I did find such a directorate critical to mention as an addendum to my Air Force Hidden Wing project, where AFL-CMC IP is critical to information program protection with administrative levels of the Air Force, specifically Air Force [7333.2s → 7365.3s] Acquisition. There’s program protection office to cover here. Just as we shifted our sights ever so briefly to the Department of Energy towards the end of our special access program section and commented on how the DOE, beholden to its own statutory authority, separate from standard executive order-based classification systems, gets real spooky real fast and operates as a perfect ecosystem for WSAPs with even tighter security protocols governed by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. [7365.3s → 7370.9s] The Department of Energy actually has its own SAPOC. Its SAPs are that sensitive. [7370.9s → 7394.5s] Not a component-level SAPCO, but its very own SAPOC. Similar to how AFL-CMC IP, AFOS-IPJ, and DARPA-SID are specialized units that aid in the safeguarding of SAP ecosystems, the DOE has their own very broad version of this as well. The DOE OICI, or Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. [7394.7s → 7415.3s] And that’s right, the DOE has its own intelligence agency. DOE OICI, sometimes referred to as DOE-IN, according to its mission statement, quote, informs national security decision-makers and mitigates threats to the DOE enterprise and the nation’s energy security by providing unique scientific and technical intelligence [7415.3s → 7430.9s] and expertise, end quote. Though quite small in size and maintaining a classified budget, out of fiscal year 2026’s $81.9 billion National Intelligence Program’s budget, to say OICI is instrumental in DOE [7430.9s → 7458.7s] compartmented projects would be an egregious understatement. Not only is OICI the DOE’s primary interface with ODNI and other intelligence agencies, OICI specializes on insights into foreign nuclear capabilities and activities, counterintelligence including espionage and insider threats, nuclear material security, protects critical infrastructure and support interactions with DOE’s national laboratories, and much, much [7458.7s → 7466.4s] more. After all, ODNI states OICI’s mission is to quote, protect, enable, and represent the [7466.4s → 7488.0s] vast scientific brain trust resident in DOE’s laboratories and plants, end quote. Perhaps it should be no surprise, but OICI’s roots can be traced back to the Manhattan Project’s ALSOS missions, which we discussed in great detail in Part 1, basically the blueprint for a parallel intelligence apparatus for legacy activities completely removed from [7488.0s → 7497.8s] standard chains of command. I am particularly interested in OICI’s Nuclear Materials Information Program, NMIP, established [7497.8s → 7513.7s] by NSPD-48-HSPD-17. As we know from Part 1 and my other previous works, as well as David Grush, language from the 1954 Atomic Energy Agreement has been liberally distorted to treat UFO activities [7513.7s → 7523.2s] as nuclear secrets. Controls like Special Nuclear Materials, Transclassified Foreign Nuclear Information, TFNI, Non-Contract [7523.2s → 7539.1s] Foreign Intelligence Information are some of the tools of the trade here. I wager, beyond a shadow of a doubt, some of OICI’s nuclear programs also see engagement with the UFO portfolio, and of course, we will discuss this in much greater detail in [7539.1s → 7547.8s] my inevitable DOE project. But here I am also particularly interested in OICI’s Security Offices and Intelligence [7547.8s → 7555.1s] Operations Center. These systems work closely with the larger ICN White House, whilst conducting counterintelligence [7555.1s → 7568.7s] and insider threat support to DOE SAPs and SCIF Accreditation. Indeed, OICI maintains 14 Field Intelligence Elements, FIEs, at DOE labs, facilities, and [7568.7s → 7580.5s] sites, and 15 Counterintelligence Field Offices at DOE facilities worldwide. Some of these FIE sites exist at Los Alamos National Lab, Sandia National Lab, Lawrence [7580.5s → 7600.9s] Livermore, and Oak Ridge. As we discussed in Part 1, specifically surrounding physical security, translated from the Manhattan Project onto the Manhattan Project 2.0, we discussed a series of alleged Classified Presidential Executive Orders in 1948 under Truman, that vested custody of recovered NHI vehicles within [7600.9s → 7619.2s] AEC National Laboratories, like those listed above. OICI really is still an emergent piece of the puzzle to me, one that like DOE, is interwoven into the very fabric of UFO legacy activities, but also an element exceedingly difficult [7619.2s → 7625.6s] to crack. Please expect much more on OICI in a future Department of Energy project. [7632.8s → 7644.1s] You can say categorically you’ve seen no convincing, confirmable evidence of intact spacecraft kept by the U.S. government. No. I’ve seen nothing that leads me to that conclusion. [7644.1s → 7649.9s] Is it possible there is some secret program that you’re just not aware of? I don’t think so. [7649.9s → 7658.8s] I have access to anything and everything I need. The main players in the legacy program have long been the Central Intelligence Agency, [7658.8s → 7677.2s] the United States Air Force, the Department of Energy, and major defense contractors. The subject of UFO has been rife with lies, disinformation, narrative control, and bizarre limited hangouts since 1947, and I do not think that is a stretch or controversial statement [7677.2s → 7696.6s] to say. When one says UFO disinformation, you may immediately think of Rick Doty and Paul Benowitz, Project Blue Book, Arrow, and the disgraced Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick, E4s telling Matt Gaetz they think there is a hybrid NHI breeding program or a litany of other intriguing and [7696.6s → 7720.9s] disturbing examples. But disinformation and narrative control is a paramount outer layer of the onion that has been harnessed for decades by elements of the legacy infrastructure, all to introduce stigma around the topic, warp narratives to expose the public to a narrow field of information, and keep the U.S. populace and lawmakers in a constant state of disbelief and confusion [7720.9s → 7736.0s] within the topic. Like I said, this concept extends back decades. Knowledge is power, and that couldn’t be more true in the 21st century, where multiple campaigns have been wagered from within the onion to shape and limit global perception [7736.0s → 7749.3s] on UFOs. And these include, but are not limited to, Arrow and ATIP. The Air Force was tasked in 1948 by the U.S. government to conduct the first ever investigation [7749.3s → 7759.7s] into UFOs, an effort called Project Sign. Sign quickly evolved into Project Grudge in 1949, which ran until 1951, where the infamous [7759.7s → 7771.8s] Project Blue Book took over and ran from 1952 to 1969. A massive schism occurred in these quote-unquote official investigations into UFOs in 1953, [7771.8s → 7785.2s] the Robertson Panel. Prior to 1953, there did seem to be some sort of transparency on this topic, and this can be perfectly observed within the words of Air Force Captain Edward J. Ruppelt, who served [7785.2s → 7798.3s] as the director of Project Grudge and Blue Book. Ruppelt would state in his 1956 book, The Report on Unidentified Flying Objects, that he observed a memo generated in 1948 from Project Sign. [7798.3s → 7808.5s] This memo stated UFOs were of quote-unquote interplanetary origin. This memo, according to Ruppelt, was ordered for destruction by General Hoyt Vandenberg, [7808.5s → 7818.3s] one of the original accused members of Match 12. Ruppelt is especially poignant now that Representative Burleson has called out by name and file designation [7818.3s → 7834.3s] AF-ATIC-FILM-0352, a briefing on film by Ruppelt titled Flying Saucer Talk. This 1952 film is held at MIT Lincoln Labs of all places, an FFRDC that is the successor [7834.3s → 7846.4s] to Vannevar Bush’s MIT Radiation Lab. Why would MIT Lincoln Labs, that was established to spearhead one of the US’s first national air defense systems, be holding such a film? [7846.4s → 7856.0s] And why was this film never volunteered for mandatory NARA collection? Probably because this film and others at Lincoln Lab depict sensitive and classified briefings [7856.0s → 7867.7s] and materials regarding non-human technical vehicles. Alas, 1953 observed the Robertson Panel again, a CIA review of the Air Force’s investigations [7867.7s → 7881.9s] into UFOs, at that time, Blue Book. Obviously, as I have covered previously, Robertson Panel was given prior mandates that the conclusions of the panel at the CIA’s behest were to reduce public concern on the topic and state [7881.9s → 7894.0s] that UFOs could be explained as prosaic aerial phenomena. This same playbook was harnessed with Edward Condon’s 1969 Condon Committee, which marked the end of Project Blue Book. [7894.0s → 7907.1s] J. Allen Hynek himself directly stated the Condon Committee outright ignored key evidence. This playbook was again harnessed in 2022 with the establishment of the All Domain Anomaly [7907.1s → 7923.2s] Resolution Office, or ARO. What was once supposed to be a joint UFO study effort called the UAP-JPO or Joint Program Office was distorted and twisted, likely by the USD-INS at the time, Ronald Moultrie, [7923.2s → 7949.8s] into the mangled ARO of today. Indeed, it was none other than Mr. Ronald Moultrie, former USD-INS, and Sean Kirkpatrick’s good buddy, that played a major role in establishing ARO and provided oversight and direction to ARO including Surveillance Collection and Reporting, System Capabilities and Design, Intelligence Operations and Analysis, Mitigation and Defeat, Governance, and finally Science [7949.8s → 7961.3s] and Technology. Moultrie is a seasoned Deep State lifer and legacy senior. I must once again ask this man why his position on the MITRE Corporation was removed from [7961.3s → 7995.8s] his public CV and bio. To this day, ARO has operated as an extension of the Onion to exponentially increase the stigma around UFOs by constant dismissal of the topic, language crafting from Susan Goff about the non-existence presence of extraterrestrials on this planet, and most importantly, operating as a honeypot for whistleblowers. I’ve tried to help. I certainly met with ARO twice as a staff member about a year ago. I actually offered to depose hostile witnesses in front of ARO leadership. [7995.8s → 8002.8s] They have yet to take me up on that. When the CIA squirmed out of answering lawful interrogatives, they directed Rep Burleson [8002.8s → 8015.5s] and Grush to ARO. But I did offer my services. I gave them leads, etc. And actually, Congress has been sending interrogatives to Cabinet agencies, something I touched on [8015.5s → 8031.0s] on Megyn Kelly back in January. We actually got, we sent interrogatives to the CIA, and the response Comer’s committee got was from the CIA was like, we are not answering any of these questions, we’ll refer [8031.0s → 8045.0s] you to ARO. And I find that very curious. I don’t know if John Ratcliffe and Michael Ellis knew that that’s what CIA General Counsel said back, but CIA is unwilling to answer detailed questions that were obviously informed [8045.0s → 8074.0s] by my experience. Indeed, ARO has outright lied through its teeth on numerous occasions. Several examples can be seen in ARO’s Historical Report Volume 1, where thanks to obtaining Michael Herrera’s official ARO memorandum for record, we can observe ARO blatantly lied about Herrera’s testimony, falsely stating Herrera discussed an extraterrestrial spacecraft and U.S. Special Forces, disgraced former Deputy Director of ARO Tim Phillips, and disgraced [8074.0s → 8087.8s] coward, former Director of ARO Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick have, for years, engaged in wildly inappropriate behavior, often resorting to emotional outbursts on LinkedIn for Phillips, or sending unprofessional [8087.8s → 8102.6s] statements to Stephen Greenstreet from Kirkpatrick. Both men have leveraged ad hominem attacks and false attacks to try and discredit David Grush, Kirkpatrick even establishing a pitiful story to paint Grush as a villain by stating [8102.6s → 8121.8s] he ghosted ARO for meetings. Gosh, I wonder why. And this goes without even mentioning the egregious falsities outlined in the Pentagon Disinformation That Fueled America’s UFO Mythology article by the Wall Street Journal, in which Kirkpatrick outright lied that the whole impetus for claims around UFO legacy [8121.8s → 8134.0s] programs was an illegal Air Force hazing program called the Yankee Blue. Hey, Kirkpatrick, you told podcasters off-air each branch of the armed forces had their own Yankee Blue equivalent. [8134.0s → 8143.6s] Why did you say this and why was it never mentioned in the article or publicly? And somehow Stephen Greenstreet got a copy of the Yankee Blue document, probably from [8143.6s → 8153.7s] Kirkpatrick, which features inaccurate security controls. So if this program was an illegal hazing ritual that tricked tens of thousands of Air Force [8153.7s → 8167.2s] officers for decades, there should be no problems in releasing the Yankee Blue document, right? If this is ever released, come back to this video and see whose signature is at the bottom of this report. [8167.2s → 8179.4s] On his Judicial Watch episode, David Grush perfectly laid it out regarding Yankee Blue. Well, yeah, and I certainly was worried about rumor, innuendo, you know, hazing programs [8179.4s → 8184.1s] that tricked people. There’s, you know, a narrative being spun in the media, Wall Street Journal, et cetera, [8184.1s → 8202.0s] about that kind of thing. I was well aware of hazing activities. I was guilty of said hazing activities earlier in my career when I was a lieutenant and thought it was funny to make, you know, Reese the Freak got the two-star general, and certainly I was already aware of that and I was calibrated to, you know, lore in the community, rument, [8202.0s → 8234.9s] as we say in the intel community, and, you know, hazing activities. So the evidentiary threshold was high and the people I brought to ICIG, you know, were hands on, they touched it, they were in the facilities, and, you know, they were well cleared people and they weren’t misconstruing a recovered adversarial aircraft for something else and some of that gaslighting that’s been going on, which I find honestly amusing to see certain, you know, former career bureaucrats, you know, use the narrative that it was some [8234.9s → 8240.1s] Yankee Blue hazing program, and those were certainly not the code words I, you know, [8240.1s → 8261.1s] I provided to the ICIG and the intelligence communities. We know the right code words and we know which reported special access programs and controlled access programs were essentially covering it up in performing financial fraud to hide some of the paper trail, misappropriating funds, and then taking haircuts across other [8261.1s → 8286.7s] black programs to funnel the money to those kind of activities to keep it off books. It is the expressed purpose of myself that Deputy Director of Aero following Kirkpatrick Tim Phillips was a quote-unquote useful idiot, in that during his tenure at Aero, Sean Kirkpatrick was partially briefed into the legacy portfolio to limit program exposure and defame David [8286.7s → 8301.9s] Grush. Hey, Sean, are your hands still tied? Perhaps Sean was rewarded for these un-American and illegal actions with his senior position at Oak Ridge as Chief Technology Officer for Defense and Intelligence Programs after [8301.9s → 8311.8s] he fled Aero that was mysteriously deleted from the internet. Perhaps he has continued to be rewarded now that his company, Non-Linear Solutions LLC, [8311.8s → 8321.2s] is subcontracting under MITRE for U.S. Space Com. And Sean can’t seem to help himself but to stay engaged, to this day emotionally lashing [8321.2s → 8331.5s] out using Green Street as a vessel whenever he gets his feelings hurt. We talk often about Moultrie and disgraced Kirkpatrick, but there is another culpable [8331.5s → 8343.6s] name here, the man who actually got Kirkpatrick employed at Aero, Mr. David M. Taylor. Taylor currently serves as the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, [8343.6s → 8355.8s] USDINS of course, and has been in similar positions of government service for 44 years. Of all the people to choose for Aero that was supposed to be the UAPJPO and Taylor chose [8355.9s → 8363.5s] Kirkpatrick. I wonder if there are any legacy ties here. My name is Lou Elizondo. [8363.5s → 8377.4s] In 2009, my life changed forever. That’s when I was recruited into a highly sensitive government program that investigated Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon, UAP, also commonly known as UFOs. [8377.4s → 8387.2s] Now I must be extremely careful with the following section here. One because this is an extremely nuanced topic, and two because critics of Elizondo [8387.2s → 8411.2s] are often painted by the UFO community as enemies. Let me get something clear here. My mission to reveal and uncover UFO legacy programs which have since 1947 operated in a coordinated capacity to retrieve, store, and exploit non-human technical vehicles is stalwart. I stand with the whistleblower. I stand with Dylan Borland. [8411.2s → 8416.3s] I stand with Matthew Brown, and I stand with witnesses I speak who will never go public. [8416.3s → 8422.4s] I stand with Ed. I stand with several figures that have appeared on my channel over the years, and most importantly [8422.4s → 8435.6s] of all, I stand with David Grush. My entire philosophy, methodology, and approach to this topic is modeled after the bravery, courage, and leadership David Grush has displayed since going public. [8435.6s → 8454.4s] But, and I need to be frank here, I do not stand with Elizondo. Nor do I trust Elizondo. I believe Lou Elizondo has been a central figure for a legacy activity to speak about the onion outside of the onion, aka a narrative control campaign. [8454.4s → 8459.7s] And let me just say this, I am speculating here and theorizing for entertainment purposes. [8459.7s → 8470.3s] I don’t care to get sued, although counter-questioning would be rather intriguing. The Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, ATIT. [8470.3s → 8475.2s] The funding for this effort was sponsored by then Senate Majority Leader, Senator Harry Reid. [8477.2s → 8482.9s] And together, myself, Jay Stratton, and our team, for nearly a decade, investigated UAP [8482.9s → 8491.3s] incidents around the world. In 2025’s Age of Disclosure, film protagonist Elizondo lies incessantly about the structure [8491.3s → 8503.5s] of AUSAP, the Advanced Aerospace Weapons Systems Application Program, and ATIT. AUSAP, out of the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, ran from 2008 to 2012, and did indeed [8503.5s → 8529.4s] have a budget of $22 million. And as David Grush stated on Rogan, one of the expressed missions of this program was to operate as the recipient of the Kona Blue DHS PSAP Transfer, Prospective Special Access Program of UFO materials from Lockheed Martin. ATIP is not AUSAP. ATIP was nothing more than an informal working group that was unfunded. [8529.4s → 8542.6s] This is common knowledge, of course, but I will go a step further. ATIP was an informal working group that was a literal cover for several National Security Council activities that wished to speak about the onion outside of the onion, and who gave [8542.6s → 8553.7s] this top cover, James Clapper. Matt Ford actually asked this to Lew on Matt’s show. Watch now how Lew dodges this question, and I do recommend watching this full interview [8553.7s → 8571.8s] by Matt. It’s really good. So my understanding of it was that it was, ATIP in certain aspects of it, were to essentially, you had factions within the legacy program, factions that felt, you know, we need to let [8571.8s → 8581.3s] some of this out. And part of one of the elements of ATIP was to sort of peel away some of the layers of [8581.3s → 8597.2s] the onion. But this was done in coordination with the Obama administration. This was part of something that came out of the National Security Council, and in particular, James Clapper. [8597.2s → 8612.3s] So can you speak to that, and again, were you ever, or are you part of the legacy program? Well, I worked with Jim Clapper, actually I worked for Jim Clapper, as a lot of people know, when he was the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, after he was the director [8612.3s → 8625.1s] there at DIA, but before he was the Director of National Intelligence. And I can’t speak for Jim. He would have to answer that to you, but what I’ll tell you, at least when I spoke to him, [8625.1s → 8637.6s] he was very happy that we had a UAP program in the department. Now, that doesn’t mean anything if you ask him now, he may be, I think, otherwise, but [8637.6s → 8648.8s] that’s certainly up to former Director Clapper to opine about. As far as where this comes from, from Obama, I never sat with Obama specifically about [8648.8s → 8658.1s] this topic or any other topic. My entree point was through the National Security Council for the programs that I was [8658.1s → 8667.6s] running in the special access world. Unfortunately, I probably wouldn’t be able to elaborate too much on how that relationship [8667.6s → 8686.8s] works. There is an established channel of communication that was between my office and that office, but much beyond that, I wouldn’t be able to really provide any fidelity to, you know, especially not just with classified information, but special access programs. [8686.8s → 8691.9s] There’s a huge sensitivity there. And especially when you’re talking about SAPs in some cases, and by the way, I’m not saying [8691.9s → 8697.2s] this is one of them, if they’re unacknowledged, right? That’s even more sensitive. [8697.2s → 8714.3s] So boy, I don’t know how to answer that question. It’s a good question. So in Age of Disclosure, when you listen to Stratton and Elizondo speak on AATIP as if it were a real working program with appropriations and see individuals like Puthoff and Davis [8714.3s → 8731.4s] labeled as AATIP scientists, this is brazen nonsense. The primary operational years for AATIP were around 2009 to 2017, primarily when James Clapper was Director of National Intelligence and Mr. Elizondo operated as the Director [8731.4s → 8741.6s] of the National Program Special Management Staff, NPMS. NPMS Director operates under the USDINS, of course, also Clapper’s former position from [8741.6s → 8752.4s] 2007 to 2010. I’m sure there’s no crossover here. An NPMS Director runs coordination between National Security Council SAPs and the DoD [8752.4s → 8759.1s] slash IC. As I stated earlier, the Director of NPMS is usually the most cleared person in the [8760.1s → 8780.6s] DoD, besides the Secretary of Defense, even more cleared than the Director of DoD SAPCO. With this comes the baggage that even outside the AATIP-NSC cover activity, Lew, either prior to NPMS position or during NPMS position, operated directly under or within the legacy [8780.6s → 8790.3s] programs. I, once again, echo this sentiment from Korbel. Yeah, so David Gresh talked again and I was really glad he decided to because he’s not [8790.3s → 8799.4s] all over the media. I do think that he has a difference of opinion and that’s for him to talk about when it comes [8799.4s → 8809.3s] to this stuff. You know, he really thinks everybody should just open up and say what they know. For example, he thinks that if Lew Elizondo was part of the legacy UFO program, that he [8809.3s → 8824.2s] should just say it, go out on the limb and just say it. At AATIP, although Clapper or his superiors’ true motives for such an activity are unknown, well, AATIP sought to conduct a partial disclosure campaign and establish Hillary Clinton as [8824.2s → 8837.6s] the disclosure president. These disclosures would have seen a huge emphasis on UFOs existing as a national security threat, revelations of an amorphous non-human presence on this planet, and the general discussion [8837.6s → 8845.3s] that we are not alone on this planet. These disclosures, however, would not have featured crash retrieval, reverse engineering, [8845.3s → 8862.8s] exploitation, NHI taxonomy, and of course, the revelations of the legacy programs. Indeed, prior to David Gresh coming forward, Elizondo would essentially only discuss crash retrievals in reference to Roswell, which of course at this point is a cultural zeitgeist [8862.8s → 8870.0s] event and a well-known cover-up. No harm, I guess, in discussing one singular crash retrieval event 70 years ago at the [8870.0s → 8880.7s] time, especially if you never mention the custodianship of the wreckage. Indeed, after Dave Gresh went public in full kimono, Lew’s crew was forced to reposture [8880.7s → 8895.1s] and discuss crash retrieval events and the legacy programs. This is extremely evident in the 2024 UAP hearings where Elizondo seems rather caught off guard and nervous compared to his usual interviews in which he can talk circles around [8895.1s → 8908.0s] really answering questions. Okay, Mr. Elizondo, you state in your testimony that, quote, advanced technologies not by our government or any other government are monitoring sensitive military installations [8908.0s → 8918.1s] around the globe, end quote. If these technologies are not made by any government, who’s making them, private companies or are you implying they are crafted by a non-human intelligence? [8918.1s → 8939.6s] Well, ma’am, that’s precisely why we’re here. The problem is that, temporally speaking, over decades, not just the last 10 years, before, to put this in perspective, are these private companies you’re implying or is this non-human intelligence? It may be both. Okay. When it comes to blue force technologies, I would not be able to discuss. Okay. Are you read into secret UAP crash retrieval programs? [8939.6s → 8947.2s] We would have to have a conversation in a closed session, ma’am. I signed documentation three years ago that restricts my ability to discuss specifically [8947.2s → 8960.5s] crash retrievals. Let’s quickly back up here as Elizondo, Mellon, General Neil McCasland, John Podesta, who was Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager and others, used one specific vessel through which [8960.5s → 8970.7s] Lou executed ATIP’s mission. And this was through Tom DeLonge and to the Stars Academy. I recognize that there were people in government that wanted to engage the public on topics [8970.7s → 8975.0s] that unfortunately had a stigma, even though they were based in scientific fact. [8975.0s → 8981.7s] At the time, there was no mechanism for them to do this. Through a series of meetings, I was soon connected to a large group of U.S. government [8981.7s → 8995.6s] officials from the CIA, the Department of Defense, and Lockheed Martin Skunk Works. These guys were the ones involved in the secret of U.S. government programs that dealt with these subjects, and they have all taken tremendous risks to themselves and their reputations [8995.6s → 9002.1s] to do something that can benefit the world. They wanted to be a part of something special, to be a part of a company that could not only [9002.1s → 9022.7s] change the way we see ourselves, but also change the path humanity is on. I have spoken at length about the quandary that is to the Stars Academy, in which DeLonge, Elizondo, Mellon, Podesta, Hal Puthoff, Major General Neil McCasland, Major General Michael Carey, Lockheed Skunk Works Executive Vice President Rob Weiss, all banded together for [9022.7s → 9030.7s] a slow disclosure campaign. I have also discussed several times how Elizondo’s ATIP’s direction of such an idea was likely [9030.7s → 9037.8s] an evolution of Project Forum. As outlined in the Bass 10-month report, which was described as disclosure efforts [9037.8s → 9047.5s] through popular zeitgeist figures. And guys, this is not a knock at Tom, I personally love Tom, I believe Elizondo and others parasitically [9047.5s → 9063.0s] attach themselves to his curiosity on the topic. Indeed in my NRO project, I theorized Elizondo even disclosed elements of the immaculate constellation USAP to DeLonge, specifically surrounding episodic visits and foreknowledge [9063.0s → 9072.4s] of UFO events, as outlined in the IMCON report. You know you have people at the National Reconnaissance Office that have a perspective based on the [9072.4s → 9079.9s] satellite feeds they’re getting and these things are coming in and out of the atmosphere. Then you also have people from the agency that are worried about and collecting information [9079.9s → 9098.0s] of what’s going on with people in different countries and here. But then you also have, you know, engineers that have a perspective on how the technology is made and what that might mean, because there’s a lot of consciousness stuff that falls in this category. Can I stop you right there? So there’s satellites that track them coming in and out of the atmosphere? [9098.0s → 9107.4s] Absolutely, yeah, absolutely. What kind of satellites are these? How would I, I don’t know, usually forward looking infrared, but I don’t know what spectrum [9107.4s → 9115.5s] of the infrared they’re looking at. So there’s some sort of a camera or some sort of a detection device that they have in the [9115.5s → 9124.0s] atmosphere just to check for UFOs? I don’t know if it’s just for UFOs, they can pick up very, very specific heat signatures and they have algorithms. [9124.0s → 9151.2s] because what you have is a satellite is a device that can pick up what you program it to pick up. Now, you put a sensor on there, but you got to tell the sensor what to do. So if the sensor says, look, something traveling at this speed with this kind of heat, you got to record that, you got to focus on it. And that’s what we call an ICBM. But if something comes in and zigzag stops and turns left and it’s traveling 10 times faster than that, we need you to record that and [9151.2s → 9176.4s] focus in on that as well. But if something just is moving low, and it’s only going 300 miles an hour, and it has these big wings and a low whatever, they’re all just a plane, you know, so the what it captures is based on, you know, how it’s programmed in the first place. But so you can differentiate between meteorites and absolutely, yes, absolutely. So, so how often are these things coming into our atmosphere? Oh, I don’t know. But I’ve had quite a few [9176.4s → 9183.1s] discussions. One of the people I’ve been, I’ve been in contact, one of my advisors for it was [9183.1s → 9213.5s] from the National Reconnaissance Office high up, high, high up. And they call it episodic visits. That’s all I know. Episodic, meaning like they have time periods where they like, there was I saw a paper where they say masters, I figured out, the Department of Defense figured out a physicist there, an algorithm of how to compute when the things fly in, and collect smaller ships like motherships, small ships, what what at what longitude and latitude, and what essentially what [9213.5s → 9218.8s] orbit it would land at when it would collect these other machines. And so they tested that. [9218.8s → 9223.9s] And then all I know is it was successful. Ultimately, Hillary Clinton wasn’t elected. [9223.9s → 9254.9s] TTSA failed. McCaslin got a slap on the wrist, and Liu was forced to reposture. You would think after the failures of TTSA in the early 2020s, before which Liu actually, quote unquote, left his position as director of NPMS to shortly join TTSA in 2017, that this limited disclosure effort would be disbanded. But seemingly, it is alive and thriving, but evolved and morphed. Enter Age of Disclosure. And it was later in my career that I actually began running [9254.9s → 9281.0s] special access programs for the US government, and in some cases reported directly to the White House and the National Security Council. The nerve to include Clapper in Age of Disclosure is one thing. But the documentary serving basically as an amnesty plea and misdirect on the legacy program structure is downright insulting to me. And this isn’t a dig at Dan Farah, the film’s director, or the quality of the documentary, but a staunch criticism towards Elizondo and Stratton, who are [9281.0s → 9292.4s] bizarrely still protecting Clapper, the National Security Council, and pushing for limited disclosures. It is true. It does get a little lonely. And this subject brings out a lot of charlatans, [9292.4s → 9318.7s] a lot of people who want attention, a lot of people who want to generate certain narratives. I’m just here to do a job and to get this information out to the American public. And I would love to go back to my normal life. I live in Colorado and I’d rather just ATV and hike with my dogs and not have to deal with this on the public stage. I never wanted to be a public personality. I have no book deal like other people in this space. And I’ll write a book. I promise [9318.7s → 9349.8s] I’ll write a book after this is all over. It’ll be my leadership meditations. My greatest critique of the film, as I have been oh so outspoken of, is the structure of the legacy program Elizondo and others portray. The film states the legacy program, singular, is spearheaded by the CIA DS&T, or Directorate of Science and Technology, within which the DS&T deputy director is the big bad mob boss of the program. Below DS&T on equal playing fields sits the DOE, Air Force, and [9349.8s → 9381.9s] contractors. This is demonstrably false on so many levels, and you don’t have to get into the details as I do on here, but I will not for one second believe this outline was crafted to translate the legacy programs to a general audience. No, I do believe such an organizational chart was generated to both protect Lou and Stratton’s legacy friends and dictate who gets to catch the live hand grenade when and if disclosure comes. I won’t go into too much detail, but as we know here, the DOE is baked [9381.9s → 9393.2s] into every single layer of the legacy structure, not beholden to the agency. We know that defense industrial-based prime contractors, besides the ones that broke free to use IRAC to start their [9393.2s → 9426.4s] own programs in 2005, are the lowest level of the totem pole. Where is the Army? Where’s the Navy? Where is the Office of Naval Intelligence, Jay Stratton? Where are five of the other big six intelligence agencies? Where’s the DIA? Where are the FFRDCs, National Labs, and UARCs? As it goes without saying, agency is not the UFO portfolio lead, though of course it has played a major, major role throughout history. Indeed, the program activity lead, as David Grush recently stated, [9426.4s → 9432.1s] has often rotated for program purposes, where administrative components to legacy operations [9432.1s → 9460.0s] often exist in a flat hierarchy with a very fractured and loose top dog control group. That’s a part of the program protection strategy where they do rotate things and that’s the same thing with how they hide this program based on time epochs and who they trust, career civil servants, career senior executives in industry. They rotate it and it’s, there’s no, they randomize the schema too. It’s not like this one guy and this one DOD office always gets it. They spread [9460.0s → 9488.5s] it across and it’s just like rule by committee, flat hierarchy, and that’s how they bounce. And I’ve seen that in conventional programs that weren’t reported to Congress as well. It has nothing to do with the subject, the way they just will hide things and make a program that’s not technically a compartment and all that stuff. Why in this organizational chart is the National Security Council missing above the DS&T? Because this portfolio out of the U.S. government is [9488.5s → 9519.9s] indeed run by the NSC. Oh, that’s right, probably to protect Clapper and Lew’s old AATIP interests. Many, many questions still remain about Lew. What was his and Clapper’s motive for the AATIP cover program that served a partial disclosure campaign initiative? What is Lew’s true background within the legacy programs? Why is Lew still protecting individuals and misleading in the age of disclosure? Though it may not seem like it, both Arrow and Elizondo through AATIP are two [9519.9s → 9542.0s] elements of the legacy program Onion, systems to offer disinformation and egregious narrative control. And guys, although this section may have been harsh, I do need to state I am beholden to my mission of uncovering and exploring the legacy programs. Again, I stand with the whistleblower, but I do not trust Mr. Elizondo nor the AATIP initiative. [9549.7s → 9567.4s] As we begin to finally wrap up our investigation into the secrecy apparatus behind UFO legacy programs, we will end our discussion with the concept of unrivaled secrecy. Various methods, operations, activities, and systems that legacy programs utilize to stay hidden, [9567.4s → 9576.5s] that we could quantify as discrete or minor layers within our legacy Onion. Critical secrecy mechanisms to discuss that won’t feature their own section, [9576.5s → 9606.4s] but tie in intimately to major discussion points within our two-part investigation. Obviously, as we discussed today, legacy programs utilize content-only SAPs to waive any and all carve-out reporting requirements. These SAPs contain CPI only and feature no budget. Indeed, budget for such SAPs can be rolled into generic DoD, Armed Forces, etc. budgets, and we discussed as such with Air Force Acquisition, SAFAQ. [9627.4s → 9660.7s] Thanks to the sage counsel of David Grush, alongside the practice of making a White House special access program non-covert to waive reporting requirements with content-only SAP application, we know that legacy programs have harnessed several methods of misappropriation of funds to keep legacy program records off books. My guesses, educated guesses might I add here for programs that get such haircuts that funnel into legacy would include USFS or US [9660.7s → 9681.2s] Forestry Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, and other obscure offices one would not immediately expect. A specific example here would be forest management money passing through USFS but is ultimately diverted towards the crash retrieval portfolio. Alongside program haircuts, we also [9681.2s → 9702.5s] know that IRAD or independent research and development has been a method for legacy funding. Well so that how does I mean I don’t want to cut you off but how does a program like that get funded? I will give you generalities I can get very specific in a closed session but a misappropriation of funds and does that mean that does that mean that there is money [9702.5s → 9731.3s] in the budget that is said to go to a program but it doesn’t and it goes to something else? Yes I have specific knowledge of that yep. Do you think US corporations are over overcharging for certain tech they’re selling to the US government and that additional money is going to programs? Correct through something called IRAD. Of course one of the major investigations in my Northrop too project was exploring how Northrop and other contractors essentially began their own breakaway UFO retrieval and exploitation activities in 2005 that featured [9731.4s → 9760.4s] little to no reporting to their original government handler. Further covert funding mechanisms for legacy programs likely include self-fund cutout activities and we’ve actually seen this in part one with a yellow fruit USAP in which Lieutenant Colonel Duncan staged his retirement from the US Army to operate yellow fruit activities through a quote-unquote private consulting cutout called BSI. Additionally I have talked in that sense at length about LTV Aerospace [9760.4s → 9774.0s] and their involvement in legacy architecture. LTV would evolve into e-systems a CIA cutout. I’m sure there are several other covert funding schemes to hide legacy financial books such as [9774.0s → 9796.0s] private capital and drug trafficking but alas the above mechanisms I do have specific knowledge on. Bob I want to ask you about recent allegations you’ve made accusing intel agencies of hiding billions of dollars in secret government spending from Congress. I mean we know about Air America you know CIA’s done stuff like that even Iran Conscious so we’ve seen this happen before it’s [9796.0s → 9801.6s] not you know it’s not aliens it’s what our government does but tell us what you know about that. [9803.4s → 9831.6s] Yeah certainly earlier in my career I was a counter-threat finance analyst. I actually worked in a special cell looking at arms trafficking and terrorist funding so I have that background in counter finance and what I found was there were haircuts taken to classified black programs to fund this. There was also self-funding cutout companies if you’re familiar and you mentioned I ran Contra and they had cutout companies self-funding some of the arms purchases [9831.6s → 9865.4s] for the Contras but also criminal enterprises unfortunately is kind of the third way I saw laundering money and I actually bumped into a very serious criminal enterprise and all that information was actually reported to Department of Justice and it led to some federal investigations and things I can’t mention now but the DOJ is actually handling that now because I bumped into a government-run criminal enterprise that was siphoning money for this topic as well to pay for kind of the crash retrieval operations off books. And make no mistake [9865.4s → 9896.0s] the secrecy behind funding legacy programs is not discrete or minor within our onion analogy. I am only briefly touching on this now because of course in the future I would like to make a full project who knows maybe a two-parter on the funding schemes and methods behind the legacy apparatus. We talked so much about program protection and program exposure mitigation within the legacy programs but let’s continue with a few specific examples. As we talked about [9896.0s → 9926.6s] with DARPA CID, there is of course the topic of wetworks. I can think of no better possible alleged example than the hero who is the late Matthew Sullivan. As we know from Representative Burleson, Matthew Sullivan was set to deliver protected disclosures on the topic of UFO legacy programs, whereas he mysteriously passed away from a quote-unquote accidental overdose just two weeks prior. Sullivan was a decorated Air Force veteran who earned a bronze star for valor [9926.6s → 9956.8s] in Operation Enduring Freedom, served within Air Force Intelligence, the National Security Agency, as well as the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, NASIC. Many have wondered if indeed Sullivan was part of the legacy program and like swirling rumors suggested, had first-hand experience with recovered UFO craft. To answer that question, who do you think David Grush is speaking about in this clip? We should be leveraging you know National Overhead Enterprise and other parts of [9956.8s → 9988.0s] our National Intelligence Enterprise on this topic, but we use it you know in secret, on the down low, the night job of a certain analyst at NASIC who also works for the the legacy program that’s also analyzing this stuff without telling his boss. That’s essentially how the program has you know dealt with this over the time and I just think that that’s a real travesty. And again, let’s listen in to what Dave Grush said recently on Fox News. And certainly recently my good Air Force [9988.0s → 10017.7s] friend Matthew callsign Quake Sullivan did pass away mysteriously before he was willing to come to the hill to testify about his knowledge of these activities. And Quake was a bronze star recipient on an Air Force officer, intel officer friend of mine that I served with and you know he was one of my you know sources in my investigation and you know he you know he passed away mysteriously and that is an ongoing FBI matter so I won’t characterize it and I’m open to you know [10017.7s → 10041.0s] different conclusions of what happened but just you know to your point there’s been a lot of anomalous things that have happened to people. As we know from Grush, Borland, Brown and others, administrative terrorism is another vehicle harnessed by program protection elements to make a whistleblower or prospective whistleblower’s life unbearable. Since we just referenced Sid [10041.0s → 10053.0s] and I speak often on Northrop, perhaps this Matt Brown quote is quite poignant here. Key players in the legacy security architecture lately or currently at Northrop Grumman [10054.1s → 10059.8s] and his name is name redacted. Show us a photo of that. I have it right here. I know you do. [10061.2s → 10085.6s] Before we look at this photo, not only that, you could prove it beyond a shadow of a doubt in the court of law and if anything were to happen to you or anybody then it’ll all be put out anyway. Yes and it’s not just me. Yes. You know in my last interview I said that it’s been a long hard road to find allies. I have them now and I do and [10088.5s → 10094.7s] we are done taking punches and not punching back. Name redacted is responsible. Okay so [10097.0s → 10124.4s] has been responsible for a lot of what you’re talking about current day. Current day as it relates to the UAP problem. He is a nexus point for legacy security. He’s part of the dirty tricks department. People bring names that need to be handled to this individual. This person looks at those names, matches it to the capabilities to go achieve XYZ objectives and then the result is an ecosystem flooded with disinformation and psychological operations and targeted attacks [10124.4s → 10132.7s] against whistleblowers and their allies. How do you know? So I cannot reveal everything about this [10132.7s → 10174.4s] because I am communicating it for others. And what is his current role in government if any? No role in government but in the military industrial complex. He is most recently at Northrop Grumman. And the little title he has here that people might find interesting is uh deputy SAPCO for DARPA. Within the David Grush judicial watch interview that we might have quoted a dozen times now and that keeps on giving, Grush spoke on some administrative terrorism that was leveraged against him to destroy his career before, during, and after his [10174.4s → 10206.9s] public exposure. And there was all these manufactured allegations against me whether from a security perspective which is kind of funny because of what I did for a living uh from personal conduct. All that was unfounded and I maintained my you know TSSCI clearance uh but they you know went after several people I know administratively. Even right after I left NGA they went after my chief of staff tried to revoke his clearance. They revoked my boss’s clearance at the NRO and they just say they started like well who was Dave’s enabler and who [10206.9s → 10224.2s] you know who might have told Dave something. Right. And so they started pot-shotting people and that’s the insidious thing under the security mafia will do. It’s you know your clearance is your livelihood and your reputation from a conduct perspective. And I just know so many people in my [10224.2s → 10249.6s] orbit um that they went after either you know legally, administratively, ruined people’s lives. I have friends of mine that have been out of work for three and a half years now. A very senior person in the in the SAP community uh was taken out and is still going through years of legal appeals and even for my reprisal matter you know trying to prove my case on that. I’ve been seeking [10249.7s → 10275.4s] documents since 2022 on that matter. I’ve been denied B7A FOIA exemption law enforcement records. Right. Well what’s going on? What what investigation is going on that affords that exemption? And I’m likely going to have to sue those law law enforcement agencies like I’m doing an EDVA uh with with the Air Force complaint against myself because that’s the only way I’m gonna I’m gonna get production in a timely fashion. And the process I feel is the punishment for a lot [10275.4s → 10281.0s] of whistleblowers. So there’s this uh sophomoric analysis going around in the disclosure community. [10281.0s → 10290.6s] Oh well they’ve never came after whistleblowers making classified disclosures to Congress. Well that may be true literally on the books as a matter of legal record [10290.6s → 10295.2s] but there’s all these admin terrorism techniques they can do to you, your family. [10297.3s → 10310.5s] Unrivaled secrecy. We have spent at this point nearly seven hours exhaustively discussing systems, methods, and loopholes legacy programs have taken for decades to carry out the retrieval, [10310.5s → 10340.8s] exploitation, and derivation of non-human technical vehicles with total impenetrable security. And the thing is we are just scratching the surface here. Such systems we have talked about include translating the secrecy apparatus of the Manhattan Project onto what I dubbed the Manhattan Project 2.0. Establishing the National Security Council’s covert action 5412 committee special group as the early overall program coordinator. Taking custody of recovered vehicles [10340.8s → 10371.4s] to Atomic Energy Commission laboratories that would blossom to the current FFRDC GOCO infrastructure within legacy today. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act introducing a litany of further classification and security protocols protected by extreme statutory authority. Breaking the programs into siloed containers hidden within cover offices and programs to hide from then black budget oversight reforms during the Cold War. And permanently severing off the legacy program control group [10371.4s → 10390.4s] into a quasi-government and industry group of just over two dozen in 1994. We discussed legacy activities exploiting special access, controlled access, and non-covert action programs. Specifically the White House creating non-covert content only covert action special [10390.4s → 10407.0s] access programs to completely waive any reporting requirements and budgetary information. We analyzed the SAP world to identify where gatekeeping structures are set up at the highest echelons of the SAP enterprise. To restrict even credentialed individuals [10407.0s → 10419.6s] from accessing the programs if they do not possess a relevant need to know. We studied types and classifications of SAPs and ultimately discussed examples of such legacy SAPs [10419.6s → 10461.7s] crossing over with three relevant OSD departments that are critical to legacy operations. USDINS, USDRNE, and USDANS. Indeed we also discussed DOE SAPs and their multi-faceted authority from both EOE-13526 and the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. We even analyzed misappropriation of funds used to funnel money to these programs including haircuts across programs, IRAD, hidden budgets, self-fund, and possible illegal activity. We identified several program protection agencies deputized to enforce insider and outsider threat protection for the legacy [10461.7s → 10470.4s] infrastructure. These include DARPA-SID, AFOS-IPJ, AFL-CMCIP, and DOE-OICI. We even [10470.4s → 10483.5s] reviewed possible actions taken by these services such as wetworks and administrative terrorism. Lastly, we have discussed disinformation and narrative management. Highlighting a coordinated [10483.5s → 10514.0s] disinformation effort that has been in place since roughly 1953 with three major milestones. The Robertson Panel, Condon Committee, and AERO. We studied a parallel effort to AERO that while also operating as a narrative management campaign originated from within a different section of the onion, Lou Elizondo and the AATIP cover program. I’m sure I’ll get flack for such discussion of Lou, but it is critical to discuss this topic and the nuances behind why there has always been [10514.0s → 10527.2s] so much controversy behind Elizondo. Elizondo is not the champion of disclosure we humans deserve. Once again, if Lou Elizondo operated at the behest of legacy programs before, during, or after the [10527.2s → 10533.4s] fake AATIP program, he should just come out and say it. He still does have time to do the right thing. [10534.8s → 10539.5s] And believe it or not guys, there is still so much I haven’t gotten to that I feel like I’m [10539.5s → 10560.0s] missing out by not including in our investigation, but this is already such a robust and long project. Two specific examples parallel to the SAP enterprise come to mind. Managed Need-to-Know, MNTK code words and constructs, and Alternative Compensatory Control Measures, ACCMs. And yeah, we’ll probably get to these in the future. [10561.3s → 10566.4s] So as we’ve seen here, the outermost protective layer of my legacy program pyramid, [10566.4s → 10577.2s] security, secrecy, and program protection is no small fish to tackle. I sincerely hope over the course of this monolithic investigation, you have learned a [10577.2s → 10594.9s] thing or two as to how the legacy programs have maintained their covert, impenetrable nature. These programs are so secretive and siloed, we as Americans are facing a severe national issue, where such legacy programs are a pitiful shell of themselves, [10594.9s → 10607.0s] rife with adversarial fiefdoms, subject to insane brain drain, and a system of enormous waste. What’s going on, guys? It’s Gerb, and I say this at the end of every single video, [10607.0s → 10617.6s] but I mean it especially now. If you’re still here with me, thank you from the bottom of my heart. It means the most that you would watch this two-part, at this point, about seven-hour [10617.6s → 10624.3s] investigation with me, learn with me, research with me, discover with me. So thank you so much. [10624.3s → 10649.0s] I appreciate it more than you can ever possibly understand. This two-part investigation has, without a doubt, been my favorite work to date, not only because this two-part has taken up so much of my life over the past couple of months, and that’s not even considering the editing on the videos. That has taken forever. But the writing of the script, the researching, getting my thoughts together, collecting the statements [10649.8s → 10681.1s] into a digestible format that I’ve collected over the years, I really loved this project. I really loved this project, and when I started off with this project, I thought it was going to be relatively simple like I do with every single video. But as you could see, I could make a part two – this is a part two, I’m sorry, a part three, possibly even a part four. You know, even in the SAP discussions, I didn’t even get to manage need-to-know constructs and code words as well as ACCMs, accredited compensatory control measures. And [10681.8s → 10706.9s] there’s a lot more I would have loved to have talked about, more program protection strategies, more of the history that we talked about so much in part one. But, you know, if you’re new to my channel – well, if you haven’t watched part one, go watch it now because I’m about to say the same thing I said at the end of that – this is about the time, if you’re new, where I do my post-video rant. For me, it’s kind of a celebratory way to get on camera and just talk without a script, [10706.9s → 10734.6s] without worrying about how I’m going to construct the next statement, construct the next argument, or lead into the next section. So it really is nice for me just to hop on here and talk with you and share my thoughts at the end of the project without having to go ahead and edit the footage, etc. So let’s try and focus as much as we can here on part two today because I’ve already done a part one debrief and so on. Part two, as I stated so often, the most important [10734.6s → 10766.5s] part of this project – and I’m going to stress it again and maybe we’ll spend a good amount of time talking about it here – is the specifics that the legacy programs has used to kind of manipulate and massage special access, controlled access, and covert action programs. As I stated throughout this project, much of the argument about UFO legacy programs is presidents, temporary employees, the vast majority of the Congress and other appointed folks within the [10766.5s → 10794.0s] U.S. government, more often than not, are not read into these programs. And I maintain that is true. As I’ve argued throughout my previous videos, throughout the two-part investigation today, is that the very legal and statutory basis for the legacy programs was born out of the executive branch, specifically the White House, specifically the National Security Council, specifically some stuff set up by Truman, and then more concretely the 5412 Committee Special Group set up by [10794.0s → 10824.3s] Eisenhower. So, since the 1950s – that would be 1954-1955 for the NSC-5412 – the legacy program effort was concentrated out of the National Security Council up until about 1994. You know, there was fragmentation of the programs throughout the Reagan administration, the ending of top secret code word access through Executive Order 12356, National Security Decision Memorandum 159, and so forth. But the controlling entity of the programs for the overwhelming majority of the [10824.3s → 10856.1s] program’s lifespan has been the National Security Council. Now, as we talked about so much in 1994, there was a quasi-industry and government control group of just over two dozen. I think if you watch back the video, you can find the exact number, as I state it visually several times. Control was vested out of the National Security Council. The primary reason here was fear over Clinton’s disclosures, and John M. Deutch and William Perry, William Perry specifically, his SAPOC reforms [10858.0s → 10888.5s] attempted to then serve as the primary gatekeeping structure. So, before we talk about these specifics with content only and non-covert action programs, let’s talk about the hierarchy of SAPs again, because I do think this is very important. And, of course, we’ll talk about the types of SAPs, the protection levels, and just kind of re-go over what we spent so much time talking about here. The hierarchy and governance of special access programs, you have your component-level SAPCOs, SAP Central Offices. Each element of the Armed [10888.5s → 10908.4s] Forces, so six total, has their own component-level SAPCO. And so does DARPA, so does the Missile Defense Agency, and so do the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And these component-level SAPCOs have kind of purview of all SAPs under their relevant departments. And then you have USD, now USW, [10908.4s → 10940.5s] I’m never going to call it the Department of War, it will always be the DoD for me. They have their own SAPCO, and then you have the DoD-level SAPCO, the Department of Defense Wide-level SAPCO. The DoD SAPCO is kind of the interface and access approval authority, basically, for members of Congress. The DoD SAPCO also kind of governs SAP policy for all DoD-wide SAPs. Above that, you kind of have the Senior Review Group, which belongs to the SAPOC, the Oversight Committee of SAPs. The Senior Review Group is a group of senior executive-level [10940.5s → 10971.9s] officials, senior executive service individuals. I think that when Dave Grush in 2023 said senior executive officials instead of senior executive service, this is because SES members, it’s kind of more of a broad paintbrush. We talk about SES individuals like William E. McClure, Randall G. Walden, Terry Phillips, Liam Russ, et cetera. But there’s also DICES, Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service. This would be somebody like Jay Stratton while he was on ONI. So senior executive officials, just kind of a broad term for that, both in and [10971.9s → 11000.4s] out of government. The Senior Review Group is supposed to prevent kind of duplication of SAPs across the DoD. And we know with legacy programs, this hasn’t been done. I do not mean it’s hyperbole when I talk about the Army and another branch of the Armed Forces kind of having duplicated special access programs on the exotic front, kind of crossing over, doing the same thing, I mean to say, with no crossover of personnel, program security officers, [11000.4s → 11027.6s] SAP security officers, contractors, security officers, et cetera, completely siloed projects. And then you have the SAPOC. And kind of the SAPOC is where a lot of decision-making is made of special access programs. We also had the, it was the Senior SAP Working Group we didn’t really talk about, but the SAPOC is kind of the upper echelon here. And from what I understand from the Wilson Davis notes that this is indeed true is in 1994, the SAPOC and the SAPOC’s SRG [11027.6s → 11056.1s] kind of got put in place as a gatekeeping structure for access into the legacy programs. This isn’t to be confused with something like the Majestic 12. The Majestic 12 are modern day, it’s not the MJ27, but a group of quasi-industry and government control group. These are not the gatekeeping structure for the programs, although they do involve, for example, if you have somebody like a DARPA SID individual who’s in this new group of over two dozen who needs somebody gone, [11057.1s → 11089.6s] that would be something that would be made at that sort of executive level position. And then your program protection agencies would deal with that person. But the SAPOC and their SRG are just more of gatekeepers. They keep the gates for specifically cleared personnel and to access the programs and manage need to know. We know with Admiral Thomas Wilson that even though he was deputy director of the DIA at the time he was denied access, I’m aware of another four-star [11089.6s → 11094.8s] general who had no idea the programs existed and was somehow able to use his credentials. [11094.8s → 11108.7s] And he had really good credentials after a period of time to brute force his way into the programs. But if you want to talk about your senior review group and within the Wilson Davis notes, the watch committee, the watch committee there would be directly connected, possibly even [11108.7s → 11136.4s] carryover members to that quasi-government and industry control group of just over two dozen. So that’s without even talking about the SAP security officers, PSOs, even further access approval authorities, but that’s sort of the hierarchy and governance of SAPs. And at the SAPCO, but more importantly SAPOC and SRG level, that’s where a lot of the gate keeping into the programs are. We talked about the types of SAPs, types of SAPs being acquisition, [11136.4s → 11163.8s] which comprise about 75 to 80 percent of all SAPs, intelligence and operations and support. And I gave what I thought was a pretty good example of if you have a triangular airframe that incorporates several elements of non-human technology, an acquisition SAP, you know, remember we have SAP umbrellas, but an acquisition SAP on this project would be how this airframe is built. If this airframe in the example I used, used a reverse engineered propulsion system and [11163.8s → 11192.4s] electro-optic cloaking, gosh, I talk about electro-optic cloaking stripped from craft quite a lot, don’t I? I hope some people have picked up on that. The intelligence SAP would protect how we know what we know, kind of the intelligence behind that craft recovery and how those materials or those systems were deemed to be exploitable. And the operations and support SAP would support how and where this craft or vehicle is used. Maybe another example we could kind of [11192.4s → 11219.5s] chew through live would be the Immaculate Constellation activity. Recently, Dave Grush has talked about, which I’m so happy he has, because now I can kind of state it as fact, because I was also aware of this, that the Immaculate Constellation activity was run out of the National Security Council, established in about 2017. I reckon this was likely an intelligence SAP, just as I reckon that the ATIP was kind of, even though an informal working group, [11219.7s → 11229.6s] disguised as an intelligence SAP, and I’ll kind of say why there. Recently at his, I think it was California show where Jeremy Corbell was on, [11230.2s → 11257.4s] Lou Elizondo was asked several questions about James Clapper and ATIP. I apologize. My mind’s running right now, guys. I have a million thoughts going through my head, so if I’m tripping up, I’m so sorry. Lou, I reckon he kind of dug himself into more hot waters by saying that ATIP was a sub-SAP to OSAP. Now, remember from the SAP umbrella, you have SAPs, you have the SAP umbrella, you have the sub-compartments, [11257.4s → 11288.1s] and you have even further compartmentation down to where similar CPI is grouped and so forth. This isn’t true. ATIP was an informal working group, so in my opinion, and I don’t think it’s my opinion, but I don’t think that’s true, that ATIP was a sub-SAP to the OSAP. ATIP directly operated out of the National Security Council and was a cover for several National Security Council activities. And as Lou continues to dodge the questions around Clapper, I wonder who gave [11288.7s → 11323.7s] a cover for these activities that ATIP was kind of acting through as a cover. So there’s a lot of pieces to pick up there. And then the Immaculate Constellation activity, I also believe, was an intelligent SAP. But let’s talk about the protection levels of SAPs, because my brain wants to go right now into content-only and non-covert action programs, but I’m just trying to progress logically as we get there. We know that SAPs protection levels come unacknowledged, which generally has an unclassified budget, and a lot of congressional [11323.7s → 11353.6s] members can get a read-in onto that. Unacknowledged, which carry multitudes higher security budget than standard-acknowledged SAPs, oftentimes the budgets for unacknowledged SAPs are kind of rolled into generic budgets, or they are completely classified and then waived, which are the most serious SAPs possible, where the SAPOC, which kind of reviews the need and continued need for waived statuses, because the SAPOC and its permanent members and its SRG are read into all [11353.6s → 11381.2s] waived-use SAPs throughout the entire U.S. government, at least within the DoD. Waived-use SAPs are extremely serious, and a lot of the times, only the Gang of Eight or Gang of Four are supposed to be read into these projects. But as we know with the legacy programs, oftentimes this is avoided. And there’s key congresspeople put here and there who are read into such activities. I would look at some senators or congressmen who were family or related to [11381.2s → 11414.0s] former presidents to kind of find out some people who might fit that bill. And then we know there’s further kind of security—not classifications, but security protections that can be put on. We know bigoted, as Dave Grush talked about, which is by name. We also, of course, know the much more standard no foreign, not releasable to foreign nationals. And I mentioned no foreign because I’m specifically aware of programs that utilize the no foreign carve-out. Back in their heyday, those programs have ended. I imagine their records and materials [11414.0s → 11448.8s] have been either destroyed or buried. But I am confident that that selection of specific programs not only existed but dealt with some pretty, pretty wide topics, from reverse engineering to crash retrievals to the study of biologics. So now let’s get finally to the real meat and potatoes and most interesting and most important part of this video, in my opinion, which is how can legacy programs use special access programs to completely waive any carve-out or reporting requirements and maintain total secrecy? Because this, after all, if we’re [11448.8s → 11475.5s] studying the legacy programs in the modern day, is the whole crux and most important piece of this video. Dave Grush’s judicial watch interview is sublime. It’s probably the best interview I’ve ever seen on the topic. It’s fantastic. And Dave Grush gave so many nuggets, not only to kind of shout out that the National Security Council’s 5412 Committee, with five initial members, was sort of the initial program coordinator for the legacy structure, but so much more. Dave talked [11475.5s → 11501.1s] about some of the tricks of the trade that have been used by the programs, and that’s to take covert action programs, which are outlined by 50 U.S. Code 3093. The 3093 specifically was established in the late—sorry, early 1990s. But covert action goes way deeper. Covert action was born kind of officially out of the 1947 National Security Act and cemented in the 1954 [11502.8s → 11507.2s] policy on covert action by Eisenhower, which established the 5412 Committee and its special [11507.2s → 11535.3s] group. The 5412 Committee was established to have oversight and purview of covert actions. So inherently, as I stated, that if you have UFO legacy programs operating out of the National Security Council’s 5412 Committee special group, which is true, these activities would inherently be classified as covert action. As the epochs evolved, these activities would be applicable under covert action programs as 50 U.S. Code 3093. So as Dave Grush said, these covert action [11535.3s → 11569.7s] programs were transitioned into non-covert action programs, White House SAPs, which effectively waived all reporting and carve-out requirements. The most important part of this video is how do you take a White House SAP, Title 10 U.S. Code 119, slash a covert action program, 50 U.S. Code 3093, and how do you get this program to operate in the gray area between Title 10 and Title 50 with no reporting and no carve-out requirements? There’s so many pieces that if you’ve watched any [11569.7s → 11601.8s] of my other videos, you can kind of pick up on this, but this is the application of content-only SAPs. Content-only SAPs are not a type of SAP nor a protection level, but a budgetary tier slash administrative designation. Content-only SAPs contain CPI, critical program information, only, and do not have a budget or do not have an applicable budget because it is rolled into generic DoD armed forces or other defense-related budgets. This is critical. This is why one of the [11601.8s → 11610.7s] huge, one of the biggest talking points is how are these programs funded? There’s so much talk about misappropriation of funds. The legacy programs have had to get ultra creative with [11610.7s → 11639.1s] funding schemes because the budget is outside of the program. The budget is outside of the program. We know, and these content-only SAPs can still operate within a SAP umbrella or towards the top of a SAP umbrella where other activities, compartments, et cetera, are below the content-only SAP. So the actual crash retrieval operations, reverse engineering, are not done within the content-only SAP or content-only SAP umbrella, but are attributable to that SAP. So that’s why we have [11639.1s → 11670.2s] haircuts across programs. That’s why we have self-fund from agency cutout activities formerly like eSystems. That’s why we have haircuts across the U.S. Forestry Service, Bureau of Land Management, et cetera. And that’s why, disturbingly, we have criminal enterprises that Dave Grush spoke of on Fox News. I have had the displeasure of learning a little bit more about those, and I really hope there is a continued federal investigation into some of the criminal enterprise activities around [11670.2s → 11700.0s] these projects. And then, of course, we know from Witness Ed, there’s large swaths of money that reached Air Force acquisition before any sort of review from Air Force Financial Management, SAF-FM, are thrown away into some black hole pot that Ed kind of figured was a joint Air Force and NRO project. So content-only SAPs, this is one of the biggest tools of the trade. And guys, this speaks to something which is far more concerning. Some of my contemporaries, I know [11700.0s → 11715.6s] Stephen Greer does this quite a bit, states the legacy program apparatus is a cabal of illegal activity and are inherently unconstitutional. So everybody who signed a nondisclosure agreement at the behest of these special access projects, he calls them, [11716.4s → 11746.0s] the NDAs inherently aren’t real, and you can violate them, and there’s no legal ramifications. That is not true. The biggest concern here is that the regulatory and statutory authority behind the legacy programs are absolutely legal. They exist in a gray area. They exist because of massaging of the special access program enterprise and control and governance structure, and they exist because of classified presidential executive orders back in the 40s and 50s. But the very SAPs themselves [11746.0s → 11753.4s] are not illegal. They are unconstitutional, but not illegal. Now, the activities that these [11753.4s → 11778.9s] programs and special access programs and activities do, those are highly illegal. The misappropriation of funds, the possible blue-on-blue action that has been suffered in the past, the myriad white and blue-collar crimes, those are illegal. But the very existence of the programs themselves, those are not illegal because there has been purposefully sought after gray areas in which to hide these programs. These programs have matured for 80-plus years at this [11778.9s → 11802.9s] point. You got to think there have been really crafty ways to hide these programs and the statutory authority behind these programs between Title X, Title 50 authorities, so that even empowered investigators like Dave Grush, when they find the programs and they take their information to the inspector general, it’s going to be really dang hard for individuals with appropriate access [11802.9s → 11818.9s] credentials to follow up on that information. These programs have gotten great at secrecy. And like I talked about, even though over the time epochs the programs have broken themselves apart from a once-centralized effort under NSC 5412 Special Group into a quasi-industry government [11818.9s → 11839.7s] and control group, the one thing that has gotten better is the secrecy apparatus of the programs. We face brain drain today. There’s no collaboration across compartments. Northrop Grumman’s doing their own thing. I mean, they’re still active in some NSC legacy activities, but in large, they’re doing their own thing. We’re at risk of severe brain drain. Has progress stagnated? I’m [11839.7s → 11877.7s] not sure. If progress has stagnated, it would be post-2009 when Dick Cheney left office. But what needs to happen alongside disclosure is a complete reorganization of oversight in the legacy program hierarchy. Imagine the brainpower behind this program set. If it was completely constitutional, above board, sure, still protected by waived USAPs, but still reported to appropriate Gang of Eight, congressional intelligence committees, etc., and had presidential overview. This could be the dawn of a new age for U.S. science, technology, space [11877.7s → 11893.9s] programs. But these programs need to be back under traditional oversight channels. And it’s not impossible, but it’s very challenging. The dominoes were kind of put in place when the program was relegated to NSC 5412. But really, since Reagan in the early 1980s, once yellow [11893.9s → 11921.4s] fruit was uncovered, these programs have been scattering, folding in on themselves. I like to kind of visualize this as there’s some string physicists who were creating objects, shapes to kind of represent the manifold of like 11th dimensional space. I’m not sure who the physicist was, and I’m not sure where to find these objects, but that’s how I imagine the legacy structure. Something infinitely more complex than a Tesseract or a Mobius cube consistently [11921.4s → 11931.3s] folding in on itself, expanding and contracting in various areas where you might be able to look at the surface area of one part of the program, but it’s constantly evolving. I’ve done my best [11931.3s → 11942.4s] to try and capture that evolution throughout this series, but there’s still so much more to cover. I’m going along on my rant, guys. We haven’t even gotten to program protection agencies, [11942.4s → 11947.6s] but I’ve talked about those so much, especially the SID or narrative slash disinformation control. [11947.6s → 11974.3s] I’m sure I’ll get some flack about Lou Elizondo, but I stand for transparency. A partial disclosure due to protection of equities or protection of co-workers or bosses or individuals that have worked within the legacy architecture for years, that’s not going to fly right now. That sort of push within the age of disclosure, it’s not going to continue to work. This is why we need individuals like David Grush, who are completely mission-oriented, open kimono, not holding back besides not saying [11974.3s → 11990.9s] stuff to where he’s going to get prosecuted or go to jail because he’s had to avoid that in the past. I don’t blame the guy for not incriminating himself and subjecting himself to espionage or treason by stating this is exactly where the crafts and biologics that I am aware of are buried. These partial disclosure campaigns that have been [11990.9s → 11997.7s] pushed since 2017, really back since the AATIP cover program was initiated, these won’t fly. [11999.7s → 12013.4s] Again, if Lou Elizondo was part of the legacy programs, he should just come out and say it. There’s still time to do the right thing. But as he said on a recent show, history will remember him as a hero or one of the biggest villains. [12013.4s → 12028.0s] I speak directly to you now, Mr. Elizondo. You have a chance to still be an American hero. If there is information you are holding on to, individuals you are protecting, lies you are telling, you will go down as a villain. As an American, I hope the right [12028.0s → 12062.0s] choices can be made. That’s all I’ll say because I can’t direct you on how to act. Now is the time to push forward for disclosure and really open transparency, especially your knowledge and involvement within the program dataset. That’s all I’ll say there. Again, I still think there are worthy questions to be asked, like did Mr. Elizondo expose Tom DeLonge to elements of the Immaculate Constellation project back in 2017 when he left as director of NPMS and joined TTSA, where he was liaison to the NRO, NGA agency, and several other [12062.0s → 12067.6s] agencies and services. I say this all allegedly. I’m a character. I’m playing a character, [12067.6s → 12091.1s] and this is all for entertainment purposes. But guys, thank you so much for joining me. From the bottom of my heart, it means the most. I’m recording this on the 17th of June, 2026. The video is to be posted the 19th. I got some awesome stuff coming up at the end of the month. I can’t wait for you guys to watch that. Already on my whiteboard over here, I have the next three projects lined out. The next one, I’m super excited to get to. It’s [12091.1s → 12116.0s] going to be a blast. So thank you all so much for joining me. Remember, I do have a Patreon. I don’t keep content there. So only support what you think the channel is worth. Who knows, maybe in the future, I can do a live every other week for Patreon and YouTube members, because I have YouTube membership as well. But right now, I’m just pushing so hard to make real change in this topic. Please forgive me if I can’t provide additional content right [12116.0s → 12119.8s] now for that. But everybody who supports that, I thank you so much from the bottom of my heart. [12119.8s → 12146.3s] You allow me to do this. You allow me to buy that Panasonic Toughbook over my shoulder over there. But please also remember to like and subscribe. Follow the Dreamland Motel, Xander Jones. He makes amazing music for this. Follow Mr. Justin, who is a member of the Night Shift podcast. He is currently helping me make my website. He’s a wonderful man. He made that flux liner over my left shoulder. Incredible guy. Follow him. Follow Xander Jones. Follow Rob [12146.3s → 12160.7s] Jones. Follow Kermit. Follow all my friends who are doing great stuff in this work. Support Dave Grush. Support Dylan Borland. Support Matt Brown. Guys, thank you so much. This end of RAND, if you can see, inspired me more than any other I’ve done. So thank you, guys. I will catch you [12160.7s → 12165.1s] all in the next project. Please look forward to that, because I’m really darn excited for it. Bye.

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UAP Gerb — “Special Access Required: the Secrecy of UFO Crash Retrieval Programs” [VOL.2]

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